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RÉSUMÉ DE SYNTHÈSE
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Cette thèse offre une lecture à perspectives différenciées de l’ultime collaboration
entre W.H. Auden et Christopher Isherwood. Elle montre que Journey to a War, ouvrage
négligé, est un texte charnière complexe annonçant un point tournant dans la carrière de
Auden et de Isherwood, lequelle remonte habituellement à leur établissement aux États-
Unis, et des points tournants dans l’histoire politique, sociale, littéraire et idéologique du
xxe siècle. En situant l’ouvrage dans le contexte historique des années 30, nous montrons
que Journey se dissocie du communisme en cherchant à établir une position antifascite
viable. Notre argument est que Journey est un moment clé dans la définition de la poétique
et de la rhétorique de Auden, dans son exploration du problème de la liberté, et dans
l’attention que Isherwood porte à la situation politique des homosexuels aux temps
modernes. Né de la rencontre avec une Chine déchirée par la guerre, l’ouvrage acquiert une
perspective critique sur le colonialisme et une perspective messianique qui se situe à
l’intérieur des grandes crises géopolitiques. Journey laisse entrevoir la réorientation
religieuse imminente des auteurs.
En s’attardant aux dimensions poétique, politique, sexuelle et religieuse de Journey,
cette thèse adopte des approches critiques appropriées à ses divers aspects. Elle éclaire le
texte grâce à du matériel biographique et d’archives, à l’histoire de la critique du livre et en
utilisant l’oeuvre de chaque auteur pour expliquer celle de l’autre. Nous abordons le rapport
entre l’homosexualité des auteurs et les traits formel, moral et politique de Journey et sur
l’imbrication du livre dans des contextes interdiscursif, idéologique et historique. L’analyse
textuelle des passages cruciaux met en lumière les interrelations des caractéristiques
formelles et thématiques. Nous insistons sur une série de passages charnières où sont
problématisées les questions de fin et de clôture et sur l’importance que jouent l’ironie, la
réflexivité et la mise en abyme dans Journey. Notre discussion souligne l’importance de la
1h
signification de la rencontre culturelle et inter-civilisatiormelle avec la Chine. Ainsi.
Joumey s’avère une anticipation des mouvements idéologiques et politiques subséquents
ainsi qu’un précurseur de la problématique littéraire postmodeme et postcoloniale de la fin
de l’époque moderne et coloniale.
Mots clefs: Auden, Isherwood, les années trentes, l’homosexualité, les sonnets, le
communisme, le messianisme, la guerre sino-japonaise
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ABSTRACT
VThis dissertation offers a multifaceted reading ofthe final collaboration ofW.H.
Auden and Christopher Isherwood. It shows their neglected Journey to a War to be a
complex pivotai work, announcing turning points in the careers of Auden and Isherwood
usualiy dated to their move to the United States; and registering turning points in twentieth
century politicai, social, iiterary, and ideological history. Situating Journey in the history of
the 193 Os, the argument shows that Journey turns away from Communism while attempting
to establish a viable antifascist position. The argument presents Journey as a key moment in
the definifion of Auden’s poetics and rhetoric, in his exploration ofthe problem offreedom,
and in Isherwood’s attentiveness to the political situation ofmodern homosexuals. Through
its encounter with war-tom China, the book attains a critical perspective on the colonial
world and a messianic perspective from within overwhelming geopolitical crises. Journey
announces Auden and Isherwood’s imminent religious reorientations.
Attentive to the book’s poetic, political, sexual, and rellgious dimensions, this
dissertation adopts critical approaches appropriate to Journey’s different aspects. It
illurninates the text using archivai and biographical material and the histoiy of critical
responses to the book, and uses the work of each author to gloss that of the other. The
discussion examines the relationship ofthe authors’ homosexuality to Journev’s formai.
moral, and politicai features and the book’s implication in interdiscursive, ideological, and
historical contexts. Close readings of crucial passages reveal complex intelTelations of
formai and thematic features. A recurrent focus is a series of pivotal passages
problematizing the issues of endings and closure. Another concern is Joumey’s insistence
on irony, reflexivity, and the figure ofthe mise en abyme. The discussion emphasizes the
significance ofthe cuimrai and inter-civilizational encounter with China. Joumey is
revealed as an anticipation of subsequent ideological and political developments and as a
late-modem, late-colonialist precursor ofpostmodern and postcolonial Iiterary concerns.
KEY WORDS: Auden, Isherwood, 1930s, homosexuality, sonnets, communism,
messianism, Sino-Japanese War
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INTRODUCTION
7Joumey to a War constitutes a major turning point in the work of W.H. Auden and
Christopher Isherwood, and registers as well a transitional moment in the history of
twentieth-century British literature. This is flot to say that Journey is a great universal
masterpiece, only that with it Auden and Jsherwood are involved in an important literary
transformation. Part of Joumey’ s historical significance derives from the standing of its
authors in the late 193 Os when Auden’s preeminence arnong young British writers seemed
almost seif-evident and Isherwood “had been tipped, for every kind of good reason, as the
most promising novelist ofhis generation” (Lehniann 233). So central to the British scene
were Auden and Isherwood that Cyril Connolly could cali their move to America, a move
more or less coincident with the publication ofJoumey, “the most important Iiterary event
since the outbreak ofthe Spanish War” (cited in Carpenter Auden 290-l), and disgruntled
British parliamentarians would cail for the condemnation ofthe supposed cowardly
treacherousness of their emigration. Whatever the vagaries of their subsequent reputations,
or the ultimate judgements oftheir work, crucial aspects ofJoumey’s importance are the
fame Auden and Isherwood had achieved by 193$ as the Iiterary leaders of their generation
and the book’s association with radical shifis in their careers.
Auden and Isherwood lefi England for the United States on January 19, 1939, their
emigration seeming to initiate such thorough transformations in their lives and careers that
critics have stili flot convincingly bridged the conceptual gaps between their early English
and their later American-based careers. This dissertation demonstrates the sort of
challenging multi-dimensional attentiveness to the work of both authors that such a critical
bridging will require. January 19, 1939 was also the aimiversary ofAuden and Isherwood’s
departure for China. They had been engaged on their Chinese travel book throughout
the previous year, and Journcy shows that for both of them 193$ had been a year of
reassessment. The seeming unexpectedness oftheir emigration is in fact a fulfihiment of
conclusions anived at afier a year ofself-examination and ideological reorientation during
the writing of Journey. More than most writers, Isherwood and especially Auden feit the
need throughout the 1 930s and their whoie careers to renew and transform themselves. The
most radical ofthese seif-transfonriations have usually been associated with their early
years in the United States, but in many respects those controversial American
transformations really begin with theirjourney to China and the writing ofJourney.
If the pivotai significance of Journey for both its authors is not widely recognized,
various reasons explain this critical neglect. from the time of its publication in March
1939, everything conspired to disrupt the reading of Journey. The factors that helped
Journey on its way to relative obscurity are many: the book’s experimental oddness; the
foreignness of China to Western readers and later to Auden and Isherwood scholars; the
immediate British sense ofbetrayai over Auden and Isherwood’s emigration, a “defcction”
which stili “ramifies to the furthest reaches” (Hendon 82) of Auden’ s and Isherwood’ s
oeuvres; the disintegration of the London theatrical milieu to which the Auden-Isherwood
collaboration had been centrai; the subsequent divergence ofthe paths ofthe two writers;
the more imposing quality, relative to Journey, ofthe long poems that Auden produced
during his first American decade and the seeming lightness oflsherwood’s bohemian
Hollywoodian-Hindu later persona; the rapidity with which the outbreak ofthe Second
World War rendered obsolete Journey’s political perspectives; and later the dramatically
changed conditions of the post-War West; the closing of China and the obliteration of
Nationalist China afier the Communist victoiy of 1949; the way Cold War polarities made
Joumey’s questioning of communism and Marxian phulosophy unreadable; the confusions
consequent upon the author’s political and religious transformations in the United States;
4and finally, the fact that the interrelations of Journey’s ideological concems and its complex
literariness anticipate both controversial ideological developments and the postrnodem
theoretical habits of reading that the book demands.
Just as we can understand the historical factors that made Journey difficuit to read,
so we can note developments that make Journey meaningful once more. Only afler the anni
mirabili of 1989-90 did a new world disorder emerge to which Joumey can again speak.
When the 1989 Democracy Movement and the massacre in Tiananmen Square broke the
speli cast by the Chinese Communist Party’s grand revolutionary narrative, they also
seemed to reveal an ideologically unstable, potentially pluralist, country, reminiscent ofthe
China Auden and Isherwood saw. China’s subsequent rise as an international power has led
as well to renewed interest in the early decades of modem China, including interest in the
traumatizing effect ofthe anti-Japanese war on the modem Chinese nation. In a comparable
way, by 1973 the Cultural Revolution had generated enough buzzing to prompt a second
edition of Joumey, though there is little evidence that the Maoist extrernism that marked
that time aflowed a full response to the book’s sceptical, self-doubting, conscientious
perspectives on China and the West. To a significant degree, today’s opening, expansive
China makes a considercd reading of Joumey not only a possible but a compelling affair.
A related development was the end of the Cold War. Journey is much concerned
with 1930s communism and Marxian philosophy, but it is a complex ambivalent concern.
Even as it acknowledges the powerful conternporary appeal of Marxism, Joumey announces
the end of Soviet Communism as an ideological and political option for Auden and
Isherwood. The Soviet Union, of course, would survive the catastrophes ofthe 1930s and
1 940s, and in some respects positively thrive as the Cold War dominated the post-War
international political scene for four and a haif decades. Yet, rather than seeming
imrnediately relevant, Journey’s oblique perspective on Mancism and Comrnunism proved
difficuit to read during the Cold War, with some critics egregiously misreading it. and
others responding to the book as an aberration. Journey’s instructive critical engagement
with Marxism, which foreshadows later deveiopments in “Western Marxism” and post
modem debts to Marxism, became fully readable perhaps oniy with the end of paranoia
about actually existing socialism in the Soviet sphere.
The current readability of Journey reflects as well the proliferation of theoretical
approaches to literary studies. Without limiting itselfto a particular framework, my own
reading depends on critical approaches involving intertextuality, interdiscursivity, reader
response theory, formalism, existentialisrn, historicisrn, Marxism, postcolonialism,
postrnodernism, deconstruction, criticai theory, gay studies, and Queer theory. The
interpretation oflourney requires these multiple approaches because the book’s poetics and
thematics anticipate so many ofthem, just as it anticipates several significant twentieth
centuiy ideological developments.
My reading of Journey proceeds through eight chapters. Chapter I begins with a
close reading of sonnet XXVII from “In Time of War,” demonstrating the centraiity of that
poem in Journey. The opening chapter shows the coordination of thematic and formai
concems in XXVII as an exemplary instance of such coordination in Journey. The reading
of XXVII effectively invoives a reading ofthe entire first part of”In Time of War,” the
sonnet sequence that is among Auden’s major achievements ofthe 1930s and one ofthe
defining moments in the development of his poetry. Chapter 2 argues that XXVII is a
crucial poem not only because of its function as a mise en abyme for the entirety of Journey,
but because ofAuden’s development in that sonnet ofthe theme offreedom and necessity
that is so central to his work and to the ideoiogical history of the twentieth-century.
6XXVII’s exploration ofthe themes offreedom and necessity is set in the contexts of
Auden’s dissenting engagement with Marxist thought and of bis abiding concerns with the
ideological dimensions ofChristianity. hornosexuality, and poetics. Chapter 3 discusses
the collaborative poetics and structure of Journey as a whole in order to counter the standard
crifical complaint that the book is incoherent. Similarly, chapter 4 examines the dynamic
coherence of the disruptive irony and infinite reflexivity that are at play in the Auden and
Isherwood collaboration in Journey. In Chapter 5, I tum my attention to the key structural
and thematic issues ofthe multiple endings in Joumey, and to close readings oftwo
premature endings of Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” which foreground political and moral
concerns that are central to Isherwood. Chapter 6 is a meticulous examination ofthe
historical and political implications of the provocative actual ending of”Travel-Diary.’ If
previous chapters are concemed with thematic and formai issues, Chapter 6 demonstrates
the entanglement ofthose issues and ofJourney with the historical actuality of China and
the twentieth-century. Finally, in Chapters 7 and 8, reading the conclusion that Auden’s
“Commentary” provides for Journey, I look at the place ofthat poem’s messianic vision in
Auden’s work and in Joumey and ofthat vision’s relation to the political and historical
context of 193$.
Though no one has insisted on it as I do, several critics together dernonstrate
Joumey’s pivotai significance. Ideas of pivotai moments and major turning points abound
in discussions of Isherwood and especially Auden. “Turning Points” is the titie ofHendon’s
chapter on Auden’s work from the mid-thirties through the beginning of the forties, the
period ofJoumey. My case for Joumey as that period’s major turning point finds support in
the fact that the transition from Mendelson’s Earlv Auden to his Later Auden coincides
historicaÏly with the publication of Journey, and further support in the juxtaposition of
7radically different assessments ofJoumey. Thus, in chapter 2, I show how Repiogle’s
insistence on “In lime of War” as the end ofAuden’s engagement with Marxism dovetails
with Beach’s insistence on “In Time ofWar” as the point where Auden’s Christian revision
ofhis canon begins. In chapter 5, I contrast fussell’s sense ofJournev as the end of
modemist, colonial travel books with Naipaul’s suggestion that in Journey we can see the
emergence ofa new kind ofpostcolonial travel writing. In chapter 7, I show that
Mendelson’s and McDiarmid’s reviews of complementary series ofpoerns, respectively
Auden’s series ofearly redemptive poems and his later series ofvisionary ‘city’ poems,
each negiect Joumey’s “Commentary,” a poem that nonetheiess iinks both series. These
paired critics’ contrasting conclusions ail point to Joumey as an important pivotai moment.
Only Stuart Christie has insisted on the transformative effect, on Auden and
Auden’s work, ofthe experience in China, noting that “Afier China, Auden’s poetics wouÏd
be forever” changed. Christie argues for the transformative consequences of”the faiiure of
the liberal Western subject to secure identity within any colonial epistemological
framework, combined with the ceaseiess desire to find a country someplace else, beyond
coloniaiism, where (just as impossibly) he could” (145-6). Along with the wrenching
politicai and epistemoiogical realities ofcoioniaiism, the transformation ofAuden and
Isherwood in Joumey invoives several other forces or factors. Their transformation is an
effect of their experiences of an immense geo-political crisis and of war and aerial
bombardrnent; offfieir exposure to the arbitrariness ofdeath; oftheir encounter with the
disorienting othemess of China; of an intuition of an open-ended freedom; of the
confrontation ofhomosexuai eroticism with moraiity; of intimations cosmic. religious, and
historicai; and of a conceptuai and ideoiogical compiexity which threatens to nullify both
their experience ofsubjectivity and Journey’s unity and coherence. The overwhelming
8realities which Joumey seeks to encompass combine to produce a transformative experience
ofthe sublime to which Joumey is the perhaps inevitabiy inadequate response.
Joumey is flot just a pivotai moment in its authors’ careers and in literary history; it
is the culmination ofthe Auden-Isherwood collaborations. It recounts their Chinesejourney
to be sure, but it aiso is the first and last explicit representation ofAuden and Isherwood’s
collaborative reÏationship. It retains key elements from their coHaborative dramas. From
The Dog Beneath the Skin, it keeps the zany humour and the themes ofthe quest and the
city; from The Ascent of F6, it keeps the theme of the Test, the mountain climbing
expedition, and an eye for geopolitics and coloniaiism; from On The frontier, it keeps a
ieffist antifascist stance, a Marxian perspective on international conflict, and a
preoccupation with ethical, conceptuai, and structurai duaiities. Though Stephen Spender
considers the Auden and Isherwood plays “strikingiy inferior to the separate works of either
coliaborator” (Haffenden 200), this broadiy held view neither diminishes the importance of
the collaborations in each author’s development, nor conveys their literaiy significance and
imperfectly realized potential. Moreover, despite the fact that some critics are dismissive of
Joumey aiso, Spender’s judgement may not appiy to Auden and Isherwood’s final non
dramatic collaboration. Suinmers, for one, calis their travei book a “success,” “the only
realiy distinguished product of the Auden-Isherwood collaboration” (67).
For Summers, Journey is important as one ofthe period’s “most interesting
explorations ofthe nature ofwar, a subject that preoccupied young writers ofthe 1930s”
(44). Summers is right, and Joumey’s many fascinations have been underestimated. A book
about a war and the nature ofwar, Journey is also significant and unique as a book about
China; as a comprehensive response to the politicai and ideological crises ofthe 193 Os; as a
representation ofthe relationship ofAuden and Isherwood; as a major turning point in the
9careers ofboth authors; and as an excmplary late-modernist text foreshadowing postmodern
developments in literature, literary theory, and twentieth-century ideology.
I have noted several instances where the juxtaposition of partial critical views of
Journey makes possible a more complete understanding ofthe book. In other cases, we see
critics perceiving similar qualities in Journey, but judging them very differently. Where one
critic sees an incoherent project, or an aesthetic failure, ideological confusion, or annoying
campiness, another holds up the same qualities of Journey as examples of a kind of work
that was flot only an appropriate response to its situation, but that was a precursor of later
values and sensibilities. The difference in judgement is ofien a generational one, and
coincides with a shifi from modernist to postrnodernist perspectives. Marsha Bryant’s cal!
for “a generative recovery” ofAuden’s documentary work in Journey to reinvigorate
documentaiy representation in the Ï990s (15) is one indication of Journey’s availability for
critical and creative recuperation today.
I have made a special effort to recover Journey as an instructive record of a Western
encounter with China. for Journey is significant not just as an example of 1 930s British
travel writing, but as travel writing about China, a civilization with which the West lias an
acute imaginative relationship. In the histories of Western responses to Chinese
civilization, Journey comes at the end ofa period of intense sinological curiosity:
“Westerners were, by the late 1920s and 1930s, being exposed to an extraordinary upsurge
ofworks about China or inspired by it. Not since the middle oftlie eighteenth century had
there been such interest in the country or its culture” (Spence Search 387). Leibniz called
China the ‘Anti-Europe’; more recently Simon Leys lias argued that it is througli the
encounter witli the alterity of China thât the West becomes most fully aware of tlie
idiosyncratic limits ofits cultural self (61). “China was utterly different,” noted Auden in
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1963, remembering the disorientation occasioned by Auden and Isherwood’s Chinese
journey. “Spain was a culture one knew. One could understand what was happening. what
things meant. But China was impossible to know” (cited in Carpenter 239). Afier six
months of traveling through China neither Auden nor Isherwood “had corne away with
more than (as Auden put it) a ‘tourist’s acquaintance’ with China.” He and Isherwood
could be said to have lefi China “empty-handed” (239), except that the experience ofits
radical alterity and unknowability are essential to any encounter with China. Understanding
littie of China, having spent their six ;nonthsjourney constantly in each other’s company,
staring into the abyss ofthe Euro-American West’s great crises, they are cornpelled to tum
their encounter with China into an occasion for self-understanding. In tandem with its
immediate antifascist, United front, and joumalistic objectives, Journcy develops into a
literary exercise in Western self-understanding and self-transformation. Such reflective
literariness is exactly what Agnes Smedley explicitly sought to avoid in China fights Back,
lier own book on the Sino-Japanese War: “I beg of you to help me [edit my manuscript].”
she wrote, just don’t make it ‘literary” (xvii). By contrast, Journey—engaged though h
was, valuable record of a historical crisis though it is—attains whatever exernplary literary
significance it lias as a detached work of Western self-understanding. Yet the urgent
immediacy of late-1930s warfare and the strange otherness of Chinese civilization remain -
thoroughly implicated in the complex reftexiveness of Journey, the seif-questioning on the
part ofboth Auden and Isherwood, their questioning of each other, and their questioning of
their culture’s habits, values, conceptual orders, and historical perspectives. Though as a
response to war-torn China Joumey can appear aimoyingly superficial, recalling the
historical specificities and actuality of Auden and Isherwood’s Chinese encounter reveals
the book’s thorough involvernent with its original context.
CHAPTER 1
ON SOIET XXVII FROM “1N TIME 0f WAR”
“At the Beginning I shaH flot begin”
Letter to Lord Byron
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HOW SONNETS END AND WHAT THEY DO
Every literary composition, writes Baudelaire, should be composed with its
dénouement in mmd: ‘je suis de ceux (et nous sommes bien rares) qui croient que toute
composition littéraire, même critique, doit être faite et manoeuvrée en vue d’un
dénouement. Tout, même un Sonnet; jugez le labeur” (Correspondance 3: 39). The
conesponding principle for interpretation is that the way a work ends, the way it works to
resolve its complications will be essential to its meaning. Baudelaire makes bis point about
the importance ofthe dénouement in a rare discussion of poetic technique, specifically in a
discussion ofthe soimet’s properties. In fact, the only other time Baudelaire comments on
the peculiar workings of the sonnet form, he again emphasizes the exernplary case of a
sonnet’s dénouement (45). An important aspect ofBaudelaire’s originality in nineteenth
century france bas to do with his adoption ofthe sonnet as his principal poetic form. He
finds in the sonnet’s two-part structure and turn a mode! for poetic and rhetorica! effects
that define much ofhis work such that there is a demonstrable ‘sonnetization’ even ofthe
other forms Baude!aire uses. Baudelaire moreover reinflects the sonnet’s thematic traditions
to represent himself as a “Petrarch de l’horrible” and define a new poetic sensibility for
modemity. A pivotai figure in the history ofthe sonnet, Baudelaire achieved a secure place
in European literature only belatedly in the I 930s when he was taken up by critics like
Walter Benjamin and T.S. Eiiot. Baudelaire’s work became a key reference too for
Isherwood and Auden, those English ‘‘inderkinder who worked so closely through the
1930s: at the beghming ofhis career, the assiduous diary keeper Isherwood pubiished, at
Auden’s urging, a translation of Baudelaire’s “Journaux Intimes” with an introduction by
Eiiot; Auden for his part in 1930 includes Baudelaire in a list of”boon companions”
(Eng!ish 48) and again in 1940 in the list ofthe poets before whom bis poetrv will be
1—
1.)
judged (Collected 204).
In the late 1930s and early 1940s Auden would prove hïrnseifa great soimeteer who,
like Baudelaire almost a centuiy earlier, could make the convention-ridden sonnet a vehicle
for poetry that rewrote conventional expectations. In Journey, Auden and Isherwood’s last
coliaborative work, Baudelaire’s influence as both keeper of an intirnate journal and self
conscious sonneteer cornes to fruition in Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” and in Auden’s sonnet
sequence in “In Time of War.” Like Baudelaire’s, Auden’s innovations have to do with
poetic forrn and with the redefinition of lyric subjectivity and themes. In a noteworthy
parallel to Baudelaire, Auden’s work with the sonnet in Journey makes an essentiai
contribution to the development ofhis overail poetics and performs a defining role in the
elaboration ofhis entire oeuvre. As with Baudelaire, there is a ‘sonnetization’ ofAuden’s
poetry and poetics. It is especially in bis “In Time ofWar” sequence that the sonnet forrn
enables Auden to attain a poetic, rhetorical, and conceptual lucidity that will remain a
permanent feature of his poetry.
The transformatjve importance of”In Time of War” in Auden’s work is clear if we
turn from the opening of Mendelson’s Later Auden to the close ofhis Early Auden. In the
introduction to the later book, Mendelson isolates “a characteristic pattem” in Auden’s
poems afier 1939 (xix). In this pattern, Auden presents readers
with two different kinds of experience in sequence. The first offers the
aesthetic, formai, ritualized pleasures ofa world ofmyth [. . .]; The second
experience is subtly but unmistakably different. [...]the language becomes
simpler, more straightforward, and makes a personal. flot a ritual, statement
about the poet’s condition and ours [. . . .] The mythical world has been
disenchanted, and transformed into parable. Typically the poem returns to its
heightened ritual style in its closing lines, but its brief descent into n darker
tone bas altered its mood. (xix-xxi)
This sequence ofmyth “matches the structure Auden described in the typical detective
story, in which the ritualized aesthetic world of the vicarage garden, ‘an innocent society in
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a state of grace’, is suddenly transformed by the act of murder into a world of guilt where
‘the law becomes a reality and for a time ah must live in its shadow” (xxi).
If this is the characteristic pattem afier 1939, it is also true that an analogous pattem
organizes earlier poems like 1937’s “As I Walked Out Que Evening.” 3e that as it may,
identifying such a recurrent pattern in the work of a writer known for his chameleon-like
changes—”you can neyer step in the same Auden twice” complains Randail Jarreil (139)—is
important for comprehending the unity within Auden’s mercurial diversity. Understanding,
just how this pattem emerges should prove fundamental to a comprehension ofAuden’s
work in its entirety. Fortunately, Mendelson towards the end ofEarly bas already pointed to
a 193$ text that is crucial to Auden’s ‘discoveiy’ and elaboration ofwhat wilI becorne his
characteristic rhetorical and imaginative pattem afier 1 939. This crucial text is the final
sonnet of”In Time of War” in which Auden “evokes our fantasies ofescape: the dream ofa
free Arcadian past, ‘the warm nude ages of instinctive poise,’ and the dream of a planned
utopian future where ‘the disciplined movements ofthe heart / Can follow for ever and ever
its harrnless ways.’ But—and the entire sequence depends on the dialectic imphied by this
recurring word—’But we are articled to error’” (357). Although Mendelson does not
comment further on how “In Time of War” depends on the dialectic of its recuning “but,”
he does emphasize the relevance ofthis “but” to the sonnet sequence’s prime poetic
influence and counter-example, the mystic sonneteer Riike.
For Mendelson the une “Certainly praise: let the song mount again and again” which
opens sonnet XIII “borrows from Rilke’s tone of dennoch preisen.” However the emphatic
‘Certainly praise’ ofthe opening “intimates the quahifying But that will soon follow”(352):
“Certainly praise [. . . I. . .j But hear the morning’s injured weeping, and know why.”
“Praise, in Auden’s work in 1938 and 1939,” Mendelson notes, “was an exphicit echo of
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Rilke’s dennoch Preisen. Auden used the word with the same troubled ambivalence he feit
about Rilke, who stood for the kind of poetic vocation Auden simultaneously treasured and
mistrusted. He honored Rilke’s ecstatic visionary freedom whule lie recognized its
indifference to suffering and injustice” (Later 6-7). Mendelson thus gives two examples of
how Auden uses the conjunction ‘but’ in to qualify the initial “aesthetic [. . .] pleasures of a
world ofmyth” and “ecstatic visionary freedom” with a second statement about our actual
condition: in XIII there is Rilke’s ecstasy, but then there are the “injured weeping;” in
XXVII there are our escape fantasies, but then there is our inescapable error.
This thematic and imaginative pattem of an initial moment that is corrected by a
second moment becomes an essential, defining feature ofAuden’s later poetry. far from
being Auden’s unique discovery, however, this pattern was already there to be developed as
a fundamental formal feature ofthe Petrarchan sonnet, with its characteristic contrast of
octave and sestet signalled by a tum at line fine. Looking at the instances ofthe recurrent,
dialectic-determining ‘buts’ in “In Time of War,” one indeed secs that they (or in two cases,
their grammatical near equivalents) occur most frequently at the beginning of the ninth une
(y. I, V, VI, X, XIII, XVI, XVII), or, as ofien happens in sonnets, either at the ‘minor’ tums
between quatrains or at premature or deÏayed ‘major’ tums (X, XI, XVIII, XXVII).
One could surmise that it is through the sonnets of “In Time of War” that Auden
first fully recognizes the thematic and formal potential ofwhat will be the characteristic
structure ofhis post-1939 poetry. The question of what came first, the mature pattem or
Auden’s discovery ofit in the sonnet, is a chicken or egg sort of question. Did Auden
return to the sonnet in “In Time of War” because of its appropriateness as a vehicle for a
rhetorical pattern already emerging as a defining feature of bis work? Or did his work with
the sonnet in “In Time of War” lead him to an awareness of a significance in the pattern?
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The congruence of sonnet form and rhetorical or thematic pattern in “In Time of War” is an
example of Auden’s genius for seizing on the expressive potential of a poetic form suited to
his subject matter. To an unusual degree in Auden’s poetics, form involves a comment on
or an analogy to what is being said. Accordingly, the sonnet with its central tum is the
appropriate form for him to develop the two-step sequence that will remain an essential
feature ofhis poems.
Just as Mendelson flot only draws our attention to the turn from an initial mythic to a
subsequent disenchanted phase, but also points to a poem’s return “in its closing unes” to
its original “heightened ritual style” as part ofthe pattem ofAuden’s rhetoric, 50 we will
find a concluding gesture ofreturn in the sonnets of”In Tirne of War.” This return occurs as
the sonnets’ endings direct us onward to the next instalment in the human epic that Auden
recounts in the sequence. In the case ofthe concluding XXVII, the dynamic ofthis return to
an original state is especially complex and intricate. Thus, along with the turn, Baudelaire’s
emphasis on the endings of literary works and sonnets in particular will be critical in an
understanding Auden’ s convention-rewriting, subj ectivity-reorienting sequence.
The question of endings is, in fact, crucial for comprehending the whole of Journey.
We will begin to appreciate this as we examine XXVII, a poem which confinns the
observations ofboth Mendelson and Baudelaire. Indeed XXVII and how it ends have an
exemplary significance. for one thing, XXVII must achieve a two-fold labour of
unravelling—not only must its dénouement bring XXVII to a close on its own terms, but the
poem must serve as a conclusion to the entire sonnet sequence, “sunmiing up the various
aspects of [the human conditionJ defined in the earlier sonnets” (Spears 149). The ways the
ending of XXVII deals with the complex pressures ofperforming its double resolution will
draw us into questions which not only animate this sonnet and the whole of “In Time of
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War,” but into questions which mn ail through Journey and which have a more generai
import. The formai and thematic issues complicating XXVII and its conclusion complicate
the entire book and prove as significant to Auden’s deveiopment as the mature imaginative
and rhetorical pattem which emerges from the sonnets of “In lime ofWar.” Close
attention to XXVII reveais that it provides a remarkable encapsulation ofJourney’s
thematic developments and a climactic review ofAuden’s struggies to define his mature
rhetorical pattem, to indicate the new horizons revealed in Joumey, and to imagine an
ending for Auden and Isherwood’s last book.
SONNET XXVII AS JOURNEY’S STRUCTURAL CENTRE AND PIVOTAL MOMENT
Few poems encapsulate more neatly than XXVII the core poetic, ethical, poiitical.
and religious features of Auden’s work. More than a presentation in miniature of issues
which Auden would explore more exhaustively elsewhere, XXVII also represents a pivotai
moment in Auden’s deveiopment. In XXVII, as in “In Time ofWar” as a whoie, we can
see the definitive coming into focus of several crucial aspects of Auden’s mature poetics.
We see the emergence ofthe pattern Mendelson describes in which an enchanting, but
enoneous myth is succeeded by, or rather transformed into, a disenchanting moral parable.
We are also able to see an illustration of how Audcn’s handling of the relationship of
content and poetic form relates to his preoccupation with the human experiences of freedorn
and necessity. Finaliy, we see a crucial staternent of Auden’s recognition ofthe centrality of
the themes of freedom and necessity to his poetics and his whole oeuvre. Auden not only
succeeds in XXVII in defining these central elements of his poetics, he aiso offers in the
unes “Each intricate maze I Has a plan and the disciplined movements ofthe heart / Can
foilow forever and ever its harmless ways” a memorable description of what wiÏi be
increasingly recognizable characteristics ofhis own poetry and ideas about poetry.
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In addition to these issues in the articulation of Auden’s “po-ethics,” as Seamus
Heaney characterizes Auden’s thinking about poetry (Electric 55), the sonnets of”In Time
ofWar” and XXVII in particular represent a pivotai moment in several ways. Specificaliy
XXVII and the other sonnets point to the reiigious turn that Auden’s work wili soon take.
They signal too a concomitant tum away from 1930s Marxian philosophy and poiitics.
These controversial turns are ciearly reflected in the criticism that has accumulated around
Auden’s work in which critics ofvarying ideological dispositions identify “In Time of
War”, flot only as Auden’s definitive achievement ofthe 1930s, but aiso as a crucial
moment of reorientation for Auden. More obiiqueiy, the sonnets reveai an understanding of
sexuality at a crisis point in the history of modem homosexuaÏity, a crisis that Isherwood
represents obiiquely in lis “Travel-Diary.” foliowing Isherwood, Auden’s sonnets situate
homosexuality, neither in the medical context ofpsychoanalytic pathoiogy, where it
frequentiy is in Auden’s early work, nor in the context of sexuai perversion and immorality,
where it is in some of Auden’s earlier writing ami in Isherwood’s Mr. Norris and Goodbye,
but within a socialized view of human sexuaiity and a radical and compiex view of human
freedom. This pivotai significance of XXVII in Auden’s developrnent is representative of
the importance ofJourney as a tuming point flot oniy in Auden’s career, but, as we shah
see, in Isherwood’s career too. Beyond the works of either Auden or Isherwood. XXVII and
Journey mark pivotai moments in the histories of both Western and Chinese hornosexuality
and in the ideological history ofthe twentieth century.
The idea that Joumey represents severai coincidentai tuming points in Auden and
Isherwood’s careers, and more broadly in history and literary history, is a key contention in
my discussion ofthis underappreciated book. In the context ofmy promotion ofthe idea of
the book’s critical importance, it is important to attend carefully to XXVII because within
Joumey, XXVII constitutes a textual mise en abyme; that is, XXVII offers an embedded
image of Joumey in its entirety. The idea ofthe mise en abyrne is in fact essential to
important structural and thematic features of Joumey. This figure and the ways in which
XXVII functions as a mise en abyme therefore require some preliminary comment here.
A literary mise en abyme, as Dillenbach defines it, is “any aspect enclosed within a
work that shows a similarity with the work that contains it” (8). for Bal, the modes by
which mises en abyme may be embedded within a text are multiple; thus, a mise en abyme
refers to “a relevant and continuous aspect of the text [.. .] by means ofa resemblance, one
or several times” (52). In the case of XXVII, we wili find that complex thematic, formai,
and narratological aspects ofthe sonnet mirror crucial features ofJourney as a whole. This
mise en abyme relationship of XXVII to Journey involves several kinds of resemblance
between part and whole. Thematicaily, we will find that religious, erotic, and political
dimensions of XXVII recur as principal concerns of the book. Formally, we will find two
things. One is that the crucial reflexive relationship between the before of the octave and
the afier ofthe sestet implicit in the two-part structure ofthe sonnet recurs in analogous
forms throughout the book. The second formai quality of XXVII that recurs elsewhere in
Joumey is a sort ofinfinite self-referentiality. We will find also that the story ofXXVII’s
wanderings is representative of the journey of Auden and Isherwood that is the book’ s
subject. finaliy, we wiil find that XXVII’s ending (which involves a complex open-ended
closure and a three-fold infinite regress to the soimet’s own beginning and to the very
beginning ofthe book and to the beginning oflsherwood’s “Travel-Diary” section) is
emblematic of Joumey’s probiematization of its own ending. These multiple analogies and
connections between XXVII and the larger text of Joumey will become clear either in the
discussion of XXVII which follows or later when we tum to a discussion oflsherwood’s
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contributions to the book.
There is, however, a further point regarding the nature of mises en abyme and the
place of XXVII in Journey. h The Mirror in the Text, Dallenbach notes that the relation of
a mise en abyme to the text in which it is embedded can be variously prospective,
retrospective, or retroprospective. A prospective mise en abyme reflects what a text will do
before the text does it; a retrospective mise en abyme reflects what a text has done afier the
text has done it; while a retroprospective mise en abyme reflects what a text does by
revealing aspects of the text that are both anterior and posterior to its occurence in the text
(60). A retroprospective mise en abyme reviews what a text bas reveaied up to the
occurrence ofthe mise en abyrne and prefigures what a text bas yet to reveai. For
Dillenbach, a retroprospective mise en abyme functions as a pivot within a text ($9-90).
Following Dl1enbach, Bal remarks that “the retroprospective mise en abyme, which
occupies an intermediate position between that which is known and that which remains to
be uncovered, is proportionaiiy and quaiitatively priviieged. It aliows ‘the reader to
presurne starting from that which it summarizes’ [. . . .] It is the structural centre ofthe
narrative, even if it is for compositional reasons, displaced toward the begiiming or toward
the end” (Bal 50). Within Joumey, XXVII is such a retroprospective mise en abyme and, as
sucli, XXVII represents the “structural centre” and pivot of the overail narrative of Journey.
That XXVII represents a ‘proportionaiiy and qualitatively privileged structural
centre’ in Joumey implies not only that it wiil make sense to speak of a centre in such a
manifestly muiticentred book, and not only that Journey, against ail appearances and against
critical consensus, can be regarded as a single unified text. It also implies that reading
XXVII attentively shouid provide a priviieged means of comprehending the entirety of
Journey. Accordingiy, whatever significance XXVII has wili be strongiy suggestive ofthe
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significance ofJourney. Estabiishing that XXVII is a pivotai moment for Auden is a key
objective ofmy discussion of that poem. In so far as XXVII is a figure for Journey as a
whole, that pivotai significance of XXVII is suggestive too of the place of Journey in the
oeuvres of Isherwood as well as Auden, and in the literary histoiy of the twentieth-century.
READTNG SONNET XXVII
Let us begin, then, by attending closely to the conclusion of”In lime ofWar,”
sonnet XXVII, Journey’s structural centre and retroprospective pivot:
Wandering lost upon the mountains of our choice,
Again and again we sigh for an ancient South,
For the warm nude ages of instinctive poise,
For the taste ofjoy in the innocent mouth.
Asleep in our huts, how we dream of a part
In the glorious bails ofthe future; each intricate maze
Ras a plan, and the disciplined movements of the heart
Can follow for ever and ever its harmless ways.
We envy streams and houses that are sure:
But we are articied to enor; we
Were neyer nude and cairn like a great door,
And neyer will be perfect like the fountains;
We live in freedom by necessity,
A mountain people dwelling among mountains. (Prose 1: 680)
The poem speaks ofa first-person plural subject whose lost, irnpoverished, envious,
erroneous, and imperfect state is contrasted to a vanished golden age and a utopian future.
On the one hand, in the first quatrain are the warm nude poise and joy of an ancient South;
on the other hand, in the second quatrain is a planned, intricate, disciplined, harrnless, and
glorious future. Though we dream or sigh for them, the past and the future utopias are
recognized as forever beyond us; for, as a revised version ofthe first une lias it, we will
remain forever “Chulled by the Present, its gioom and its noise” (Collected 193).
The poem’s disavowal ofthe false certainties ofnostatgia and utopianism and its
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acceptance of irremediable existential uncertainty are at once a timeÏessly classic statement
about human experience and eminently relevant to twenticth-century actuaiity. Not oniy
does the poem conform to Auden’s mature rhetorical and imaginative pattern as described
by Mendeison, but the unes “each intricate maze / Has a plan, and the disciplined
movements ofthe heart! Can foiiow for ever and ever its harmless ways” announce a
formalist aesthetic recognizably that of the mature Auden. Those unes, with ail their irony.
could almost serve as a motto for Auden’s later poetry. In XXVII, they can certainly serve
as a seif-referential heuristic principle for interpreting this intricate and disciplined poem.
Like most of Auden’s “Sonnets from China” (as he renamed “In Time of War” when
he revised it in 1960 for his Coliected $horter Poems), XXVII seems only obliqueiy
concemed with China or with the Chineseness ofAuden and Isherwood’s experiences. The
authors of Journey have indeed wandered in mountains and siept in huts—so these huts may
be Chinese, but mountains are a consistent feature of Auden’s paysages moralisés, and not
one soleiy associated with China. A further link to Joumey’s Chinese context could be read
into XXVII’s penuitimate iine—”We iive in freedom by necessity.” The une alludes to
Engels’ AntiDuhring, thus acknowledging the Marxism that was certainly in the air during
Auden and Isherwood’s Chinese trip, as they met Communists like Agnes Smedley and
Chou En Lai and sought to assess, among other things, the prospects for Communisrn in
China. As we shah see, though, Auden and Isherwood, in spite oftheir lefi-wing
reputations, do flot have much to say about the communist option for China. In any case,
Marxist and Communist ideas about freedom and necessity and about once and future
utopias, were such current issues in the late 1930s that these things too cannot be regarded
as having been exclusively provoked by the Chinese situation out of which XXVII arose.
Christopher Caudwell, for instance, used the same formula from Engels—”freedorn is the
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recognition ofnecessity”—as the epigraph to Illusion and Reality, Caudwell’s “study ofthe
sources of Poetry,” which Auden reviewed favourably in early 1937; and in “Morality in an
Age of Change,” an essay which like XXVII dates from late 193$, Auden refers to the same
formula from Engels “as a famous definition” (Prose 1: 47$).
Along with this engagement with Communist political philosophy, there is another,
equally evident, and yet unremarked, dimension to XXVII that seems to lead far away from
China. for the poem’s evocations ofhomosexuality are unmistakable, though the criticai
silence regarding them would lead one to think otherwise. for, the first quatrain’s “ancient
South” involves an allusion to ancient Greece, the pereimial Paradise Lost for alienated
Western homosexuais. In this poem, homosexuals’ present lostness recails the idea of
Greece’s gratifying long-vanished cuit of bodiiy equilibrium; in that ancient South a
guiltless mouth could tastejoy—the suggestion offellatio deriving notjust from the
emphasis on thc oral, but from the sexual connotations ofjoy’s etymological association
with the french jouissance.” These evocations and associations are reinforced by allusions
to Baudelaire’s description ofa similar, though explicitly Greek, “ancient South”:
J’aime le souvenir de ces époques nues,
Dont Phoebus se plaisait à dorer les statues.
Alors l’homme et la femme en leur agilité
Jouissaient sans mensonge et sans anxiété [.
[. . .] Ces natives grandeurs, aux lieux où se font voir
La nudité de l’homme et celle dc la femme.
Auden cites this passage in his 1938 introduction to The Oxford Book of Light Verse (Prose
1: 434); whereas though Baudelaire envisions bis ‘nude epochs’ as heterosexual, Auden’s
“we” imagines the “ancient South” as predominantly homosexual.
A homosexual fantasy informs the sonnet’s vision ofthe future too, with its dream
“ofa part / In the glorious bails ofthe future.” “Part” and “balls” are synonymous with
‘role’ and with ‘dances,’ so that the une appears to be about a dream that “we” also vi1l
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participate in the glorious dances ofthe future. Dancing here (as it only sometimes does in
Auden) serves as a symbol, on the one hand, ofhuman unity and harmony, and, on the
other, of an unselfconscious heterosexual glamour and beauty denied homosexuals (cf. “We
Too Rad Known Golden Hours” and the third interlude in Frontier). “Part” and “bails” can
5e taken, however, in an indecent sense too—as referring to testicles and to the seam
bisecting a scrotum. Here the phrase “glorious balis” echoes the sexual banter of of close
friends, or of loyers and fellow bath-bouse habitués like Auden and Isherwood.1
In XXVII, the scandalous vulgarity of its evocations of fellatio, scrota, and testicles
enliven and make lewdly comic the sonnet’s octave. Other hornosexual double entendres
occur in Auden’s work, as in this passage from New Year Letter that recalis XXVII’s
superimposition of sexual vulgarity and philosophical concerns, and its opposition of the
idea of a carnal innocence to actual temporal human distress:
Yet anytime, how casually,
Out of his organized distress
An accidentai happiness,
Catching man off bis guard, will blow him
Out ofhis life in time to show him
The field of Being where he may
Unconscious of Becoming, play
With the Eternal Innocence
In unimpeded utterance. (Collected 221 [my italics])
Auden’s gestures towards homosexuality are flot aiways as prankish and crude as this
reference to a blow job, but in XXVII’s quatrains, they are both. Some readers vi11 take
these homosexual indiscretions as embellishments, and others as defacements, ofthe grand
The details ofthis flot quite private erotic and anatomical in-joke anticipate by ten years the
samizdat “purely pornographic poem” (Auden to Kailman, cited in Mendelson Later 298) entitled
“The Platonic Blow” in which Auden expands on the same features of the male genitals: “1 admired[.
. .] the neat / Sutures ofthe capacious bag” and “[IJ tickled his heavy, voluminous balis.” This
psychoanalytically rich image of sutures on the male genitals compares with Auden’s use ofthe
image of”the wound” and ofthe idea of “being wounded” to write about homosexuality in The
Orators and about the acceptance of Christ in For The Time Being.
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public edifice ofAuden’s canonical work. In the former case, Auden’s indiscretions would
constitute something akin to a sexual Democracy Wall and, in the latter, a sort oftoilet stali
graffiti supporting Kimball’s case against the seediness that “sets in shockingly early” in
Auden’s career (106). Such homosexual vulgarity is, however, only one expression ofthe
homosexuality that is an essential aspect ofAuden’s vision and poetics.
The more one considers the interplay between XXVII’s satire on political nostalgia
and utopianism and its evocations of homosexual alienation, the more complex and
uncertain becomes one’s interpretation ofthe poem. It is easy enough to imagine that the
poem deflates, even mocks, its own tempting nostalgic and utopian political visions by
allowing shocking and indecorous sexual fantasies to disrupt and ridicule them.
Nonetheless the gravity of the poem’s political theme reasserts itselfundiminished in the
sestet. furthermore, the ironically disruptive sexual lewdness which deflates the nostalgic
and utopian visions’ pretensions to political seriousness becomes with the slightest
reflection problematic in itself.
Take the “innocent mouth” that would taste the joy of fellatio; whose mouth is it
anyway? There should be only two candidates: homosexual men and heterosexual women.
Perhaps no sexual act is ever entirely innocent; relative to the homosexual version, though.
most dominant moral codes would, perhaps erroneously, hold that heterosexual fellatio is
more innocent or at least less guilty than the homosexual act. And if the second quatrain’s
“glorious balls” and our knowledge ofAuden’s queerness support a reading in which the
mouth is homosexual, the first quatrain’s “instinctive poise” seems instead to refer to
heterosexuality’s non-inverted, ‘natural’ sexuality. It would certainly be unusual, again
from the perspective of dominant moral codes and natural philosophies, including those
Auden espoused, to describe the celebration of homosexuality in ancient Greece as
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“instinctive”—homosexuaÏity being on the contrary commonly taken as one of the chef
instances of the counter instinctive and the uimatural.
The ancient $outh of the poem may therefore flot be ‘counter instinctive’
homosexual Greece at ail, but rather the instinctive hetero-consecrating Eden in which
Eve’s mouth was not yet guilty of having eaten a forbidden fruit. Or more ambiguously,
XXVII’s ancient $outh may be either Hellas or Eden. The sexual myths ofthese two
ancient contexts have been evoked earlier in “In Time of War”—the second sonnet
responds to the Biblical story of a lost Eden, and the eleventh comments on the myth of
Ganymede; but in ways that are characteristic ofthe disorienting qualities of”In Time of
War,” Auden disturbs the presuppositions ofboth myths. XI develops the stoiy ofZeus’
patemalistic homoerotic desire into an unanticipatedly sinister revelation about the hateful
nature ofthe beloved. II reviews the story ofthe loss ofEden in tenus that allow one to
read it straiglit as a commentary on the ortliodox heterosexual myth; or, to read it as a
comment on the situation ofhomosexual loyers, and ofAuden and Isherwood themselves:
They wondered why the fruit had been forbidden;
It taught them nothing new. They hid their pride,
But did flot listen much when they were chidden;
They knew exactly what to do outside.
[ j
They wept and quarrelled; fteedom was 50 wild.
In front, maturity, as lie ascended,
Retired like a horizon from the child;
The dangers and the punishments grew greater;
And the way back by angels was defended
Against the poet and the legislator. (Prose 1: 667)
Homosexual loyers know “exactly what to do outside” in order to conceal their
homosexuality from a world that has, to them perhaps inexplicably, forbidden it. They must
even conceal “their pride,” perhaps as Auden and Isherwood had to hide their periodic
homosexual chauvinism. Certainly, as Isherwood remembers in Kind, Auden and
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Isherwood on their Chinesejourney “wept and quarrelled” like rival queens (303-5).
“Maturity” too is a concem for homosexuals, since homosexuaiity is condemned as
immature. They are acutely aware as well ofthe legal and imaginative challenges to the
iegisiator’s2 and the poet’s desire to escape “the dangers and the punisi-iments” and return,
against the divine will, to an Edenic sexual innocence.
Recaliing XI and II, XXVII’s first quatrain manages to embrace both of Western
cuiture’s principal homosexual and heterosexual fantasies of a paradisai original sexuality,
the one in the philosophical homosexuality of Greece, the other in the reiigious
heterosexuality oflsrael. The poem’s first person pronoun “we” might be taken to embrace
the ancient poetic lesbianism of Greece as well—were it flot for the “halls” in the second
quatrain, the habituai neglect ofwomen’s subjectivities in 1930s writing by British men,
and Auden’s tendency to think of iesbianism as sexless: witness Auden’s sarcastic
caricature of Riike with his “bodiiess visionary ecstasies” as “the greatest iesbian poet since
Sappho” (y. Mendelson Early 284n).
The ambiguities concerning the identity ofthe male homosexual or female
heterosexual fellating mouth and about the plural subject “we” are characteristic of a
general ambiguity invoiving ail subjective pronouns in “In Time of War.” O’Neili and
Reeves describe how “the impression of a collective consciousness is disorientatingly
conveyed by the indeterminate subject ofthe sonnets, in the first twelve usually ‘he’,
2
The ambiguity about whether “the poet and the legislator” in Auden’s unes “And the way back by
angels was defended I Against the poet and the legislator” refer to a single figure who is both poet
and legislator or to two separate figures is significant given that Auden found Shelley’s description
of poets as the unacknowledged legistators of the world “to be the silliest remark ever made about
poets,” observing that “that sounds more like the secret police” (Prose 1: 348). With respect to the
poet’s desire in Xl to evade dangers, punishments, and angels, and retum to Eden, it is impossible
to teil whether the poet Auden is evoking his own futile homosexual utopianism, or his periodic
wish (which Isherwood did not share) to turn away from homosexuality back to the heterosexual
normality he has teft behind.
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sometimes ‘they’, until in sonnet XIV the ‘we’ ofAuden and our present epocli enters”
(172). Regular unannounced shifts of context and subjective pronoun contribute to
uncertainties about the identity ofthose varying subjects so that the “sonnets remain blurred
and out of focus” (Davison 141) and “over and over again the reader is put to great pains to
identify the character or type referred to in a given sonnet or even to make out the general
theme ofthe poem” (Beach 42)
Beach complains that such disorienting ambiguities couÏd have been avoided had
Auden provided the poems with tities. Auden easily coufd have done so too, since
Joumey’s opening sequence does have tities, and since lie published about a third ofthe
sonnets of “In Time of War” (or versions ofthem) at various times with unambiguous
tities—The Bard (sonnet VII), Ganymede (XI), Economic Man (XII), The New Age (XII),
Surgical Ward (XVII), Press Conference, Air Raid (XIV), Chinese Soldier (XVIII),
Embassy (XIX), Exiles (XXI), and A Major Port (XXV) (Prose 1: 825). There is as well a
list in Auden’s barely legible hand in the diaiy that he and Isherwood kept on their way out
to China which provides titles for twenty-four poems which correspond roughly to the
poems of “In lime ofWar:” Creation (I), The Fali (II), Language (III), Truth (VI), The
Warrior (V), The Priest (VI?), The Peasant (IV), The City (VIII?), Ganymede (XI), The Poet
(VII), Tunes (XXII), Air Raid (XIV), Exiles (XXI), Soldier (XVIII), G.H.Q. (XVI),
Hunting, The Ambassador (XIX), The Great Men (XXIV), The Littie Men (XXIV), Prayer,
Love (XXVI), The Wanderer (XXVII). (The last title, if I have deciphered it correctly, is
noteworthy in that it repeats at the end ofthe 1930s the titie ofa well-known poem of
Auden’s from the very beginning ofthe decade, and in so far as it describes XXVII’s vision
ofhumanity: what is more, the typescript ofthe first draft ofKind, the later
autobiographical work in which Isherwood recounts lis life in the 193 Os, shows that
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Isherwood had given the book the provisional titie Wanderings). Auden’s omission of
tities in “In Time of War” is a deliberate decision whose motivation is flot difficuit to
divine. Perhaps Beach “does flot sec how the imaginative effect of [the poems of”In Time
of War”] would have been impaired by giving them tities, provided the tities given suited
the subject and intention of the poem” (42), but clearly by omitting tities, Auden introduces
a sense ofambiguity, indeterminacy, and disorientation which is essential to the sequence’s
telling ofthe story ofmankind.
The poems compel the reader to constantly wonder who “he,” “they,” and “we”
might be (there are no ‘she’s or ‘you’s or ‘I’s). One wonders as well about the genetic or
genealogical relationships between the poems’ vague grammatical subjects, since the
solemnifying Roman numerals heading each sonnet, the thematic and lexical repetitions,
and the syntactical continuities ofpronouns and ofthe transition-easing conjunctions that
repeatedly open the sonnets, ail imply that the human subjects are connected to one another
in some sort of temporal or developmental sequence. And wonder one should. For, as
Mendelson observes, “English poetiy lias nothing else quite like them” (Early 349). A
reader does not get a definitively satisfactory sense of either who ail these subjects are or
how exactly they are related; rather one’s sense is ofidentities and relationships that are
always ftuid, unfinished, dissolving.
Auden’s use ofthird person pronouns enacts the variability ofthe human subject in
the history ofmankind. His insistence on the first person plural pronoun reflects the
collaborative authorship ofJourney and is also representative of the experience of
subjectivity ofthe Auden generation in the 1930s. The vague pronouns in the sequence’s
sonnets reveal that Auden has leamed to exploit the polysemous potential of pronominal
ambiguity in ways that are more philosophically coherent than those discemed by
jCuimingliam and Imlah in the 1932 poem “A Communist to Others.” For Cunningham in
“A Communist to Others,” it is “flot possible at any point [
- .1 finally to settie” who the
speaker is or who “we” arc; rather the poem’s “pronouns prove, strictly, unreadable.”
Cunningham sees these ambiguïties negatively as “helplessly contradictory and {. .
perpetually misleading and frustrating,” as a “messy wash [. . .] utterly apt to the confusions
and contradictions ofAuden’s wavering social allegiances, his well-known uncertainties as
to political and moral direction at the time ofwriting” (Bucknell yjp 184-$5).
Imlah sees Auden’s special attention to the pronoun “we” in a larger context that
allows us to imagine Auden striving between the purported confusions of “A Communist to
Others” and the deliberate indeterminacy of “In Time of War” to find a viable way of
conceiving of a first person plural subjectivity:
Many poems ofthe 1930s make distinctive use oNhe pronoun ‘we”: ‘A
Cornmunist to Others’ is their prototype. The Marxist, iconoclastic ‘we’
created here became, in the hands ofa small number of writers under Auden’s
influence, simply their version—anti-athletic, misogynist, exclusively
cosmopolitan—ofthe clubbislmess they deplored in other circles {. . .1. As a
result in the second haif ofthe decade, the public-school-communist ‘we’
loses its mischievous thrust in the shadow of a more urgent and less voluntary
histoncal force; in {. . .] MacNeice’s “The Sunlight on the Gardens” [this
‘we’] is revealed as an emblem ofdoomed shared enjoyments. [In ‘We are
dying, Egypt, dying’] it is the pronoun that is dying [. . .]. In Auden’s case, the
transformation ofthe pronoun is compressed into a few months. He is quick
to discover a ‘we’ that has personal as well as communal meaning. (192)
By the time we get to 1938 and to “In Time of War,” Auden’s pronouns have moved
beyond the messy wash Cunningharn rejects and evolved into something akin to what Imlah
perceives: they have become a subtie means ofregistering the urgent ethical dimensions of
personal and plural subj ectivities and of exploring the historical instability and fluidity of
individual and collective (if male-biased) human subjectivity. Auden will again exploit the
ambiguity ofpronouns in his explorations ofhuman subjectivity through bis second
sequence of Riikean sonnets “The Quest.” A prefatory note included when those sonnets
3first appeared in 1940 explains that the “‘He’ and ‘They’ refened to sliould be regarded as
both objective and subjective” (Fuller 336). Such an objective and subjective “lie” recaïls
as well the third person Isherwood narrators that Isherwood was developing in bis fiction.
for Spears, Rilke’s exploitation ofpronomial vagueness is an important example for
Auden’ s procedure of “putting unidentified persons, indicated only by pronouns [. . .] in
usually symbolic landscapes, with the sonnet beginning in the middle of an unexplained
situation.” This Riikean procedure enables Auden to generate “a fresh union of abstract and
concrete, ofgeneralization about life and particular example” (25-6). Behind Rilke’s
indeterminate pronouns lies the abiding Germanophone philosophical interest in the nature
oftranscendental subjectivity, and thus it is possible to trace the ‘unEnglish’ grammatical
subjects of “In Time of War” through Rilke back to Kant, F ichte, and Hegel. Later in bis
“Dichtung und Wahrheit,” Auden imitates the manner of another Austrian (in this case,
Wittgenstein) to explore again, though in a very different maimer, the possibilities ofthe
sense and reference ofpersonal pronouns and the philosophical problems of subjectivity.
“The Quest” and “In Time of War,” in their manner, subj ect matter, and use of
pronouns, are at times complernentary and at others contrasting sequences. Whereas the
pronouns of”In Time ofWar” convey an impression of the history ofhumanity’s collective
consciousness, in “The Quest,” the “He,” and “They” correspond to “the selfs discovery of
a personal quest for its own true ground ofbeing through the rejection of false paths”
(Fuller 336). “The Quest” gives an account oftlie individual search for authenticity; “In
Time of War,” an account ofhumanity’s transformation and revelation of itself. And in
spite ofthe pronominal indeterminacy that Auden exploits, recognizing what sort of
historical human figure is being spoken about in specific poems in “In Time of War”
remains crucial to understanding the poems and the sequence. This is flot as difficult as
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Beach lets on. Callan, Mendelson, and especialiy fuller (234-24 1) have identified subjects
ofmany ofthe sonnets. Some ofthe sequence’s grammatical subjects, flot inciuding those
whose identities Auden’s tities have at ieast partially established above, are I) an Adamic
Man created in Bibiical fashion, afier and in contrast to the plants and animais, II) the fallen
“they” who have lost an Eden-like original condition; IV) the hunter; V) the soldier or
miiitarist; VI) a monk-like scientist or philosopher; VIII) modem bourgeois man; IX) kingly
or saintiy heroic individuals; X) the Word or Law as an anonymous Christ; XXIII) Rilke;
and XIII, XIV, XVI, XX, XXV, XXVI, and XXVII) an indeteminate “we” in the present.
The we’s that dominate the sequence’s second haif are flot as disparate as the
various he’s and they’s in the first haif, but they often involve the crucial possibility ofthere
being several competing or complementary identities for the subject ofa singie poem. The
oddest ofthe first person plural pronouns occurs in XVIII where Auden writes that an
anonymous Chinese soldier has died so that “our daughters / Might keep their upright
carnage,” an unaccountable “our” which can be taken as representing “a generous gesture of
united-front sympathy, or an insulting colonialist appropriation” (Kerr in Izzo Legacv 286),
or perhaps as an emptily non-partisan though idealisticaily charitable gesture toward the
unity of ail humankind. Kerr’s conscientiousness in criticizing Auden’s use ofthe plural
“ouf” to speak of Chinese daughters is consistent with similar objections in Emig when he
refers to Auden’s use ofthe pronoun “our” as a bad “act of colonisation [.. .] for it implies
that personai histomy, here a priviieged middie-class perspective, is the same as that ofthe
invaded China” (128). Emig and Kerr, though, are allowing their own culturaÏ
conscientiousness regarding that problematic “our” to blind them to the conscientiousness
and concern that is already in Auden’s text with its ongoing explorations of possible modes
ofshared plurai subjectivity and its circurnspection regarding the indeterminacy and fluidity
‘n
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of human subjectivity. The issue of a cross-cultural “our” is raised explicitly in Auden and
Isherwood’sjoumalistic travel piece “Meeting the Japanese” (Prose 1: 448). As we shah
see, neither Kerr’s nor Emig’s comments do justice to the multiple and shiffing identities of
the first person plural subjectivity ofAuden’s sonnets. In any case, more politicaÎly
incorrect than the self-conscious colonialist overtones ofXVIII’s “our daughters” is how
that possessive pronoun subordinates suent feminine subjectivities to the sequence’s
masculine and male homosexual perspectives.
Ail the diverse pronomial and substantive subjects in “In Time of War” stand in
historical relationships to one another, which tend to be genealogical, evolutionary, or
revolutionaiy in the first half of the sequence, and in the second half, a question of complex
contemporaneousness. The subjects are also linked to one another because most conftont
situations, challenges, and issues that are analogous to those facing the others. One such
issue which is found in several sonnets and which is prominent in XXVII is that of
“choice.” The unifying theme of choice has invariably been seen as central to “In Time of
War,” and we will retum to it too, but other similarly unifying themes, crucial to the
coherence ofthe sequence and to the relationships between the various sonnets’ subjects
have not been emphasized enough. This is most true ofthe erotic aspects ofthe
soimets—even though the sonnet as a form has been so intimately involved with erotic
poetry that one would expect Eros to figure prominently in a sequence of sonnets.
However, when Mendelson distinguishes Auden’s “writing on public themes” in Journev’s
sonnets from “his writing on Eros” in other sonnets and poems (Early 348), his bhindness to
the centrality of Eros is typical of commentary on “In Time of War.” Yet eroticism and
sexuality are key attributes ofmany ofthe subjects ofthe sonnets of”In Time ofWar.” and
Auden’s treatment ofEros displays concerns which are clearly homosexual.
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We have noted how XI recasts the homosexual Ganymede myth and how II allows a
queer reading ofthe myth ofEden and the fail, but the problems ofEros and homosexual
Eros in particular arise repeatediy as Auden moves through human history “round our sex
and reasons,” in IX’s phrase. In I the concluding une draws attention to one ofthe
supposedly key differences between humans and other creatures, namely that Man
“[chooses] his love.” This ambiguous phrase can refer to either a choice of the individual
who is loved, or to a choice of sexuai orientation. Auden acknowiedges, as we have seen,
complexities and anxieties conceming the second kind of choice in II, and again in III where
the representative human figure, prey to the delusions made possible by the powers of
language and to the confusions ofmisdirected desire, “knew of love without love’s proper
object.” In IV, the peasant farmer has no choice in love; rather in his nature-dominated,
necessarily-heterosexual life, “The mountains chose the mother of his chiidren” whule “his
young cousins in the city / Pursued their [. . .] unnaturai course.” Sexuality haunts the
phulosopher-scientist who in Biblically euphemistic language “feli in love with Truth before
he knew her” and who in his celibacy (and in one ofAuden’s periodic evocations of
masturbation) “mocked at those who served ber with their hands.”
Erotic implications lie in inconspicuous details. In the “Chinese $oldier” sonnet
(XVIII), the une “His name is lost for ever like his looks” suggests a wistful eroticism,
consummated metaphorically when the “daughters” his sacrifice will save are said to “love”
the “earth” he will become. In “Surgical Ward” (XVII), the patients (like the sequence’s
various subjects) “lie apart like epochs from each other.” They can flot lie together, as
loyers would, because suffering isolates them: “Only happiness is shared, / [.. .] and the
idea of love.” In such an anxiety-ridden context, only the idea of love, flot love itself, can
be shared. Sexual pleasure, in contrast, can be shared, like the tunes in XXII which “speak
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to the muscles ofthe need forjoy,” shared (with an Elizabethan pun) by “the dying and the
loyers soon to part” who “have to whistle” as the sonnet alludes to Cole Porter’s “Do you
love me as I love you?” and Charles Trenet’s “Il y a de la joie.”
Whereas aspects of love and sexuality are kept in the background, or implicit
through most ofthe sequence, in the penultimate XXVI love becomes the principal theme.
Perhaps for that reason, XXVI is among the sequence’s two or three most obscure poems
and its presentation of love is camouflaged behind the incongruous language of industrial
production and commerce whose “metaphors [. . .1 mischievously violate the decorum of
love poetry” (Mendelson Early 356). Love, contends the octave, is a modest, anonymous
workshop that should manufacture flot an unsaleable product (unsaleable because
antiquated, foolish, childish, quaint, or impractical), but a saleable one. The sestet,
however, is less interested in the unsaleability of the product than it is in love itself, for this
love, though “a minor item of our daring plan,” is the “single product that since work” in
love’s workshop “began / Through all the cycle showed a steady profit.” “We’re amazed to
find it” so, because in ‘our’ mistaken busyness “We took no notice of it;” and “We can’t
believe that we ourselves designed it,” because it is so easy to “imagine as Auden once did
that [love] came into being instinctively, as one ofthe natural functions ofthe ftesh” (356-
7). For Mendelson love in XXVI is Eros, and its “we,” the “we” of loyers; but for Fuller the
love in XXVI is Charity, concomitant with the “pity” ofthe previous sonnet XXV’s last
line, and its “we”, the “we” of a more inclusive human community. Thus, XXVI’s
profitable love is the charitable love which enables us “to endure disaster” and prompts us
to “feed a beggar rather than find him picturesque” (Fuller 240-1).
Neither Mendelson’s nor Fuller’s reading excludes the other. By the end ofthe
1930s, Auden’s love poetry encompassed simultaneous visions ofEros and Agape. A rarer
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feature ofthe poem’s treatment of love is the linking of the uniquely positive use value of
love with the world ofcapitalism. This is more than mischievous in the political context of
Auden’s late 193 Os milieu: the metaphoric identification of love with manufacturing and
profitability violates flot only sentimental and spiritual ideals, but also the left-wing anti
capitalist orthodoxy with which Auden was associated. The erotic and ideological bad taste
of such metaphors may explain the poem’ s obliqueness and obscurity. Another motivation
for the obscurity is that the poem comments on Auden and Isherwood’s own professional
and amorous relationship. That the “we” that dominates the second half of “In Time of
War” lias a shifiing identity is clear. That one ofits possible references in XXVI is to
Auden and Isherwood themselves has a precedent in the post-Edenic pair of II, as suggested
above, but has an even more clearly demonstrable antecedent in XXIII. There the
sequence’s reference narrows for the one and only tirne to the first person singular as
Auden, acknowledging the personal and poetic example of his model Rilke, identifies
himself in the minimally conspicuous form ofthe objective pronoun “me.” This
inconspicuous “me” in XXIII is clearly Auden, and XXVI’s more obscure “we” may be
profitably taken as referring to Auden and lsherwood.
As a poem from Auden to Isherwood, XXVI gestures toward the gap between
Auden and Isherwood’s public names and fame and the private workshop where they are
both loyers and diligent working partners. The poem reviews elements and attitudes (now
seen to be mistaken) reminiscent ofthe earlier work of both writers, but especially of
Isherwood’s. The poem recails from Isherwood’s work, the condemnation of “the old
manors” (Memorial) and “the children’s games” (Isherwood and Upward’s suppressed
“Mortmere”; Auden and Isherwood’s unpublislied “The Enemies of a Bishop”); the “artistic
girl” who loves “quaint / Unsaleable” art (Goodbye’s Natalia Landauer on Isherwood and
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the narrator’s Conspirators); and with a likely pun on “bugger,” the seif-loving, “selfish,”
propensity to see “In every impracticai beggar a saint” (Otto and others in Mr. Norris and
Goodbye). Isherwood himselfwould mock this last aspect ofhis 1930s self when lie looked
back on the period in the bugger-satirizing “Ambrose” section of Down There. Finally, the
closing unes of the poem seem to comment on the almost completed “cycle” of Auden and
Isherwood’s youthful careers and oftheir coilaboration—the “daring plan,” amid whose
otherwise mixed resuits, the sole reliable proj ect lias been the love that neither of them lias
been troubled by or even taken the trouble to acknowÏedge.
The earlier sonnets of “In Time of War,” culminating in XXVI, provide ample
justification for pursuing an erotic reading of XXVII, and for taking its first quatrain to refer
to lost sexual paradises, whether Eden, Lesbos, or Athens. We can sigh and sigh for
whichever lost paradise is ours or for ail three ofthem. Perhaps we can even sigh for the
idea of a lost equilibrium, an “instinctive poise,” comprehending the homosexuai and the
heterosexual. What we sigh for wili be our choice, for the poem implies that sexuality is
now as much a “choice” as it ever was “instinctive.” Though Auden does not try to resolve
the quintessential Western debate on the naturalness or wilifulness of (homo)sexuaiity, the
first quatrain does identif’ the chief causes ofthe painftilness ofthe debate. On the one
hand, when XXVII describes our pining for an “instinctive” sexual poise which we do not
have, it acknowledges our perennially frustrated desire to see sexuality and our sexual
“choice” made natural; on the other hand, when it reminds us that it is this veiy power of
choice that has led to our being lost and nostalgic, the poem aiso refuses any facile
satisfaction at our having the freedom of sexual choice.
Although questions of the natural versus the volitional origins of hornosexuality
which Western culture has discussed for so long locate the poem in a Western context,
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XXVII’s “ancient South” may tum out to be Eastern rather than Western. We are, afier ail,
supposed to be in China—among the most ancient of lands—and XXVII like most poems in
the sequence’s second haif may actually be a ‘Sonnet from China’. It is easy enough since,
as Auden writes later, the “East is definitely southem” (Prose 2: 335), to convert the
“ancient South” into an “ancient East” by rotating the East-West axis along which Europe
has been opposed to China to align it with the North-South opposition which resonates
throughout Auden’s work (cf. Iceland, F6, “Goodbye to Mezzogiorno,” “Hammerfest”).
East-West and North-South oppositions certainly mark in comparable ways the colonial and
post-colonial history of the twentieth century. XXVII’s “ancient South” can now stand for
an exotic Other, and as with Hellas and Eden, this Other involves a corresponding fantasy
of sexual innocence: the fantasy of a less troubled, instinctive, non-Western sexuality to be
encountered in the ancient vicinities of Timbuktu, Tahiti, Thailand, Taiyuan, or Watutsi
land.
h is difficuh perhaps to accept a Chinese setting for this paradisal vicinity, given the
thousand year old cruelties of Chinese foot binding, ofthe siicing away of boys’ entire
genitalia to ensure their sexual neutrality as eunuchs, and of other sexual and gender
practices, and given the deserved reputation ofthe People’s Republic of China for
repressiveness in sexual matters, including the matter of homosexuality. It is not 50
difficuit to accept that potentially bisexual fantasies of exotic ethnie or anthropological
sexual paradises could replace the more hallowed homosexual and heterosexual golden ages
of Lesbos and Athens, and of Jerusalem and Eden. In spite of the foot binding (which
Isherwood duly remarks upon3), it would have been possible for Auden to imagine China as
The first occasion oflsherwood’s interest in foot binding presents a combination ofthe clinical and
the surreal: “in the operating-theatre, we watched [the medical missionariesJ McClure and Brown
at work. The patient had a vaginal-urethral fistula, sustained in childbirth. We took the
n
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one such exotic homosexual paradise. According to Bret Hinsch, traditional Chinese
tolerance ofhomosexuality was a recurrent source of surprise for Westerners (2). Hinsch
traces the literary contours of the male homosexual past in China, and argues that the
Chinese homosexual tradition “feu victim to a growing sexual conservatism and the
Westernization of morality” in the mid-twentieth century (4). With the 1949 Communist
takeover, homosexuality became a criminal offence in China, and subsequently earlier
Chinese attitudes to homosexuality have been so totally annihulated that, as Hinsch rightly
observes, “anyone familiar with the situation of homosexuals in modem China finds
evidence from earlier centuries almost unbelievable” (163). Yet in 1935 Matignon could
reaffirm (2) that in his experience in China public opinion “reste tout à fait indifférente à ce
genre de distraction et la morale ne s’en émeut en rien: puisque cela plaît à L’opérateur et
que l’opéré est consentant, tout est pour le mieux.” Pederasty was rather considered
“comme une chose de bon ton, une fantaisie dispendieuse et partant un plaisir élégant. [. . .1
Pratiquer la pédérastie, c’est un luxe cher, tout comme manger des nids d’hirondelles ou des
oeufs de cent ans” (267). So common did homosexual acts appear to 5e that Matignon
could record as an axiom that “tout Chinois qui se respecte pratique, a pratiqué, ou
pratiquera, la pédérastie” (262).
Modem ignorance oftraditional Chinese homosexuality has been even more
characteristic of China than the West. Lamenting this forgetflilness, Hinsch wants to
explain both as entirely due to the nefarious influence of homophobie Western morality and
opportunity of examining her feet” (536). This bizarre vignette could serve as an emblem for
representing issues ofgender, gynophobia, cultural histoiy, and semi-colonial domination that are
significant elsewhere in Isherwood’s work and in the history of China as well. A second
occasion—”from one ofthe huts beside the une an old woman emerged on minute bird-like feet
leading by the hand a child often. She beckoned invitingly. I laughed, shook my head, and turned
back towards the train” (556)—altows Isherwood to present foot binding in conjunction with chiÏd
and youth prostitution, issues that we wilI have reason to retum to in our discussion oflshenvood’s
“Travel-Diary.”
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erroneous Western scientific attitudes to homosexuality. Hinsch’s survey ofthe refinements
of the “Male Homosexual Tradition in China” ignores, however, how sordid and cruel
Chinese homosexuaÏity and particularly its elaborate system of paedophilia could be (cf.
Matignon 270-71), and ignores the possibility that modem Chinese forgetftulness is also a
response to intolerable and humiliating memories ofthe realities that Georges Soulié de
Morant commemorates in his tragic masterpiece Pei Yu, Boy Actress and that, as we will
see, Isherwood records as well in “Travel-Diary.” Be that as it may, in ways that are now
more readily associated with places like Thailand, this tolerance of homosexuality and
juvenile prostitution drew Western homosexuals to China right up until 1949, and the
Republican period in which Auden and Isherwood visited China “marks the twilight years
ofthe history ofsexuaf tolerance” (Brady “West Meets East” 103-106).
In this context, we begin to see XXVII and Journey against the backdrop of a maj or
recasfing ofthe nature ofhomosexual experience. If we can take XXVII to involve the
envious sighing ofthe Westemer over non-Western erotic insouciance, or supposed
insouciance, we can also understand XXVII’s nostalgia for “the taste ofjoy in the innocent
mouth” as a response to the guilt of the colonial or semi-colonial (and even post-colonial)
Westemer as he pursues his ancient fantasy of innocence in a disorienting but obviously
decadent ancient South—just as Auden and Isherwood had to take “aflernoon holidays from
their social consciences” to indulge themselves with boys in a bathhouse in Shanghai
(Isherwood Kind 308). The prospect also arises, though, that the innocent mouth Auden is
refering to belongs, flot to a man or a woman, but to a hired, or enslaved, Chinese boy. This
horrifying prospect is consistent with Soulié de Morant’s concluding vision ofthe degraded
decadence oftraditional Chinese paedophilia early in the Republican period through whose
twilight Auden and Isherwood passed. More to the point, the prospect, Auden’s ironic
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renunciation of it in XXVII, and a historicized presentation of paedophilia, are consistent
with themes introduced in Joumey’s ‘Ganymede’ sonnet and Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary.”
(The theme ofthe homosexual exploitation ofpoor boys occurs elsewhere in Isherwood and
in Auden’s early “Uncle Henry,” and the spectre ofhomosexual rape recurs in Auden’s
“Epistie to a Godson” and Anxiety [Collected 480]).
If the homosexuality in XXVII lias a disturbingly exotic Eastem aspect, another
possibility is that the “ancient South” is the phallus itself The first quatrain’s landscapes
seern a typical Audenesque allegory for the human body or, as Spears has it, a “moralized
anatomy” (141): mountains for breasts is a common trope, and one found elsewhere in
Auden’s work (“By landscape reminded once ofhis rnother’s figure / The mountain heights
he remembers get bigger and bigger”). There are other examples in Auden’s work of
eroticized landscapes providing figures for the human body, and though not found in
Auden’s lists of siang for male and female genitals in A Certain World (262), the “ancient
South” quite plausibly refers to human genitalia. The movement from the mountains to the
South” thus imitates a movement from a lover’s breasts down south to the warm, nude
“instinctively poised” phallus; or—since the sestet’s “great door”, whose cairn nudeness we
do not share, can suggest any ofthe variously uncaim, penetrable human orifices, this
southward movement can also be imagined as irnitating the movement to a feminine “door,”
to the vulva and labia majora, to the vagina, or (to be oecumenical about it) the movement
to a masculine or feminine ass, to the anus and rectum. (“Nothing,” XXV hasjust reminded
us, “is certain but the body”). This corporal joumey ofXXVII’s lover is repeated in “The
Platonic Blow” in the movernent from the “masculine tits” down to a raunchy exploration
oflower areas, including the lover’s asshole. Taking the ancient $outh as the phallus. one
begins to hear a paradoxical pun in the “wann nude ages of instinctive poise” such that
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what we sigh for is rather the phallus’ ‘warm nude aegis of instinctive poise’. The image of
a phallic father figure like aegis-bearing Zeus has antecedents in XI and V, and the longing
for protection in the absence of such a father Auden wilÏ explore at greater length with irony
and elegiac dignity in Anxiety’s “Lament for a Law-giver.” In XXVII, the retrograde
potential of such longing resonates in the nostalgie fantasies and the utopian desire for
discipline that our sexual lostness generates in the poem’s second quatrain.
We began, then, by noting a disruptive sexuality which mocks the poem’s political
themes and now note a corresponding political longing and nostalgia which haunts sexuality
in the poem. The erotic and the political dimensions ofthe poem seem to cail each other
into existence as they certainly cali each other into question, each tending to disturb the
other and to complicate the other’s compulsions. XXVII’s first quatrain is masterfully
ambiguous in the way it simultaneously evokes the desires and anxieties of a specific sexual
act, fellatio, and of several rival rnyths or master narratives ofthe history of sexual
happiness and unhappiness. Further ambiguities temper how we can regard ail these erotic
paradigms and exacerbate the ironies and paradoxes associated with the tension between the
quatrain’s political and erotic themes.
Why, for instance, are we sighing? We might be sighing out ofthe fatigue that
cornes with our journey’s arduousness. We rnight be sighing out offrulfilment as we
repeatedly glimpse “the ancient south” in the course of our mountainous wandering. We
might sigh for an ancient South out of regret, because we immediately lose sight of what we
can only glirnpse, or because the myths of a lost paradise of sexuality touch us. We might be
sighing on another level out ofexasperation, sighing not at the recognition implicit in these
narratives that sexual unhappiness is a basic human condition, but sighing out of exasper
ation at the naivety of such tales about a once-upon-a-time-and-place sexual happiness.
An
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This exasperation arises from the obvious unreality ofthe cornfortable nudity ofthose
dreamt ofmythical ages. We know too well that humans caimot simply go nude because we
are exposed to the cold and wet, or to the unbearable heat of the sun, and because whatever
their landscapes, we live with the knowledge of misery, death, peril, work, and human
oppression. It could be too that most human nakedness is so uninspiring that we actually
find the idea of the desirability of those nude ages too farfetclied to entertain with anything
more than a sigh of self and species-deprecating resignation.
Whichever is the reason we sigh, having sighed our fil! in the first quatrain over the
impossibility ofreturning to our ancient south, we move to the second quatrain where rather
than making warrn nude love, we find ourselves “asleep” in our poor huts, dreaming ofthe
balis ofthe future. The shocking arnbiguity ofthe indecorous puns on “balls”—as glam
orous dancing celebration of heterosexuality, as testicles, even as occasions of fucking itself
—typifies the whole stanza. Politically, there is a disturbingly ambivalent image of a
guerilla army, like the Chinese Red Army (which in 1938’s United Front lias been reconstit
uted as the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies), biding its tirne in huts preparing to
celebrate its assumption of power. It is disturbing flot because of right or left wing ideolog
ical considerations, but because the guerrillas’ orientation to the future and enduring ofpre
sent deprivation are destined to be succeeded by glory even while justice goes unmentioned.
It is disturbing too because, whereas Auden had written a year earlier in his own
political pamphlet poem “Spain 1937” ofthe “conscious acceptance ofguilt in the
necessary murder,” here the “disciplined movements” are in denial about the harmfulness of
their plans or their intricate mazes. Behind this denial or blindness lurks rnuch ofthe dark
history of modem utopian political movements whose violence had already troubled Auden
in late-Weimar Gerrnany and Republican Spain and which he would corne to understand as
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inherent in their forward-looking orientation: thus, “the Utopian dream permits indulgence
in aggressive fantasies” because “the actions by which [Utopia] could be realized are a
necessary element in [the Utopian’s] dream” (Hand 410). Whereas the first quatrain’s
evocation of political tendencies circa 1938 seem most relevant to right-wing fascist and
Nazi themes ofnostalgia and patemalistic authority, the second quatrain’s seem most
relevant to Marxist and Communist themes ofrevolution, future utopias, and self-sacrifice,
and to 1930s lefiist duplicity regarding Soviet and Spanish Republican atrocities. We are
disturbed finally because the second quatrain’s dream ofa glorious future seems no more
destined to be realized than the first quatrain’s happy pastis to be regained—the earlier
“again and again” ofunassaugeable nostalgia being echoed now by the perpetual deferral of
the glorious future as “for ever and ever” we onlyfolÏow the mazes’ plans. “Plans,”
whether XXVI’s “daring” plan or even Soviet “five year plans,” may be the new “choice” of
the “disciplined movements ofthe heart,” but they are no more likely to lead us out ofthe
lost, impoverished condition our choice bas lefi us wandering in than the first quatrain’s
southem fantasies are. Indeed the echoes in XXVII of the Anglican conclusion of the
Lord’s Prayer—”for Thine is the Kingdom, the Power and the Glory, for ever and ever.
Amen”—suggest ideas of etemity and transcendent perfection that make a mockery of
human plans for glorious futures.
As significant as the shifi in temporal orientation between quatrains from nostalgia
and visions of past fullness to utopianism and visions of future glory is the shifi from our
original vague “wandering” to the second quatrain’s “disciplined movements.” The
dissatisfactions ofpointless vagabondage prompt a fantasy about an earnest discipline
leading us out of our maze, but with the phrase “the disciplined movements ofthe heart”
corne the political, moral, and sadomasochistic implications that the idea of discipline
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entails. The association of sadomasochism with the late Auden’s civil persona is not so
obvious, but in 1935 Isherwood, in a conspiratorial nod to his friend’s reputation as the
enfant terrible who from undergraduate days had presented himself to friends as shockingly
uninhibited and sexually adventurous (Carpenter 48), dedicated to Auden the scandalous
tale ofthe sadomasochistic roué Mr. Norris. (As in the case of XXVI, several details in
XXVII gain depth when read with Isherwood in mmd: the first quatrain’s vagabondage and
interest in an illusory South can be taken as referring to Isherwood’s ceaseless wandering
through the thirties and to the ilÏ-fortuned Greek queer-topia he satirizes in Down There; the
very word “lost” ofthe first une is a keyword in lsherwood’s 1930s writing; indeed “The
Lost” was to have been the titie of Isherwood’s projected epic ofthe period ofwhich
Goodbye and Mr. Norris are the fragments; lastly, not only does the latter novel infonu the
second quatrain’s sadomasochism, but it is possible to see in the coincidence ofutopianism
and hornosexual frustration and in-joking in the second quatrain, a nod to the gay
Ïiberationism that is a unifying socio-political concern oflsherwood’s life’s work).
With the emergence in the second quatrain ofthe idea of discipline, we see thatjust
as erotic fantasies and sexual vulgarity mock the power of the political themes, so political
anxieties haunt the heart’s erotic themes. Like the first quatrain’s implication that choice in
sexuality leads to sexual unhappiness and its suggestion of a paedophilic fantasy, the intrus
ion ofthe ideas of social and sado-masochistic discipline into the poern’s sexual fantasies
makes it impossible to read the poem lightÏy, even after we become aware ofthe poem’s
shocking or comic sexual vulgarity. The sexual, the erotic, the hedonistic may deconstruct,
critique, or ironize the graver political problems and eamest ideological perspectives the
poem explores, but this happens only ambivalently; for the political themes ofthe poem
also make the poem’s sexual prankishness and erotic longing tactless, even sinister.
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As we tum to the sestet, “our” wistful nostalgia and hopeftil dreams have been
transformed into “envy,” with its overtones ofthe french envier in so far as we desire the
assuredness of those streams and houses, and of the etymological invidia in so far as we
resentfully wish iii upon them. The ever-moving streams and the sedentary domestic
“houses” represent two contrasting ways ofbeing “sure,” neither of which “we” possess.
Instead, “we” must envy them because “we are articled to error.” 1-lere the root of ‘errof in
‘err’ allows Auden to couple the earlier idea of wandering with the idea of being mistaken:
so that, if in the first le, “our choice” is the origin of our “wandering,” here our wandering
is linked to our having been mistaken in that choice.
It is crucial to see that the turn from octave to sestet really involves in quick
succession two drastically different tums. The first is the move that replaces the octave’s
nostalgie desires and utopian hopes with an envy into which our frustration and jealousy
cause us to lapse. (Auden links the themes ofEros and ofhuman envy ofthe natural world’s
simpler certainties in the 1936 song “fish in the unruffled lakes.” One also discerns in
XXVII a shadow of homosexual enviousness of apparent heterosexual certitudes. There
may even be a nod on Auden’s part in the direction oflsherwood’s heterosexual-resenting
experience of homosexuality). The morally destructive alternative of envy, however, must
be turned away from immediately; it offers no solution to the octave’s disappointments and
unsolved problems; such envy is in fact an expression of our despair. Yet only once envy’ s
false alternative has been proposed can the recurrent “but” which Mendelson has identified
as defining the sequence’s dialectic reorient the entire poem (Early 357). This is because
the “but” must accomplish two linked but distinct reorientations at once. The “but” of “But
we are articled to error” turns away from both the positive temptations of nostalgia and
utopianism and the negative temptations of envy and despair; moreover, it overcomes those
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intertwined temptations as it tums towards the unpromising laws ofthe sestet.
The legal diction of “we are articled to error” remind us ofthe Audenesque
intrusion ofthe reality ofthe law into the aesthetic world ofmyth. It is consistent too with
Auden’ s use elsewhere of legalistic language, images, and concepts to discuss moral and
erotic issues (see, for instance, “Law like Love”, a poem behind which one senses Auden’s
awareness ofthe legal prohibitions against homosexuality; and sec Hyde’s summative
discussion ofthe concept and force in Auden’s work of”The Hidden Law” [446-463]). In
XXVII, Auden’s legalese suggests that the association of our freedom to choose with our
inevitable mistakenness and our consequent errancy is a law by which we must live.
Moreover the iaw is categorical in its negativity: we “neyer” were in an unanxious past so
our sighs for it are futile; we “neyer” will be in a perfected future so our dreams there are
futile as well. The sestet’s two ‘nevers’ nullify once and for ail the realisticness ofthe
erotic and political visions both ofthe nostalgia ofthe first quatrain’s “again and again” and
ofthe hope ofthe second’s “ever and ever.”
Once those negative conditions have been asserted, we move to a positive statement
ofthe nature ofthe law. for the implications ofthe iaw according to which we must live are
rendered explicit in the formula ofthe sonnet’s penultimate line: “We live in freedom by
necessity.” This final reveiation ofthe iaw is consistent with our having been “articled to
error,” flot only because ‘being articled to error’ describes so aptly a modem truth-seeking,
law-formulating scientific method, but also because a “hope for change persists faintly in
the word articÏed [since] one is articied to apprenticeship [...J for a fixed and finite term”
(Mendelson Early 200). We have been articled to error, and the end of otir erring coincides
with the recognition ofthe law, though the law our error has taught us to recognize will be
the law ofthe infinite retum ofthe problem offreedom: “We live in freedorn by necessity.”
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Pronounced with the definitive authority of a proverb, this sounds like a conclusion to the
sonnet’s explorations ofits themes. Actually the Iine’s philosophical abstractness and spare
language stand at several rernoves from the poetic images and human situations that the
sonnet describes. The relation ofthis conclusive unequivocal-sounding staternent to the
various ambiguities ofthe poem would soon becorne problernatic, except that before we can
begin to corne to terms with the meaning ofthe proverb, the sentence moves on to the
poem’s final une and back to the already established images and more familiar language of
“A mountain people living among mountains.”
The poern’s last une takes us from the finality of the previous line’s conclusion back
to the original lost condition ofthe poem’s opening, our beginning “upon the mountains of
our choice.” We are retumed to the lost condition from which we have tried and aiways
will try to escape, whetlier to a wished-for past which lias neyer existed or a dreamed-of
future which neyer shah corne to pass. Ratlier than ease our dissatisfaction with our
lostness, the poem leads to the recognition that this condition is permanent. In fact, our
dissatisfaction is now more profound because the poem seems to close off both past and
future as avenues of escape, even for fantasy.
That our dissatisfaction is more complete is signaled in the rnutation ofthe first
line’s “wandering lost” into the last line’s “dwelling”—for if we once hoped to move from a
condition of lost wandering through a condition ofpurposeful hut-inhabiting movement to a
more secure condition ofdwehling, like those ofthe “streams and houses that are sure,” the
first and hast unes tehi us that whether we are “wandering lost” or “dwelling” in the
mountains, the mountains remain the anxious mountains of our uncertain, erroneous
choices. “Dwelling” cannot, anymore than “wandering,” preserve us from the moral peril
ofthose mountains. “Dwelling” here echoes XIV’s “We dwell upon the earth,” a phrase
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Mendelson traces in Auden, as in Heidegger, to Hôlderlin’s “dichterisch, wohnet der
Mensch auf dieser Erde.” Whereas though the Nazi-tainted Heidegger uses the une to
confirm that “Being itselfis founded by poetic language,” Auden uses it “to expose the
corruption of any system of thouglit that regards the ethically neutral powers of language or
nature as the measure of ail things” (Early 354). In English, “to dwell upon” lias the
idiomatic sense of”to worry orbe anxious about.” This other sense of”dwell” in XXVII’s
last une means that our dwelling place ultimately aiways remains a place of anxiety too. We
can either choose to dwell in the moral mountains ofthat anxiety, or in a probabÏy futile
effort to escape, we can choose to resume our anxious wandering again.
So at the end ofthis poem we retum to the difficulties we begin with. We have
learned to negate two false solutions to our erotic and political problems, and have acquired
one bit of abstract wisdom that will stay with us. It is, however, a wisdom that does not
promise any respite, any way out ofthe mountains; a wisdom that heightens awareness but
which provides no answers. There is no end in sight to the moral problems, and so the only
way for this poem to end is for it to put us back in an infinite regress where it began, which
is not where we think we belong, but where, happily or unhappily, we must reside.
“The last une, ‘A mountain people dwelling among mountains,’ is a conclusion to
the sequence that leaves everything to be played again, where stiil [as Auden writes in
“Morality in an Age 0f Change”l ‘we do have to choose, every one of us” (O’Neill and
Reeves 176). Notice, though, how this conclusion’s radically disorienting implications are
mitigated to the extent that the final line’s repetitiveness and concreteness, in tandem with
the fonnulaic certitude of the preceding une, make those unes familiar and reassuring.
XXVII, even as it rules out any possibility ofa truÏy reconciled conclusiveness, manages
thus to suggest a sense of closure. Like, however, the Christian numerological convention
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that the number twenty-seven (as the triply Trinitarian product ofthree times three times
three) involves perfection and completion, XXVII’s closure is conventional and formally
punctual, but it is flot substantive. The closure is essentially illusory, for the ending in no
way resolves the problems XXVII has presented; it simply retums us to them; and the sense
of completion in its closure does flot hold in the larger contexts of “In lime of War” for any
longer than we need to tum two blank pages to the introduction of “Commentaiy” which, as
the sonnet sequence itselfdoes, opens retrospectively with Mankind’s tentative beginnings.
Ihe ending of XXVII may not even allow us to move on to “Commentary” at ail.
for the anxious mountains and the potential for renewed wandering in its close return flot
oniy to the beginning of XXVII, but also to the very beginning of Journey, to the shipboard
questions ofthe first stanza ofthe opening poem “Ihe Voyage” “when the mountains swim
away {. .1 / and the gulis abandon their vow” (if there is a pun on “gulis”, it refers to the
once again departing travel-snobs Auden and Isherwood). In fact, the last une of XXVII
also retums to the first sentence and pages oflsherwood’s “Iravel Diary,” where the
riverboat called the Tai Shan canies Auden and Isherwood into China, since “Shan” means
mountain and the name of the Tai Shan, which Isherwood thrice draws attention to, refers to
one of China’s most sacred mountains. Ihe association ofmountains, motion, and human
journeys occurs repeatedly in Joumey. It occurs in the book’s, twice staged, departure
scenes—first from England or Europe in “Ihe Voyage” and second from colonial Hong
Kong to China in “Iravel Diary.” It occurs again at the beginning of XXVII and again in
the “Iravel Diary”s F6-like hike up mountain passes to the summit. Ihe recurrent
associations ofmountains andjoumeying mean that when the last une of XXVII returns us
to the sonnet’s own beginning, it refers as well to the very beginning ofthe book and the
beginning ofthe “lravel-Diary.” Ihe retum and the infinite regress at the end of XXVII is
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thus three-fold, and the mountainjoumey thematized in the poem is repeated endlessly.
“In circling back to its own opening, [a] poem appropriates one ofthe simplest and
most effective closural devices” (Herrnstein $mith 256). However, when a poem’ s opening
is a vista of lostness, nostalgia, desire, anxiety, and wandering, the effect of this device
becomes anti-closuraÏ. At the end of XXVII, Auden thus creates diametrically opposed
effects: on the one hand, he successfully suggests the “strong and secure” sense of closure
that is almost inherent in a Renaissance form such as the sonnet; while, on the other hand,
he actually offers the “weak” and “minimal” closure typical ofRomantic and modem poetry
which has tended to involve “ultimately unresolvable” dialectical processes (234; 247).
Smith’ s description of Eliot’ s modemist poems as allowing for “the expressive qualities of
weak closure—a sense of open-endedness, a refusaI to [. . j solve the unsolvable, resolve
the unresolvable— [though] they also secure adequate closure” (250), applies also to
XXVII. The complexities ofXXVII’s closure are indicative ofthe modemism ofAuden’s
1930s renovation ofthe sonnet. Following Smith, we sec in XXVII’s complex and illusory
closure, the coincidence of Renaissance and Romantic concems and poetics, and take
XXVII’s closing inconclusiveness as representative ofAuden’s contribution to modem
poetics. Moreover, just as the political, religious, and erotic themes identified in XXVII are
exemplamy ofthe themes that Journey as a whole explores at greater length, SO the poem’s
anticlosural closure is exemplamy of ail the other concluding moments in Joumey that we
will explore. Before we can consider those other moments though, we have yet to finish
with the ultimately unresolvable dialectic ofthe conclusion of XXVII.
CHAPTER 2
LARGE CLAIMS FOR A SMALL POEM:
XXVII IN AUDEN’S WORK, JOURNEY,
AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
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THE DIALECTICS 0F NECESSARY FREEDOM
The allusion to Engels in XXVII’s conclusion bas less to do specifically with
Chinese Communism than with the general ideological situation of 1938. In the context of
Auden’s work as a whole, however, the une is crucial. It constitutes a fuicrum around which
we can sec Auden defily moving into place several ideological burdens which are central
flot only to his own work and to Journey, but also to twentieth-century political controversy.
The implications ofXXVII’s “We live in frcedom by necessity” open onto a vast range of
ideological problems, the responses to which in Joumey are expressions of core struggies of
their time. At issue in that one line are Auden’s existential appreciation ofthe problems of
the philosophical comprehension of the relationship of frecdom and necessity, the relevance
of modem Cbristianity, and the limitations oftwentieth centuly Marxism and Communism.
As with its paradoxical anticlosural closure, XXVII presents the human condition as
irremediably uncertain with an artistry that is nothing if not assured. XXVII “achieves the
perfection whose absence it laments” (Morson 287) largcly because ofAuden’s certainty
about our uncertain moral freedom. “We live in freedom by necessity” resounds at the end
of XXVII with the definitive authority of proverbial wisdom, yet this apparent certitude,
even as it rises above them, is undermined by the ambiguity, erroneousness, and negation
out of which the line is pronounced. In the midst of moral certainty, the line’s declarative
certitude memorably preserves what is pcrhaps the crucial moment of an ideological
dynamic central to Auden’s work. Far from providing a definitive conclusion, XXVII’s
penultimate line announces a new departure in Auden’s intellectual odyssey to find an
equilibrium in his understanding ofthe relationship between freedom and necessity. One
cannot overemphasize the importance ofthis issue in Auden’s work. The titie of
Greenberg’s study ofAuden, Ouest for the Necessary underscores its centrality. Replogle
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notes that a “freedom-necessity-choice conception of human existence” was central to
Auden’s “intellectual development” (“Marxisrn” 594), and argues that, as XXVII’s allusion
to Anti-Duhring suggests, Auden got several ofthe freedom-necessity-choice ideas that
preoccupied him through his career from Marx and particularly from Engels (590, 594).
PhiÏosophy and religious thought richly illustrate the paradoxes, contradictions,
complementarities, doctrinal mysteries, and institutional controversies associated with ideas
offreedom, necessity, and choice. In some respects it is easy to locate Auden’s handiing of
these themes within the histories of philosophy and religion. His linking of freedom and
necessity reflects Auden’s affiliation with post-Hegelian thought (“Hegel and his left-wing
followers looked upon freedom and necessity as two sides ofthe sarne coin, two ideas
dialectically interconnected” (Marcoulesco 419)). In other ways, however, it is not easy to
appreciate what distinguishes or drives Auden’s thinking on these two dialectically
connected ideas.
To comprehend Auden’s position, it will be “necessary to recognize, as several
commentators have noted f. . -] Auden’s fondness for paradoxical statements about the
relation between choice and necessity” (Jacobs 11$). Auden’s appreciation ofthe
paradoxes that ideas regarding “freedom-necessity-choice” lead to means that as lie returns
to these problems later in his career, lie is less interested in arriving at simple solutions to
them than he is in illuminating their difficult undecideable reality. And though Auden
retums to the knotty complex of ideas regarding “freedom-necessity-choice” ftequently in
lis subsequent career, “In Time of War” remains the pivotal moment in his lifelong
engagement with the problem offreedom. In comprehending Auden’s position, we need to
recognize the historically specific dimensions of his preoccupation with freedom and
necessity, for “the nature ofliberty f. . .] obsessed the young intellectuals ofthe thirties”
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(Hoskins 85). This generational fixation is directly related to larger political crises of the
1930s, and is particularly relevant to Joumey since young 1930s intellectuals saw liberty as
the central issue ofthe Sino-Japanese War.
Auden dwells obsessively on the thernes of freedom and choice tbroughout “In Time
of War.” The first sormet notes that one of the features that distinguished humanity in
contrast to the animais from the very beginning is that the malleable, dissembling, fearful,
erroneous, childish human creature “chose his love.” II recounts that the heterosexual
and!or homosexual post-paradisal ‘they’ “wept and quarrelled [because] freedom was so
wild;” and IV observes that for the unfree peasant, it was “the mountains [who] chose the
mother ofhis chiidren.” Then in V, the military leader cornes “to free [the young] from
their mothers.” IX speaks of an enigmatic heroic “they” who “are what we feed on as we
make our choice. / We bring them back with promises to ftee thern [. . . I. . .1 They could
retum to freedom; they would rejoice.” The gods and goblins ofthe old superstitious world
are glad in XII “To be invisible and free.” In XV, the evil-doing Japanese bomber pilots
who, though “free,” “chose a fate / The islands where they live did flot compel,” thus
demonstrating that “At any time it will be possible / b turn away from freedom.” XVI
speaks of “Exiles” who along with their countries have lost their freedom, ofother people’s
“freedom” being hostile to them, and ofthe “may” ofpossibility and choice becoming a
“must” of compulsion. Before returning in the sequence’s final sonnet, variations on the
theme of freedom have been encountered in a bewildering set of cornbinations that opens
horizons ofthought stretching far beyond the terms ofthe freedom-necessity-choice
conception ofhuman life that Replogle suggests Auden initially derived from Engels.
Recognizing the affiliation of this complex of ideas with Engels and Communist
thought is crucial to understanding the dissenting, transformative, intellectual labour that
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Auden performs in “In Time of War.” An ideological orientation sympathetically influenced
by Marx and Engels, to say nothing of a partisan identification with Communist Party
orthodoxy, was so widespread among Auden’s contemporaries in the mid to late 1930s that
it is hardly necessaiy to demonstrate its importance. Only months before Auden and
Isherwood travelled to China, their mutual friend and literary conscience Edward
Upward—who had joined the Cornmunist Party as early as 1932 (Spender World 132) and
whom Auden in Iceland had lately named his literary executor (Prose 1: 359-360)—had
published his “Sketch for a Marxist Interpretation ofLiterature” in Day Lewis’ Mmd In
Chains; and Auden himself had claimed to “agree with” Illusion and Reality, Caudwell’s
“Marxist book on the aesthetics ofpoetiy” (Prose 1: 386-87). If Auden came closest to
endorsing Communism as a political movement in late-1 932 and early-1933 (Mendelson
Early 1$-19, 14$-51), 1937-3$ is the considered expression ofAuden’s theoretical opermess
to Marxism with “Spain 1937,” frontier, and “In Time of War,” each representing thorough
engagements with Marxian and Communist perspectives (Replogle 590-593), and with “In
Time of War” being “more indebted to Marx and Engels than anything Auden ever wrote”
(592). This indebtedness is most productive in the Marxian analyses ofthe material and
ideological limits of the subjectivities that Auden presents in the sequence’ s early sonnets.
However, as the trajectory of Auden’s meditations on freedom and necessity shows, “In
Time of War” reveals not Auden at his most Marxist, but Auden surveying Marxian
philosophical themes even as he is definitively tuming away, in XXVII and “Cornmentary”
especially, from the possibility of a Communist political position.
It is a received critical idea that Auden’s unambiguous public articulation ofhis
differences with Communism took longer than it should have. This is a view common
among American critics of an anti-communist sensibility and British critics who can stiil
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feei the siight to English self-esteem caused by Auden’s emigration. Cunningliam descrihes
how, for Auden as for many others, the tum away from Communism or feÏÏow-traveliing
proto-Communism began with disillusionment regarding the Republican side during the
Spanish Civil War, and suggests that fears both of abetting the fascist cause in Europe, and
ofbeing “maligned and ostracized on the Lefi” (as Orweli was for Homage to Catalonia)
prevented a quick unequivocal goodbye to the Popular Front and ail that. It was far easier,
suggests Cunningham, “to let one’ s enthusiastic tones leak slowly out and the damning
confessions to emerge, if at ail, siowly and later. This was Auden’s way” (461).
As Auden’s revisions and rejections ofpoems from this period attest, Auden had
things to answer for with respect to fis adoption of, or his wiiiingness to ailow others to
project onto him, a public role as poet for a ciearly compromised Left (though sometimes
Auden’s detractors conveniently forget that many others have as much or far more to
expiate for thcir alignments, whether with the Lefi or with an at least as egregiousiy
compromised Right). However, it is also true that Auden’s engagement with Marxian
Engeisian ideas—his borrowings from them, his debate with them, and his detachment from
them—though characterized by complexity and some ambiguities, is untainted by the
spineiess disingenuousness and lingering sneakiness ofCunningham’s insinuations.
Whatever the particularities of Auden’ s case in so far as he aliowed himseif to be
identified as a partisan spokesman, Joumey does invoive Auden and Isherwood’s clear
dissassociation ofthemselves from Communism. More pertinent than the issue ofwhether
Auden in the iate 1930s made a clear break with Communism is the fact that on a
philosophical level his encounter with Marx and Engels and Communism provokes a
productive intellectual exactingness that ieads to a lasting wisdom. The association of
Auden with proto-Communist partisanship, in whatever respect it might be justified, and
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Auden’s disavowals ofrhetorical political poems that others valued highly, are interesting
as special instances of phenomena of ideological and political alignment, schism, and
reorientation experienced in countless twentieth-century lives. Grosvenor’ s argument that
Auden’s intellectual crisis in 1937-3$ “was a personification ofthe crisis ofa moment in
British literai-y history” (Izzo Legacy 240) actualÏy applies to more than just literary histoiy
or just Britain. One must be careful, though, about how one projects those broader crises
onto Auden’s work. Auden’s crisis is important as a representative expression of a critical
moment, but the instructive record ofAuden’s transformation during that crisis ofideas
derived from Marx and Engels exhibits considerably more integrity and clear sightedness
than many have allowed him. One reason Auden’s 1937-3$ crisis is widely misrepresented
is that so few critics have given Joumey the attention it requires. Correct but undeveloped
is Replogle’s assessment that Auden “escaped nearly ail the frenzied doubts and conflicting
anxieties [regarding Communism] ofhis neo-Marxist middle-class friends,” but that “in the
end the philosophical tenets of Marx and related thinkers probably had a more lasting effect
on [Audenj than on the others” (Poetry 24). XXVII, like Journey as a whole, reveals the
complexity ofthis individuai and epochai crisis in partisan engagement and philosophical
comprehension. If Auden had been a committed Communist before Journey, Cuimingham’s
snideness about Auden’s equivocal ways of signaling his disaffection would be justified
because Journey couid then be condemned as flot presenting this ideologicai shifi forcefully
enough as a major turning point that is a break and a disavowal. Since, however, Auden
had flot so committed himself, no such disavowal was in order, and Journey rather than
being principally concemed to articulate a break with Marxism reveals instead Auden
seeing through 1 930s Marxism to other horizons.
XXVII’s une “We live in freedom by necessity” is important because it records an
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epiphany in Auden’s long meditation on the themes of fteedom and necessity, but aiso
because with this une Auden signais that he is weli beyond the limits of conternporary
Communist orthodoxy or proto-Communist partisanship. When O’Neiii and Reeves
observe that XXVII “flot only cites but also breathes life into Engels’ dictum that ‘freedorn
is the knowiedge ofnecessity” (176), they are only haif way to the truth. for in XXVII,
Auden does flot just cite Engels, he radicaÏiy revises Engels’ understanding of the
relationship of freedom and necessity. Auden’s variations on the themes of freedom and
necessity would continue to involve revisions ofEngels’ phrasing and thouglit, but wouid
do so in an effort, not to simply reject, but to critique and contextualize the Marxian and
Communist positions. Henceforth Auden’ s explorations of the freedom-necessity-choice
complex are part of a search for a fuller understanding—which for Auden would inciude an
orthodox Christian understanding—ofthe implications ofthe conclusion of XXVII.
The radical nature ofXXVII’s reformulation ofEngels’ conception ofthe
relationship between freedom and necessity lias flot been clarified adequately in the critical
literature. Replogle in his review of “Auden’s Marxism” refers to XXVII only as a “final
summation,” and not, as he should have, as a ‘transforming revision’ ofAuden’s
understanding of Engel’s comments on freedorn and necessity. Replogle notes that “the
freedom-necessity-choice concept does not disappear” (593) after “In Tirne of War” and
argues that Marx and Engels “laid the foundation for a conception of human existence that,
incorporated into and transforrned by Christian theology, became the central theme of
[Auden’s] later poetry” (595). Replogle does flot explain why “oddly enougli, with
[XXVII’sJ final summation ofthe human condition, Auden’s Marxism ends abruptly”
(593). This is not strictly truc, since Marxist vocabulary again dominates in the fifih age of
Anxiety (Gottlieb 95), but it is truc that the degree ofAuden’s engagement changes
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drastically afier XXVII. Replogle caimot explain why this is so, because like other
commentators, Replogle bas not noticed that through XXVII Auden is already articulating
an understanding of freedom and necessity which contradicts Marx and Engels.
Replogle’s presentation of Auden’s treatment ofEngels is lucid, but incomplete.
Later critics like O’Neill and Reeves simply beg the question by telling us that Auden
“breathes new life into Engels’ dictum.” Other critics confuse the issue by persistently
aligning Auden with Engels even afier Buell’s 1973 observation that in XXVII “Auden lias
wittily transformed Engels’ famous dictum that ‘freedom is the consciousness ofnecessity
into a statement that no longer concerns the relation ofthe individual consciousness to
historical law but rather the aloneness and fallibility of man within a world that gives him
no assurances” (176). Ihe inability to perceive what XXVII means derives from the
complexity ofthe sonnet’s ending with its returns, its infinite regresses, and illusory closure.
It also derives from resistance and projections engendered by the controversies regarding
Auden’s relationship to twentieth century socialism and communism, and ofAuden’s
beliefs regarding these -isms in the 1930s and after. Thus, Stan Smith (misquoting) writes
“It is a travesty ofthis sequence, which ends up with the orthodox ‘Marxist’ proposition,
‘We live in freedom of [sic] necessity...’, to cast it as a rejection of socialism, as [. .
Callan does” (118). Far from travesty, what Callan actually does is to situate the sequence
“at a critical point in [Auden’sl intellectual development between early 1937 when he went
to Spain, and late 1939 when he assernbled the collection Another Time” (Callan 135).
Smith’s objection that Callan reads the sequence in the light of hindsight finds support in
the fact that Callan considers, flot the original “In lime of War” sequence, but “Sonnets
from China,” the sequence as Auden himselfrewrote it much later. Nonetheless Callan’s
conclusion that by “the end ofthe thirties [Auden] had become, philosophically, flot a
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Communist, but a would-be Christian,” in spite of its misleading suggestion that Auden
ever was a Communist, trumps Smith’s mistaken daim that “In lime of War” ends with an
“orthodox ‘Marxist’ proposition.” Seen in the overail context ofAuden’s career, “In Time
of War” and XXVII reveal what Jacobs following Maclntyre describes as a “fault une”
where the tectonic plates of different “traditions of moral inquiry” meet and where the
daims ofthese conflicting traditions must be adjudicated (Jacobs xvi-xvii)—the conflicting
traditions in this case being Marxism and Christianity.
Smith argues that it is “illicit to import Auden’s subsequent biography into the poem
to justify this reading” (11$), but reference to Auden’s subsequent biography does flot
constitute an “illicit” justification for a reading, even if it is not an entirely ‘necessary and
sufficient’ one. The problem for $mith is not whether Auden’s later biography and
ideological development can be ‘imported’ into an interpretation of XXVII. Smith’s
problem is that he wishes Auden’s later biography were other than it is. A further problem
is that aspects of what Smith thinks of as “subsequent biography” are already in the 193$
poem. For Auden in XXVII has already rejected Marxist philosophy in favour of something
resembling Judeo-Christian philosophy.
XXVII’s revision ofEngels became a permanent feature ofAuden’s thinking and is
closely related to ideological developments central to the twentieth-century. In order to
understand Auden’s revision ofEngels, we need to recali exactly what Auden was
responding to. Engels writes in Herr Eugen Dtihring’s Revolution in Science
Regel was the first to state conectly the relation between freedom and
necessity. b him, freedom is the appreciation ofnecessity. [. . .J Freedom
does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the
knowledge ofthese laws, and in the possibility this gives ofsystematically
making them work toward definite ends. [...]freedom of the will therefore
means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with real knowledge of the
subject. [. . . I Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and
over extemal nature which is founded on knowledge ofnatural necessity; it is
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therefore necessarily a product ofhistorical development (125-26).
Engels retums to the relationship offreedom and necessity in a conclusion to AntiDuhring
diametricaily opposed to that of XXVII, and in a partisan flourish, Engeis prophesies that
“humanity’s leap from the reaim of necessity into the reaim of freedorn” wiii happen once
and for ail only when the “modem proletariat” accompiishes its “worid-cmancipating [. ..]
historical mission” (310). for Engels, freedom progressively supercedes necessity so that
he predicts humanity’s eventuai accession to a reaim of total freedom.
There is no such utopianism or even progressivism in the conclusion of XXVII. On
the contrary, in spite of some hints earlier in the sequence and later in “Commentary” that
Auden does want to see freedom as emerging in history, the poem categoricaiiy rejects
utopianism and progressivism. Auden wouid iater describe as Un-Christian the ideas “that
man can become free by knowiedge” and “that he who knows the good wiii wiil it,” and
holds instead that “knowledge only increases the danger” (Lectures 312). A second
difference from Engels is that XXVII has us not only ending in freedom, but begirming in it.
“We live in freedom by necessity” is far less compatible with Engeis’ point ofview than it
is incompatible. The une is so riddlingiy polysemous as to be impossible to reduce to any
single reading. What the line means varies according to what “by” is taken as meaning and
to whom the “we” in question refers. We noted in the previous chapter the ambiguities
throughout “In Time 0f War” sunounding Auden’ s use of personai pronouns, particuiarly
his use of”we.” In XXVII the candidates for first person pltiral subjectivity range from a
universal humanity in its political and erotic aspects; to more specific political coiiectivities,
lefi, right, etbnic, or national; to gender and erotic groupings, including maie homosexuais
r,,
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in particular; to Auden and Isherwood themselves.1
As if those permutations were flot enough, depending how one takes the preposition
“by,” there are several possible senses in which one can interpret the une. Only one ofthese
amounts to an agreement with Engels who daims that for freedom-comprehending Regel
“ist die Freiheit die Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit” (Engels Gesamtausgabe 118). Each of
the other senses means something quite different and some are distinctly at odds with
Communist orthodoxy of 1938, specifically with Stalin’s argument—an argument in a text
dated from September 193$ and so exactly contemporaneous with XXVII—for the
extension to the study of history and society of the same Engelsian principles that dialectical
materialists employ in the study of nature (Stalin Dialectical 5). Only if”by” is read as “by
means of’ can Auden be taken as saying with Engels that we become free through our
mastery ofnecessity, i.e. by means ofour knowledge ofnatural law. In this case “We live in
fteedom by necessity” does mean something like “Freedom is the appreciation of
necessity.” Such a sense of “by”, though, is neither idiomatically, nor the sense most
consistent with the poem’ s rej ections of utopian and progressive anticipations of future
certainties, and with the poem’s insistence on the inevitability both of choice and error and
ofhaving to live with the consequences of our choices.
Idiom and context suggest a reading ofthe une that says that we are free because we
Auden exploits the ambiguity ofpersonal pronouns again in “In Praise ofLimestone”:
The ‘we’ / ‘they’ ofthe poem may, then, be successively (a) human beings y.
animais (le. “the inconstant ones” versus the “beasts who repeat themselves”); (b)
artists y. non-artists (ie. the chiid y. his rival brothers, in Auden’s theory of art this rivalry
being a wish to piease the Urmutter); (e) Engiish y. Italians (with their different
conceptions of God); (d) vailey-dweilers y. mountain-dwellers and nomads; (e) the loyers
(Auden and Kaliman) y. the seekers of “immoderate soils”; and (f) human beings y. statues.
The poem’s power cornes from the suggestive and shifiing variety of its propositions”
(fuller 406).
I wouid add homosexuais y. heterosexuals to the ‘we’ / ‘they’ oppositions of”Limestone.”.
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must be: we are freefaute de ,nieux; we cannot choose flot to choose; our freedom has been
thrust on us from the beginning. Or, as $mith tellingly misquotes the une, “We live in
freedom ofnecessity” [my italics]. In Engels’ Hegelian terms the only necessity that the
poem teaches us to recognize is the necessity of recognizing our freedom. Instead of
breathing new life into Engeis’ dictum, Auden tums Engels’ idea ofthe relationship of
freedom and necessity inside out, and converts it to the idea, which he would restate twenty
five years later in The Dyer’s Hand, that “Necessity is the consciousness ofFreedom” (61).
The readings ofthe une suggested so far are ail compatible with the broadest senses
ofthe poem’s first person plural subject, with the “we” as humanity in its entirety coming to
terms with its collective story, common situation, and shared nature. Other contexts and
plural subjects, however, radically reorient the import ofthe line. In Joumey, there are also
far iess universal ‘we’s contrasted with far less universal ‘they’s. In “The Ship” and “Hong
Kong,” there are ‘we’s’ as Occidentals or British versus them as Orientais; in XIII, it is
versus a ‘them’ as Chinese; in XV it is versus a ‘them’ as Japanese. Since freedom is not
just an abstract philosophicai question in Journey, but an urgent geo-political problem, this
non-Japanese “we” is a democratic “us” versus a dictator-dominated “them.” Spears holds
that the “surface reference [in XXVIII is topical and political—democracy versus
totalitarianism” (142). Auden elaborates on this opposition of an “us” as democrats to a
“them” ofFascist, Nazi, and Japanese totalitarianisms in “Commentaiy.” In this context,
XXVII’s second last line conflrrns that ‘We live in democratic freedomfaute de mieux.’
This is what Auden implies in his panicky “Democracy’s Reply to the Challenge of
Dictators,” the text ofa speech delivered in October 1938 (Prose 1: 816), and in the 1937
pamphlet “Education” (415). These two texts do much to clarify Auden’s proclairned
politics and stand as a contemporary refutation of the idea that Auden can be thought of as
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Communist in this period.
XXVII’s next to concluding une can also be read as involving a very different sort
ofcontrast, since “by” can mean ‘beside,’ ‘next to,’ ‘in proximity to,’ such that ‘we live in
our freedom beside a contrasting necessity.’ Contrasts betveen the reaim ofhuman
freedom and that ofnatural necessity are among Auden’s most characteristic themes.
Appearing early and recuning regularly to the end of his career, variations on this contrast
find expression in poems from cThis Lunar Beauty,” “Our Hunting Fathers,” “Our Bias,”
“Their Lonely Betters,” “Homage to Clio,” to “Address to the Beasts.” In “In Time of
War,” Auden opens both the sonnet sequence and “Commentary” with the contrast of
natural necessity and human freedom. Sonnet I is devoted to establishing the features that
differentiate humans from plants and animais; and the first five stanzas of “Commentary,”
occuring immediately afier the conclusion of XXVII, are devoted to situating Man within a
natural cosmos which he seems both to belong to and stand apart from. Reiterating the
contrast ofman and nature later in “Commentary,” Auden revisits the phrasing XXVII:
“Men are not innocent as beasts and neyer can be, / Man can improve hirnselfbut iiever
wilt be perfect” (686). It is a mistake to expect or seek the enviable assurance ofnatural
necessity, like that ofXXVII’s streams that are “sure” or ofEngeis’ Anti-Duhring, because
humanity lives in a distinct world of imperfect moral freedom and incertitude.
An already noted feature ofthe contrast in I ofnature’s animais and plants to
humanity is that the latter from the beginning “chose lis love.” As also noted, this theme of
choice in love embraces both the choice of loyers and that of sexuai orientation. Given
XXVII’s systematîc entanglement with problems ofEros and sexuaiity, the une “We live in
fteedom by necessity” has a specific reievance to matters of Eros and homosexuality,
especiaIly since questions of freedom and necessity frequently arise out of questions about
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the nature of homosexuality. One way of looking at homosexuality bas been to describe it,
as the medical and psychological disciplines have ofien done, flot as a matter of personal
erotic choice, but as an expression of necessity, either of a psychological and biological
orientation determined innately, or of a pathological neurotic compulsion determined by
involuntary forces of heredity or environmental (de)formation. “In Time of War” opposes
to this a thoroughly voluntarist view of homosexuality that is as ideologically radical and
transformative as Auden’s revisions ofEngels on freedom and necessity and his rejections
of nostalgie and utopian political visions.
Auden was acutely aware ofthe peculiar freedom ofthe homosexual. The specious
contrast ofhornosexuality and heterosexuality implicit in IV lias already pointed to the
peasant’ s choice-deprived, reproductive, heterosexual ethos, determined by the natural
necessities of “seasons,” “mountains,” “the sun,” “the earth,” which stands in opposition to
the townsman’s freer “unnatural course.” In IV, it is the agrarian heterosexual hero wlio is
dominated by necessity, while the townsman, whose sexual orientation is unspecified,
pursues an unnatural freedom. The theme ofthe fteedorn ofthe homosexual recurs in
Islierwood’s work. The narrator in Goodbye, reflecting on bis “ill-defined” position as
homosexual, describes an “exhilarating” realization of bis lack of “kinship with ninety-nine
per cent ofthe population ofthe world, with the men and women who eam their living, who
insure their lives, who are anxious about the future oftheir chiidren” (56). freedom from
the worries that things like life insurance are designed to assuage seems primordial in
Isherwood’s conception ofthe homosexual and seems part ofthe cause ofhis disdain for
heterosexuals.2 Homosexuals’ relative freedom from responsibility is one cause of an
2
Isherwood is stiil on about freedom-loving, insurance-scorning hornosexuals in A Single Man.
Resenting his noisy familied neighbours, George reflects on the Californian bohemia he once knew
and typically Isherwood has George blame wives and mothers, for ruining it: “The vets themselves,
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envious heterosexual resentment of homosexuals, and is perhaps the aspect of
homosexuality which most justifies the designation of modem homosexuals as “gay.” for
Auden in “In Time of War,” however, such freedom does flot seern so gay: “They wept and
quarrelled: freedom was so wild” (II); lie “knew of love without love’s proper object, I And
was oppressed as he had neyer been” (III). Nor does it seem so exhilarating, rather it is
chosen “by necessity.” The homosexual’s freedom from natural and social obligations is
the necessary precondition of what “we” have chosen. It seerns an enabling condition of the
writing life that Auden and Isherwood have both chosen. for the “we” ofXXVII’s second
last line can be taken to refer specifically to Auden and Isherwood, in the same way that
earlier “we”s like those of “Wandering lost upon the mountains of our choice / [. . .] we
sigh” and “Asleep in our huts, how we dream” can clearly refer to Auden and Isherwood on
their Chinese joumey. Homosexuality thus becomes an aspect ofthcir choice to maximize
their freedom, even if it means being “articled to error” and resenting, as Isherwood and
some ofhis fictional creations do, natural “streams” and [heterosexual] houses that are
sure.” Read this way, XXVII sums up the sequence’s reflections on Auden and Isherwood’s
homosexual erotic experience and the privileged class-freedorn they enjoy. These essential
personal dimensions of “In Time of War” allow us to think of the sequence as involving,
along with its epic and philosophical concerns, love poetry written by Auden to Isherwood.
The sequence is surely a significant work of homosexual love poetiy, thougli this love
poetry of Auden’ s is characteristically flot made up of “love poems,” but of “poems about
love.” As in poems such as “A Bride in the 1 930s,” Auden’s erotic lyricism is embedded
no doubt, would have adjusted pretty well to the original bohernian utopia [.. . .] But their vives
explained to them right from the start and in the very clearest language, that breeding andbohemianism do flot mix. for breeding you need a steady job, you need a mortgage, you need
credit, you need insurance. And don’t you dare die, either, until the family’s future is provided for”(14). (cf. chapter 6, note $ for more on insurance).
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inextricably in large social, political, and historical contexts.
Subsequent to Joumey, Auden’s reflections on the human experience of freedom
and necessity develop beyond the multiple ambiguities ofXXVII’s closing unes, but their
development remains consistent with the sonnets of “In Time of War.” He lapses into an
equivocating angelism in “Morality in an Age of Change.” Written, like “In Time of War”
in 1938, when Auden’s thinking on the freedom-necessity-choice complex was at a crisis,
Auden’s essay adopts the Engelsian une that “By studying the laws ofphysical nature,
[Man] has gained a large measure of control over them and in so far as he is able to under
stand the laws ofhis own nature and ofthe societies in which lie lives, lie approaches that
state wliere what he wills may be done. ‘freedom,” as a famous definition lias it, “is con
sciousness ofnecessity” (Prose 1: 478). Even here there are signs that Auden is uncomfor
table with the definition of freedom he is considering (see Mendelson Early 299-303 for an
analysis ofthe essay’s ideological deficiencies). There is the fact that he refers to Engels’
definition only as “famous,” and flot as “correct” or “compelling.” There is, for instance,
tlie potentially nullifying qualification tliat only “in so far” as lie can understand the faws of
his own nature will Man approach the freedom Engels envisions. There is the Hitler, Stalin,
and other dictators-evoking suggestion of a “state where what he wills may be done;” and
there is the blasphemy implicit in applying that Deity-describing phrase to humanity.
Also in late 1938, between the explorations of XXVII and the troubles of “Morality
in an Age of Change,” Auden develops the issues of fteedom and necessity in a talk on the
nature of drama. These remarks are “a retrospective program” for Auden and Isherwood’ s
dramatic collaborations (Mendelson Early 259), but seem as pertinent to the reflections on
freedom in his just completed sonnet sequence as tliey are to the dramas:
there is a [. . .j justification for discussing the laws of the limitation of a
medium [. - . because] in order to be free it is necessary to study those factors
69
and forces which limit one’s freedom. [.. .] the stage is supremely
conservative in the relation between man’s free wiii and the forces which lirnit
and fiuistrate that wiil. [. . .] drama is impossible if you believe that man’s life
is completeiy determined and lie bas no free will at ail. If you have no free
will and no possibiiity of making a choice, the dramatic suspense disappears at
once. [. . .1 if you are completely liberai and beiieve that man’s wili is
absolutely uncontrolled, the stage falis to bits and does not mean anything [..
.]. The drama is the form [for] the culture which hoids temperately to the
belief in the free wiil ofman.
The difference [. . .] between cornedy and tragedy is that [in comedy] the
characters are aware of their lack of freedom. [. . . jit is at the end of the play
that they discover that they were freer than they thought, whuÏe in tragedy they
continualiy believe that they are free until they discover that they are not as
free as they thought. [.. .] iastiy, politicaliy, the stmggle to avoid limitation,
about which [. . .] the dramatist is much concerned, that is, the stniggle
between destiny and free will, now taking place very obviousiy and materialiy
in the outer world. (Prose 1: 7 19-23)
Auden’s reflections on freedorn and necessity grow conspicuously paradoxicai in bis
elegy for Yeats—”Each in the celi ofhimseifis almost convinced of bis freedom;” “In the
prison of his days / Teach the free man how to praise”—and in “New Year Letter”—
How grandly would our virtues bloom
In a more conscionable dust
Where freedom dwells because it must,
Necessity because it can,
And men confederate in Man. (Coliected 240)—
and in “Anthem for St. Cecilia’s Day”—”O biess the freedom that you neyer chose.” They
are stoic in an address at Srnith College: “Ail freedom implies a necessity, that is to say,
suffering” (“Romantic or free?” Prose 2: 358). Auden’s reflections then turn doctrinally
mysterious in For the Time Being in Gabriel’s speech:
Since, Adam. being free to choose,
Chose to imagine he was free
b choose his own necessity,
Lost in his fteedom, Man pursues
The shadow ofhis images” (Coiiected 360);
e and especiaily in “The Meditation of Simeon”: “for in Him we become fiully conscious ofNecessity as our fteedom to be tempted, and of freedorn as our necessity to have faith”
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(388). They become world-weary in Anxiety, another poem set in wartime “when necessity
is associated with honor and freedom with boredom” (449); and didactic in “Friday’s
Child,” his 1958 commemoration of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the pastor martyred by the Nazis:
11e told us we were free to choose
But, chiidren as we were, we thought—
“Patemal Love will only use
force in the last resort
On those too bumptious to repent.”—
Accustomed to religious dread,
It neyer crossed our minds 11e meant
Exactly what He said. (675)
In 1972 in “Unpredictable But Providential,” Auden meditates on the origins of life, “the
first real Event,” which gave to some “Original Substance” “a new freedom, to grow, a new
necessity, death” (659). There are in total about two hundred lines in Auden’s poetry where
the words “freedom”, “necessity”, or “choice”, or their cognates and derivations, occur
(Dowiing Concordance 262-265, 626-7, 1103-5, 1975-6, 1978) often in the sorts of
combinations evident in the passages just quoted. There are as well many other occurences
ofthis thematic complex, for instance, in the variation on the necessity versus freedom
polarity in the later Auden’s opposition of”behaviour” and “deed” (Firchow 220). It is,
however, chiefly subsequent to XXVII’s final summation ofJourney’s exploration ofthe
issues that the tenor of Auden’s musings on freedom and necessity become theological.
It is ironic—in terms ofAuden’s position in the history ofphilosophical and
religious thought—that 193$, “In Time of War,” and XXVII mark tuming points in both
Auden’s understanding offreedorn and necessity and his openness to Christianity. It is
ironie because, at the very time that Auden was taking up Christianity-inflected themes and
a philosophical rigour on questions of freedom and necessity, much of Christianity was
abandoning its centuries long preoccupation with the issue of free will.
Many Christian thinkers have let the subject [of free will and predestination]
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drop, in keeping with the declaration by the World Conference on faith and
Order (1937) that theories about how the truths ofGod’s grace and human free
will might be reconciled are not part ofthe Christian faith. As Christians have
become [. . more wary of logical abstraction, secular philosophers have
fihled the void with their own concepts offreedom and necessity, free will and
deterrninism” (Mclntree 429).
The secular aspects ofthe later Auden’s religious thought should perhaps be as problematic
for Christianizing critics as the Christian suggestions in Auden’s ‘secular’ poetry from the
1930s have proved for some anti-clerical critics. There is something typical ofAuden in
his doubly contrarian persistence in pondering the theological issues which had become
secondary in much modem philosophy and culture, and in studying the philosophical
problems ofhuman freedom abandoned by modem Christianity.
Auden clarifies bis position on freedom and necessity in the 1962 published version
ofa lecture delivered in the late fifties. The authoritative opening paragraphs ofthe essay
“The Virgin and the Dynamo” offer a concise, yet full articulation of the understanding of
the relafionship offreedom and necessity first presented in XXVII. Auden’s intellectual
development bas involved a long debate with Engels and with associated Marxian
materialist perspectives, but Auden’s thinking in “The Virgin and the Dynamo,” as the title
of bis essay indicates, also involves a revision of Henry Adams, and an integration of
Adams and Engels into the religious philosophies of Rudoif Kassner and Kierkegaard.
Replogle explains Auden’s incorporation ofEngels’ concems into a Kierkegaardian
perspective in terms ofthe shared assumptions that Engels and Kierkegaard derived from
Hegelian thought and empirical epistemology. Though some were incredulous when
Auden’s religious conversion became apparent, for Replogle Auden’s ethical concerns were
flot betrayed by bis later religious point of view. but rather could become “parts of a larger
vision” (Poetry 50-6 1). “In Time ofWar” announces this dialectical conversion ofa secular
Marxian ethical perspective into Auden’s later religious vision. Such dialectical procedures
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are essential to Auden’s thought. Mendelson notes that with “Heidegger, as with other
philosophers and poets, Auden responded to an ideological enemy by appropriating and
subverting him” (Later 317), but Auden approaches friendly figures, as well as the stages of
his own development, in the same way. The dialectical openness and self-conscious ironies
ofthis procedure is characteristic ofAuden’s poetry and aesthetics.
The incorporation ofAdams into Auden’s mature perspective is a geopolitical
instance ofAuden’s dialectical procedure. Auden read Adams soon afler emigrating to
United States in 1939, and Auden’s argument with The Education of Henry Adams’ chapter
on “The Dynamo and the Virgin”—like his argument with Engels’ Anti-Dihring—becarne
a permanent part ofAuden’s thinking. Auden first makes use ofAdams’ symbols ofthe
Dynamo and the Virgin in New Year Letter as part ofhis description ofthe character of
secular America, that “culture that had worshipped no / Virgin before the Dynamo”
(Collected 236). Auden glosses the reference in the “Notes To Letter” with an
uncommented upon quotation from Adams (New Year 147). As with Engels, Auden rejects
Adams’ thinking (Hand 63) and revises Adams’ terms into a more comprehensive view of
the world. He does this by bringing together his revision of Adams and his revision of
Engels’ conception offreedom and necessity. In a way which is typical of Auden’s
reconciliation offalse and dangerous oppositions and which is ideologically creative in the
Cold War political context, Auden rejects and preserves the thinking ofboth the American
Adams and the Communist-endorsed Engels.
It would seem that, for Auden, Adams and Engels erred into versions of what Auden
calis the “Two Chimerical Worlds.” The chimerical world inhabited by Adams is a
“magical polytheistic nature created by the aesthetic illusion which would regard the world
of masses as if it were a world of faces.” Such an error resuits in an “aesthetic religion [that]
‘-7 -,
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says prayers to the Dynamo.” The chimerical world inhabited by Engels is a “rnechanized
history created by the scientific illusion whïch would regard the world of faces as if it were
a world of masses.” This error resuits in a “scientific religion [thatJ treats the Virgin as a
statistic. Scientific politics is animism stood on its head” (62). Extreme contemporary
examples ofthese twin chimerical worlds are, in the case ofAdams’ error, fascism or
Nazism, and in that of Engels’, Communism or Stalinism. These are the saine political
chimeras whose presences in 1938 haunt respectively the first and second stanzas of XXVII.
In contrast to Engels’ and Adam’s chimerical worlds, Auden identifies “Two Real
Worlds.” There is the “Natural World of the Dynamo, the world of masses, identical
relations and recurrent events, describable, flot in words but in terms ofnurnbers, or rather,
in algebraic terms. In this world, freedom is the consciousness ofNecessity and Justice the
equality of all before natural law.” And there is the “Historical World of the Virgin, the
world of faces, analogical relations and singular events, describable only in terms of speech.
In this World, Necessity is the consciousness of Freedom and Justice the love of my
neighbour as a unique and irreplaceable being” (Hand 6 1-62). These distinctions between
two incommensurable ‘Real Worlds’ and two similar, if diametrically opposed, ‘Chimerical
Worlds’ constitute a modernized religious view ofhuman wisdom and folly that Auden
articulated with ideas from Adams and Engels and from religious thinkers like Kierkegaard
and Rudoif Kassner. The influence of Kierkegaard is evident in the concept of an “aesthetic
religion” and ofthe antithesis ofrepetition and singularity; that ofKassner is evident in the
term “chimerical” and the antitheses of masses and faces, of identity and analogy, and of
speech or word and number or algebraic terms. Kassner, who remains “almost unknown in
English” (Mendelson Later 366), develops ideas regarding these oppositions and regarding
chimeras in several essays, notably Von den Elementen des Menschlichen Grôsse (1911),
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Die Chimire. Der Aussitzige (1914), and Zahi und Gesicht (1919). Kassner’s ideas
conceming chimeras are relevant to many collective modem phenomena, flot only but
obviously including aspects of Fascism, Nazism, and Communism. As Mendelson telis us.
Kassner “equates chimeras with the unclean spirits who possess the demoniac in Mark 5:2-
13, and whose ‘name is Legion: for we are many.’ The idea that membership in any
collective group is a form of demonic possession recurs throughout Auden’s later work”
(367). This diffidence regarding collectivities motivates in part the circumspection,
ambivalence, and ambiguity with which Auden employs the plural pronoun “we” in XXVII,
and tbroughout “In Time of War.”
for our discussion of XXVII, there are two relevant details in the conception in
“The Virgin and the Dynamo” ofthe two Real Worlds. First there is Auden’s rejection of
the sorts of chimerical worlds we encounter in the octave’s nostalgic and utopian demonic
collective mirages. Second there is Auden’s conception in each ofthe Real Worlds ofthe
relationships of freedom and necessity. for XXVII’s conclusion that “We live in freedom
by necessity” is restated in Auden’s 1962 summation of bis views on the issue. Thus, in
the real Natural World of the Dynamo, just as Engels had argued, “Freedorn i s the
consciousness ofNecessity.” In the real Historical World ofthe Virgin, however, just as the
transforming revision of XXVII concluded in 1938, “Necessity is the consciousness of
freedom.”
Auden’s development in bis later works and his systematic, almost semiotically
diagrammatic, presentation in Hand of the varieties of the human experience of frecdom
and necessity are the authoritative glosses for the une “We live in freedom by necessity.” In
193$, however, that mature articulation lay in the future and the pressures and limits ofthe
contemporary ideological context must flot be forgotten if we are to understand the line as it
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occurs in “In Time ofWar.” In that context it is easy to understand why critics have misread
Auden’s sequence as involving ideological wavering around problems of ‘orthodox
Marxism’ or Communism for in that context it is common to mistake Marxian and socialist
perspectives for an imaginary Marxist monolith. Such a monolith is in part a simplification
dictated from the later perspective ofthe Cold War, and in part a mirage found in
contemporary 1930s polemics and propaganda, whether pro-Soviet and pro-Communist or
anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. “In Time ofWar” cannot be comprehended, though,
except in terms of a contrast to the idea of a simplistic Marxist orthodoxy or to a single
Communist Party une. Much more cogent to “In Time of War” are various sorts of thinking
then emerging along Marxian unes, including critical thinking on Marxism itself, and
urgent contemporary thinking on such quintessentially twentieth-century issues as the
“freedom-necessity-choice complex.”
One thinks of Sartre and the influential existential philosophy he developed in
L’Être et le Néant. Like Auden, Sartre first explored his concem with such issues in his
literary works, principally La Nausée (a work published in March 1938 while Auden and
Isherwood were in China). Sartre subsequently developed the themes of La Nausée more
explicitly in the discursive modes ofphilosophy and criticism. Freedom, necessity, choice,
anguish, bad faith, the body, the situation, ail these celebrated concepts of Sartre’s are
immediateiy pertinent to an understanding of the sonnets of “In Time of War” and of
Joumey as a whole: “On inisistera [. . .] sur l’armature conceptuelle et philosophique de
l’ensemble, avec la notion de l’aliénation et l’opposition entre l’être et l’existence.
L’homme est conscience, liberté et pour-soi; à l’inverse des animaux pleins d’eux même:
condamné à être libre, l’homme de ‘In Time of War’ est un héros sartrien avant la lettre”
(Aquien 102).
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A second contemporary thinker whose work helps us read “In Time of War” is Erich
Fromm. Grosvenor notes the interest Auden shared with Fromm and other Freudian
Marxists in combining Marxism and psychoanalysis, but observes that “Auden neyer
synthesized the two into a coherent system ofthought” (Izzo Legacy 267). McLeod,
however, sees parallels between Auden and Fromm’s perspectives on Marx and on
freedom. For McLeod, fromm is “the only author contemporary with Auden” whose
reading of Marx resembles Auden’s appropriation of Marx in “In Time ofWar” (59). For
Fromm, Marxism, rather than being opposed to Biblical religion. is an expression ofthe
tradition of emancipatory Judeo-Christian Messianism and humanism (McLeod 44; fromm
Marx 64-9, 26 1-3). The synthesis ofMarxian and Christian themes in “In Time of War” is
not a sign of ideological self-contradiction, but derives instead from the profound affiliation
of Marxism and Christianity that in Auden permits them to enhance one another. Mcleod
conectly perceives the affinity ofAuden and Fromm’s work, but errs in calling Fromm the
only contemporary author who saw the complementarity of Marxism and Christianity.
Patrick Deane includes Auden in a secular and religious Britisli tradition emphasizing
precisely that complernentarity (24-31). The conflation of socialist and Christian discourse
is possible in that tradition because Marxism derives from Judeo-Christianity with which it
shares a “steady concentration on the Millenium” and because Marxism and Christianity
have a common teleological orientation (30). Deane argues that the idea ofthe
complementarity of Marxism and Christianity was “one of the principal—and most readily
consumed— productions of middle-class intellectual culture in Britain during the thirties”
(30).
Stili, the affinity ofAuden and Fromm is striking. McLeod demonstrates that
Auden’s treatment ofthe theme offreedom in “In Time of War,” and especially XXVII,
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anticipates the reflections on freedom in fromm’s widely-read Escape from Freedom.
Fromm and Auden present similar Marx-influenced histories of the development of
humanity toward freedom (McLeod 5$); both postulate an inherent human freedom and a
relative fluidity in human nature (6$); both recognize the problematic tension between a
negative “freedom from” and a positive “fteedom to” (69); both reflect on the anxious
unhappiness that flows from freedom and our consequent desire to ignore or escape from
freedom, and to regress into nostalgic or utopian fantasies ($9; 110). So compelling are
the parallels between fromm and Auden that McLeod wonders whether the ideas in Escape
from Freedom, which appeared two years afier “In Time of War,” were somehow available
to Auden in 1938. A simpler explanantion is that in the case ofFromm, as in the case of
many other thinkers, Auden’s sometimes controversial, usually unforeseen, development
foreshadows later, more broadly adhered to philosophical and literary trends.3
Fromm, Sartre, or any other particular thinker aside, the themes of freedom and
necessity have been central to the articulation of Western culture at least since Exodus and
the Illiad (ouf ur-’joumey to a war’)and central to modem philosophy and civilization
generally, and often tragically so. Auden’s timely, explicit, and sustained development of
In addition to McLeod and Grosvenor’s view that Auden anticipates fromrn and Aquien’s view
that the Man of”In Time ofWar” anticipates the Sartrean hero, Jacobs argues that Auden “is in a
significant sense [Alasdair] Macintyre’s predecessor in considering the conflicts arnong and within
traditions” (xviii); and that “the position Auden is working through in The Prolific bears a striking
resemblance to the [later] moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch” (U). Gofthieb notes that Auden’s
thought anticipates Hannah Arendt’s in The Hurnan Condition (7). Boly sees Auden as a precursor
of modem semiotics (y. “Literary Evolutionist”) and Auden’s critical practice as proto
deconstructionist (Reading 71) and proto-structuralist (67). Stan Smith identifies analogues in
Auden of Lacan’s psychoanalytic theories (Cambridge 12). for their parts, Bozorth, Emig, and
MendeÎson see Auden respectively as foreshadowing themes in queer theoiy, postmodernism, and
Derridean deconstruction. Auden also embraces Bahktin’s analyses ofthe Carnival a decade before
the academic vogue for Bakhtin’s work. There is too Auden’s early coordination of Freud and Marx
in the 1930s. If Brodsky’s opinion that Auden was “the greatest mmd ofthe twentieth century”
(Qj 357) has ment, it is partly because of Auden’s avant-gardist anticipation ofdevetopments in
the work of SO many diverse thinkers.
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these themes provide a crucial argument for the permanent relevance of Auden’ s work to
modem experience. It is perhaps the veiy obviousness and universality ofthis relevance
and centrality which has made it difficuit for some critics to read clearly this overarching
thematic ofnecessity and freedom in Auden’s work,just as the history oftwentieth-century
politics and ideological controversy bas made it difficuit for critics to read XXVII without
distortion. Jacobs suggests that the failure ofcritics to articulate a balanced view of
Auden’s ongoing attempt to negotiate between the forces ofpersonal wiÏi and the forces of
fate or of the determined may be related to the respective incapacities of adherents of
existentialist, structuralist, post-structuralist, and, I would add, Marxian, critical schools to
corne to terms with the very freedom-necessity-choice complex that Auden explores so
persistently. However difficult it is to deal with Auden’s view ofthat complex, it is easy to
agree with Jacobs that “Auden consistently avoided, almost from the beginning of his career
and certainly to its end, the twin temptations ofPeÏagius and Calvin: radical voluntarism
and radical determinism” (117). Certainly, the dialectic offreedom and necessity that
weaves through Auden’s work from beginning to end is one ofthe principal sources of
coherence in a body of work whose diversity and contradictions some commentators have
been too quick to criticize and whose unity and coherence have too ofien rernained
unperceived or insufficiently acknowledged. Nowhere does Auden more succinctly
encompasses ail the meanings that diaiectic has in his work than in the pivotai XXVII with
its penultimate une “We live in freedom by necessity.”
POETICS...POLITICS. ..CHRISTIANITY. ..HOMOSEXUALITY
XXVII concentrates in one poem the principal concerns ofAuden’s development of
the themes of freedom and necessity. A masterpiece of concision, the poem unfolds a
vision of a complex ideological crisis of enonnous breadth. XXVII articulates both
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Auden’s generational tum away from Communism and his permanent incorporation of
Marxian thought into an ongoing ideologicai project. The poem coincides too with a
tuming point in modem Christian thought about freedom and necessity. XXVII iliustrates
the complex intelligence motivating Auden’s handiing of poetic form, and crystallizes the
process ofthe much-debated transformation ofthe early into the later Auden and marks the
emergence of what Mendelson identifies as the characteristic pattern of Auden’ s mature
rhetoric. The poem’ s articulation of a radical view of homosexual Eros coincides
moreoever with major crises in both Chinese and Western understandings of
homosexuality. Ail these aspects of XXVII develop, moreover, with topical reference to the
political crisis of 193$ and of an encounter with China during its anti-Japanese war.
Ail such aspects of XXVII recur throughout Journey, though the many ideological
burdens which XXVII carnes so lightiy are borne less elegantly by the book as a whoÏe.
XXVII’s defi manipulation of the terms ofits crises, including the very temptations that
undermine one’s capacity to deal with those crises, helps us understand Joumey’s struggie
with its shifiing and unwieldy burdens. The book’s thematic complexities are reflected in
an aesthetic uncertainty which drives the book’s composition, just as compositional features
of XXVII such as its mm, its infinite regresses, and its anticlosural closure are directly
related to the poem’s themes. A defining feature of Joumey is its periodic presentation of
provisional resolutions of its ongoing thematic and aesthetic uncertainties. Understanding
the relationship between thernatic and compositional issues elsewhere in Journey is crucial
to comprehending the book. XXVII, which presents a vista of almost the entire range of
Joumey’s thematic and ideological problems, also provides the book’s rnost poetically and
aesthetically rnasterftil resohition ofthose problems. In XXVII’s ideological and
compositional tour de force we can find a heuristics tbrough which we can interpret Journey
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as an expression of a multifaceted ideological crisis and through which we can evaluate
Joumey’s other aftempts to shape an aesthetic resolution to its ideological difficulties.
We have seen that XXVII’s une “We live in freedom by necessity” ultimately leads
into the reaims of Biblical myth and Christian thought. Whereas in his earlier work, these
religious contexts are evoked obliquely, reticently, and even in an occulted fashion,
subsequent to XXVII, such traditions become explicitly evident in Auden’s work. The
latent religious dimension of “In Time of War” has puzzled critics, encouraging those of
neo-testamentary bent, and aggravating those who wish to see Auden’s early work as
strongly secular. Commentators duly note that Biblical myths of the Creation and the Fail
inform the two opening sonnets and that the myth of a modest, anonymous, Messiah
informs the tenth. Elements ofthese rnyths, as well as echoes ofthe “Lord’s Prayer,” are at
work in XXVII. In such contexts, XXVII’s second last une directs us to the Judeo-Christian
mysteries of our need to recognize and exercise a God-given free will, and the une insists
on the impossibility ofretuming to an Eden where choice will not be anguished and our
responsibilities not so perilous. This congruity of XXVII with Biblical and Christian thernes
anticipates developments Hynes dates to 1940 when “What tAuden] found in Christianity
was a system ofbeliefs that could contain his new conclusions: the ethic of loneliness; the
aesthetic of imperfection; the paradox of necessary freedom” (“Voice” 44).
Few commentators have been comfortable reconciling the Christian aspects of “In
Time of War” with its reviews of secular history and its Marxian historical analyses. Smith
and Beach deny the pertinence of a Judeo-Christian reading of the sequence, arguing instead
for its predominant secularism, and even the illusion of its ‘orthodox Marxism’ (Smith 117-
8). In contrast, Replogle. though he caïls the creation myth “completely secular” and reads
the sequence through a Marxist prism (Poetry 42-44), finds the sequence’s Christianity
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more than incidentai and decorative. Auden’s recourse to Bïblical themes in “In Time of
War” (along with some ambiguous comments about the date ofhis retum to Cbristianity in
Auden’s essay in Modem Canterbury Piigrims (ed. Pike)) leads Replogle to mistakenly
conclude that Auden must have “first read Kierkegaard sometime in late 1937 or early
193$” (55), that is just before he went to China and wrote “In Time of War.” In fact, Auden
had not read Kierkegaard before the fa!! of 1940 (Mendelson Prose 2: xix). One need not
presume that Auden was aiready familiar with Kierkegaard in order to speculate on the
Judeo-Christian implications ofthe sequence. Beach considers sucli speculations
illegitimate: “present-day readers of ‘In lime of War’ who are flot closeiy attentive to the
text may very welI take this whole work to be an anticipation of the most orthodox
Christian views” (7); but Hynes, reflecting on the sequence’s mix of Marx with Christian
themes “treated rather eccentrically,” observes that “You couldn’t eau it a Christian poem,
cxactly, but you could say that its argument is consistent with Christian faith, and is not
consistent with Marxism” (Generation 345). Spears too notes that, though XXVII’s “surface
reference” may be contemporary poiitics, the poem “is very close to Auden’s later
Christian” themes (142). Callan’s further conclusion that the sequence reveals Auden as
philosophically “a would-be Christian” (135) is simply a more reasonable reading ofits
Judeo-Christian dimensions than those of critics whose resistance to Christianity weakens
their readings of “In Time of War.”
The coexistence of the religious and the secuiar in the sequence might be explained
away by describing “In Time of War” as a transitional work from “a critical moment” in
Auden’s intellectual deveiopment between early 1937 and late 1939 (Callan 135) during
which he was passing from a ‘Marxist’ phase to his mature Christianity. This description,
however, omits the Christian aspects ofAuden’s work prior to 1937 and the permanence of
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Marxian concems in his later work. Such a description omits the affiliation of”In Time of
War” with Christian socialism in Britain and the sequence’s anticipations ofBiblical
interpretations of Marx (McLeod 5-6, 8 ; fromm Marx 26 1-3). Categorizing “In Time of
War” as transitional can diminish the imaginative originality and breadth ofa vision of
humanity that makes the sequence “Auden’s supreme achievernent ofthe 1930s”
(Davenport-Hines in Smith Cambridge 19).
for Auden’s achievement in speaking ofhuman history and human nature in the
supposedly incompatible terms of Marxian historical materialism and of Christian myffi and
morality represents a remarkable poetic solution to one of the crucial ideological dilemmas
ofthe twentieth-century. In its institutional expression in the 193 Os, this dilemma defined
for T.S. Eliot the possibilites of modem drama and literaiy community: “There are only two
causes now of sufficient seriousness [to create a new audience around a common cause],
and they are mutually exclusive: the Church and Communism” (“Religious Drama” 4-5).
This dualistic ideological dilemma oriented partisan bias in the case ofthe Spanish Civil
War, that regional prelude to catastrophic global schism. Auden, however. overcomes the
ideological binarism dividing his contemporaries by taking from the conservative religious
right its moral imperatives and its insistence on human imperfection and from the
materialist lefi its historical analytics and emancipatory horizons. Auden’s politicalÏy
precarious wedding ofthe Christian and Marxian in “In Tirne of War” constitutes Auden’s
imaginative response to the shock ofthe anti-ecclesiastical destruction he witnessed during
the Spanish Civil War and contrasts to the desolate image of loyalist George Orwell
searching for a resting place: “I came upon the ruins of a church that had been gutted and
bumt in the revolution. It was a mere sheli, four roofless walls surrounding piles ofrubble.
In the half-darkness, I poked about and found a kind ofhollow where I could lie down”
o -Ô.)
(175 Homage). Anticipating Hugh’s fantasy ofbeing at once “Hero ofthe Soviet Republic,
and the Tme Church” (240) in Malcoim Lowiy’s retrospective look at 1938 in Under the
Volcano, Auden’s Christian-Marxian marnage remains a counter-example to the
incomprehension dividing seculan lefi and religious right in political cultures today.
In fiising Christian and Marxian perspectives, Auden eschews the narrowncss and
authoritanianism to which each is susceptible, when operating solely on its own terms and in
diametnical opposition to the other. Considering the human potential wasted when people
allow themselves to be polarized irreconcilably, and considering the destruction then being
wrought by partisans of Lefi and Right, and the inestimable apocalyptic destruction about to
be wrought in the Second World War, one wants to say ofAuden’s vison of humanity in “In
lime ofWar,” what Frye said in the 1930s of William Blake: “Read Blake or go to Heu:
that’s my message to the modem world” (Ayre 114). The world, though, does not work that
way. “For poetry makes nothing happen,” as Auden had realized by 1939 and subsequently
spent much ofhis literary energy and some ofhis immediate reputation reminding us. In any
case, the modem world simply would not have had enough time by March 1939 to read “In
Time of War” before it found itself in a hellish holocaust of its own making.
Most commentators have been compelled to note the sequence’s apparently
problematic, but in fact far-seeing, maniage ofMarxism and Christianity. No one, though,
seems to have remarked on the tensions between the sequence’s erotic inflections, on the
one hand, and, on the other hand, both its political dimensions and its Judeo-Christian
resonances. The political, erotic, and religious thematic clusters are ah essential to the
sonnets of “In Time of War,” and the sequence is misrepresented if any of them are ignored
or suppressed. One of Auden’s achievements in “In Time of War” is his presentation of a
comprehensive view of humanity which is rooted in the historical experience of 193$ and
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which apprehends that experience’s religious and political dimensions as part of a single,
simultaneous, lived reality. A more unexpected achievement is the acuteness with which
Auden presents the continuity ofthose religious and political dimensions with the erotic
dimensions ofhuman experience.
The Bakhtinian idea of a text as an arena for the reproduction of differing discourses
illuminates the interaction ofthe erotic, the political, and the religious in XXVII and reveals
a range of discourses at play in XXVII: prayerful Anglicanisrn, campy sexual siang,
classicism, the late Romantic poetry of Baudelaire, the abstractions of materialist
philosophy, legalese, the jargon of political pamphlets, the lexemes ofAuden’s allegorical
landscapes and oflsherwood’s thematics in lis unfinished epic The Lost, the grand
narratives ofthe Bible, Comrnunisrn, fascism, secularization, and democracy. The
intertwining of erotic, political, and religious language in XXVII and “In Time of War”
involves, though, more than a formaI invocation of differing and sometimes contradictory
discursive elements. The coincidence of sud diverse themes suggests an apprehension of
the ontological, social, psychological, biological, and spiritual intercorrnectedness of human
existence. Some such existential apprehension infonns Auden’s poetics in XXVII and
elsewhere, as he moves within multiple discursive and human contexts simultaneously.
“Few writers have ever managed to inhabit so many levels of life,” Gopnik observes of
Auden (91), though a bit misleadingly—for we recognize this kind ofbreadth, depth,
complexity, and wholeness as qualities of great literary authenticity. “In Time of War” and
Joumey as a whole presents the truths and crises ofthe erotic, the political, and the religious
as realities which do not occur in isolation the one from the others, but which overlap such
that the seardli for the truths of each remains part of a single searching. In Joumey, none of
these realities can be rendered inessential by being subordinated to the daims of another;
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none can assume total explanatory power for human existence or exclusive predominance
over the others.
Though the coexistence ofreligious and political perspectives in “In Time of War”
has occasioned some debate, the obiiquely presented, yet pervasive erotic aspects have
received almost no attention. Even as recently as 2002, Kerr misses the sequence’s erotic
quaiity entirely (Izzo Legacy 275-296). Yet the sequence’s treatment of eroticism and
homosexuality and its linking ofthese issues to the politics and theology of freedom are as
original as both its political and historical explorations and its conflation of mythicai
religious themes and engagé politicai concems. It would be a mistake to insist on the erotic
and homosexual at the expense ofthe sequence’s Christian and political-historicai
dimensions, except as a corrective to prior neglect ofthe erotic. Stili from today’s
perspective, when Judeo-Christian religious authority no longer imposes itseifthe way it
once did, when many ofthe egalitarian ideals of modem Christianity and Marxism have
achieved a putative ideological dominance, when Cold War paranoia about Marxism bas
faded, and when sexual emancipation is being trivialized through commercialization, the
sonnets’ difficuit holistic vision of sexuality iss an especiaily instructive aspect of “In Time
of War.”
Not only does Auden present (homosexual) Eros in a broad coherent vision of
human experience, but he makes it, flot accidentai or incidentai, but essentiai to both the
sequence’s political and reiigious content. In XXVII the vision ofa voiuntarist
homosexuality and a concomitant vision of the enhanced and probiematic fteedom of the
homosexuai coincide with a tuming away from the calis of the faise nostalgia of Fascism
and of Communism’s faise totalitarian vision ofhistoricai necessity. These visions coincide
too with a renunciation of nostalgia for iost sexuai paradises and a renunciation of the
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fantasy of innocent sexual enjoyment of the erotic offerings ofthe exotic—renunciations
which Isherwood also dramatizes in “Travel-Diary.” These visions of homosexuality
coincide too with a rejection of a certain version ofliuman freedom offered by Engels and
contemporary Marxist thinkers. The recognition ofthe difficuit truth and experience of
erotic freedom becomes in the sonnets inseparable from the recognition of political freedom
and unfreedom. Similarly, the final phulosophico-religious epiphany in XXVII concerning
the inescapable condition of human freedom is concomitant with the epiphany regarding
political freedom, but it is also a consequence ofthe sequence’s reflection on the nature of
homosexual identity and the nature of erotic and personal freedom.
Auden’s hornosexuality complicates the simplistic moral stories rnocked by Smith
wherein the committed but naive young political radical matures into the wise Christian
traditionalist, or alternatively the committed political visionary recoils from the hard truths
ofpoÏitics and retreats into obscurantist Christian conservativism (Smith 1-2). Auden’s
homosexuality complicates those fables since Auden tums away from 1 930s leflist politics
flot just because ofhis commitments to democratic socialism and liberalism, notjust
because ofhis reemergent Christianity, but because bis inadmissible sexuality is
incompatible with 193$ Lefiism. Auden’s sexuality complicates those simplistic fables
since it is also in conflict with the Biblical and Christian morality towards which he turns.
By the same token, Auden’s political and religious circumspection are partly responsible for
the resistance in gay liberationist studies and queer theory to the incorporation ofAuden’s
work into their particular historical canon, though he is surely as strong a precursor to those
cultural developments as is the considerably less challenging Isherwood.
This question ofthe relationships ofthe homosexual to Christianity and Marxisrn
troubles the unique fusion of the erotic, the political, and the religious in “In Time of War”
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as well. It is flot oniy because neither Christianity nor Communism or proto-Communism
can accommodate the ideological and moral aspects ofAuden’s homosexuality that the
story of the transformation ofthe early Auden into the later Auden is so complicated.
Auden’s transformation is also complicated by the fact that the freedom-necessity-choice
complex, which is central to the development ofAuden’s thinking and which Replogle
argues is the focus through 1937-38 ofa Marxism-influenced ideological crisis that cornes
to a close with XXVII, had actually animated Auden’s work for almost a decade, from well
before the general rise in Marxian enthusiasm in the mid and late 193 Os. The story of
Auden’s transformation is further complicated because Auden’s meditations on fteedom,
necessity, and choice have involved homosexuality from the beginning.
Aspects of the freedom-necessity-choice complex are articulated as early as the
poem “1929” which speaks ofhow “choice seem[sj a necessary enor,” a une entirely
compatible with themes elaborated in “In Time ofWar.” Other early poems also bring
together thematic and lexical elements ofthe freedom-necessity-choice triad. “‘There is a
free one,’ many say, but en” ventures one poem that portrays a closeted homosexual who
seeks Ïike the restless ‘we’ of XXVII the comfort ofthe “intrinsic peace” of love (sec
Bozorth on the figure’s ostensible heterosexuality and homosexual subterfuge (75-6)). Like
“In Time of War,” “A Free One” alludes to a freedom and anxiety that are peculiar to the
homosexual. Just as “In Time of War” dwells on the paradoxes of the necessity of choices,
SO the poem “family Ghosts” links desire and possible erotic fulfihiment with a “choice”
that is paradoxically predetermined by inheritance: “ghost’s approval ofthe choice”
suggesting, for Bozorth, that “far from a liberating violation ofthe authority ofthe past,”
homosexual desire “is aiways enslaved to the past” (72-3). The torments of choice as a
necessary enor, ofthe unfree I free homosexual, and of an erotic choice which is from the
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beginning flot wholiy one’s own help explain the aggressive morbidity of lunes from “1929”
where “death” is the “necessary condition ofthe season’s putting forth.” Those torments
expiain the ominousness of unes where Auden’ s young voice sounds “like the slogans of a
psychiatric dictator” (Isherwood Kind 2) who promises to abolish the difficulties of freedom
once and for ail: “It is time,” that voice in 1929 proclaims, “for the destruction oferror.” To
this 193$’s anti-utopian XXVII answers, “But we are articied to error.”
The resounding rhetoric of 1929 is ultimateiy hollow, and in 1933 in The Orators
Auden us worrying again over the contradiction between his Airman’s apparent autonomy
and the fact that this autonomy has flot been chosen, but instead has been imposed by
historical or psychological necessity (Mendelson Early 102). Auden’s most impressive
attempt to deal with the freedom-necessity-choice complex prior to “In Time of War” is
“Spain 1937.” There Auden again explores the problem ofthe relationship ofchoice and
necessity and freedom, but in a less satisfactory manner—for the Auden who later suppressed
the poem—than that of “In Time of War.” “Spain” develops a “manifest argument [whichj
asserts that ail human actions are chosen by the will” and a “metaphoric argument [which]
maintains that some special actions in the political reaim [. . .] are the product not of will
but of something very much like unconscious instinctive nature” (Mendelson Early 319).
For Mendelson, the infamous line “The conscious acceptance of guilt in the necessary
murder” is paradoxical, “the one une in the poem in which the manifest argument about
choice directly confronts the metaphoric argument about necessity. [...j The poet chooses
to accept guilt in this murder, but the act itself is a necessary step taken by others toward
History’s inevitable fulfiliment” (322). This contemptible (as Mendelson rightly cails it)
but ail too recognizable idea is answered by the following year’s ironic une in XXVII about
“the harmless ways” ofthe plans the disciplined heart follows. For his part, Mendelson
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contrasts the moral dilemma of”Spain 1937” regarding necessity and choice in “the
conscious acceptance of guilt in the necessary murder” to a verse letter from the previous
year’s Iceland.
Though a less effective poem than “Spain,” the letter to Richard Crossman in
Iceland “strikingly anticipates Auden’s thinking in the 1940s and afier” (Mendelson 312n).
Whereas the problems of homosexuality are at play in Auden’s earliest thematizations of
freedom, necessity, and choice, we can see Christian motifs in the Crossman poem’s
treatment ofthe same thematic complex prior to the ‘would-be Christianity’ of”In Time of
War.” Perhaps it was the Jesus Cbrist-evoking surname ‘Crossman’ which prompted
pagan-sumamed Auden to the poem’s Christian meditations, his musings that
however far we’ve wandered
Into our provinces ofpersecution
Where our regrets accuse, we keep retuming
Back to the common faith from which we’ve ail dissented,
Back to the hands, the feet, the faces? (Prose 1: 241)
The letter to Crossrnan (who later co-edited The God That Failed, the well-known mid
fifiies disavowal of Communism) adumbrates Hand’s distinctions between Two Real
Worlds and Two Imaginary Worlds and “contrasts two realms: the real world of unique
particulars and the imaginary world of abstract historicai forces” (Mendelson 311). “To
recognize uniqueness, [the poem’s] argument runs, is to recognize one’s personai
responsibility for the worid’s disorder; to escape into abstractions like History is to blame
the world for one’s own sufferings” (312). This is analogous to XXVII’s argument that we
must recognize the inescapability of our perilous freedom and flot pursue false ideas of a
reassuring Necessity. As in XXVII, we wander into territories created by our choices and
regrets. As with “In Time of War,” the Crossman poem contrasts uncertain humans to
animals “who neyer will grow up to question I The justice of their permanent discipline”
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(Prose 1: 241). The Crossman poem shares with “In Time of War” its emphases on the
body, on enor, on our capacity to commit ourselves to abstractions at the expense of flawed
human reality, on the law, on pagan antiquÏty, on necessity, and on choice.
The anticipation in 1936’s letter to Crossman of Auden’s thinking from the 1940s
onward reinforces the notion that when the ‘preconversion’ (or pre-reconversion) XXVII
moves toward a Christian perspective on freedom, necessity, erotic paganism, and human
unhappiness and imperfection, it points forward to Auden’s maturity. Replogle too sees in
XXVII an articulation ofAuden’s later religious position. Like Mendelson, Replogle flnds
anticipations ofAuden’s mature religious thinking earlier than XXVII or even the Crossman
poem. For Replogle, the 1933 poem “Here on the cropped grass ofthe nanow ridge I
stand,” later entitled “The Malvems,” though written well before Auden’s Kierkegaardian
years, expresses “a conception of human nature” much like his Kierkegaard-influenced
philosophy in the 1940s and afier (35).
“The Malvems” is relevant to Journey, flot just because it anticipates XXVII, but
because Auden incorporates passages from it into the “Cornmentary” which immediately
follows XXVII as the book’s conclusion. Auden’s lifelong interest in the relationships of
freedom and necessity is at play when “The Malvems” has the voice of the First World
War’s dead explain the origins ofthe war as in part the resuit ofpeople’s “Denying the
liberty we knew quite well to be our destiny” (English 1 44)—a line which plays with the
same paradox as “We live in freedom by necessity.” That and other lines in the 1933 poem,
as well as the fact that the poem’s moral meditation occurs in a mountain setting, cones
pond to themes in XXVII. The analogies and echoes between “The Malverns,” a poem
looking back analytically at the catastrophic Great War, and Joumey’s XXVII, make more
perilous the situation ofthe latter’s deluded, erotically-confused, freedorn-evading
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nostalgics and utopians as they wander into a new military disaster. Replogle argues that in
“The Malvems” Auden begins moving away from an optimistic position regarding the re
coverability of an innate human goodness toward a perspective, shared by Marx and Kierke
gaard and more clearly articulated in XXVII, from which humanity is seen neither as poss
essing an instinctive goodness, nor as capable ofregaining an unspoiled spontaneity (35).
Where Replogle and Mendelson identify early occurrences.ofthemes and ideas
usually associated with the later religious Auden, Hyde discems in Auden’s “nominally
secular” early period not only what are essentialÏy Christian themes and intuitions, but the
unconscious workings of an essentially divine law (446-463). That so many critics find
important foreshadowings ofAuden’s later Christianity in poetry from his secular or, as
some have thought, even Marxist days in the 193 Os, and find in particular foreshadowings
of his Christian view of freedom, necessity, and choice, will seem problematic only to those
with strong biases regarding the mutual irrelevance ofthe religious and the Marxian.
However many readers have resisted reading Auden’s early work in religious terms, the
anticipations of Christian themes in the early poetry are as significant as the original and
permanent involvement of Eros and homosexuality in Auden’ s work, and the Biblical and
the homosexual are both crucial to Auden’s meditations on freedom, necessity, and choice.
Homosexuality and Christianity are essential contexts within which one must think of
Auden’s work at every point ofhis career. The diary Auden kept in Berlin in 1929 confirms
that from the beginning homosexuality and Christianity are consistent concems for Auden:
that journal, besides dwelling on sexual matters, opens with Auden taking the visiting
Isherwood to homosexual activist Magnus Hirschfeld’ s Institutfur $exuaÏ- Wissenschaft,
and closes with j ottings on the varying conditions of Christ in the face of different modes of
sinfiilness.
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Whcn we look backward from XXVII through Auden’s earlier work or look forward
from it through the later work, we sec that XXVII’s treatment ofthe freedom-necessity
choice trilemma and its relationship to XXVII’s treatment ofhomosexuai, Christian, and
poÏitical motifs are inscribed within an ongoing exploration ofthese themes which is a
defining characteristic of Auden’ s work. XXVII, however, is flot just one more item in a
series of meditations on these themes. Rather, it represents, if not the most complete
articulation ofthis thematic complex, the most crucial moment in Auden’s lifelong
development ofthese interrelated themes. XXVII is, to adapt an idea from Dil1enbach (89-
90), a ‘retroprospective pivot’—it represents a turning point which both sums up Auden’s
previous explorations and prefigures the teachings that Auden will henceforth try to
articulate. The idea that XXVII enacts a pivotai moment finds support in Repiogle’s
argument that with this poem Auden’s engagement with Marxism changes dramatically. It
finds further support in Beach’s complementary argument that in the chronology ofAuden’s
work an illegitimate redefinition of the Auden canon begins with the Christianizing revision
ofJoumey’s “Commentary” (Beach 5-10)——that is with second half of “In Time ofWar”
that immediately follows the quasi-Judeo-Christian conclusion of XXVII. Like XXVII’s
own tums at une nine and ten, the turn that XXVII as a whole enacts within Auden’s oeuvre
is manifold. Between them Replogie and Beach emphasize two complementaiy aspects of
XXVII’s pivotai significance: RepÏogie more or less approvingly drawing attention to
XXVII as a ‘final summation’ ofAuden’s engagement with Marxism through what is
actually a ‘transforming revision’ ofEngels; Beach strongly disapproving ofXXVII’s
anticipations ofthe Christianity and the Kierkegaardian philosophy ofthe later Auden. The
idea of XXVII as a pivot aiso finds support in the fact that the last major work discussed in
Mendelson’s Early is “In Time of War” and that his comments on XXVII in that concluding
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discussion arc so apposite to the description in the introduction of his Later of the
characteristic pattem of Auden’s poetry afier 1939. XXVII could almost be said to be the
hinge that links Mendelson’s Early to his Later, just as it is the pivotai moment in which we
can see the early Auden giving way to the later Auden.
On the very first page of bis introduction to Later, Mendelson describes XXVII’s
vision ofhumanity’s historical freedom as a definitive staternent of one oftwo opposing
basic beliefs that are in tension throughout Auden’s career; the other belief being related to
his notion that life is “ruled by mysterious forces” (xiii). The tensions between these beliefs
constitute the “inner debate” (xiv) of Auden’s work: are the various events in a human life
“better understood as the product of involuntary necessity or of free choice”? (xiv). for
Mendelson, this debate at the core ofAuden’s work also defines the basic principles of bis
poetics in a way that, like the characteristic rhetorical and imaginative pattem ofthe post
1939 poems, is fundamental to comprehending how Auden’s poetry works. Mendelson
describes a crucial anaiogy at the heart of Auden’s poetics such that the relationship
between traditional and innovative verse forms is seen as analogous to the relationship of
necessity and freedom in human experience:
Traditional forms and meters were among the means by which he evoked an
order that existed prior to any personal intervention: physical laws, bodily
instincts, social conventions, beliefs and habits inherited from a family or a
culture. Inegular metres, newiy invented or modifled forms, prose poetry, and
forms and metres that had not yet been naturalized into English verse—ail
these were used in lis work to evoke voluntary, unpredictable acts, newly
found accomodations between, on one hand, the world of nature and the
instinctive body and, on the other, the world ofhistory and the individual face.
But the metrical form ofAuden’s poems typically presented only one side of
bis poem’s arguments with themselves. The most conventional-seeming form
[..j could mask the most unstable and innovatory content; the most
unconventional form [. . .] could contain uncompromising statements of
psychological and ethical necessity. (xiv)
The idea that Auden’s interest in freedom and necessity guide his handling ofpoetic form
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illuminates what is going on in XXVII and in the use ofthe sonnet in “In lime ofWar.”
In the context of literary tradition, the use of the sonnets in “In Time of War” is
convention-confounding enough to be considered paradoxical. For Auden chooses the
soimet’s constricting form to present a vast and fluid subject, and achieves “monumental
dignity and strength” where one might expect “a garland of miniatures” (Mendelson Early
34$). Rather than expressing the sonnet’s usual subjective, highly individualized lyric
themes with their deep associations with unblushing Petrarchan heterosexuality, Auden
reviews the entire epic ofhuman historical development by focussing on anonymous first
person plural or third person figures, and in the course of doing so hints at the surreptitious
condition ofhomosexual love.
In XXVII, as Mendelson’s description ofAuden’s poetics would lead us to expect,
Auden exploits the fixed fonn and predictable features of the sonnet to present an
ineluctable necessity in human life, namcly, our ‘necessary freedom,’ and present the
accompanying moral danger that we will try to 11cc rather than admit that freedom. Auden
does these two things by showing us first the need to reject the false visions ofthe absolute
and necessary that are reviewed in the two quatrains and by displaying our freedom’s
competing social, erotic, personal, political, historical dimensions. XXVII suggests that our
obligation not to deny but to recognize the ineluctablity of our imperfect freedom will
inevitably appear as a categorical and perhaps religious obligation.
The sonnet with its two-fold structure—the before of the octave and the after of the
sestet—is eminently suited to enacting the temporality ofthis recognition and to
representing the double bind ofnecessary freedom. Accordingly, in the octave of XXVII,
we are shown how we misuse our fteedom of choice when we try to choose false
necessities; while subsequently in the sestet, we are told ofthe incvitable necessity of
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recognizing our imperfect freedom. In Auden’s analogy-based, paradoxical poetics, the
rule-bound form ofthe sonnet conveys a statement about open-ended human fteedom.
furthermore, XXVII presents that radical human freedom in a way which is consistent with
the authority ofAuden’s culturally inherited Judeo-Christian beliefs, but which turns away
from the Marxist or Fascist options that in 193$ appeared to many as innovative and
radically modem, and as promising liberation from unnecessary restrictions.
For Auden, ail iiterature, is ultimately conditioned by the sorts of paradoxes of
freedom and necessity with which XXVII is riven. The essay “Squares and Oblongs” is
perhaps his clearest statement of how issues of freedom and necessity bear upon literature:
[Man’s] ego seeks constantly to assert its autonomy by doing something of
which the requiredness is not given, [.. .] something which is completeiy
arbitrary, a pure act of choice. [.. . ] there are no doubt natural causes
behind the wish to write verses, but the chief satisfaction in the creative act is
the feeling that it is quite gratuitous. [.. j Games are actes gratuites in which
necessity is obeyed because the necessity here consists ofrules chosen by the
players. (Prose 2 : 341)
The ideas of freedom and necessity are thus at the centre ofAuden’s understanding of
poetics and the ethical significance of literature—just as we have seen that in “In lime of
War” the themes offreedom and necessity are at the heart ofAuden’s understandings of
modem politics, of the condition of homosexuality, and of Judeo-Christian religious myth.
The series of suggestive commonalities between the reaims of Biblical myth,
(homo)sexuality, politics, and poetics which Auden develops tbrough the opposed terms of
freedom and necessity, and which are ail operative in XXVII, constitute one of the
consistent and defining features ofAuden’s work. Auden’s propensity for seeing the
pertinence ofthe crucial issues offreedom and necessity to such diverse realms of
experience and reality is an important factor in his capacity to encompass his
characteristically broad and even contradictory range of enthusiasms, influences, and poetic
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forms. The constancy of his attention to the issues of fteedom and necessity stabilizes the
diversity and eclectïcness of bis other interests. Auden can, for instance, promiscuously
adopt any and ail poetic forms, as he moves through successive ideological perspectives,
from Freud to Marx to Paul, because for him form relates directly to bis conceptual and
thematic interests in freedom and necessity.
This recurrent interest unifies Auden’s work, but does flot do so unproblematically.
The quasi-analogies Auden perceives between diverse reaims of experience in so far as
these reaims can each be ordered in terms of the concepts of freedom and necessity allow
him to move from one human context to another, from sexuality to poetry to religion to
politics. Productive as those analogies are for Auden, they remain imperfect. That is why
in each ofthe realms ofpoetics, sexuality, poiitics, and religion, Auden’s thinking can
become paradoxical and counter-intuitive; why what begins as simplicity can end up as
unresolvable complexity; why at some moments Auden’s insistent interest in fteedom and
necessity can invoive a blurring of heteronomous human realities. These problems derive
from the very nature of analogy as a means of argument and comprehension. Outside of
mathematics, the similarities suggested by analogy are neyer absolute, and analogies
frequently draw attention to similarities between diverse realities even as they draw
attention away from differences which render the analogy misleading. Auden was a self
critical enough poet to recognize the radical limitations of his analogical habits, noting in an
agnostic moment that “Since the analogies are rot / Our senses based belief upon, / We
have no means of leaming what / Is reaily going on” ( Collected 676). Stiil, the crucial
opposition of freedom and necessity defines a set of analogies in a body of work for which
analogy is a core organizing principic. As Gottiieb observes, “the distinction between
analogy, which operates on a principle of proportion, and imitation, which operates on the
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principle of identity, stands at the basis of [. . .J Auden’s poetry and poetology” (8). At its
best the opposition of freedom and necessity in Auden’s work functions as a key mediating
term—to adopt a concept from the Hegelian tradition—between different orders of
experience. Jameson describes mediation “as the invention ofa set ofterms, the strategic
choice of a particular code or language, such that the same terminology can be used to
analyze and articulate two distinct types ofobjects or “texts”, or two very different
structural levels ofreality” (Political 40). Such a mediating term allows us to perceive that
“social life is in its fundamental reality one and indivisible, a seamless web, a single
inconceivable and transindividual process” in which different levels are “neyer really
separate from one another.” As such a mediating tenn, the freedom / necessity opposition
enables Auden to order his various understandings ofreligious myth and morality, of
sexuality, ofpolitics, and ofpoetics around one ofthe crucial issues ofthe twentieth century
and of human life and civilization generally. Auden establishes a series of analogies that
enable him to encompass different areas ofhuman experience and to play our
understandings of those areas and experiences off one another.
The multiple fields of simultaneous meaning available to Auden through analogy
recali Dante’s four levels ofinterpretation. Auden’s achievement is that he can encompass
so much, flot in the forms ofthe epic, the drama, or the novel, but from within the smaller
forms and scope of lyric poetry. In contrast to Dante’s hierarchy of complementaiy levels,
though, the different reaims ofmeaning in a poem like XXVII exist in a dialectical, ironie,
even contradictoiy tension. As with Auden’s multi-faceted apprehension of our existential
situation in “In lime ofWar,” “the contradictions in Auden’s thought require not resolution
but navigation” (Grosvenor 267). “Auden’s poems”, agrees Ernig, “transform tbemselves
into a writing of negotiation, openness, compromise, and dia’ogue” (204). Arguing for the
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postmodemism ofAuden’s work, Emig observes that Auden’s “writing tums into a chorus
of distinct voices and positions, yet without homogenizing or forcefiully harmonising their
concems. The contradictions that emerge from this pluralistic and dialogic approach must
therefore flot be read as logical flaws, but as the consequence of a different kind of logic”
(206). With this different kind of logic, Auden’s “poetry continually pushes forward into
ten-itory that becomes too unstable for traditional concepts of thought” (204). For Emig
“Auden’s poetic thought [.
. .] arrives at a new relation to existence,” in which it is capable
of overcoming the limitations of restricted or inherited concepts while stiil acknowledging
its reliance on them. So it is that a pre-modern concept of analogy, with roots in medieval
Christian philosophy, is adapted to Auden’s exploration of the postmodem condition.
Certainly Auden’s openness to the holism ofthe political, the reÏigious, the erotic, and the
poetic in “In Time of War” seems, in spite ofthe coordinating role of Auden’s freedom I
necessity analogy, dynamically confficted and dialectically provocative rather than ordered
or hierarchical. A much later haiku ofAuden’s confirms the ftuidity ofthe relationships
between different dimensions ofmeaning and reality: “His thoughts pottered I from verses
to sex to God I without punctuation” (Collected 599). 0f this haiku, Bozorth remarks “To
punctuate Auden’s potterings would be to seek conceptual order at the cost of obscuring the
subtie, oblique ways that his views ofhomosexual love and desire inform his religious
poetry” (223). Neglecting to remind us that Auden’s views of God inform bis hornosexual
and erotic poetry, Bozorth also does flot note that this haiku omits Auden’s political and
ethical musings as essential dimensions ofhis ars poetica and his perception ofreality.
Stiil Bozorth’s emphasis on the open, unordered qualities ofAuden’s on-going meditation
on poetry, sex, God, and politics are as pertinent to our reading ofJournev as is the
analogical proportionality with which the freedom I necessity opposition can structure
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Auden’s work. An analogical order and a dialogical openness, both self-conscious to an
exceptional degree, exist as complementary tendencies in Auden’s work.
The conceptual and poetic ramifications ofAuden’s mediation and analogy making
around the freedom / necessity binarism are especially evident in a poem like XXVII, and
pervade Auden’s work, particularly afler 1939. When Seamus Heaney writes ofa
diminution of uncanniness and wildness of Auden’ s language as partly a regrettable effect
of an art that conscientiously “seeks the heraldic shape beneath the rippling skin”
(Government 126), he might have specified that the “heraldic shape” that Auden seeks
beneath his subjects’ surfaces repeatedly displays proportions conforming to Auden’s
notions ofthe opposed concepts offteedom and necessity. Though the persistence ofthe
idea of a falling off in Auden’ s work afier 1939 is tiresome—for any diminution of
uncanniness and wildness in Auden’s poetry afier 1939 is more than offset by Auden’s
poetic mastery, his prolific inventiveness, his philosophical rigour, and his cultural and
imaginative breadth—we can allow that there are some noteworthy qualitative differences
between Auden’s work from the thirties and his subsequent work; and so allow the
pertinence ofPhilip Larkin’s question ‘What became ofWystan?’ The answer is not, as
Larkin thinks, that afier Auden lefi England for the U.S. in 1939, he lost his subject matter
and feu out of touch with his public (Reguired 125). What really happened is that Auden by
the end of 193$, having passed tbrough wartime China, had found a permanent
understanding of what would remain his subject matter and recognized the crucial issue that
he would seek to represent in his work, namely, to quote XXVII one last time, that “We live
in freedom by necessity.”
Whether the effects ofAuden’s effort to organize bis poetry and thought around the
issues of freedom and necessity are as deleterious as Heaney and Larkin suggest, whether ail
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instances ofthe mediations and analogies involving freedom and necessity in Auden’s work
seem valïd, are less interesting questions for us in our exploration of Journey than the
question ofthe origin of Auden’s habituai reliance on such analogies and mediations. For
Auden’s “invention” or “strategic choice” of the freedom / necessity opposition as a
unifying code is flot arbitrary. Rather, as XXVII reveals, the “invention” ofthis “code”
emerges from the crucibles of Auden’ s experiences of the moral and erotic conditions of his
own youthfui homosexuality, ofthe political crises ofthe 1930s, ofhis inherited
Christianity, and of wTiting a self-consciously modernist poetry. Ail ofthese areas of
human expression—sexuality, politics, Christianity, and literature—passed through crises of
transformation during the 1930s, and Auden’s muiti-faceted accommodation ofthose
wrenching transformations is particuiarly comprehensive, coherent, and conscientious.
There is something historically specific then to Auden’s solving the problem of how to
encompass these various wracking realities through analogies constructed on the freedom /
necessity oppostion. Just as it is in Journey that we can sec the emergence ofAuden’s
mature rhetoricai pattem, so it is in the course of 193$’s Journey that a definitive analogical
solution realÏy emerges for Auden. That is why in XXVIi Auden is able so succinctly to
encompass ail these reaims of experiences, each fundamental to his work, and to display the
unifying function ofthe concepts offreedom and necessity in his comprehension and
representation ofthese diverse reaims of experience. The 1 930s remain for many the
definitive decade for Auden’s work in the sense that rnany celebrate lis poetly from that
decade more than his later work. The 1930s are aiso definitive in the sense that it is the
personal, sexual, political, cultural, and creative crises ofthat time and the lessons Auden
lad drawn from those crises by decade’s end that defined the contours ofthe mature
Audenesque and the nature of tIc poetics, themes, and poetry that Auden would devote
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himself to subsequently.
XXVII is then a pivotai poem with fundarnental relevance to several definitive
features ofAuden’s work, notabiy his mature rhetorical pattern; his approach to poetic
form; lis postrnodem openness, dialogical pluralism, and analogical vision; and his
complex simultaneous developrnent ofreligious, poiitical, and erotic themes. As an
encapsulation ofJoumey, XXVII’s pivotai significance suggests as well the importance that
Joumey has within Auden’s, and Isherwood’s, work. Like XXVII and “In Time ofWar,”
the negiected Joumey is indeed a pivotai work as wiil be made ciear in the chapters to
corne. Also significant for our reading of Joumey is the emergence ofthe poem’s succinct
assuredness at a pivotai moment within Joumey. Not oniy is XXVII a narrative, thernatic,
and poetic mise en abyine for Joumey, but the poem occurs at a retroprospective juncture in
the book such that XXVII reviews the explorations of Joumey to that point, notably in
Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary,” and announces the worldview about to be eiaborated in
“Cornmentary.” The assured centraiity of XXVII stands in the same relation to the
apparentiy uncertain discontinuities ofJournev as the conclusive une “We live in freedom
by necessity” stands to the shifting troubles of XXVII. Thematically, XXVII’s
heterogeneous bundie ofpolitical, religious, and erotic preoccupations mn throughout
Journey and at tirnes threaten to render it the uncentred, incoherent book some have taken it
to be. Aesthetically, XXVII’s neat anaÏogical and ideologicaÏ solutions contrast to
Joumey’ s sectional discontinuities and narrative and discursive ranginess and to the less
obviously elegant formai structures with which the book as a whole contains its thematic
and structural problems. As a key moment in Joumey, XXVII not oniy encapsulates the
book’s thernatic and ideological concems; XXVIJ’s poetic eiegance throws into relief
Joumey’s other iess succinct formai resolutions ofthose concems.
CHAPTER 3
THE CONSTRUCTION 0f JOURNEY TO A WAR AS A WHOLE
My inquiry is purely historical; no lightning flashes any longer from the long since
vanished thunderclouds, and so I may venture to seek for an explanation ofthe system
of piecemeal construction which goes further than the one that contented people then.
The limits which my capacity for thought imposes upon me are narrow enough, but the
province to be traversed here is infinite.
franz Kafka, “On the Construction ofthe Chinese Wa1l’ Translated by WilIa
and Edwin Muir as “The Great Wall of China”.
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PARTS 0f A WHOLE: REFLECTTONS ON REFLECTIONS
Claiming that XXVII constimtes a mise en abyme, an embedded image ofthe whole
story of Joumey, and its structural centre, implies that the book is a meaningfully unified
whole. This idea stands in contrast to the discontinuous heterogeneity ofthe book’s
sections; it also goes against most commentary on the book. Graves disparages Iceland and
Joumey as “informai travel scrapbooks, written partly in light verse, partly in light prose,
but ail in saleable joumalese” (435). Cunningham secs the book as just another floppy,
randomly structured, 1930s travel book, but one that is floppier than most: “lots ofthe
youthful Baedekers are fihled with [. . .] obvious devices for fihiing the page, for ftilfihling
the contract with the publisher any old how. Lettersfrom Iceland [... andj Journey b a
War are opportunistic rag-bags. The ‘30s travel book had ousted the novel as writing’s
loosest, baggiest, most monstrously capacious form” (391). Even commentators who unlike
Cunningham have written of Journey as if it were worth considering its wholeness and unity
have flot developed their points extensively enough to counter complaints about the book’s
incoherence and discontinuities. Be that as it may, Auden and Isherwood themseives must
have given some thought to the composition of Journey and in some way resolved for
themselves the question of its unity and form.
The history of Western poetics, argues Morson, is a history of “a succession of types
ofunity and unifying principles” (287). Critics’ complaints about the incoherence of
Joumey derive from a perennial concern to discover in an artwork a “unity that rules out the
merely contingent” (287). The unifying structurai and thematic principles that make
Joumey a coherent work of art require an unusual degree of attention precisely because of
the book’s discontinuous hybridness. Critics formulate the problems ofJoumey’s apparent
disunity and incoherence in different ways: some having to do principally with its dual
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authorship, others having to do with the book’s division into radically distinct sections, yet
others having to do with the special problem of the book’s ending or endings. Each ofthese
concerns must be addressed if we are to establish that approaching Joumey as a text with a
kind of unity and coherence significantly enhances the interest of the entire text.
Evelyn Waugh’s hostility to Auden led him to overstate an idea found in most
criticism ofthe book: “it is impossible,” writes Waugh, “to treat this publication as a single
work; it is two books which for the purposes of commercial convenience have been issued
as one [Isherwood’s marketable travelogue will help seil, Waugh opines, Auden’s duli
verses]” (Haffenden 289). Whoever wrote the comments on the fly-leaf of Journey’ s flrst
edition agrees with Waugh about the separateness oflsherwood’s and Auden’s
contributions and describes the book as “flot so much a collaboration, as an attempt to give
a picture ofthe Chinese war from two different and individual angles.” Fiimey suggests one
“could argue that the collaboration succeeds primarily because there is so littie collabor
ation” (168), and crifics tend to endorse this position by effectively pronouncing “either
Auden’s sonnet sequence or Isherwood’s diary, the book’s ‘primary’ text” (Bryant 130) or
by dealing exclusively with the contribution ofwhichever author happens to interest them.
Bryant tries to correct this critical imbalance when she reads “the poems, diaiy,
photographs and captions against one another to show that none of the books parts can
daim central status” (131), but she too proceeds from a critical bias that emphasizes the
discontinuities within and between the different parts of the book. Noteworthy as such
discontinuities are, they hardly need emphasis, and Bryant’s more original contribution to
our understanding ofJoumey is her incompletely developed “holistic approach” (135) to its
interpretation. Reflecting on the temary relations between Auden’s poems, Isherwood’s
diary, and the photographs (again principally Auden’s), Bryant analyses how occasionally
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“images from the Picture Commentary, Travel-Diary, and the poems will align themselves
into an unsteady triptych” (133). Besides providing the first meaningful discussion of
Auden’s photos and establishing an iimovative view of the relationships between the
various representations in verse, prose, and photographs, Bryant underscores the importance
of reading different parts of Joumey in relation to one another. We have seen important
compositional and thematic connections between different sections when we noted that the
last une of XXVII retums, not only to the soimet’s own beginning, but to the beginnings of
“The Voyage” and ofthe “Travel-Diary”; and noted that the beginning of”Commentary”
revisits the beginning ofthe sonnet sequence.
Hynes, who describes the book as a “discontinuous collection of parts in different
forms” (Generation 342) before noting that “the link between the two parts, the prose and
the poetry, is in fact clear enough” (343), also approaches Joumey holistically, as does Kerr.
Hynes’ and Kerr’ s different approaches to the question of the wholeness of the text are flot
incompatible with Bryant’s. Rather, by drawing attention to different aspects ofthe book’s
wholeness, Bryant, Hynes. and Kerr together suggest the complex riclmess ofthat whole.
Where Bryant focuses on temary relations between genres and media within Joumey, Hynes
and Kerr emphasize the binary relationships between the different texts of Isherwood and
Auden. for Hynes, Isherwood’s subject is the “local” and “particular” war (343), while
Auden’s is a war that is “universal” (344) and “general” (347). Kerr develops the
opposition ofAuden and Isherwood in more detail: Auden is globally, epically oriented;
Isherwood, disoriented and ironie (27$). Auden is assured (292), “authoritatively
historicist” (286), and omniscient (294); Isherwood, bewildered (283), ignorant (281),
provisional (292), and without authority (293) or underauthoritative (294).
Broadly speaking, critics who note the authorial complementarity, as opposed to the
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authorial inconsistency, see Isherwood as developing a subjective perspective, and Auden,
an objective one. Isherwood and Auden’s contrasting texts complement one another
because, rnuch like the yin and the yang, they represent antithetical but inseparable parts of
a whole. In the way, thougli, of yin and yang or of an Engelsian interpenetration of
opposites, we will see that Isherwood’s subjectivity involves its own necessary objectivity,
just as we have seen in the objectivity in the sonnets of “In Time of War” recunent flashes
ofAuden’s subjective experience is paradoxicaliy acknowledged in XXIII through the
objective pronoun “me.” It is discernible as well in bis care to irnplicitly include his own
concern with homosexual love in the sequence’s development ofthe theme ofEros in
human history. Finaily, Auden’s conscientiousness throughout the sequence about what
and who are involved in any first person plural subjectivity is another sign ofhis attention to
the problem of subjectivity—he is trying neither to deny subjectivity, nor to project his own
subjectivity on everything and everyone, but rather to be objective about the possibilities of
the subjective. We find the sarne conceptual and perspectival play in Auden’s “Picture
Commentary” when it presents a photo of Auden or includes in photos of the “Eastern
observed” evidence of the radically different condition of Auden as “Western observer”
(Bryant 163-7)——thereby objectivizing the subjectivity behind ail the other pictures.
Isherwood’s subjectivity is partly a matter of lis narcissistic preoccupation with bis
own personality and partly a matter of critical attention to his own feelings and reactions.
Here too, however, questions ofthe relativity ofthe subjective and the objective soon arise.
for Isherwood’s approach to his subjectivity resembles the putativcly objective attitude of
I 930s documentary. He both seems to be considering his peculiar subjectivity as objectively
as possible, and, as in Goodbye’s famous “I am a camera” metaphor, seems at times to be
trying to reduce his subjectivity to an impersonal ideal ofpurely objective seeing and
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recording. In the latter respect, Isherwood is approaching the ideal ofthe sort of objectivity
that flows from an epistemological “faith in the primacy of perception” (Wilde Isherwood
14). furthermore, we will find when we examine the end of “Travel-Diary” that Isherwood,
by focusing utterly on what arc purportedly objective facts, enters into a process of excising
his subjectivity altogether—only to end with a sudden reassertion ofhimself as
idiosyncratic subject.
This play of objectivity and subjectivity is an organizing principle in Journey.
Epistemologically, this subjective / objective dynamic is possible, even necessary, because
no matter who the author is, what the medium is, or what the fictional premise is, neither
objectivity nor subjectivity can ever be perfectly established. The subjective and objective
aiways remain entangled so that rigid conceptions oftheir antithesis soon collapse. In
comprehending the relationship of Auden’ s and Isherwood’ s texts in Journey, ideas tending
to absolute dichotomies between the one’s objectivity and the other’s subjectivity are
misleading—not only because each author composes his section with the contrast to his
collaborator’s section in mmd, but because each has a significant role in the composition of
the other’s texts. Isherwood’s “Travel-Diaiy” is based on journal entries made alternately
by himself and Auden in the course of their Chinese journey, while Isherwood’ s editorial
authority had long been an aspect ofAuden’s creative process (Isherwood Exhumations 19).
The play ofthe subjective and the objective is then an organizing conceptual motif internai
to both Auden and Isherwood’s separate texts, as well as being an important aspect ofthe
overarching complementarity of the two texts in relation to one another. In this doubly
enfolded manner the subjective / objective opposition serves as both structural and thematic
principle in Journey.
Just as the relations ofthe subjective and the objective in Journey’s dual authorship
1 OZ
C structure Joumey in a meaningftul way, so the binary relations that Hynes and Kerr see and
the temaiy relations that Bryant sees between the book’s distinct sections suggest that cadi
section depends on the others to illuminate or complete it. Such complex intenelations and
complementarity compels us to interpret Journey flot as a collection of separate parts, but as
a single work with a substantial integrïty of its own.
An essential unifiing feature ofJourney related to the dialectic of subjective and
objective is a poetics of infinite reflexivity. Bryant describes Journey as a “self-reflective”
text (14, 141, 154), a “seif-scrutinizing” text (15, 139), and a “self-conscious” text (129,
169). Her reading focuses on its “moments ofdisconcerting self-reflectiveness” (166). We
have seen that the reflexive relafionship in a sonnet of the afler of the sestet to the before of
the octave is particularly acute in “In Time ofWar.” This conventional aspect ofsoimet
form is one of several binary structures that set in motion Journey’s reflexive dynamic. The
oppostion oflsherwood’s prose and Auden’s verse is a more conspicuous example ofthe
binarism that structures Joumey. By manipulating a series of such interlocking dual
structures Auden and Isherwood create a hyper-reflexivity that is one ofJourney’s most
noteworthy qualities. The opposing objective and subjective tendencies just described
develop the reflexivity inherent in the book’ s structural dualities. The recunent figure of
the mise en abyme also contributes to the hyper-reflexivity of Joumey, as does the irony that
ramifies through the book. Journey’s irony is, as we shall see, both an example and an
effect of its structural dualism. Before considering those other forms of reflexive duality,
let us consider how the opposition of prose and verse generates a reflexivity through
contrast that emphasizes, flot only the dialectical relationship of Auden and Isherwood’ s
different perspectives, but also sustained aesthetic, poetic, and epistemological concerns of
Journev.
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VERSETS TO PROSE AS ORDER TO EXCREMENT
We had corne to where the pathway, narrower grown,
Crosses the second ridge, whereofthe rock
Is buttress to another arch of stone.
Here in the other chasrn whining of folk
We heard, that puffed and snorted as they rolled,
While with their paims upon themselves they knock.
The banks were crusted over with a mould
Thickening upon them from the rnounting fume
Which eyes and nose assaulted and befouÏed.
The bottom was so deep that through the gloom
We could see nought, until we found a road
To the cliff s summit and upon it clomb.
Thereon we stood, and in the hoÏlow showed
Down there a people dipt in excrement
As if from human privies it had flowed.
Binyon Dante ‘s Inftrno XVIII
The contrast of prose and verse is a prorninent feature of Journey, but the meaning
oftheir opposition needs clarification. No absolute criteria oppose poetry and prose in
Journey, yet the relationship between the very different uses Auden and Isherwood make of
verse and prose have a particular conceptual significance. Throughout the book, the
objective bias ofAuden’s poetry is matched by a drive toward elaborate forrn and order.
whule Isherwood’s subjectivity conveys a sense of overwhelming disorder and formlessness.
The opposition of verse and prose that Auden and Isherwood develop is evident in the role
the versified sections play in the book’s construction. Auden selects and arranges poetic
forms so that almost rnechanically, by fiat of sheer poetic formalism, they seern intended to
provide the book with a much needed containing structure. This overarching formai
structure is itself a further sign that the book lias been conceived, not as a series of distinct
parts, but as a unified whole.
The formai architectonic Auden’s verses provide can be seen if one disregards
Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” and the “Picture Comrnentary” and looks at the sections in
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verse only. The principal poetic form in Journey is the sonnet with its two quatrains and
two tercets distinctly set off by une spaces. The only poems flot written in sonnet form are
the book’s opening poem in quatrains (“The Voyage”) and its closing poem in tercets
(“Commentary”). Yet with those introductory and concluding poems Auden magnifies the
form ofthe sonnet in order to structure the opening and closing of Journey. As with a
sonnet, the book begins with quatrains and closes with tercets; as with many sonnets, the
opening quatrains of “The Voyage” pose questions, present initial situations, and raise
problems while the tercets of “Commentary” offer responses, resolve problems, and effect
closure. Isolating the sections in verse, one sees that the sonnets ofthe opening sequence
and of “In Time 0f War” are framed within the oversized and lop-sided, but enclosing
sonnet-like structure suggested by “The Voyage” and “Commentary.” If one then inserts
the “Travel-Diary” and the “Picture Commentary” into their respective places, one finds
that the same oversized sonnet-like structure encompasses everything: the opening
sequence, Isherwood’s travelogue, the photographs, the sonnet sequence, and the verse
commentary. In the sort ofmirroring typical of mise en abyme, the sonnet’s stanzaic
structure recurs on the scale of the entire book so that the structure of the sonnet is
emblematic ofthe structure ofJoumey as a whole. While, however, the quatrains that open
a sonnet are typically more expansive than the narrower tercets which must bring the sonnet
to a close, the relationship of”The Voyage” to “Commentary” is inverted. The book’s
closing response to the enigmatic, qucstion-posing opening quatrains of “The Voyage”
cannot be contained within a neat and tidy sestet, but sprawls into the encyclopaedic ninety
three tercets of “Commentary.” The latter ultimately closes flot with the graceful gesture of
a tercet, but with the blocky solidity of an arbitraiy concluding quatrain. Together, the final
quatrain of “Commentary” and the opening quatrains of “The Voyage” constitute a minimal
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frame consisting of a pair of initial and terminal brackcts for the sections of Journey.
The arbitrary flimsiness ofthose brackets compared to the scope of what they
contain is ail too evident. Yet the large-scale sonnet-like structure organizing the sections
in verse and the entire “unruly” book (Bryant 129) seems deliberateiy imposed. The
deiiberateness of Auden’ s contrivance is confirmed in a second organizing magnification of
the sonnet structure. For the arithmetic ratio of the numbers of unes in the two parts of “In
Time of War” is equivalent to that of the numbers of unes in the two parts of a sonnet.
Expressed numericaliy, the ratio of the eight unes of a sonnet’ s octave to the six unes of its
sestet is 1.3. This is the same ratio as that between the numbers oflines in the two parts of
“In Time ofWar”: the sonnet sequence has (27 x 14 ) 37$ unes and “Commentary” has
((93 x 3) + 4 ) 283 unes, with the ratio 37$ / 283 being equal to 1.3. Gerald Manley
Hopkins calls his abbreviated—six unes followed by four and a haiflines (6 /4.5
1 .3)—but isomorphic version of a sonnet a “curtal sonnet,” and we might describe the
sonnet-like proportions that structure both of “In Time of War” and Journey as those of an
“epic,” “cosmic,” or “encyclopaedic” sonnet. It is as if Auden wants to project the soimet’s
structure onto a sweeping horizon so that its microcosm attains macrocosmic dimensions.
When Auden writes “With what precision was each strophe planned” ofthe
decadent poet in VII, he is also self-consciously referring to his own deliberate formai
contrivances in Journey. The formai structures ofAuden’s verse in Journey are both
aesthetically arbitrary and essential to Auden’s ethical and epistemological vision.
Congruent as they are with ethical and epistemological dimensions of the mature before and
afier pattern ofrhetoric in Auden’s poetry, these sonnet-like formai structures look arbitrary
when opposed to the book’s overwheiming, sublimely uncontainabie subject matter. The
arbitrariness ofthe organizing poetic structure in Journey and its incapacity to impose a
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convincing order on the book becomes an important part of the meaning of that structure
and a demonstration ofthe artificiality of ail artfuiness. In the exaggerated contrast between
the magnified stanzaic constrûctions ofAuden’s sections and the ofi-noted problem of
shapelessness in Journey, we see the ernergence ofa fttther aspect ofAuden’s mature
poetics. This is Auden’s insistence on the disjunction between the intractability of the reai
and the artificiality of art. Whereas we want art to “present to us [. . .] aiways the perfectly
tidiable case of disorder” (Auden Collected 426), Auden later insists on the chasm
separating Ariei’s “will to compose, to form at ail costs a felicitous pattern” and the
incorrigible disorderly grossness ofCaliban, “the only chiid of[.
. .] the unrectored chaos”
(429). As with the articulation ofAuden’s mature rhetoricai pattern in the sonnets of”In
Time of War,” so Journey with its contrast of felicitous formai organization to the disorder
of the Real proves pivotai in the definition of Auden’ s mature aesthetic theory, a work that
defines his core ethical and episternological preoccupations. In Journey, the aesthetic,
ethical, and epistemologicai dimensions of the contrast of order and disorder are developed
through the contrast ofAuden’s poetry and Isherwood’s prose.
Kerr observes ofthe relationship ofthe Auden and Isherwood texts within Joumey
that while “Auden or ‘Auden’ from his hesitant beginnings becomes more authoritatively
vatic as the book progresses, Isherwood (‘Jsherwood’) chooses to flounder ever deeper in
the viscous particularity of China” (293). Where Auden constructs an overail formai order
by the end ofthe book, the poetics oflsherwood’s text do flot ernphasize the supposition of
an order in his subject or the imperative of imposing a forma] construction. Rather,
Isherwood repeatedly acknowledges his inability to perceive an intelligible order in bis
Chinese experience. Either there is no order in what lie observes or he cannot comprehend
it. His description of a Chinese meal early in the “Travel-Diary” reveals an epistemological
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problem troubling his entire diary:
One’s first sight ofa table prepared for a Chinese mea! hardiy suggests the
idea of eating, at ail. It looks rather as if you were sitting down to a
competition in water-colour painting [. .] You begin the mea! by wiping
hands and face with bot moistened towels [. . .] Then cornes the food. It is
served in no recognizabie order ofprogression—fish does flot necessarily
follow soup, nor meat fish. Nor can the length of the mea! be foreseen by the
guest. His favourite dish may well appear at the end, when lie is too bioated to
taste it. (506-7)
The disorientation caused by things arriving “in no recognizable order of progression”
recurs in more serious contexts. There is the “general confusion” of the
operating-theatre [which] was a scene of lively rough-and-ready activity. The
work of six surgeons had to be done by three—and quickly; there was no tirne
for professional niceties. People stroÏled in with telegrams or parcels, and
remained to help, to the best oftheir ability; there was sornething for
everybody to hold: a leg, a towel, or a bucket. In the general confusion, while
Ayre’s back was tumed for an instant, one ofthe operating-tables upset. The
patient’s head hit the floor with a resounding crack. (530)
Later this sort of confusion is iinked to the disorders ofwar, which is afler ail the book’s
principal subject matter, when Isherwood presents the mental constructs of General Head
Quarters as inadequate representations of the realities of war-engendered confusion:
Producing a pencil, postulating our interest as a matter of course, he drew
highroads, shaded in towns, arrowed troop movements; lecturing us like the
brilliant sixth-forrn boy who takes the juniors in history while the headmaster
is away [Ishenvood is surely thinking of the account in Lions of bis self
sabotaged career as a history student at Cambridge]. Eveiything was lucid and
tidy and false—the ftanks like neat littie cubes, the pincer-movements working
with mathematical precision, the reinforcements neyer failing to arrive
punctual to the minute. But war, as Auden said later, is not like that. War is
bombing an already disused arsenal, missing it, and killing a few oid women.
War is lying in a stable with a gangrenous leg. War is drinking bot water in a
bam and worrying about one’s wife. War is a handful of lost and terrified
men in the mountains, shooting at sornething moving in the undergrowth.
War is waiting for days with nothing to do; shouting down a dead telephone;
going without sleep, or sex, or a wash. War is untidy, inefficient, obscure, and
largely a matter of chance. (603-4)
This incongruity of military maps and the actual disorder ofwartime is simply the most
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acute instance of a general epistemological problem in Isherwood’s Chinese experience.
Not only is there no match between the war and the representations of the war, more
generally there is no match between language and the objects it is supposed to refer to.
There may be a surfeit ofnames in Joumey, but, as in Isherwood’s Berlin books (Wilde
Horizons 93), names keep getting distorted: thus Isherwood, who is “Issyvoo” in Goodbye,
becomes in China “Y Hsiao Wu” (509), or “Mr Y” (579), or “Isherman” (613), and Fleming
becomes “frame-Up” (614) or “Framing” (613). Like the Chinese who stumble over
English names, Isherwood has to contend with the foreignness of Chinese names and
throughout Joumey is made aware of the mutual incomprehensibility and mutual
untransïatability of different semantic systems. Names and language are problems for
Auden too—whose own name as we shah see undergoes a memorable distortion—who
raises the puzzles ofnaming and ofhaving a name in “The Traveller,” in “Hongkong,” in
III, XVIII, XXIV, XXVI, and in “Commentary” (686); and who in III, a poem originally
entitled “Language,” provides a history of the creation of language and names, and an
analysis of the inimical consequences of the disjunction of signifier and signffied. For
Isherwood, not only do famihiar names become unstable, but personal identities do too. Just
as the succession of human types and situations in Auden’s sonnet sequence reveaÏs the
fluidity of human nature, so for Isherwood the identities of individuals alter with their
changing circumstances. “Does a man become a different person in a different place?”
(557), asks an Isherwood who repeatedly foregrounds the arbitrary performative and
circumstantial aspects ofpersonal identity, including bis own (Bryant 143-55), and who
manifestly considers the question worth asking. If neither objects nor their names stay put,
there is little hope that any kind of reliable fit is possible between them; the very possibility
ofthe intehligibility ofthings or ofwriting anything meaningful becomes unlikely.
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Towards the end ofthe book. Isherwood retums to the incomprehensibility of
Chinese cuisine: “they were cooking bamboo in ail its forms—including the strips used for
making chairs. That, I thought, is so typical ofthis country. Nothing is specifically either
eatable or uneatabie. You could begin munching a hat, or bite a mouthfui out of a wall;
equally, you could build a hut with the food provided at lunch. Everything is everything”
(621). Everything is everything: there is no order, no propriety; things happen “without
apparent object” (532). Isherwood can only report his “chaotic impressions” (623) or bis
“surrealistic mood” (592). Rhetoricaiiy, Isherwood expresses the difficuity of ordering his
impressions through his frequent reliance on the random list. A non-hierarchical way of
integrating or simply acknowiedging the items ofone’s experience, sucli a list is a form that
accommodates incongruous and suneal juxtaposition, and is one ofthe characteristic
rhetorical forrns oflsherwood’s prose in “Travel-Diary.” There are lists ofthe phenomena
ofwar (603-4), ofCharieton’s inconsequent conversation (590), ofthe details of
Wenchow’ s picturesque scenery (623), of commodities and distractions in Shanghai (625),
ofsleep-disturbing noises (621), ofthe keywords ofAngio-Chinese rapprochement (575),
ofChristian denominations (537), and (as in almost ail the passages cited above and the
passage below) countless mini-iists of adjectives and things:
amidst the booths and shops, were shailow dug-outs, barely a yard deep and
no Ïarger than a dog-kennei, roofed over roughly with planks, earth, and straw.
In myjaundiced, sleepy mood, everything I noticed seemed miserable and
corrupt. Every third person in the crowd appeared to be suffering from
trachorna, or goitre, or hereditary syphilis. And the foodstuffs they were
buying and selling looked hatefui beyond belief—the fiithiest parts ofthe
oldest and most diseased animais; stodgy excrement-puddings; vile, stagnant
soups and poisonous roots. (529)
Here the incomprehensible formiessness of China, of war, and of the experiences of the
journey does indeed, as Kerr suggests, tend towards something iike viscousness.
Formiess, unformable, viscous, things keep retuming Isherwood to the issue ofthe
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ubiquity of excrement: the excremental pudding above; the “warnings against dysentery”
that will corne from eating fruit (51 1); the “people [. - .] squatting on bare haunches, to
manure the earth” (527); “the averted, snot-smeared, animal faces ofthe very humble”
(512); the “unappetizing relish” with which the Chinese “hawked and spat without
restraint” and made use ofthe spittoons “placed just behind our respective chairs” in the
dining car (527); the “naked buttocks [ofthe very young chiidreni, pushing out through the
divided breeches [divided 5° that in diaper-eschewing China, chiidren can squat to relieve
themselves directly on the ground] [...] smeared with dirt from the road” (508); the
“foreign devils screaming with laughter at mysterious jokes, singing in high falsetto or
mock operatic voices, swaying backwards and forwards on [our] seats [. . . in] an exercise
which we had invented, in a vain effort to ward off constipation” (511); the fact that
“constipated though we were we could stili eat” (557); the “night sou” manuring the wheat,
“each single plant” (532); the “after-effects of an attack of dysentery” (593). There is too
the case of “Chin-dung” whose comic narcissism contrasts with the nauseating suggestion
in his name (555). Even the bathbouses are “filthy and smel[l] heartily of urine” (539);
even when fantasizing about a life in Shangri-la, Isherwood conscientiously remembers they
would have to learn to “clean the thunder-boxes” (591). Not for nothing does “Au Dung”
(the transliterated Chinese version of Auden’s name which Tsherwood teils us appeared on
Auden’s Chinese visiting card (509) and which fortuitously describes the monumentally
dirty dandy that Auden was) have the progressive culture ofthe West voyaging to “the
septic East” (497). Not for nothing does Auden later dedicate “The Geography of the
House,” a poem about going to the toilet, to the copro-obsessive Isherwood.
The issue of excrement, and shit in particular, cannot be removed from Isherwood’s
experience of China; it runs through it from the beginning to the end.
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the immediate effects of China [. . .] became immediately apparent on both of
them. Auden had dysentery throughout much ofthe trip. Christopher had
colds, sore throats and then internai spasms. In Shanghai, I remember how lie
lay on the floor grunting with pain and opening and shutting like a jackknife.
Later, in the Enganad [sic], afier an analysis ofthe contents ofhis colon, the
doctor delighted him by syaingthat [sic] lie had found at least twenty different
species of intestinal parasite. (Unused chapters. Ch. 14 173)
he recails in a draft of Kind. In “Arriving in Japan,” the draft of a travelogue incorporated
into Journey and “Meeting the Japanese” (Prose 2: 448-50), Isherwood sketches a
bureaucratic analogue to the aesthetic contrast in Journey between war-torn China’s
formlessness, epitomized in the disgustingness of shit, and the artificial hyper-formalism of
the stanza-like structures Auden manipulates to organize the book:
When we lefi Shangliai. the choiera epidemic was spreading rapidly, and our
day at sea was enlivened by preparations for the visit ofthe Japanese
quarantine authorities. Each passenger was provided with a small circular
glass box and a pair of miniature chopsticks [as with the excremental
puddings, there is here a hint of coprophagism]. Ail boxes, we were wamed,
must be fihled by the evening and handed over to the purser in signed and
numbered envelopes. It was inconceivable that more than a dozen ofthese
hundreds of unsavoury [yet again a coprophagic whiff] samples could be
tested before we berthed—very likely, none of them would ever be examined
at ail. But the Japanese live rigidly by the letter ofthe law : no excrement, no
landing-permit. So we fihled our little boxes as best we could. Some of us
[including, no doubt, the chronically constipated Isherwood] were reduced to
tipping the ever-obliging Chinese stewards.
In addition to this satiricai opposition of bureaucratic management and excrement,
Journey’s contrast between disgusting formlessness and formai artifice lias a contemporary
literary analogue in Sartre’s La Nausée.
No less than La Nausée, Joumev “represents [. . .1 a kind ofcrisis in the relation
between fiction and reaiity, the tension or dissonance between paradigmatic form and
contingent reaiity” (Kermode 133). On the one hand, like Sartre in La Nausée, Isherwood
in lis “Travei-Diary” needs to give a representation of “the horror of contingency” as
“nauseous and viscous” (Kermode 136). On the other hand, “there is an irreducible
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minimum of geometry—of humanly needed shape or structure—which finally limits our
ability to accept the mirnesis of pure contingency” (132). Kermode cites Murdoch’s
contrast of”what she calis ‘crystaliine form’ with narrative ofthe shapeless, quasi
documentary kind” (130). In the face ofthe shapelessness of pure contingency, “form is a
matter of recherche” (132). In Journey, the ultimate expressions ofthe need for geornetry
and the search for forrn are the exaggeratediy crystalline and inorganic strophic shape of
Auden’s containing structures. Since we judge a literary work in part according to “its
transfiguration ofthe contingent” (Kermode 136), it is worth noting that though the pure
formalism ofAuden’s sonnet-like macro-structures can be seen as fuifihling the human
requirement for form, the effect ofthose structure is ambiguous. While they do answer to
our need for geometry, their superimposed quality reveal and problematize our desire for
such formai completion and fulfilment. Though there are more convincing formai
‘transfigurations’ of contingency in Joumey, such as the essential Audenesque pattern of
mythic enchantment and parabolic disenchantment in the sonnet sequence, which structure
from within the book’s individual sections, the stanza-like sonnet-mirroring structures
provided by the book’s opening and closing and by the numericai relationship ofthe two
parts of “In Time of War” are too inconspicuous and arbitrarily mechanical to be
convincing. What that first structure brackets cannot so easily be contained and continues
to spiil onwards in the closing bracket of “Commentary” for almost three hundred unes so
that the organizing structure’s potential formai elegance is undone by its final
disproportionate dimensions.
Also problematic is the ‘contingency’ Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” presents as
disgusting and excremental. Kemiode suggests that the contingency which is “nauseous
and viscous” in Sartre may be “ultimately sexual” in nature: “Ibis is unformed matter,
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materia matrix; [in Sartre’s novel] Roquentin’s is ultimately the form giving male role”
(136). We can object immediately that in the relationship of form and formÏessness,
formlessness is flot necessarily female and the form-giving role is flot necessarily male, but
in Joumey the long column ofAuden’s “Commentary” does have something phallic about
it. Whether the muckier aspects of buggery explain Isherwood’s transformation of
nauseating and formless matter, which Kermode represents as sexually feminine, into faeces
is a question better left unasked. Certainly, though, the feculent quality ofnauseating
contingency in “Travel-Diary” is linked to the fact the Isherwood encounters it in China.
Isherwood’ s preoccupation with human waste in Journey is a reflection of an
essential dimension of the experience of twentieth-centuiy modernity and of China’ s
relationship to Western and Japanese power. Rogaski recalis that “By the late nineteenth
century the functioning of sewers, the salubrity of water, the banishment of odors [.. .1 were
hailed as hallmarks of urban modernity” in the West (Rogaski in Esherick 3 1), and that
these virtues were recognized as ideals to be aspired to elsewhere. Govemment
administered hygiene became a “central emblem of modemity” and was thought of as “an
essential quality of Western civilization, an elemental characteristic that distinguished West
from East” (31). The ideal of “hygenic modemity” and China’ s failure to embody it became
for Chinese and foreigners alike “a marker of Chinese inadequacy, if flot inferiority” (40)
and “an essential ‘skill” (30) “which China lacked in its quest for modem civilization”
(46). In China to be ‘modem’ has more than anything else meant to be “civilized” and
“clean” (30), and foreign and native confidence in Chinese cleanliness has seldom been
very high. The warning “Neyer [toi mix with a Chinese crowd, or you’ll get typhus” that
Isherwood and Auden hear during their sojoum in Hong Kong (Prose 1: 499) sums up the
contemporary position of international medical officialdom. In an article published early in
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the twentieth century in a German medical journal, “Tsuzuki bluntly concluded ‘Der
Prophylazis sind die Chinese unzuganglich’ (the Chinese are incapable of enacting
[sanitary] prevention), and warned that in terms of public health, foreigners must be
exceedingly suspicious ofthe Chinese city and the people in it. [....Tsuzuki] sternly
wamed foreign residents to limit direct contact with Chinese people if they wished to avoid
contracting disease” (Rogaski 37). In an effort to become modem and clean the Chinese
tried to develop new norms of behaviour: “City residents who practiced [hygenic modernity
did] not excrete or expectorate in public places” (30); “intimate functions such as excretion
were also regulated. Working-class residents and out-of-town travelers who had previously
used the convenience of open fields were forced at gunpoint to defecate in public toilets”
(40); “Even merchants and degree holders who lapsed in their observation ofhygenic
modernity were forced to carry pails of sewage for the bureau under the watchful eye of
armed Sikh guards” (40).
In spite of such policies, “the persistence of shit” (42) and of pre-modern Chinese
approaches to its management (31, 42) remained problematic for Chinese and foreign
authorities. By the 1930s, it was Generalissimo Chiang’s turn to tackie the problems of
human waste and Chinese immundicity and to prornote the ideals of hygenic modemity by
launching the New Life Movement in 1934. The veiy hygienicaÏly modem Mme. Chiang
outiines the principles ofNew Life during Auden and Isherwood’s interview with her in
Wuchang. Though Isherwood endorses Mme. Chiang (and the Generalissimo)’s leadership
of China, he prefers to present the Movement as motivated by political cynicism, and is
suspicious of “reformist extravagance, police bullying, and the compulsory scrubbing of
teeth” (Prose 1: 522-5). In any case, he doubts New Life will prove effective: “On the way
back to Hankow [after the interview with Mme. Chiang] we discussed the Movement and
121
the Chiang régime. Could China ever be cleaned up? Auden, himself a veteran enemy of
compulsory hygiene, was sceptical” (524). Even the person ofMme. Chiang might flot be
entirely free of China’ s filth. When Isherwood remarks that “Strangely enough, I have
neyer heard anybody comment on her perfume. It is the most delicious either of us has ever
smelt” (Prose 1: 522), he might not realize how close he is to associating her with shit—that
is if we accept psychoanalyst Dorninque Laporte’s assertion that “Perfume, pare-fumier, bas
aiways countered manure. By proposing itself as the counteragent of shit, perfume only
ensures its persistence; denial only makes the proof more positive—shit is there” ($6). That
shit may be present etymologically, sociologically, or psychoanalytically within “perfume”
enables us to read Isherwood’s description ofMme. Chiang’s perfume as ‘delicious’ in the
context of bis recurrent coprophagic fears in Journey.
for Isherwood, the permanent dirtiness of China cannot be ignored or explained
away; rather China is the country which Auden called “The Bad Earth” where a place can
be “set down, without apparent object [.. .J in the midst of an immense mud plain” (532).
Isherwood’s China is definitely not Peari Buck’s Good Earth (the film version ofBuck’s
1931 novel had been released in 1937, and Buck was awarded the Nobel Prize for her
depictions of Chinese peasants while Auden and Isherwood were piecing together their own
‘China book’). In Journey, however, the Earth is Bad not as a resuit of China’s poverty, or
its muddiness and shittïness; rather the Bad Earth is a product ofwar:
from here we looked down on War as a bird might—seeing only a kind of
sinister agriculture or anti-agriculture. Immediately below us peasants were
digging in the fertile, productive plain. Further on there would be more
peasants, in uniforrn, also digging—the unproductive, sterile trench. Beyond
them, to the north, stili more peasants; and, once again, the fertile fields. This
is how war must seern to the neutral, unjudging bird—merely the Bad Earth,
the tiny, dead patch in the immense flowering field of luxuriant China. (547)
More than the persistence ofmere shit, it is the consequences ofwar that nauseate: “In one
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hut [of a military hospital] the sweet stench of gas-gangrene was so violent that I had to step
outside to avoid vomiting” (539); “we stood beside one old woman, whose brains were
soaking obscenely through a littie towel, I saw the blood-caked mouth open and shut” (587).
In contrast, then, to Kermode’s Sartre-derived emphasis on the strictly nauseous
quality of formless contingency, it is specifically war-inflicted human suffering that
Isherwood presents as sickening. As for shit, it is sickening in Journey really only when it is
mixed with ideas of coprophagisrn; otherwise, shit is either simply a matter of fact or an
occasion for humour. References, whether humorous or horrified, to shit and shitting whule
en voyage are part of any properly glamourous travel book1, but, in the face of the
nauseating grotesqueness ofthe physical suffering ofthe war wounded, such humour can
only seem inappropriate. The incompatibility of humour and atrocity may be one reason
why such scenes ofhuman suffering are so rare in Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary.” Another
reason is that Isherwood and Auden actually witnessed littie fighting and consequently saw
few war wounded—travelling as they were in the luli between the Fail ofNanking and the
Battie of Wuhan. Stili it can seem at times that Isherwood is, if flot avoiding real suffering,
then flot giving it the emphasis it deserves. As a consequence, the comic qualities of
Isherwood’s travelogue have posed a problem for critics: Clayton remarks on Isherwood’s
incapacity to reach “across the barriers of language that [. . .] confound him” to the sort of
“imaginative empathy” with the war wounded and war dead that Robin flyde achieved in
her riveffing account ofthe Sino-Japanese War (e-mail to author).
Whether Isherwood’s comedy is appropriate, the link between shit and humour is
essential to Isherwood’s aesthetics, and clearly the comedy is important to Isherwood. Just
[y.] There is no Toilet Paper on the Road Less Travelled: The Best ofTravel Humor and
Misadventure. Ed. Doug Lansky. San Francisco: Travelers’ Tales, 199$.
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as Isherwood, by repeatedly acknowledging the lack of perceptible or intelligible order,
provides a self-reflective justification for the procedures and aesthetics of “Travel-Diary,”
so Isherwood shows repeatedly how ofien in China humour is actually the appropriate
human response to war-tom life:
The Mayor [ofCanton]’s smooth round face was split permanently, it seemed,
by an immense grin [. . . .] It was hardly necessary for us to interview him: he
interviewed himself, laughing ail the time.
[...J We both like Mr Tsang. If this was typical ofChina’s attitude towards
the Japanese, it was certainly an example to the West—with its dreary hymns
ofhate, and screams of”Baby-killer”, “Hun”, “sub-human fiends.” This
scornful, good-natured amusement was, we agreed, exactly die note which a
cultured, pacific country should strike in its propaganda against a brutal,
upstart enemy. Mr Tsang’ s kind of humour, if properly exploited, should win
China many friends abroad. (504)
Isherwood’s hopeful speculations regarding the undreariness ofChinese propaganda and
China’s cultured pacificism is uninformed wishful thinking, but Auden’s less ideologically
compiicated later reference to the Chinese as a “humorous” people (681) passes more
easily, and the very sensible idea of maintaining good humour in the face of serious and
unpleasant business recurs in Isherwood.
Thus, operating on the vaginal fistula mentioned earlier, Dr. McLure keeps up
a running commentary for the benefit ofthe amused and slightly scandalized
Canadian Sister. “Let’s have sornething to lrneel on.. .You see, Sister, I’m
more devotional than you think.. .Now the torch.. .Let your light shine. . .Oh boy,
that’s good! $ponge, Brother...More light in the north-east...Phew, I’m
sweating. This is worse than two sets of tennis.. .Now then, Bunty pulls the
strings. Which string shah you pull, Brother? 1f you were in a sailing-ship,
you’d be sunk...Well, that’s fixed the exhaust. We’ll do the differential
tomorrow....” (536)
“How wehÏ this honest mirth becomes their labour,” Hamiet says of the gravediggers, and
such seemly unseemly joking runs through “Travel-Diary.” Isherwood’s campiness and
joldnesss in Journey and elsewhere disconcerts more critics than it charms (fussell 219,
Wilde Isherwood $6, Swingler in Haffenden 291, Upward 20, Mizejewski 42, 70). In
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“Travel-Diary” Islierwood’s position as an observer ofChinese suffering makes his humour
and jokes especialiy problernatic. It is possible to defend Isherwood’s cornedy on the bases
of his sense of the Chinese thernseives as humorous, of his fantasy of humourous Chinese
propaganda, and even ofAuden’s observation in “Cornmentary” that in “clever” France
“ridicule lias acted a historic role” (685). Isherwood’s apology for camp is pertinent too:
“You sec, mie High Camp aiways has an underlying seriousness. You can’t camp about
something you don’t take seriousiy. You’re not making fun of it; you’re making fun out of
it” (Evening 110). The camp humour and sense of absurdity in Joumey is flot exciusiveiy
Isherwood’s. We have already heard Auden’s comically vulgar double entendres involving
bails and biow jobs in XXVII and the mocking of masturbation in VI; and we shah soon
look at the wry irony that arises in his “Picture Cornmentary.” In “Cornmentary” Auden wiil
offer the absurd image ofthe gaiaxy revolving “like an enormous biscuit” (680), and lie
allows the “Comic Muse” to dominate in “Macao” and “Hongkong.” Furthermore, the lines
ahluded to earhier—”It is our culture that with such cairn progresses / Over the barren plains
of a sea; somcwhere ahead I The septic East” (496)—involve a comic pun on “culture.”
Certainly, as the hater revision to “SlowÏy our Western culture in full pomp progresses”
makes even plainer (Collected 174), it is our Culture in the senses of Shakespeare, Thomas
Edison, and Co. which is heading East on the “brightly lit” and “clean” ship-city ofthe
modem West. However, for the medicaily minded Auden, for the traveller who in “The
Voyage” is iii with fever (496), who passes the “sick ape” ofthe originary Egyptian Sphinx
(496), who suffers from diarrhea (593), “culture” also suggests a contagious “bacteriaÏ
culture.” This is the sort of culture which the modem Japanese were after in the stooi
samples ofthe passengers from cholera-ridden Shanghai, but to which, ironicahly. the
invading Japanese are thernselves compared by Isherwood and Auden (500. 525, 673).
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Possession ofthis kind of amorphous nauseous culture may seem to differentiate the
West from a “septic East,” as in the “alarming experience” Auden lias “afler a visit to the
station lavatory at the far end ofthe sidings, [whenJ he had returned to find that Chiang and
our luggage had utteriy disappeared—swallowed up in a vast, arnorphous mass of sleeping
soldiers and refugees which had grown perpetually larger, like a nightmare fungus, and
threatened gradually to cover the entire platform” (532). The ambivalence of”culture” does
flot, however, permit the attribution of this sort of culture solely to China or Japan. The
West too has its “culture” which has canied its filth wherever it has progressed over the
seas—our “km who trousered Africa, carried our smell / to germless poles,” our km the
looters, as Auden describes them in “Whitsunday in Kirchstetten,” whose tum, now that
European colonialism is ending, it may be “for latrine duty” (Collected 745).
The idea of ‘culture’ reminds us that the verse forms Auden manipulates in Journey
involve more than a purely formai geornetry, more than the fonnal replication of the
stanzaic struciitres ofthe sonnet at the level ofthe entire book. The verse forms also have a
cultural history and are the bearers of cultural and thematic associations. Here questions of
the radical differences and oppositions between Chinese and Western cultures do becorne
pertinent. For the verse forms in Journey are quintessentially Western. Unlike Ezra Pound,
Victor Segalen, or Robin Hyde, Auden’s encounter with China neither prompts him to
imitate Chinese forms, diction, or themes, nor leads him to write poems govemed by an
intense personal response to the particularities of China. Instead Auden writes an
unChinese poetry that can seem to universalize a Western experience. Auden tums to verse
forms central to the Western literary imagination, using the forms with an obvious
awareness of their history. Thus, the hexameters of “The Voyage” and “The Slip,” the two
poems in Joumey most focussed on the theme ofthe Journcy, recali the hexameters of
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classical epic and the archetypal voyage of Odysseus. This specific recollection is
reinforced by the parallels between “The Voyage”s concem with false voyages and Dante’s
presentation ofUlysses’ final journey in the Infemo in the Canto from which Auden bas
Michael Ransom read at the beginning of written two years earlier than Joumey.
Though unrhymed, the tercets of “Commentary” are clearly meant to evoke Dante
whom Auden alludes to directly in the unes “the wish to build / A world united as that
Europe was in which I The flint-faced exile wrote his three-act comedy” (687).
furthermore, the example of Dante lies behind “Commentary” in Auden’ s presentation of
exemplary individuals, of historical epochs, and of longish and dialectically contrasting
speeches. Dante’s example also lies behind unes such as “The innocent and short whose
dreams contain no children” (681) which Auden calls a “Dante periphrasis for describing
children” (quoted in fuller 242), or in the unes Auden reuses from the uncompleted “In the
year ofmy youth” with its “Dantesque journey through the modem city, with the character
Sampson (based on Gerald Heard) as Auden’s Virgil” (Fuller 128). Like the tercets with
their evocation of Dante and his terza rima, Joumey’s other principal poetic forms, the
sonnet and blank verse, both originated in Italy, “that Catholic country with the shape of
Comwall,” as “Commentary” describes it, “Where Europe first became a term ofpride”
(Prose 1: 684).2 Europe first became a term ofpride in the pan-Europeanism of Dante and in
2
Those unes on Italy occur in a passage where Auden is flot celebrating European pride, but
rejecting the totalitarianism ofthe three Axis powers Italy, Japan, and Germany. Auden’s recourse
in the uni ingoistic but clearly anti-Axis Journey to verse forrns with manifestly Italian origins and
to the special examples of Dante and ofRiike involves an implicit refusai to aiiow the menacing
contemporaly leadership oftwo ofthe Axis powers to appropriate to themselves the cultural
heritages oftheir own languages and civilizations. The idea that a critical yet conciliatory response
to the political crises and national rifts oftwentieth century European civilization is impticit in
Joumey’s versification is bom out in the trajectoiy ofAuden’s later ‘Italian’ and ‘Austrian’ periods
(1948-57 and 195$-71 respectively) when Auden develops this response into a major dimension of
his later work. Auden’s deliberate immersion in Italian and Germanophone cultures involves an
effort to subvert the national potarizations ofmodern Europe, to undo the untenable ideological
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the Renaissance Italy that produced both the sonnet and unrhymed versi scioti. It is hard to
overstate the centrality in Western literature ofthe two principal verse forms in Joumey.
The blank verse, the sonnet, and the Dante-evoking tercets of Journey have ail been
especially significant in the literary culture of England and remain core forms in the
repertoire of English-language poetry.
In Journey, then, just as in the sonnet sequence we have seen Auden working within
the grand traditions of the Bible, ancient Greece, the Enlightenrnent, and Marxism, so he
works flot with any Chinese-inspired poetic exoticism, but with the utterly canonical
resources ofpost-Renaissance European and English-language poetic traditions. Auden’s
use ofthese canonical verse forms is part and parcel ofthe long view of European history
articulated in “Comrnentary”: “This is the epoch ofthe Third Great Disappointment,” he
writes, as he reviews how the epoch that began with the Renaissance, and proceeded
through the Enlightenrnent, the Industrial Revolution, and Colonialism is “today, ail spent”
(6$ 1-2). Precisely because, for Auden, the hopes ofthat epoch have been disappointed and
seem, in the catastrophic i930s, “ail spent,” Auden’s reliance on some ofthat long epoch’s
most characteristic poetic forms involves him in the self-conscious irony ofVII’s
description ofthe decadent poet deliberately planning his strophes.
The relationship between Auden’s preoccupation with faltering master narratives
and his reliance on canonical Western poetic forms is a significant aspect ofAuden’s
formalism in Journey. Auden’s reliance on major Western forms and his formalisrn in
Journey are aspects ofhis critique of Western master narratives. Proceeding from
Mendelson’s description ofAuden’s analogy-based approach to poetic from, we can take
the fact that those poetic forms issue entirely from the grandest European tradition as
isolation of both the forrnerly fascist or Nazi countries and of Anglo-American hegemony, and to
preserve, or recreate, a more complete vision of Western civilization.
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consistent with the fact that the evocation of established Western notions of law, instinct,
social convention, culture, and belief is necessary to Auden’s reexamination ofthose
narratives. It may seem paradoxical and unfashionably Eurocentric that Auden is so
preoccupied with the West in a travel book on a Sino-Japanese war, just as it may seem odd
and disappointing that Auden’s versification and poetry reveals no engagement with
Chinese poetry.3 The absence of Chinese-derived poetic fonus should flot be taken as
indicating that Auden fails to respond to China or fails to entertain new versions of
established Western ideas or new accommodations between humanity and the world. Rather
Auden’s encounter with China is the occasion of an intense reexamination of crucial aspects
ofthe Western heritage. Eschewing an “imperial monologics of appropriation,” Auden
allows the Chinese content oflourney’s sonnets to provoke an ‘Occidentalizing’
deconstruction of Western subjectivity and culture (Christie 152), while similar instances of
China’s transformation of Western categories lead in “Comrnentary” to the adumbration of
a sweeping and new vision ofhumanity and the world.
from the Renaissance through twentieth-century modernism, the sonnet has been
perhaps the single most important form in Euro-American poetry, and Auden’s awareness
ofthe soimet’s history allows Journey’s sonnets both to depart from the sonnet’s past and to
utterly conform to the form’s most expressive features. We have seen how deliberately
Auden uses the thematic expectations associated with the sonnet as a fou, by using its small
lyric form for large epic purposes, by avoiding the subjective “I” in favour of the third
j
Auden’s only invocation ofChinese poetry occurs much later in “Mountains” when he imagines “a
green crofi, I Bright with flowers laid out in exquisite spiodges / Like a Chinese poem.” The point
ofthe reference to Chinese poetry in “Mountains” is flot imitation of or engagement with the
Chinese tradition; rather Auden evokes Chinese poetly in a gesture of negative seif-definition. In
Joumev, as momentarily in “Mountains”, China serves as an Other which Auden is Not, in contrast
to which Auden can better understand and present what he is and what the West bas been and is.
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person “he” or of a collective “we,” and by expioring a surreptitious homosexuality in a
form usually associated with Petrarchan hetero-eroticism and with male-fernale love and
marnage. We have aiso seen, adapting Mendeison, how Auden latches onto and makes
permanently his own the sonnet’s most critical feature, its turn between octave and sestet.
The sonnet’s tum arguably has more ethicai, iiterary, phiiosophicai, and psychologicai
analogues than any other other poetic convention in modem Western poetry, and Auden’s
fascination with such tums is a major part oflourney’s significance. We have seen too that
Auden projects the microcosm of the sonnet onto the macrocosmic scale of Journey.
For their part, though the blank verse tercets of “Commentary” have a iess iilustrious
history as a vehicie for memorable poetry than the sonnet does, they derive from a history of
formai innovation at least as curious as that ofthe sonnet and perhaps as crucial in the
development ofEngiish-ianguage poetry. Auden’s use ofthe form in Journey is inscribed in
a context of poetic tradition and formal innovation that ailows us to better appreciate the
significance of both the versification in “Commentary” and the structure of the entire book.
As Auden’s own allusions to Dante suggest, behind the resembiance ofterza rima and
Auden’s blank verse tercets lies a genealogical connection. The tercet as a stanzaic form in
Western poetry “was first developed systematicaliy in Italian poetry,” most notabiy by
Dante, from whom “it spread to vernacular poetries” (Preminger 1270). Though the biank
verse tercets of Journey are now a wideiy used verse form in Engiish, the process of formai
innovation through which they entered Engiish poetry is compiex. The wedding of tercets
and blank verse resuits from the combined efforts of post-Miitonic Romantic, Victorian,
and Edwardian poets and translators to recreate Dante’s terza rima in Engiish. The present
status of blank verse tercets as a canonical poetic form is chiefly a resuit of the work of
Wailace Stevens, who deveioped it as his major poetic form around the same time that
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Auden was working with the form in “Commentary” (Preminger 1270). Where Stevens,
“the poet who most eagerly embraced the romantic principles Auden rejected,” succeeds,
Auden’s efforts in the form through the 1 930s remain substandard, and in contrast to
Stevens “for Auden the regular unrhymed triplet became a sign of falsity and imposture” in
his later poetiy (Mendelson Early 246). Auden’s versification in “Commentary” derives
from a complex literary historical matrix and is part of a dynamic within English poetry in
which poets like Stevens, T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Laurence Binyon, and Louis MacNeice
were struggiing to respond to imaginative, ideological, and formai aspects ofthe Dantean
heritage. In 1938, the blank verse tercet could hardly be employed without bringing into
view the entire edifice of modem Western high culture. The rigour of Western order, the
upliffingness of Western progressivism, and ‘that old old Miltonic-Dantean rag’ are ah
inmplicit in Journey’s verse sections, and their poetic geometry and stanzaic architectonics
provide the organizing and containing structures for a book which threatens to cohlapse into
formless disorder.
The civilizing formahism and poetic geometry ofAuden’s verse develop an
especially stark contrast with the disgusting excrementai formlessness that Isherwood’s
“Travel-Diary” keeps siipping in. Morson hinks Auden’s sense ofthe tension between
shapeiess contingency and artful form to a fundamental issue in the Aristotehian legacy:
“The order of art and the mess of experience: this opposition underlies much Western
thought [.. . .J for Aristothe, and for the tradition ofpoetics deriving from him, the harmony
of art ideahiy eliminates ail contingency from the artwork” (287). In Journey, Auden’s verse
imposes an aesthetic order and opens great historical vistas, whiie the prose in “Travel
Diary” is the vehicle with which Isherwood must find ways ofhandling the nauseating
formlessness of snot, piss, shit, mud, and blood; ofnegotiating the incoherent impressions
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of China and the disordered destruction of war; and of registering either the absurdly
appropriate comic response to some ofthose things, or the uncomprehending disorientation
they occasion.
Isherwood’s fascination with shit is a permanent aspect of bis work. Ris Single Man
has a long toilet scene in which the wiping of bum-stickiness becomes an issue (17-31), and
a scene where the hero George “emits loud prolonged farts” as he walks across a parking lot
(72); Down There records Isherwood’s first act on bis first morning on Ambrose’s
homosexual dystopia as the digging ofa latrine hole (99); in Mr. Norris, the nanator’s
response to the proliferation of Brown Shirts in Nazifying Berlin is to imagine that
“everything in the room was really a kind of brown: either green-brown, black-brown,
yellow-brown, or red-brown, but ail brown, unmistakably. When [he] had had breakfast
and taken a purgative, [he] feit better” (166); in Meeting, Patrick observes of bis Indian
snapshots that “luckily [Mother] won’t be able to smell the stink from the open drains and
the assorted droppings!” (59).
The contrast of shit and the poetic in Joumey is representative of a tension within
Auden’s work also, a tension deveioped most fully in his collaboration with Isherwood on
Joumey, but which remains integral to Auden’s aesthetics. The Ariel-assisted Muse in “The
Sea and the Mirror” fears, among possible spell-breaking violations of aesthetic decorum
and artistic illusion, Caliban’s perverse farting (Collected 425). “The Geography ofthe
House,” the poem dedicated to Isherwood on the toilet, articulates a ftiller conception ofthe
relation of shit and art, presenting them not as opposed, but as related analogically and
psychologically—art flot as a mere antithesis of shit, but as shit transfigured:
All the Arts derive from
This ur-act of making,
Private to the artist:
Makers’ lives are spent
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Striving in their chosen
Medium to produce a
De-narcissus-ized en
-during excrement.
The mature Auden may strain in these unes to express a central issue in his ars poetica. but
“The Geography ofthe House” also comments lightly on a moral issue in Auden’s
aesthetics and in his views of art and his own career:
Keep us in our station:
When we get pound-noteish,
When we seem about to
Take up Higher Thought,
Send us some deflating
Image like the pained ex
-pression on a Major
Prophet taken short.
This amusing contrast ofhigh-mindedness and the lowliness of defecation comments
retrospectively on the contrast ofAuden’s status as a literary political prophet in the 1930s
to the intestinal troubles he and Isherwood suffered while in China.
In Joumey, the oppositions of shitting or farting to poetry in these later passages are
developed as part ofthe complementary / contrasting opposition oflsherwoods “Travel
Diary” and Auden’s verse. Excrement is a matter for the relative formlessness of
Isherwood’s unassuming prose. In his hands, excrement may be gross, but it is best
responded to with humour rather than disgust; and it is an almost omnipresent aspect of the
experience of China. By contrast, Auden’s poetry is rigorously formai. The verse
structures of Auden’s poetry bring into play the idea ofa triumphant Western culture. Their
apparent high-mindedness is undercut by but not entirely undone by the ironies and
vulgarities which emerge subsequently and by Isherwood’ s foregrounding of excrement.
Tt wouid be a mistake to identify with either Auden or Isherwood the aesthetics
impiicit in their respective sections. Rather the collusion of Auden and Isherwood produces
1
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an aesthetico-ideological vision larger than either the “Travel-Diary” or the verse sections.
As Ken notes (Izzo Legacy 277), it is significant that in structural terms Isherwood’s prose
diary cornes enclosed within Auden’s poetry. Auden’s Western verse structures strive to
shape the formÏessness of immediate experience and to contain the experience of the
uninteliigible disorderiy China that is revealed in Isherwood’s travelogue. There is an
analogy here to the relationship between imperialistic Europe and semi-colonial China.
Journey reveals the tension, during an epoch of European ascendancy and of Chinese
disintegration, between Western formai imperatives and the uncontainability of China—a
stark presentation of the incongrnity of available Western categories and the non-European
world and non-Western realities those categories cannot successfully comprehend.
Equally stark is the vulgar contrast of structuring poetic form and the formlessness
of excrement. This contrast is representative ofperennial aesthetic and epistemological
issues, but the specific associations of excremental formlessness with Chinese realities and
of formai order with Western culture is potentiaily offensive. However, as with the pun on
“culture” which refers us simultaneously to civilization and bacteria, and reverses the
significance of the image of Western culture progressing across a sea, 50 the apparent
containrnent of China by the West, and of Isherwood’s Chinese diary by Auden’s verse
structures, is inverted in Journey’s opening sequence. In “Macao,” the relationship of
Portuguese Macao and China is analogous to the relationship ofAuden’s versification with
its impiicit ideas of a Western historicai order to the immense China which neither
lsherwood’s prose or Auden’s poetry can convincingiy contain. Macao seems “A weed
from Catholic Europe, [thatj took root / Between the yeliow mountains and the sea, / And
bore these gay stone houses like a fruit, / And grew on China imperceptibiy” (498). It is the
campy Western coiony Macao, with its “Rococo images of Saint and Saviour” where
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“nothing serious can happen,” that is dependent, even parasitic, on China, and flot China
that is dependent on this “Portugal-cum-China oddity” (Collected 176).
Like Macao, Auden’s poetry in Joumey is a fanciful European weed growing
parasitically on war-tom China. Like Macao with its childishness and playful formalism,
poetry “makes nothing happen,” as Auden would write in “In Memory ofW.B. Yeats” only
months later. The two bits of siang for “homosexual” in the third une also remind us of
Auden’s sense ofthe homosexual’s proneness to frivolity. War-torn China, in contrast to
unserious “Macao,” and in contrast as well to the colonial comic opera in Joumey’s
“Hongkong,” is a very serious place indeed. Mendelson dates “Macao” to December, 1938
(Collected 176) alrnost a full year afier Auden and Isherwood actually passed through
Macao, and dates the Yeats elegy to February or March 1939 (Later 12). Just as Mendelson
and fuller find anticipations in “In Time of War” ofthat great elegy (Mendelson Later 7;
Fuller 243), “nothing serious can happen here” in “Macao” reverberates in the elegy’s
“Poetry makes nothing happen,” one ofAuden’s most notorious unes. That une is rarely
understood properly in its immediate context where the question of the inconsequentiality
ofpoetiy arises with reference to matters over which poetry has no influence (illness and
hospitals, the death ofthe body, the economy, war, and looming world war). The Yeats
elegy, however, also insists on a broader point that is consequent on the composition of
Journey; that is, that poetry, even or espccially a poetry that organizes on such a vast scale
everything that Joumey contains, in the end can make nothing happen.
Auden’s insistence on poetry’s ineffectuality and ftivolousness is a source of chagrin
for those who look to poets for political leadership, as much of the young English literary
set vainly looked to Auden through the 1930s. But the point about the mature Auden’s
insistence that poetry makes nothing happen must be appreciated in light of a deeply feit
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concomitant realization which Auden and Isherwood articulate in the course oftheir
Journey, composed as it was at the desperate end ofthe 193 Os. This is the realization that,
beyond the pretensions ofpoets and readers, beyond the good humour oflsherwood’s
responses to Chinese excrement, beyond the visionary formai orders ofpoetry, it remains
tragically true that some very bad shit happens indeed. To comprehend Auden’s dictum that
“poetry makes nothing happen,” one must read it in light ofthis last realization regarding
the absoluteness ofthe reality oftragedy. In that light, it can be translated, like other
philosophical and religious attitudes, into a vemacular response to the fact that Shit
Happens: ‘Shit happens’ (Taoism); ‘Confucius say, ‘Shit happens’ (Confucianism); ‘This
shit has happened before’ (Hinduism); ‘There’s nothing like a good shit happening’
(Hedonism); ‘Why does this shit aiways happen tous?’ (Judaisrn); ‘If shit happens. you
deserve it’ (Catholicism); ‘Shit evoives’ (Secular Humanism). . . . We can now add to this
list Auden’s version ofthe attitude ofthe poet: ‘Shit happens,’ says the artist,’ but I can
make something memorable out of it’.
It is the shitty experience of colonialism and war in an incomprehensible China and
his efforts to contrive a formai order in which to represent that experiences that aimounce
Auden’s realization that poetry makes nothing happen. Just as Journey is a neglected book,
so Auden and Isherwood’s encounter with China has been seen as a brief and accidentai
episode with no permanent effect on the work of either. But their experience in China and
the writing ofJoumey have a demonstrable transformative effect on both Auden’s and
Isherwood’s work. As Christie insists, Auden’s poetics are “forever” changed after his
experience in China (145-6). If Auden and Isherwood’s elaboration ofthe contrast of verse
and prose is a prominent feature ofJoumey, Joumey is also their major development ofthe
tension between order and contingency in art. Provoking this development, their encounter
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with war-tom semi-colonial China occasioned significant tums in their understandings of
themselves and the effectiveness of art, and occasioned the development in Journey of an
exemplary twentieth-century vision of the aesthetic and ethical dimensions of literature.
FURTUER DUAL STRUCTURES
Duaiity is fundamental to the construction of Journey. We have seen the importance
ofthe contrast of verse and prose and the Auden-Isherwood collaborative duaiity with its
conceptual and thematic opposition of subjectivity and objectivity, but duality is flot only a
matter of such extemal relationships oflsherwood’s section to Auden’s sections. As with
the dual structure of octave and sestet within the sonnets of Auden’ s “In Time of War,”
there is a temporal duality internai to “Travel-Diaiy.” For in “Travel-Diary” each odd
numbered chapter is written as a retrospective travelogue, and each even-numbered chapter
is written in dated entries as if it represented an actual travel diary that Isherwood
maintained throughout the joumey. This distinction, though explicitly signalled, is easily
overlooked, since stylisticaily there is littie difference between the two sorts of chapter. and
since chronologicaily the sequence of events in successive chapters respects the travellers’
Chinese itinerary. Nonetheiess temporally “Travel-Diary” is structured in tenus of a
deliberate alternation between late-193$ retrospection and early-193$ iinmediacy, and this
temporal alternation between a narrative relation of then-ness and one of now-ness is an
important analogy to the before and afier of the sonnet’ s structure. A third dual temporal
structure in Joumey has to do with the temporal dimension of the relationship between the
first and second parts ofAuden’s “In Time of War,” that is between the sonnets which we
have already considered and “Commentary” which we will consider in our concluding
chapter. This temporal movement between a before and afier repeats the temporal
dynamics already established within the sonnet sequence itself. We will consider later the
1—,
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implications of the recurrent temporal structures within Isherwood’ s “Travei-Diary” and
between the sonnets and “Commentary.” It is enough now to note that the recurrent duaiity
of after and before is another ofthe binaiy compositionai features which require us to think
of Journey as an especiaily seif-reflexive text.
To the dual temporal structures internai to “Travel-Diary,” internai to the sonnets,
and between the sonnets and “Commentaiy,” and to the oppositions of verse and prose and
of the Auden and Isherwood sections in general, we must add the set of oppositions that
structure and compiicate Journey’s “Picture Commentary.” The binary opposition ofthe
textuai and photographic media is comparable to but more radical than the opposition of
verse to prose, and it too is a crucial element in the overali effect ofthe book. The
occasionai cases of “unsteady triptychs” which Bryant identifies as emerging out of
Isherwood’s prose, Auden’s poetry, and Auden’s photographs (133-5) constitute special
instances of a ternary reflexivity within Journey, but these occasional triptychs do flot
diminish the more obvious contrast of photographie and textuai media. The latter is an
opposition in which the disjunction between photograph and text is just as important as
their complementarity. for Bryant, neither the poems nor the diary “anchor” Auden’s
photographs. Instead the “uneasy relationships” ofthe book’s different media “question
Auden and Isherwood’s abiiity to represent the Sino-Japanese War” and deconstruct the
genre ofthe documentary text (135). Biyant’s hoiistic approach to Journey involves
restoring to Auden’s “canon the visual texts that he produeed alone (his published
photographs [in Iceland and Journey]) and those he produced in collaborations with others
(his documentary filmmaking)” (6). Bryant shows how persistent was Auden’s questioning
ofthe relations between visual and verbal modes ofrepresentation and knowing.
Auden’s self-conseiousness regarding the possibiiity ofdoeumentary representation
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is evident in the provocative way he presents the photographs. “Auden’s use of dualistic
photo pairings” make the “Picture Commentary” seem initially “the most orderly part” of
the book (Bryant 131). As Bryant argues, however, the sense ofthe orderliness ofthe
categories and oppositions organizing the presentation of the photos soon gives way to
puzzled scepticism. for the organization ofthe photographs in “Picture Commentary” into
opposed pairs is not the revelation of a convincing or stable structuring of reality. Instead,
like the hyperformalism of Auden’s magnifications of sonnet structure, the “Picture
Commentary” reveals a superficial conventionalism in the categories and the dualistic
thinking behind the ordering of the photographs. For in spite of what the supposedly radical
terms oftheir oppositions suggest, the members of each pair look far more similar than they
do different; they are comparable examples of human clay and their categorizing captions
seem arbitrary and irrelevant. Or they would be irrelevant, if the “Picture Commentary” did
flot so clearly display the brutal facts of the inequality that lies behind some categorizations
of these essentially similar persons, including the inequality of the observer and the
observed (Bryant 164). The asymmetrical distributions ofpower, privilege, and well-being
between paired subjects ruin the symmetry of the pairings and deconstnict the idea ofthe
stability of the social hierarchies involved.
Just as the confiising and brutal arbitrariness of what at first seem clear categories
complicates the significance ofthe photographs, the incongruity ofthe photographic images
and their ambiguous captions (Bryant 148, 165) troubles our understanding ofthe “Picture
Commentary.” As in Iceland, “Auden’s opposition ofphotographs and captions disorients
our vision” (90). In Joumey, the photographs’ “uncertain relation to Auden’s captions”
(131) is frequently ironic (165), and sometimes very darkly so. The reality of human
hierarchies is spoofed in the photograph of Chiang, Auden and Isherwood’s attendant,
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humbly riding a donkey. Simply identified as “Chiang,” this Chiang is a comic contrast to
the exalted Generalissimo Chiang. The object of a considerable cuit ofpersonality in China
and of public attention world-wide, Chiang Kai Shek had just been on the cover of Time in
January 193$ as Man ofthe Year for 1937. The exaÏted Chiang would have been seated on
a white horse or, as in the photo at the outset ofthe “Picture Commentary” accompanied by
the winsome Madame Chiang, rather than a donkey. There is too the irony that the photos
labelled as the actual military front present a seemingly peaceful river scape and a statue of
a Buddha in a temple, while the most intensely martial-looking photos in which we see
what looks like actual fighting are labelled “Stiils from [the filmi fight to the Last.”
Finally there is the ominous irony ofthe caption ofthe photo ofthe young soldier, which
reads simply “Unknown Soldier,” which we will retum to in chapter five.
The ironic critical juxtaposition ofthe photographs in “Picture Commentary,” their
ironic relations to their incongruous captions, as well as their “oblique relations to
Isherwood’s diary and Auden’s poems” (Bryant 131), lead one to conclude with Bryant that
Journey’s photographs “like the larger collaborative text that contains them” are self
consciously dualistic and “riddled with contradictions” (167).
REFLEXIVITY AND MISE ENABYME
A further source ofreflexivity in Journey is the figure ofthe mise en abyme. The
reflexiveness inherent in the dual relations of caption to photograph, of one photograph to
another, oftext to photograph, of verse to prose, of objective to subjective, ofAuden to
Isherwood, and of afier to before in both “Travel-Diary” and “In lime of War,” is a
fundarnental recurrent feature oflourney. The reflexivity ofthe mise en abyme bas a
special importance as a structural expression ofthe authors’ experience ofthe relative
powerlessness of homosexuality and in their self-conscious sense of powerelessness before
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the overwhelming political crises confronting them in 193$. Mises en abyme are suited to a
seif-reflective work like Joumey since the “first identifying property” and “the common root
of every mise en abyme is clearly the idea of reflexivity” (Dl1cnbach 42). Reflective mise
en abyme-like moments occur throughout Joumey, but two that are particularly crucial are
the conclusion oflsherwood’s “Travel-Diary” and XXVII, the conclusion ofthe sonnet
sequence in Auden’s “In Time ofWar.” The latter instance we considered at length in our
opening chapter; the former we will turn to later.
Auden and Tsherwood both have predilections for the figure ofthe mise en abyme.
Gofflieb notes that “Auden is repeatedly drawn into reflection of images on reflection, most
notably in The Sea and the Mirror but also in other poems and prose works, both early and
late, where images ofthe mirror, Narcissus, and the seif-reflective ego propel Auden’s text
in the direction ofa mise en abime” (81). Similarly, Mizejewski, in a discussion ofthe
fictional story “The Englisli Girl” which the Isherwood narrator is asked to write within the
larger story “Sally Bowles,” notes the recunence in Isherwood’s work of the motif of
embedded texts “in lis self-conscious references to texts-within-texts. The tities of Prater
Violet (1945), Lions and Shadows (1938), and The World in the Evening (1954), for
example, are ail actually tities of other fictional texts described in the works, as if the tities
were in special quotation marks” (61). Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” is another such
embedded text within the larger travelogue of Joumev. Only “Travel-Diary” recounts the
full chronology ofthe authors’ Chinesejoumey, and like Auden’s parabolic XXVII,
Isherwood’s section serves as a representation ofthe whole. The importance of mise en
abyme-like reflexivity to both Auden and Isherwood, the repetition of analogous structures
of reflexivity throughout Joumey, and the occurrence of actual mises en abyme in that book
demand reflection on our part. The multiple instances of binaiy oppositions and dualistic
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reflexivity flot oniy serve as thematic and structural principles within Joumey; they are also
linked to poetic, philosophical, and literaiy theoretical questions ofthe first order.
Daflenbach writes of a mise en abyme of the code of a work. This involves the
representation within a text, not ofthe whole story or ofthe characters, but rather a
representative exemplification “du propre art poétique de l’auteur” or, as Dillenbach’s
transiators have it, “ofthe author’s own aesthetic theory” (9$). There are many instances of
Auden and Isherwood implicitly representing and justifying the aesthetics and procedures of
Joumey. Isherwood’s presentations ofthe humour ofthe Mayor of Canton or Dr. McClure
implicitly develop apologies for Isherwood’s comedy; the randomness ofa Chinese mea! or
ofwar and examples ofthe siippage of signifier and signified help explain his emphases on
incomprehensibility and the surreal; his perception of social role playing in the behaviour of
the people he encounters illuminates the motivation for Tsherwood’s heightened sense of
hurnan theatricality. The examples of human pairings in the photo essay correspond to the
most fundamental such pairing in Journey, that of Auden and Isherwood. This twiiming,
consistent as it is with the variation of binary structures of reflexivity, is essential to the
authors’ “art poétique” and aesthetic theory. In the case of XXVII, we find a mise en abyme
that encapsulates flot only the narrative ofajourney ofa polyvalent “we” and the book’s
principal themes and situations, but in the sonnet’s two-part structure we also see the most
conspicuous and forceful instance ofthe book’s insistent playing with a key component of
the book’s “code,” namely binary reflexivity. Auden’s development ofthe dual temporal
structure and inherent reflexivity of the soimet in “In Time of War” becornes a defining
characteristic ofJourney that, as we have noted several times, persists in Auden’s poetry
afier 1939. Both the mise en abyme and the quality ofself-reflexivity suggest the wholeness
of a work in so far as the former represents the whole and the latter involves an implicit
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centripetal tendency in which a work tums in on itself in a search for its own integrity.
In the case of an apparently incoherent text like Joumey, such confirmations of its
wholeness are particularly important. The reflexivity of mise en abyme is significant in
other ways too. Mieke Bal speculates that the “figure distinguishes itselfby an aspect
emblematic ofthe feminine situation: the mirror” (45). Bal’s association ofthe mise en
abyme with mirroring and the situation of women is pertinent to the figure’s significance in
Joumey since both are linked to the authors’ homosexuality. Twentieth-century
psychosexual theories with which they were familiar linked homosexuality, the idea of the
mirror, and the problem ofnarcissism. Psychoanalysis, for instance, posited ccmiffor
reflection as the lamentable symptom of homosexuality” (Bruhm 3), and most such theories
argued that though homosexuality might not be “the exclusive domain ofnarcissism,” it is
“certainly the strongest case” (4). Partly because ofthis theoretical context, images and
metaphors of the mirror run through Auden’ s work. In Joumey, “distance” itself is
conceived of as a mirror in which “The Traveller” tries to the see the strangeness of bis own
face (Prose 1: 497). The related issue of narcissism is also implicit in Isherwood’s focus on
Isherwood-like narrators and his and their fascination with thernselves. The condition of
narcissism is similarly central to Auden’s poetry and to his thinking on poetry, Eros,
homosexuality, and ethics.
The idea that the reflexivity of mise en abyme is consistent with the “feminine
situation” illuminates the reflexivity in Auden and Isherwood and Joumey. for Bal,
“specular’ seif-reflective reflection seems to be in opposition to ‘discursive’ reflection”
and “suggests a powerlessness, a submission to the directions given by the text” (57).
Isherwood and Auden certainly had access to the apparatus ofpublishing and to discursive
modes of reflection. However, in 1938 social, legal, and personal constraints operated to
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deny Auden and Isherwood access to discursive reflection on the crucial matter oftheir
hornosexuality. This is the conflict that homosexual writers have experienced between
“being empowered to speak but unable to say” (Yingling 26). We can relate Auden and
Isherwood’s fascination with ‘specular’ non-discursive seif-reflection to the limitations and
heightened self-consciousness ofthe homosexual. In spite oftheir class privilege and
literary success, the powerlessness Bal associates with specular reflection is consistent with
the sense of powerlessness against legal and social condemnation that was unavoidable in
their experience ofhomosexuality. At least as significantly, an aspect oftheir political
experience in 193$ was a sense ofpowerlessness in the face ofthe war in China and the
European crises that their individual and collaborative works had been attempting to report
engage with. The “submission to the directions given by the text” that Bal proposes
involves in Joumey a submission to the imperatives of topicality and political engagement.
For Isherwood in the “Travel-Diary,” this involves the requirement that lie recount the steps
of a joumey and his experience of a culture and situation he has barely understood, and in
the conclusion of”Travel-Diary” it will involve Isherwood’s exceptional submission to the
third-party expertise ofRewi Alley. With Auden, we see instead a submission in “In Time
of War” to the imperatives of objectivity, of seeing his subjectivity objectively, and of
placing his subjective perspective in the encompassing impersonal contexts of human
history, war, international politics, and compromising but ‘actually existing’ political
partisanship. The relative powerlessness ofAuden and Isherwood as homosexuals and as
individuals in overwhelming political crises explains in part, not only the reflexivity of
Journey’s mises en abyme, but the varying narcissistic, ethical, and epistemological
reftexivity ofthe entire book.
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REfLEXIVITY.. .IRONY. .TEMPORALITY. .. ‘AUTHENTICITY’
In addition to Bal’s suggestions regarding the significance of mise en abyme, Paul de
Man’s discussion ofreflexivity, irony, and temporaiity develops a fiirther perspective for
the evaluation ofthe significance flot just of the reflexivity of mise en abyme, but ofthe
reflexivity and the structuring rote of ail the various binary oppositions in Journey. In
multiplying instances of such reflexivity, Auden and Isherwood circle around conceptual
aporia that are part and parcel ofthe essence ofliterature. These aporia have to do with the
nature of irony, and with the relationship of irony and literature to being in the world, to
action, and to self-consciousness. De Man writes of “the notion of dédoublement as the
characteristic that sets apart a reflective activity {. . .] from the activity ofthe ordinary self’
(Blindness 212). For de Man, the notion of dédoublement as “self-duplication” or “self
multiplication” (212) is “essential for an understanding of irony” (212). Appreciating both
irony and the doubling ofthe self is essential to understanding Joumey, a book whose
hyper-reflexivity generates a small encyclopaedia of ironic modes and species.
The doubled self of irony involves “a relationship within consciousness, between
two selves,” writes de Man, “yet it is not an intersubjective relationship” (212). This idea of
a relationship within consciousness between two selves and de Man’s further association of
the doubled self of irony with a perrnanently self-consciousness narrator (218) cail to mmd
Isherwood’s paradoxical practices of, on the one hand, developing fictional narrators who
resemble him and even bear his name, but who are not to be identified with him, while, on
the other hand, employing in his autobiographical work the third-person singular to refer to
his historical self. Isherwood’s narrative practice in both his fiction and his autobiography
would seem to confirm de Man’s point that the moment the difference “between the persona
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ofthe author and the persona ofthe fictional narrator [. .j is asserted is precisely the
moment when the author does flot return to the world [. - . and] discovers instead that there
is no way back from his fictional self to his actual self’ (219). For Isherwood even the idea
ofhis actual self tends to irrelevance as he insists increasingly on the fictional nature of
“Christopher Isherwood.” As we will see, in Journey at least as clearly as in any of bis
other works, Isherwood represents—by means ofthe deliberate contrast between the
temporal situations of altemating chapters—the problems of the difficulty of finding a way
back to the world and of the disjunction between bis text’ s ironie narrative self and his
actual self.
A second major aspect of Joumey is illuminated by de Man’s discussion ofthe
doubling of the self within consciousness that occurs in irony. For though Isherwood’ s
narrative practices confirm the idea that self-duplication involves a relationship within
consciousness between an empirical and a fictional self, Journey also involves the ironies of
the intersubjective and intertextual relationships between Auden and Isherwood. For de
Man, neither Isherwood’s ‘Aristotelian’ self-mocking irony (Cunningham cails Isherwood
“a perpetuallyjokey seif-denigrator” (295)), nor Isherwood’s intersubjective irony in bis
presentation of the Auden-Isherwood relationship, is of rnuch interest. Humorous
intersubjective irony is less interesting than the “comique absolu” ofthe intrasubjective
irony ofthe divided self (213). “Within the realm of intersubjectivity one would speak”,
writes de Man, “ofdifference in terms ofthe superiority ofone subject over another, with
all the implications of will to power, of violence and possession which corne into play when
a person is laughing at someone else—including the will to educate and to improve” (212).
The intersubjective / intertextual relationship of Auden and Isherwood involves
these sorts of comic irony when Isherwood refers to Auden as “Au Dung” and when he
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presents their relationship as rivairous and riven by incompatibilities. Indeed, Joumey has
a special interest as the only oftheirjointly-authored texts in which the relationship of
Auden and Isherwood is overtly represented and explicitly at issue. In the “Travel-Diary,”
Isherwood uses Auden as a fou against which to explore his own responses to their Chinese
joumey, with the apparent strength of Auden seiwing to heighten Isherwood’s obvious
weakriesses in a parodie version of his opposition of the Truly Strong Man and the Truly
Weak Man. 0f the two friends, Isherwood is more sensitive to the rivalrous aspect oftheir
relationship, later recounting how in China “I sometimes found myseif really hating
him—hating his pedantic insistence on ‘objectivity,’ which was really a reaction from my
own woolly-mindedness. I was meanlyjealous ofhim, too. Jealous of bis share ofthe
limelight; jealous because he’d no longer play the role of dependent, admiring younger
brother. Indeed, I got such aphysical dislike ofhim that I dehberately willed him to get iii;
which he did” (Kind 304). These intersubjective ironies in the Auden-Isherwood
relationship in Joumey deserve more consideration than de Man’s dismissal of such modes
of irony would suggest.
For instance, the complex play of objectivity and subjectivity allows the respective
contributions ofthe two authors to cancel the premises, to complement the omissions ofthe
other, and to force reconsiderations ofwhat being either objective or subjective can possibly
mean. Isherwood’s contrast ofhis “woolly-mindedness” with Auden’s “pedantic
objectivity” (305) corresponds flot just to temperamental differences, but to deliberateiy
differing tendencies oftheir contributions to Joumey. it is important to recognize the
methodicalness oftheir agreement to differ in their Chinese book. Their other
collaborations also proceed according to a deliberate division of intellectual and poetic
labour, but the assigned tasks are not aiways the same. Journey’s division is a reversai of
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that which characterized the writing of F6 when “it was understood, throughout, that
Wystan’s speciality was to be the ‘woozy’ and mine the ‘straight’ bits” (Kind 241), and
recails the “deep stylistic division” in Qg between the “fairy-tale quest” and “the focus in
the choral poems” on reality (Rowe in Bold 194). Neither Isherwood nor Auden himself is
actually exclusively subjective or exclusively objective, or exclusively straight or
exclusively woozy. Rather they seem to have decided that each would principally exploit
one or the other of such paired contrasting attitudes in the writing of collaborative texts, that
each would focus on exploring one term of opposed potentialities, both terms of which
actually exist within every human subject. What looks initially like an intersubjective
dimension of the relationships between different parts or aspects of an Auden-Isherwood
text, such as the verse and prose sections or the objectivity / subjectivity opposition in
Journey, tums out to involve an important intrasubjective analogy. The objective /
subjective tension conesponds to a self-division within human consciousness that
approaches the condition of doubleness de Man sees in the self-duplication in irony.
Together Auden and Isherwood through the fiction oftheir intersubjective textual
oppositions represent what the contrasting tendencies ofthe self-divided human subject
might look like. Taken as parts of a whole those tendencies suggest what an ideal
‘authentic’ hurnan self would be if its partial aspects were ftilly developed.
The selves de Man describes as the inauthentic empirical self and the self-aware self
of language coexist simultaneously, but their relationship tends to be represented as the
relationship of a first moment of inauthentic consciousness to a second moment of
reflective self-consciousness on that original inauthenticity. Irony can thus be represented
as a temporal sequence involving “two stages of consciousness” (224). Through his
analysis ofthe two-stage temporality of irony, de Man rejects literature’s capacity to lose
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itself in a delusional or mystified pursuit of idealized notions of direct mimesis of reality or
an immediate symbolic meaningfulness and rejects the selfs desire to identify with a
nonhuman reality outside ofitself. De Man argues instead for literature’s capacity to
represent an authentic self-divided human experience oftemporality (Mileur 330). De Man
draws an analogy between allegory and irony, with its temporal experience of an inauthentic
before and a self-conscious afier, in so far as both involve a constitutive reference to a
temporally anterior moment from which they draw their meaning. Like irony, allegory
necessarily admits “the existence of a temporality that [. .J relates to its source only in
terms of distance and difference [. . . .1 Allegory and irony are thus linked in their common
discovery ofa truly temporal predicament” (de Man 222). De Man’s association ofthe idea
of a two-fold temporal structure inherent in allegory and irony with the idea of ironie self-
duplication illurninates the poetics of Journey.
We have already noted the comparable temporal structures that characterize
Isherwood’s “Travel-Diaiy” and Auden’s “In Time of War.” The recurrent movement from
a mystified first moment to a disenchanted second moment in Auden’s poetry (a complex
example ofwhich we saw in Chapter One’s discussion of XXVII’s two-step tum from
desire-engendered mystification to envy to law-governed disenchantment) involves the sort
of temporal structure de Man ascribes to irony. De Man’s discussion of irony also
illuminates the two basic temporal situations developed in the altemating chapters of
Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary.” The altemation between the immediate recording ofthe
joumey as experienced in early 1938 and the retrospective writing up ofthe record ofthe
joumey in late 1938 is an example ofa pattem as characteristic oflsherwood’s work as the
mystification-disenchantment pattem is ofAuden’s. Retrospection is one ofthe defining
motifs and motivations oflsherwood’s oeuvre. This retrospective orientation is evident in
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the autobiographical Lions, Kind, and Kathleen. Retrospection is also an important
dimension of Isherwood’s motivation and technique in Conspirators and The Memorial
which look back at the effects ofthe Great War on Isherwood’s generation, and also in
Goodbye, Prater Violet, Down There, and Meeting. Isherwood typically either organizes his
books so that the relationship of a later moment to the past is a prominent feature of their
structures, or sets his stories in a period ofhis life to which he looks back from a secure
temporal distance. A complex technical development ofthe narrative possibilities of
retrospective temporal distance emerges as early as The Memorial with the temporal,
causal, and narrative interrelations among its sequence of ‘books’ dated 192$, 1920, 1925,
1929. The crisis ofthe 192$-29 cusp being delayed by the retrospective interludes of 1920
and 1925.
When fryer observes that “There is aiways a time delay in Isherwood’s career
between his experiencing a phenomenon, and his writing it out” (Isherwood 350), he sees
the importance in Isherwood’s work ofthe temporal distance between the occurrence of an
event or experience and its autobiographization or fictionalization. This delay affords
Isherwood the time to reflect on the past, to see a shape in events, and to correct himself,
before he must present what lie thinks should be understood as the true significance of bis
experience ofevents. As a writer Isherwood drew especially directly on his personal
experience and on actuality for his material, but a period of reflection was an equally
essential feature ofhis working method. Isherwood himselfcomments on this dimension of
his work. “Toward the end ofmy stay in Germany, I became much more conscious ofthe
political situation,” recalls Isherwood. “The Berlin books were written with a good deal of
political hindsight. I couldn’t resist posing as someone who had been deeply concerned
with the fate of Germany right from the day ofmy arrival. That simply wasn’t true. To
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begin with, I was both indifferent and ignorant. And even as late as 1932, 1 find that I [....]
speit Hitler’s name wrong!” (Conversations 101). Ihe political perspicacity of Goodbye,
which is set in 1930-33, the period when Isherwood was living in Germany, but which was
written afier Isherwood had lefi Germany and flot published until 1939, is in large part an
effect oflsherwood’s retrospective revision ofhis experience. This pursuit ofretrospective
understanding became for Isherwood a central objective flot just ofhis writing but ofhis
religious education. A diary entry from the forties records Isherwood’s hope as he begins to
live as a Vedantic monk: “I am not going to the Center to forget such places. No—if this
training succeeds, I shah be able to retum to [. . . anyj scene ofthe past, with the kind of
understanding which sees what they are really about” (Guru 99). Isherwood’s habit of
deferring con-m-ient on events and experience enabled him to render them in ways
impossible in the open-ended historical uncertainty of their initial immediacy, and enabled
him to present his considered and edited versions oftheir significance and ofhis own
implication in them. In the case of Journey, Isherwood found himself in the uncongenial
situation of having to pronounce upon matters which were not only foreign to him and
towards which he was temperamentally still “both indifferent and ignorant,” but matters
whose ultimate significance the rapidly changing course of world events had flot yet made
clear. The sense ofuncertainty in 1938 was indeed acute: through the months Isherwood
was writing up his “Travel-Diary,” heroic Kuomintang resistance dragged out the
cataclysmic Baffle of Wuhan, while in Spain Republican fighters held back the Nationalist
advance, and Europe’s whole fate hung in the balance during the Munich Crisis. When
considering how developments in late 193$ bear on Isherwood’s presentation ofhis early
193$ joumey, it is important to emphasize the uncertainty ofthe global situation and ofa
situation in which Isherwood found himselftrying uncharacteristically to understand his
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China material without the benefits of hindsight.
The difficuit immediacy of his Chinese experience, along with its confused mixes of
gravity and superficiality, of the recognizable and the strange, bas much to do with why
Isherwood’s narrative can seem tonally uneven, self-conscious, and unfocussed. Through
the different temporal situations of altemating chapters Isherwood gains some perspective
on his material by writing into the structure of “Travel-Diary” the necessary time delay
between the experience and its representation. The temporal gap between the retrospective
odd-numbered chapters one through fine, and the datedjoumalesque immediacy ofthe
even-numbered chapters two through ten is an effect of Isherwood’ s search for the comfort
of his customary time delay and a structural expression of the problematic nature of the
whole project of writing Joumey. The temporal contrast between the retrospective chapters
and the diary-like chapters is a fictional conceit which dramatizes the temporal, existential,
and epistemological situation of Isherwood and Auden as they wrote their book. This
contrast does flot reflect a difference in the conditions in which Isherwood composed the
two sorts of chapters. For the even numbered diaiy-like chapters no less than the
retrospective odd numbered chapters are the result oflsherwood’s rewriting ofthe original
diary Auden and he kept in China. As such both are equally removed from the immediacy
of the China experience and of the original diary. Both are informed by the imperfect
hindsight possible at a remove ofa few months. The temporal altemation in the text is a
fiction which relates notjust to Isherwood’s problems and proclivities as a writer, but which
emphasizes the uncertain relationship between the immediate context of early 1938 and the
minimally retrospective context of late 1938, and should remind readers of the acutely
experienced political crisis out of which both Auden and Isherwood composed Joumey.
The problems ofthe minimally retrospective qualities ofhis situation and ofthe
I L))
fictional status ofthe book’s altemating temporal structure corne to the fore in the
beginning and ending of Joumey. Isherwood begins chapter one paradoxically with the
more settled point of view of retrospection, and ends the joumey in chapter ten not with an
achieved retrospective assuredness, but with a diary-like entry in the present tense with the
final emphases on the uncertainty of events and on the moral demands of existential
imrnediacy. Where de Man seeks to show the unsurpassability of the time- and language
constituted ironic second self, Isherwood leaves us in the end, flot with the retrospective
secondary self of fiction, but with a representation of an empirical self that—like Auden’ s
wanderers at the end of XXVII—bas not moved beyond its initial and immediate dilemmas
and has no reliable way of getting beyond them. Like that of XXVII, the ending of “Travel
Diary” is crucial to Journey and leaves us having to decide what to make ofthat empirical
self and with littie idea of how the real Christopher Isherwood will proceed.
Journey’s non-temporal binary structures of caption / photo, photo / photo, photo I
text, verse I prose, order I disorder, objective I subjective, and Auden I Isherwood also
exhibit qualities de Man ascribes to the doubling of the self in irony. These multiple ironic
dualities reinforce one another. Each such dual structure and all such structures taken
together set up a semantic dynamic in which there is no resting place. None ofthe
representations in the book possesses immediate or complete truthfulness. There is always
another representation presenting an alternative experience, mode of intellection, or point of
view. Ahhough each representation is legitimate and none is ever entirely rendered
superfluous, none can stand on its own or convey anything final. Instead we are perpetually
referred to an alternative moment or mode of representation for a new perspective that
comments on or differs from the other. Together the different moments and modes might
be said to complete one another, but there is no ultimate completion—just an unfinished
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process of moving between partial representations and partial responses. The unending
quality ofthis dynamic recalis the infinite rcgress at the end of XXVII. It is consistent too
with de Man’s conception ofthe dynamics ofirony: “Irony engenders a temporal sequence
ofacts of consciousness which is endless [. . . .j irony is not temporary [. . .} but repetitive,
the recurrence ofa seif-escalating act ofconsciousness” (220). for de Man, irony involves
a permanent seÏf-consciousness (218) and a temporality “that allows for no end, no totality”
(222).
De Man is describing the modem ironic species known as Romantic Irony. This is
an irony which, like Journey’s ceaseless binary dynamics, involves a “gesture ofinfinite
seif-reflection” (Simpson 14). The idea of Romantic or “novelistic” irony is obviously
apposite to Joumey: “Vacillating in this way between prophetic self-assertion and
empathetic self-effacement, the romantic poet is necessarily an ironist, flickering like
Hamiet between the imperial scope of the mmd and its comic condemnation to the prison of
the body.’ The ‘terminal gods’ in this ‘double plot’ [...] are Ariel and Caliban” (Enright
13n). This dualistic characterization applies directly to Joumey. There the prophetic tone,
the imperial scope ofmind, Ariel’s capacity for artistic invention, arc ail Auden’s; while the
self-diminishment, the comedy ofthe body, and Caliban’s grossness are Isherwood’s. This
is complicated by the questions ofwhether Auden’s capacity for impersonal objectivity
should be called self-effacement or whether it is a sign ofthe assertive self-confidence of
the prophetic poie ofirony; and converseiy compiicated by the questions ofwhether
Isherwood’s egocentricism should be seen as a kind of self-assertion, or whether his self
deprecating preoccupation with his own responses is best described as a kind of self-
effacement. In Journey, the vacillation of irony occurs within a four-poled matrix defined
by Isherwoodian and Audenesque varieties ofboth self-assertion and self-effacement.
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If de Man’s conception of the endless self-consciousness of irony and the infinite
instability of Romantic irony are remarkably consonant with Joumey, the book’s system of
irony-generating polarities can also be described using Booth’s classifications ofirony. In
so far as its “ironic undercuttings are [. . .j innurnerable” (Booth 250), Joumey involves
“infinite irony.” In Booth’s terms, the real question is whether the open-ended ironies of
Journey are instances of an “infinite unstable irony” in which there are no stable
propositions or positions at ail (240) and the irony is “infinite in the negation ofmeanings”
(250); or whether those ironies are rather instances of “infinite stable irony” in which the
‘infinite’ underminings of irony are conducted in a genuine universe [whereJ value and
commitments need not finally be absurd” (268).
Without cleaving to this Boothean dichotomy, it seems clear that in Joumey, we are
presented with something like the infinite stable irony that Booth describes. De Man wams
against the error of “seeing irony as a preliminary movement toward a recovered unity, as a
reconciliation of the self with the world by means of art” or as “the prefiguration of a future
recovery” (219). Indeed, there would seem to be no completion, no final restful moment of
reconciliation and harmonization involved in Joumey’s overlapping sets ofbinary
dynamics. In so far, however, as de Man argues that the ironie self must have priority over
the inauthentic empirical self and must refrain from trying to move “toward a recovered
unity,” in so far as the de Manian ironist must refrain from making “the leap out of
language, the domain ofthe ironie, into faith” (Mileur 334), there the ironists Auden and
Isherwood and their ironical Journey begin to diverge from de Man’s ideal of an infinitely
ironie subject, and move instead towards a problem which reealls Booth’s “stable-infinite”
irony.
Where de Man promotes an ideal of ironie self-eonsciousness and its associated
156
two-stage temporal manifestations within which ironic temporality, the mmd appears as
“infinitely agile” (Mileur 333), Auden and Isherwood in Joumey reveal the problem ofthe
tensions between, on the one hand, recognitions of ironic self-consciousness and of
complex temporality, on the other, and authentic desires for an impossible authenticity and
for a recovered unity (334). Contra de Man, Mileur insists on the selfs desires “to move
beyond and outside itself’ (334) to achieve some sort of oneness or in-touclmess with the
world as essential to authentic irony. Joumey moves toward both a revelation ofthe
necessity of the self moving beyond and outside itself, and a revelation in “Commentary” of
the reconciliation ofthe self and the world. Mileur argues that de Man “does not seem to
take into account” that any choice of irony and its temporality over such desires and
requirements will remain haunted “by the sense of inauthenticity arising from repressed
desire” (330). Mileur argues further that authentic temporality and authentic desire “are
deepÏy at odds and any choice between them, however qualified, is plagued by a sense of
incompleteness” (330). In contrast to de Man, Auden and Isherwood’s turn to irony in
Joumey does flot cause them to forget that the desire from which irony draws its parasitical
strength is precisely a desire for “a reconciliation ofthe self with the world” (de Man 219).
Like Mileur, they recognize that authentic desire means that the ironist feels the need “to
make the leap out of language, the domain ofthe ironic, into faith.” At the crucial moments
that are the endings of XXVII and ofthe “Travel-Diary,” Joumey exposes the unreal
identifications that such a desire is tempted by, while simultaneously acknowledging the
unironic reality ofdesire. Although Mileur’s de Manian description of “the infinite play of
signifiers, the perpetual deferral ofmeaning, the ironizing of ironies of irony” (336) is
suggestive of the interactions of the multiple levels and instances of irony in Joumey,
Mileur’s recognition that “irony retums us to the selfs predicament as unhappy
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consciousness, striving to move beyond and outside itself’ (334) describes just as well the
ironists’ predicament in Joumev. Auden and Ishenvood, even afier their elaborations of the
infinite truths of ironic consciousness, return at the end of XXVII and of the “Travel-Diary”
to our desire-driven and anxious present where ‘we live in freedorn by necessity.’ Without
the concem at those moments with the authenticity ofthe desire to move beyond and
outside ourselves, without its concern with the necessity of our moving beyond our text
based infinitely ironic fictive selves, Journey’ s representations of our authentic complex
temporal predicament would itselfbe inauthentic. Without the book’s problematizaiton of
that desire, the “perpetual deferral of meaning, the ironizing of ironies of irony” in Joumey
would constitute, as Mileur comments, “a perpetual flight” that simply reveals the
persistence of our desire to move beyond ourselves, to know the world we live in, and in
sorne way coincide with it (336). Beyond the negative revelations ofour authentic and
unrealizable desires at the end of XXVII and “Travel-Diary,” it is in Auden’s
“Commentary” that Auden attempts to corne to conclusive positive reconciliations ofthe
self and the world, and of authentic human desire with the infinitude and temporality of
irony.
Modem philosophers of irony have ftorn the beginning recognized this tension
between an awareness ofthe infinite quality of Romantic irony and the inevitability ofour
need to reconcile ourselves with the world. fichte “differentiates hirnseÏf from [. . .j what
was popularly recognized as irony, which he regarded simply as an elaborate self-protection
and an avoidance of action, one of the rnost important obligations of enlightenment. Self
reflection is absolutely necessary [. . .j but it should neyer remain rnerely speculative.”
from a Fichtean perspective, the play of irony with its “unsettled hovering between
‘authority and mere emptiness’ is [. . .] a necessary step” that “impels us toward determinate
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knowledge. (Simpson 71-2). In this view, seif-reflection through the infinite play of irony
must be engaged with the moral seriousness of “action” and “detemiinate knowledge,”
those linked “obligations of enlightenment.” Similarly the infinite ironies of Journey, rather
than arbitrary play, are a function ofreal moral concems that are multivalent and
overlapping. There are the pressing problems of how one should respond to the war
between Japan and China and to the issue ofWar in general; how one should respond when
confronted with the victims ofwar and with the poorest ofthe world’s poor; how one
should regard the contradictory international alliances and enmities engendered by the war,
those critical, but ideologically-unlikely coalitions, on the one hand, of Imperial England
and the British sphere of influence, Nationalist China, the Soviet Union, and the USA, and
on the other hand, oflmperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy. Other ethical issues
are familiar to us from our discussion of XXVII. These involve the problems of
comprehending a homosexual experience in the terms of a heterosexual conceptual order
and of weighing in the balance the respective philosophical daims of religion and
contemporary politics. For Auden Journey represents a tuming point in both political and
religious orientation, as lie tums away from a I 930s Marxist inflected perspective to a more
explicitly Christian point ofview, and a turning point in so far as he presents a bold
voluntarist view of sexuality. As we shah see in our discussion of bis “Travel-Diary”
similar tums are occurring in Joumey for Isherwood. These ethical tums in Auden and
Isherwood’s thinking anticipate their emigration to the United States; their adoption ofa
electoral republicanism in politics; and their respective religious conversions, Auden’s leap
into Christian faith, and Isherwood’s retreat into monkish Vedantism with bis concomitant
espousal ofpacificism during the Second World War. Auden and Isherwood’s ethical turn
in Joumey also anticipate the adoption of a more openly confessional and hiberationist
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attitude towards homosexuality, with Isherwood posing the political problem of his gayness
and Auden working through the problem in the sonnets of “In Time of War.”
ft is no accident that Mileur echoes Kierkegaard in speaking ofthe need to “leap out
of language, the domain of the ironic, into faith.” Auden himself, shortly afier the
publication ofJourney, would begin to study Kierkegaard on both irony and faith and begin
to adopt crucial Kierkegaardean metaphors and concepts such as that of “the leap of faith.”
Auden’ s biographical movement from 1932 through 1941, from Journey to his renewed
faith, is an enactment of problems at the heart of Kierkegaard’ s existential phulosophy and
Christianity and ofproblems at the heart ofMileur’s revision of de Man. It is in the context
ofthese existential ethical issues that one must understand Joumey’s infinite ironies. The
confusion and complexity of the ethical demands made upon Auden and Isherwood in
China at the end ofthe 1930s drive the two authors to heighten the degree ofthe irony of
their book. The hyper-reflexivity and the self-conscious literariness ofJoumey are directly
proportional to the intensity of the ethical and political expectations regarding the two
authors’ ability to instruct readers about how to act with respet to the crises ofthe late
1930s and the Sino-Japanese war. Auden and Isherwood’s farne as leaders ofa literary
generation and the 1930s ideal ofthe engaged artist combined to create activist expectations
that were positively Byronic. To such expectations, Auden and Isherwood responded
idiosyncratically with the comedy and skepticism of “Travel-Diary,” the detachment of the
sonnet sequence, and the abstruseness of “Commentary.” In these respects, the literariness
of Joumey contrasts strongly with Agnes Smedley’ s intentions in lier own account of the
Sino-Japanese War in China Fights Back: “1 beg ofyou to help me [edit my manuscript],”
she wrote a friend. just don’t make it ‘literary” (xvii). Joumey’s endless ironizing and
complex literariness have been seen as evasive, but they are symptoms ofthe real
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seriousness ofthe choices and problems which Auden and Isherwood are confronting.
We
can see in Journey an enactment of an infinitely ironic consciousness faced with the ne
ed to
take a leap of faith in one’s engagement with the world. The critical controversies prov
oked
by the exaggerated ‘speculative hovering’ of Joumey’ s irony are inseparable from the
controversies provoked by the actual ideological and biographical choices which Journey
announces in Auden and Isherwood’s lives and by the associated reorientations in their
respective literary vocations.
There are paradoxes in the ways Auden and Isherwood attempt to solve the
problems they faced. If the endless textual ironies ofJourney can seem evasive, then the
real world choice of both authors to move to the United $tates, rather than looking boÏd and
decisive, soon ended up itself looking, once the Second World War broke out, like an
illegitimate evasion of their patriotic, I iterary, and moral obligations. Similarly, their
ideological choices and religious leaps ended up, flot so much returning them to the world,
as sending them into the sacred textual traditions of their respective religious faiths and into
an art that was less directly engaged with actuality—the mystic Isherwood of Prater, the
Audenesque Isherwood of lis translation ofthe Bhagavad- Gita; the aesthetic, the
theological, the psychological Audens ofThe Sea and the Mirror, Time Being, and Anxiety.
One could say ofAuden’s religious faith that the crucifixion becomes for Auden the one
event and theme by which he returns inevitably to the truth of the world, that the nails of the
crucifixion become, as it were, what fixes the otherwise infinitely ironic self to the actual
empirical world. The crucifixion, however, remains also a ‘crucifiction,’ not in so far as it
may flot have happened, but in so far as, like other beliefs, the crucifixion, which retums
Auden to the reality ofthe world, is aiso made present by texts, with ail the ironic self
conscious infinities that textuality opens up.
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At the end of 193$ and the beginning of 1939, the playing out of such paradoxes and
ironico-existential-ethical problems lay in Auden and Isherwood’s futures. In a
ny case, at
the end ofthe Ï930s, it was probably not principally a theoretical urgency to tum from irony
to the world that was driving Auden and Isherwood away from literary secularism
into
religious faith. Rather, it was the finally unavoidable recognÏtion, which Auden and
Isherwood shared with other mid-twentieth-century religious converts, that uncontain
able,
unprecedented evil was abroad in the world and the concomitant recognition that
ideologically only hoary old religious doctrines seemed to address adequately the “per
sistent
problem ofevil” (Cunningham 466).
The recognition ofthe ethical, moral, and political seriousness ofthe world
‘stabilizes’ Journey’s infinite ironies; this is not to say it simplifies them. The iron
y is
stabilized by the recognition of the force of the desire and the ineluctability of the need
to
try to reconcile the self to the world, somehow. The irony is stabilized, though flot
dirninished, by the recognition ofthe reality ofthe moral seriousness ofthe hurnan c
rises
that the world involves. The first ofthese stabilizing ethical recognitions is implicit
in the
persistence with which Auden and Isherwood retum us to the problems ofthe reÏationship
ofthe self and the world; the second derives from the nature ofthe subject matter which
they must confront. Both recognitions are flot just matters oftheme and subject matter, but
rather are supported by technical aspects ofthe text. Structural and dialogic features of
Auden and Isherwood’s collaboration operate to confirrn such ethical recognitions and to
stabilize or contain Ioumey’s infinite irony.
The ironies of Joumey may be infinite, but the ultimate implications of such an
in±initely ironic text are, according to Booth, oftwo kinds:
There are really two sharply distinct ways in which the vision of an infinite
series of ironies, evcry one undermined by further ironies, can be turned upon
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life and the universe [. .} We can say that ail truths can 5e undermined with
the irofly of contrary tniths either because the universe is essentially absurd
and there is no such thing as coherent truth or because man’s powers of
knowing are inherentÏy and incurably limited and partial. (267)
One or the other of these sorts of contrasting visions may be accepted as tnier than the other
sort, but works that articulate either of these visions ofthe universe will likely be equally
invoived in potentialiy untenable rhetorical, textual, and ironic convolutions. For its part,
Joumey certainly acknowiedges the possible absurdity of man’s relation to the cosmos in
Auden’ s description of “the galaxy [as] free for ever to revolve like an enormous biscuit”
(Prose 1: 680); and acknowledges the apparent meaninglessness ofthings in Isherwood’s
surreai lists and his recurrent sense of incomprehensible formlessness; and acknowledges
the signs ofthe ftitiiity of man’s various self-transformations in the sonnet sequence’s
catalogue of unviable human types. Signs of the absurdity of the universe and human life
are certainly there, but tentative contra-indications to those absurd possibilities are there as
well. The sonnet sequence does end with a lasting epiphany, however disillusioning it may
5e, about the nature of an actual human freedom that gives a terrible meaning to the
absurdity. Isherwood does manage to find a minimal retrospective purchase from which to
order his experience and does manage to raise his own version of Lenin’ s urgent question
“What is to be done?” Auden does manage to sketch in “Commentary” an ethical program
for hurnanity and an image ofa human hermeneutic that is not absurd. Consequently, while
acknowledging the possibilities that the ‘universe’ and human affairs can be absurd, the
book also implies that it is possible aller ail to achieve or discover something meaningful.
Booth discems a radical difference between the “local underminings” of irony and
the unquaiified cosmic assertion that the universe—not just this or that effort of man to grasp
it—is absurd” (253). He argues further that “if the ‘infinite’ underminings ofirony are
conducted in a genuine universe—if value and commitrnents need not finally be absurd—then
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differences in our interpretations make a difference; though no formulations will ever be
fully adequate, some will be more ncarly adequate than others, and the quest for truth and
for truer interpretations will itself 5e meaningful” (Booth 26$). The works ofthe wTiter for
whom the quest for truth remains meaningful, in spite ofthe infinite underminings ofirony,
“may in some respects resemble Beckett’s” (Beckett being for Booth the ultimate example
ofa writer whose work seeks to reveal the absolute absurdity ofthe universe). As in
Beckett’s work, “every proposition will be doubted as soon as uttered, then undercut by
some other proposition that in tum will prove inadequate.” Unlike Beckett however, for the
writer whose quest remains meaningful, “both the effort to understand and the particular
approximations, inadequate as they are, will 5e worthwhile: the values are stable” ( 269).
With these distinctions ofBooth’s in mmd, and observing Joumey’s gestures toward
meaningftilness, we may conclude that, in the end, Joumev’s irony tends to a revelation flot
of the ultimate absurdity of things, but rather of human imperfection, what Booth describes
as our “inherently and incurably limited and partial” powers ofknowing.
Given the stability of the universe and of value, and given the limitations and
partiality of human knowing, Booth holds that “the true philosopher lives in a self-
corrective dialogue, in which the inadequacies of one attempt fat knowledge and
understandingJ lead inevitably to another one and then to yet another”(275). from a
Boothean perspective, the infinite irony in Journey is an essential part of an ongoing self-
corrective dialogue. In Booth’s terms, the irony, though infinite, can ultimately 5e seen as
stable. It is flot that Auden and Isherwood succeed in revealing the truth of the universe, or
even the truth oftheir own ideological existential moment, or that humanity achieves finally
a fulfilment of its nature. Rather the dialogic ironies of Joumey are part of a meaningful
process because they have the capacity to correct or qualify inadequate, partial
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representations of the truth. This ironic, dialogic, self-corrective meaningfulness is a key
structural feature of Journey. In their mutual ironic imperfection, they “are articled to enor”
as XXVII’s une lias it with its implicitly modest hope. Such a self-corrective
meaningftilness is perliaps an inherent potential of ail literary collaborations. Other
coilaborators may opt for a single-voiced, united-front literary production that emphasizes
aesthetic oneness and ideological agreement, they may resist ironic tension and
intersubjective differences, but in Joumey Auden and Tsherwood give much more play to
the differences between their interests, perspectives, and sensibilities. Their differences are
flot, however, a comic or tragic demonstration ofthe absurd impossibility of
comprehension. This emphasis on difference and dialogue contrasts markedly not only with
de Man’s idea of a mistaken identification with their inauthentic empirical selves, but also
with mid-twentieth century totalitarian political and philosophical predilections which
tended to insist on the necessity of ideological conformity and collective submission to a
single party une. Auden and Isherwood’s insistence on the dynamic and open dialogue of
differences constitutes perhaps the book’ s real political and philosophical position.
Certainly, it is the book’s ironic intersubjective tensions that transform their collaboration
into Boothean self-corrective dialogue.
A later haiku ofAuden’s offers a useful gloss on the Auden-Isherwood dialogue in
Journey: “When truly brothers / men don’t sing in unison / but in harmony” (Collected $85).
The collaborative authorship ofJoumey approaches a condition ofunison only momentarily
and very infrequently. The collaboration might, however, be said to involve a condition of
complex intersubjective harmony tliat is capacious enough to accommodate a high degree of
counterpoint and of ironie dissonance. The idea of a brotherhood based on an ideal of
harmony rather than one ofunity is useful in describing the relationship ofAuden and
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Isherwood in Journey. That relationship needs to be characterized in several different tvays.
At times, as in the industrial metaphors of XXVI and in Isherwood’s accounts oftheir joint
joumalistic endeavours, it appears as a productive relationship ofworking partners.
Implicitly, in XXVI and elsewhere in Auden’s sonnet sequence as welI as in the
intertextual, structural embrace oftheir respective contributions to the book, the relationship
has a vague, almost unspoken, erotic dimension. The idea that their relationship is based on
a condition ofbrotherhood which insists that their voices and perspectives are flot identical
is also important. This is a condition of friendship which permits the acknowledgement of
differences, even of a resentfiul rivalry, between them, without risking a degeneration into
the destructiveness ofa relationship of rival brothers. The relationship ofAuden and
Isherwood in Joumey can resuit in a Boothean self-corrective dialogue because the
relationship is characterized by a division of labour within a shared project; characterized by
erotic entanglement; and characterized by a condition of brotherhood or friendship capable
ofencompassing a high degree ofintersubjective tension. Each ofthese dimensions ofthe
relationship proceeds from the common assumption that the relationship derives from both
parties and that neither party shall violate the other or betray the involvement ofthe other.
Exemplary as the Auden-Isherwood dialogue is as a philosophical and political model it is
easy to see that its openness is limited by the shared gender, class, sexual, and national
identities of its two interlocutors. There is a sameness underwriting the differences that
their dialogue can tolerate and promote. More jarring and difficuit corrective dialogues are
easy to imagine. To Auden and Isherwood’s credit, they do explicitly acknowledge Others
who remain excluded from Joumey’s meaningful productive dialogue, namely, women,
excluded almost completely from Auden and Isherwood’s 1930’s male and homosexual
perspective; and the Chinese, excluded because of the gulf of incomprehensibility between
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Western and Chinese categories.
In so far as the dialogue of Auden and Isherwood is self-corrective so that limited
and partial attempts at understanding become part of a meaningfiul quest for truth, it is
because of the complex mutuality of their relationship. It is because of and within this
relationship that Joumey’s infinite ironies, instead ofbeing experienced as a symptom that
the universe is ultimately absurd, can be experienced as a necessary dissonance within a
mutually enriching dialogue. Precisely because those ironies can be seen as corrective, they
have a ftinction, beyond their more immediately obvious disruptiveness, which is truth and
falsehood revealing, and which, as such, has an ethically and conceptually stabilizing effect
on both the self and its perception of the world.
Booth’s use ofBeckett as an example of a writer whose irony tends to dernonstrate
that “the universe is essentially absurd” suggests a contrast to the Auden and Isherwood of
Journey in the form of Godot’s Viadimir and Estragon. The idea ofthe infinite
underminings of Beckett’s irony revealing the absurdity ofthe universe is a useful contrast
to the more hopeful role ofirony in the Auden-Isherwood collaborations. In contrast to the
dialogue of Viadimir and Estragon, that of Auden and Isherwood in Joumey is meaningfully
corrective. In contrast to the absurdity of Godot, the universe and values, including the
value of friendship, in Journey seem stable despite the infiniteness of ironic reflection,
despite the critical destabilizing tendencies ofAuden and Isherwood. In contrast to
BeckeWs devastated landscapes, the war-torn scenes in agricuÏturaÏ China seem a freakish
aberration, and the sinister Europe of The Dog, F6, and frontier remains recognizable and
flot yet irredeemable. The contrast is between Beckett’s post-War, post-Holocaust, post
atomic bomb sense of anomie and Auden and Isherwood’s sense prior to the war that social
and political engagement were urgent and that it was possible to discover how to act
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responsibly.
The infiniteness ofthc irony in Joumey, to adopt freely Hegel’s distinction, is a
good infinity. It would be a bad infinity if it were only a destroyer of meaning, if ail it did
was shatter the coherence of ail representation whatsoever and deny ail possibiiity of a vaiid
perspective, if it resulted only in a series of isolated, discontinous instances of ironic
negativîty. But jarring, disruptive, and open-ended though it is, the infinite irony in Journey
is a good infinity. Its infinite irony is dialectical, corrective, relational, and productive. It
does flot operate to deny individual or cultural perspectives, so much as it operates to define
and question them against other perspectives. It does flot operate to nullify particular
representations, so much as it operates to qualify them by revealing their incompleteness
and partiality. It does flot operate to destroy meaningfulness, so much as it operates to
reveal a larger, more comprehensive field or world ofmeanings. It does flot operate to
render obsolete the desire to know and coincide with the world, so much as it operates to
acknowledge the difficult reality of that desire.
This contrast between good and bad infinities applies to both de Mari and Booth’s
discussions of irony as well. Clearly the idea of a relational, dialectical good infinity is
consistent with the notion of a text in which the ironies are infinite, but which, whether
through a self-corrective dialogue or other means, also involves a reaffirmation of a stability
in the universe and of values. Even de Man’s conception ofthe infinite irony ofthe self
duplicated subject cari be thought of as a good infinity in so far as it involves the subject in
a manageable permanent processes of revelation regarding the meaning of its selffiood, or
rather the potential meanings ofthe two selves of its duplicated self, and of revelation
regarding both its state ofactual inauthenticity and its fitful gestures towards a condition of
impossible authenticity. Booth may be anxious about saving the stability ofthe world and
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value; de Man may be concerned to identify a doubleness within the subject as the source of
an infiniteness in irony: for both, however, irony is part of an infinite dialectic which
reveals the condition ofthe self in the world. Positive examples ofthe infinite dialectic are
found in the infinite regress in XXVII that reveals the original and permanent condition of
human freedom; in the dynamic interpenetration of subjective and objective in the
relationship ofAuden and Isherwood; and as we shah see, in “Commentary” in the
constructive feedback loop of a hermeneutical messianic relationships of humanity to itself
De Man insists on the importance ofthe distinction between an imperfect, vulgar
irony which is intersubjective and what he considers a more elevated philosophical irony
which occurs intrasubjectively as a resuit ofthe spiitting ofthe self into an inauthentic
empirical self and a self constituted in language and fiction. We have seen how the
complex before and after temporality ofthe ironie de Manian self structures the texts of
both Auden and Isherwood. However, in the intersubjective relationship ofAuden and
Isherwood in Journey, the different emphases and roles ofthe respective authors
complement each other so that the intersubj ective outer duality of the Auden-Isherwood
relationship also represents or ‘writes large’ the sorts of intrasubjective inner duality that de
Man places at the origin of ironie infinitude.
It is clearly possible to analyze the inner structures of Auden and Isherwood’s
respective texts in terms of de Man’s version ofthe temporality and duality ofirony;
however, as we have seen, it is possible too to read the intersubjective Auden-Isherwood
relationship in Joumey as analogous to the intrasubjective tension ofobjectivity and
subjectivity, or as playing out the cognitive implications of form and formlessness. The
Auden-Isherwood relationship needs to be interpreted as having both intersubjective and
intrasubjective significance. Because the intersubjective relationship ofAuden and
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Isherwood also dramatizes crucial intrasubjective issues, de Man’s disparagement of
intersubj ective irony as he draws attention to the rigours of intrasubj ective irony seems
overly hasty. A more perceptive reading of the nature of irony, in Joumev at least, requires
that intersubjective and intrasubjective ironies be given equal interpretative play.
Besides, de Man is mistaken, flot so much in his fascinating analyses of irony, but in
valuing the intrasubjective over the intersubjecfive. Intersubjective dialogic irony is flot jusi
potentially corrective in the epistemological sense that Booth envisions; and it is flot only
that in Joumey the intersubjective irony can be related fairly directly to what are properly
intrasubjective dualities. Rather, it is a question of intersubjective irony having the
potential to reveal a subject’s state ofethical and psychological inauthenticity or
incompleteness to a degree that is at least as noteworthy as the intrasubjective irony ofthe
de Manian spiit self. In fact, there are good reasons for thinking that in comparison to
intrasubjective irony, intersubjective irony lias as great a potential effectiveness as a spur to
authenticity, in life and literature, and good reasons for thinking as well that intersubjective
irony is as inherently infinite as de Man argues the intrasubjective irony ofthe empirical and
ficitve selves must be. Certainly the dialogical dynamic resulting from intersubjective
encounters of different sensibilities, perspectives, and discourses is necessarily disruptive,
corrective, and open-ended.
Joumey richly illustrates de Man’s presentation ofthe doublïng and twoness, and in
particular the self-duplication, that lie at the origins of irony, and illustrates lis linking of
this doubling to the idea of irony’s infinitude and the idea of an authentically complex
human temporality. However, Journey’ s development of dialogic, interdiscursive,
intercuhural, corrective, ironic intersubjectivity counters de Man’s slighter estimate ofthe
potential ofintersubjective irony. The book also validates Mileur’s criticism ofthe
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incomplcteness of de Man’s emphasis on irony’s involvernent in authentic human
temporality at the expense of irony’s troubled relationship to authentic, if unrealizable,
human desire. What de Man does flot emphasize enough, and what Joumey shows at
several crucial points, are the causal and dialectical relationship of desire to ironie self
consciousness, and the causal and dialectical relationship ofthe pressure ofimmediacy to
the complex double temporality of irony. It is authentic desire which drives irony, and
though desire may turn (in)to irony in the interest of seÏf-understanding, desire also retums
itself. Similarly, though our immediacy in the world, the imperative that we coincide
somehow at some point with the world we find ourselves in, scems impossible and becomes
enmeshed in a matrix of complex ironico-allegorical temporality, this does flot mean that
the ethical problems of the immediate therefore disappear; rather they too retum—just as in
Joumev afier the ironizing and the elaboration of complex temporal structures, Auden and
Isherwood return us to the present and the immediacy ofthe present’s undeniable ethical
pressures and undecidable existential choices.
In Joumev, in XXVII, at the end of”Travel-Diary,” and in “Commentary,” the
tensions of desire and irony, of action and speculation, of immediacy and complex
temporality, reveal the unforgiving starkness ofthe moral dilemmas Auden and Isherwood
face. These dialectical tensions reveal the moments oftheir necessary ethical leaps out of
irony and into the world. It is flot that irony must be lefi behind at the ethical moment in the
world, but rather that the ethical epiphany and moment occur in contexts of infinite irony
and that the infinite irony occurs in a context of ethical deliberation and decision. This
tension of complex irony and immediate desire, for Auden and Isherwood, is still
productive and revelatory. They can multiply ironic oppositions indefinitely, and make
those forms of ironie doubleness crucial to the poetics of Joumey because for them irony is
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driving Joumey towards the achievement of what is desired.
A DISTANT MIRROR
There is in Journey’s reflexivity, with its multiplication of ironic or contradictory
pairings and its demonstration that any point ofview or truth daim bas a counterpoint,
something analogous to the relation ofthe West to China. Leys illuminates the cultural and
epistemological dimensions of Journey’s self- relexive engagement with China:
du point de vue occidental, la Chine est tout simplement 1 ‘autre pâte de
Ï ‘expérience hunwine. Toutes les autres grandes civilisations sont soit mortes
(Egypte, Mésopotamie, Amérique précolombienne), ou trop proches de nous
(cultures islamiques, Inde) pour pouvoir offrir un contraste aussi total, une
altérité aussi complète, une originalité aussi radicale que la Chine. C’est
seulement quand nous considérons la Chine que nous pouvons enfin prendre
une plus exacte mesure de notre propre identité et que nous commençons à
percevoir quelle part de notre héritage relève de l’humanité universe]le, et
quelle part ne fait que refléter de simples idiosyncrasies indo-européennes. La
Chine est cet Autre fondamental sans la rencontre duquel l’Occident ne saurait
devenir vraiment conscient des contours et des limites de son Moi culturel. [.
.11e voyage en Chine [estj finalement un “voyage au fond de la connaissance
de soi.” (60-l)
For both Isherwood and Auden this journey to self-knowledge and to the lirnits oftheir
‘cultural selves’ is a destination integral to theirjoumey to China.
Critics who fault Auden and Isherwood for failing to understand China—”somehow
his travel diary disappointed me badly,” writes Iris Wilkinson, “He’s written of China as
from Clapham—the far East delusion and the instinctive colour difference, I suppose”
(Wilkinson letter to A.A. Irvine 13 -4)—mistake an essential point of Journey. Isherwood,
by focussing on his misconceptions and his ignorance, by focussing on the gap between
actual Chinese behaviour and the behaviour he expects based on the “traditions” of
“European stage-Chinese” (Prose 1: 506), by focussing on the tension between Chinese
conditions and his ah too English reflexes, is not engaged in the sort of sympathetic
empathetic identification with China which is so moving, as well as itselfpotentially
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delusional, in the case ofWilkinson’s pseudonymous Dragon Rampant, or, as we shah see,
in the cases ofAgnes Smedley and Rewi Alley. Rather, as much as Isherwood is engaged
in the writing of a book about China, he is also engaged in a reflective act of self-criticism.
Isherwood’s subject is the incongruence, not the fusion, ofhimselfand this other place. For
Auden and Isherwood, the encounter with China is the occasion flot chiefly for an
understanding of China but for the understanding ofoneseif, ofone’s Moi culturel. There is
an aesthetico-poetic analogy here, involving, on the one hand, the insistence on the
difference between Isherwood’ s cultural self and China’ s cultural self, and, on the other
hand, the insistence on the differences between Auden and Isherwood within their
intersubjective, self-corrective dialogue. In the case ofboth the Isherwood-China and the
Isherwood-Auden reiationships, irony and comedy are two effects of the insistence on the
differences between the two perspectives involved, and both signal a refusai of an unreal,
delusional suppression of the differences between thc two entities, a refusai of their fusion
into a single voice or experience. This insistence on difference and this openness to ironic
duality make possible the self-corrective dialogue which Booth calis truly philosophical and
the self-reflectiveness which is such a prominent dimension of Journey. It is entirely
appropriate that the reflexivity, self-consciousness, and irony of Joumey unfold under a
Chinese star; the book’s cndlessly ramifying reflexivity is an exemplary aspect ofAuden
and Isherwood’s response to the radical cuitural Other which Leibniz called the “Anti
Europe”.
françois Julhien’s observation that “La Chine n’a pas développé sa pensée morale
autour du choix, de la tentation, de la transgression, bref elle s’est passée de cette grande
mise en scène du mal, fondée sur la liberté, qu’a dramatisée l’Occident” (31) reveals
Auden’s probing ofthis ethical philosophical complex in “In Time ofWar,” along with
n
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Isherwood’s satirical engagement with the same complex in “Travel-Diary,” as an
expression of their attempt at cultural self-understanding against the backdrop of a radically
different Chinese civilization. Their dramatization of a complex which is crucially Western
(a “grand ‘Occident”, remarks Jullien, encompassing Indian and Islarnic versions ofthe
Choice-Temptation-Transgression-Freedom-Evil complex) is an expression of their
disorienting, seif-reflective encounter with the non-Westenmess of China.
In Leys’ conception ofthe relation of China and the West, the special significance of
China for the West derives from the facts that China is a living civilizational equal of the
West and at a polar extreme of otherness from the West (unhike various vanished cultures or
the more proximate Indian and Islamic cultures). Granting Leys this, we note that the
deadness of ancient Egypt is specifically ahluded to in “The Sphinx” as the travellers pass in
Joumey beyond the limits and origins of the Western world, and note as well that Isherwood
would soon begin his spiritual migration to India. However, we also note that afier their
encounter with China in 193 8—and in spite of Auden’s avowal that “like everyone else,
apparently, who has ever been there, if only for a few days, I shah be fascinated for the rest
ofrny life by China and the Chinese” (Prose 2: 35)—the more radical human alterity of
China without a Imowiedge of which, implies Leys, Western self-knowledge remains
partial, if not impossible, seems to fall permancntly off their maps. Though China itself
may have fallen off the map, China is flot in Journev merely a backdrop against which the
dialogue ofAuden and Isherwood can occur at a critical moment in their respective
developments. Rather China is integral to that critical moment. The stark world-turned
upsidedownness ofthe differences between China and the West sets in motion the reflexive
dynamic in which Isherwood and Auden cali into question themselves, their cultural and
historical assumptions, their episternological categories, and their understanding ofthe
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world. If “the distance” is a minor that allows the traveiler to sec his face in “The
Voyage,” and if the greater the distance, the clearer the mirror, then Auden and Isherwood
have chosen the mirror of ail minors in which to regard their owu Western faces. From the
hyper-reftexivity of Journey Auden and Isherwood each emerge transformed, with a clearer
sense, if flot immediately of what the nature of his mature work shouÏd be and of what he
thinks is his essential self, yet certainly with a clearer idea of what his own face really looks
like and a clearer idea of the sort of person and writer he is not.
CHAPTER 5
THE SENSE 0F AN ENDII’1G
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ENDTNGS, TURNINGS, AND NEW BEGINNINGS
The unifying focus ofmy reading of Journey is that ofits ending. Examining how
Joumey ends is a critical question for comprehending the book as a whole. The aspects of
the poetics ofthe book sketched 5° far, the critical perspectives evident in the discussions
which follow, the themes brought to light in our reading of XXVII, ail are relevant to Auden
and Isherwood’s thematic and structural insistence on the problem ofloumey’s ending. If
this single problem is the recurrent focus ofmy reading ofthe book, the formai and
ideological issues foregrounded in Joumey’s unfolding ofthe problem ofhow it might end,
and in the way it actually does end, provide the complex matter for my interpretation.
Journey is a book that keeps retuming to the issue of endings. A book obsessed with
its own ending, it is not a work that ends well. In this it resembles the collaborative dramas
in which Auden and Isherwood display an incapacity to bring their plays to a satisfactory
close. Joumey’s topical subject matter necessarily resists closure in so far as the outcomes
ofthe Sino-Japanese War and the contemporaiy world crisis were in 1938 unknowable.
Auden elevates to a general historical principle the uncertainty of their Chinese j oumey
when he retrospectively revises the opening line of XXI from “The life of man is neyer
quite completed” to “Our global story is not yet completed” in “Sonnets from China”
(Collected 192). Historical, this radical open-endedness is also ideological and structural.
What the authors seem to be saying about crucial areas of concem, like politics, sex, and
religion, they find not just difficuit to say, but at this point in their lives alrnost unsayable,
and to some extent perhaps, even unthinkable. Both authors had been wrestling for the
better part of a decade with the ideological and existential difficulties that animate Joumey,
and would wrestle with them for decades to corne. Much that is implicit in the book they
are able to make explicit only later. Still, Journey is a kind ofculrnination, a summing up of
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their ideological and personai trajectories through the thirties, and an early revelation of the
orientation oftheir work to corne.
It is easier to accept Joumey as an end to the thirties than as a prelude to the later
work, since it marks the end of so many things: the end of the Auden and Isherwood
collaborations; the end of any ambiguity regarding their relationship with Communism; for
many, even now, the end of the integrity of their youthful careers and of the coherence of
their overali work; the end oftheir hopes for peace in the world; the end ofthe 1930s. With
a war, and very possibiy global war, as a destination, it is no wonder the book’s authors shy
away fromrrjving. The title Joumey to a War describes the whole dread-fihled itinerary of
these authors through the 1930s. The book is the last chapter in the story of its young
authors’ struggles with the problems of knowing that theirs is a destination they wish were
otherwise, that the ultimate end ofthe 1930s is a war which few want and for which only
the worst are ready. Theirs is a fearful destination they can predict oniy too well. With
their childhood memories ofthe Great War, Eiiot’s “In my beginning is my end” signais for
them not a compietion, but the inevitable return of an unimaginable trauma.
for ail those reasons, as one considers Auden and Isherwood’s approach to War and
their coming to the end oftheir wanderings through the 1930s, it has been easy to take
Joumey simpiy as a final (and weak) instalment in the progression ofthe British phases of
their careers, afler which follows a radical break occasioned by their move to the United
States. It is, however, when one reads the book as a prelude to the later work that the book
begins to take on a ‘new life’ ofits own. More thanjust an ending, Journey points at
important new beginnings in the work and lives of both writers—new beginnings in their
erotic, poiiticai, and religious outiooks that were scarcely acknowledgeable within the
ideological and discursive limits they had hitherto established for their work. The
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perspectives implicit in Joumey are usually associated with the long American-based phases
ofAuden and Isherwood’s careers. for it was afier they moved to the United States that
they articulated more or less unequivocally their new religious and political points of view.
As sometimes happens in sonnets, however, the crucial tums in their carcers that are usually
associated with their move to the U.S. actually occur somewhat earlier than they are
supposed to have. Their infamous breaks with their youthful careers and their controversial
new beginnings are already occurring with Journey. Auden and Isherwood’s last
collaborative work is a prelude that announces—by implication and by omission, obliquely,
inchoately, tentatively—their imminent religious, political, and moral turns.
Journey embodies the paradox of an ending which is a new beginning. “Every end in
histoiy,” Hannah Arendt notes, “necessarily contains a new beginning,” In its purely
temporal aspect, this paradox is obvious, but the living meaning of the paradox springs from
the conditions ofthe endings and new beginnings in question. Pursuing the paradox further,
Arendt identifies the existential and historical meaning of a work like Journey: “this {new]
beginning,” she writes, “is the promise, the only ‘message’ which the end can ever produce.
Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity ofman; politically,
it is identical with man’s freedom” (Origins of Totalitarianism 478-9). Even if Journey
appears to be organized around the idea of its ending, it is in the new beginnings that Auden
and Isherwood announce that we must read the message ofthat end. Deciphering that
message, we find that Arendt’s insistence on the implication of man’s capacity for freedom
in those new beginnings coincides with the principal concem ofAuden and Isherwood’s last
collaborative work. for the promises and new beginnings inherent in jgçy’s ending are
a testament to political freedom and an existential act of human freedom.
An ending which is a new beginning is not an end, but a turning point. Journey is
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not only representative of major tuming points in twentieth-century political ideology and
history, it also marks major ideological tuming points in the work and lives ofboth Auden
and Isherwood. This idea ofa tum as a new begiiming is a prominent trope in Auden’s
work. Auden’ s belief in the virtue of turnings and new beginnings is an important moral
motivation for the many stylistic, formai, and ideological changes that characterize his
work. We have seen also the particular emphasis given to the tum in the sonnets of “In
Time of War,” and the way those emphatic turns register Auden’ s discovery of the ethicai
rhetorical pattem that will characterize his mature poetry. Just as Arendt associated
peopie’s capacity for new beginnings with their capacity for freedom, so Auden’s discovery
of the conceptuai and moral significance of the turn in the sonnets of “In Time of War”
occurs in a sequence whose major theme is the history of human freedom. Stan Smith notes
the centrality ofthe trope ofturning in Auden’s work throughout the 1930s. Smith sees the
trope ofthe tum in Auden as a figure for psychological, ideological, ethicai, and political
conversions which have 1930s analogues in Jungian psychology and Marxist revolutionism,
but for which the archetype is the religious conversion of $t. Paul (“Ruined” 120-7)—an
archetypai conversion which is bound up with Biblical and neo-testamentary themes of
liberation. Such analogues and religious archetypes oftuming, the Audenesque aesthetics
and architectonics of tuming, and the larger twentieth-century context of historicai and
ideological developments provide the contexts for evaluating the significance of the tums
that occur with Joumey. These contexts reveai the thoroughness with which Joumey, as a
book of endings, tumings, and new beginnings, engages with the authors’ experience of
ftmdamentai questions of their time.
THE NONSENSE 0F AN ENDING
In his study of interwar British travel books, Fusseli notes that “Somehow we feel a
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travel book isn’t wholiy satisfring unless the traveller retums to bis starting point: the
action, as in a quest romance, must be cornpleted” (Abroad 208). Proceeding with this
criterion, Fusseil finds Auden and Isherwood’s book wanting. “Nothing is rounded off:
Joumey sirnply cornes to a stop, for no particular reason, with the two travellers in
Shanghai, baffled over what to make ofit ail” (220). Fusseli is right when he identifies
Journey’s ending as problematic, but he is wrong about where the book ends. For it is only
the end ofthe book’s second section, Isherwood’s “Travel-Diaiy,” flot the book in its
entirety, which can be said to simply corne to a baffling stop with Rewi Alley in Shanghai.
In Abroad Fusseli is dismissive of Journey: the book’ s “unravelling and dissolving
offorms [. . .] marks the decadent stage in the course ofthe between-the-wars travel book.”
For fusse!!, the sonnets of “In Time 0f War” are among “Auden’s veiy worst things,” while
Isherwood’ s prose “narrative is disturbingly discontinuous, interrupted by j okiness,
nervousness over what literary mode is appropriate, and self-consciousness about the traveÏ
book genre itself’ (2 19-20). This judgernent ofAuden’s sonnets is dernonstrably false; that
oflsherwood’s prose, more interesting than fusse!! allows. In the cases ofboth Auden’s
sonnets and Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary,” and ofJoumey as a whole, fussell’s impatient
dismissiveness makes for inaccuracies and preclude a sympathetic consideration of the
visionaiy originality of what Auden and Isherwood achieve in their last collaborative work.
Stili fusseli does help us comprehend some of Journey’s peculiarities, particularly
the fraught subject ofthe book’s ending, or endings. Outlining the characteristic features of
the genre, fussel! sees in the travel book elements ofthc mernoir and the essay; but he
ultimately situates travel books in the reaim ofthe romance (204-10). fussell adapts frye in
suggesting that the travel book is a “dispiaced” romance, a modemised myth “brought down
to earth” (208). fussell invokes Joseph Carnpbeil’s description ofthe thrce part myth ofthe
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hero: “first, the setting out, the disjunction from the familiar; second, the trials of initiation
and adventure; and third, the return and the hero’s reintegration into society” (20$).
fussell’s mistaken focus on Isherwood’s disconcerting ending in Shanghai has the virtue of
drawing attention to one ofthe most crucial moments in the entire book, but as I will
demonstrate at some length, the presentation ofAlley in the conclusion oflsherwood’s
“Travel-Diary” needs to bejudged flot just à ta FussetÏ in terms ofthe romance imperatives
of the Travel Book as Quest Romance. It must be read in terms of the haphazardness of the
history and the actuality into which, Fusseli argues, modem travel writing dispiaces those
romance imperatives. Furthermore, Isherwood’s baffling conclusion with Aiiey in
Shanghai must be pïaced in the context ofthe overail structure ofJourney.
Despite his low opinion ofthe book, Fusseil articulates a perspective from which we
can reevaiuate the narrative trajectoiy ofJourney. For if the travel book is a dispiaced
romance, one which is “lowered, brought down to earth, rendered credibie scientifically”
(fusseil 20$), then Journey in the “Travel Diary” couid be thought of as having been almost
irremediably displaced out ofthe mythic pattem into an intractable worldly reality. This
reaiity in the world of 1938 is so problematic that Isherwood in his concluding pages seems
to refuse the shaping power of myth and to allow the details of reaiity and the confusing
and disorderiy data of ‘science’ to replace the myth entirely. Instead of a sense of an
ending, what we get is an inconclusive socio-political analysis of the array of crises facing
the people of Shanghai and China. And how familiar these crises are: the industrial
exploitation of workers and chiidren; the makeshifi living conditions of refugees; the gap
between Western dominated modemity and native reality; the suffering of crippled veterans.
That ail these are the very stuff of the modem and post-modem world goes without saying;
as does their resistance to the shaping role ofmythic imperatives ofreturn and completion.
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The persistence of these sorts of human degradation, suffering, and alienation testifies to the
appropriateness of Isherwood’ s simply coming to a stop in his presentation of them, of his
refusing to find a way to get beyond such tortured earthly realities and bis refusing to retum
to the optimistic mythic pattern from which his narrative bas, for fusseil, lapsed.
Nonetheless there is more to the question of the pattern of myth and romance in Journey
than Fusseil perceives, and later, we will consider how the pages with Alley that conclude
Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” do fit into a comprehensive mythic structure.
first, however, it is important to give some sense ofjust how critical the question of
endings is to Joumey and to clarify that Fusseli is indeed mistaken about so elementary a
thing as where and how the book cnds. for subsequent to the terminus in Shanghai in
Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary,” the book continues with Auden’s “Picture Commentary” of
sixty-three photos, his sequence oftwenty-seven sonnets, and his unbaffled “Commentary”
ofninety-three tercets and a closing quatrain. Had fusseil looked beyond the book’s
conspicuous ‘disturbing discontinuities’ to some of its thematic and structural unities, he
might have been able to imagine how “Commentary” completes the book and the
reintegrative stage in the myth ofthe hero. Just as importantly he might have considered
how the book’s distinct parts end, and why the authors stage so many endings, and what the
interrelationships and cumulative effect ofthose successive endings are.
Besides Isherwood’s diary’s ending in Shanghai, there are in Joumey four other
obvious endings. There is the concluding shot in the photo essay—a portrait of a pensive
young soldier. This photo is given an emphasis flot just because it is the final picture in the
series, but because it is larger than ah the others; and because it stands on its own, isolated
as each of us is before the prospect ofbodily death, while ail previous photos are paired two
to a page, in fairly obvious relationships of contrast or complementarity. The emphaticness
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ofthat final photo derives also from the ominousness ofthe photo’s caption—”Unknown
Soldier”—which draws attention to the mortai peril this anonymous soldier may at any time
face. The conclusion ofthis photo commentary, the caption implies, is flot the end ofthe
subject ofthe final photo’s story, and as for the probable brutal sad end ofthat story and of
ail that the photo essay has boni witness to, it is too well-known already, flot least from ail
those memorials dedicated in the authors’ youth to the Unknown Soldiers ofThe Great
War. The caption imbues the photo essay’s conclusion with instability and a honibly ironic
openendedness, and in so doing the caption transforms the soldier’s handsome pensiveness
into twentieth-century tragedy. The photograph itself. with its evident capacity to record,
but ils caption’s underscoring ofthe photographer’s and the viewer’s inability to protect the
subject of the photo from impending death, becomes an aspect ofthe tragedy. Both in its
capacity to bear witness to the unknown soldier’s life and in the bitter irony ofits incapacity
to prevent the soldier’s tragedy, the photograph exemplifies Journey’s efforts to bear
witness to war and tragedies it too cannot undo.
A ftirther conciuding moment in the book occurs with the last poem in the sonnet
sequence. This ending too is hardly satisfactory, if a neat closure, like a comforting
romance ofretum, is what one desires. Instead, “we”—and, as already discussed in detail,
several different first person subjective pluraiities are possible here—are returned in an
infinite regress to “the mountains of our choice,” lost where we began, and where we must
live “articled to enor,” envying “streams and houses that are sure.” Imperfect, “we” are, and
aiways will be, compelled to accept an anxious freedom which brings littie comfort and
which must remain, for us in our varying individual and collective identities, forever open
ended.
Even before the programmatically inconclusive endings of XXVII and of “Picture
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Commentary,” and the myth-bafffing end of “Travel-Diary,” there has already been another
unexpected, disorienting end to the beginning ofthe book, Joumey’s opening sequence of
poems. These six poems chart the traveller’s progress from English departure to Chinese
destination. “The Voyage,” “The Sphinx,” “The Slip,” “The Traveller,” “Macao,” “Hong
Kong”—the tities promise an allegorical account of the European’s journey out to meet the
Exotic Oriental Other. But, it is the farniliar the authors meet when they arrive in the far
East: a chintzy “Catholic Europe” in Portuguese Macao, and their privileged British selves
in colonial Hong Kong. It is flot just the mythic retum and sense of re-integration that an
ending should bring which can seem absent in Joumey. With this initial sequence, the
“setting out,” Campbell’s “disjunction from the familiar,” which should set the whole
romance myth in motion, is deferred and made paradoxical by the colonial realities which
the authors encounter as they arrive in China. Indeed, throughout Journey the authors raise
the issue ofbeginning more ofien, if less elaborately, than they do that ofthe book’s ending.
The most conspicuous such moment occurs at the very end oflsherwood’s “Travel
Diary,” which concludes with Isherwood saying that “One doesn’t know where to start” and
Alley replying emphatically that “I know where I should start” (634). Isherwood, however,
bas been pïaying with the idea ofbeginning since the very beginning. “Now it’s going to
start,” says Auden as they steam into the estuary ofthe Pearl River; “Now it—whatever it
was—was going to start,” repeats Isherwood (500). A quasi-Heideggerian “being-about-to
start” (53$) describes a basic existential condition that Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” neyer
overcomes, just as Auden and Isherwood neyer satisfactorily arrive at the front that is
supposed to 5e the destination oftheirjoumey. Auden and Isherwood insist on the
difficulties of perceiving just when and where theirjourney begins, but it is the problem of
conceiving of an ending, an existential having-to-come-to-an-end, that really dominates
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Joumey, to the point that the entire book is structured around a series of endings.
In the endings of the opening section, the photo commentary. and the sonnet
sequence, Auden diminishes or undoes any incipient sense of an ending, just as Fusseil
complains Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” does. With the opening sequence, Auden brings us
face to face flot with the disjunctive Chineseness of his destination, but with his imperial
European origin. With the final caption of the “Picture Commentary,” he points us beyond
the Unknown Soldier’s immediate photogenic present to bis unknown and unknowable
future. With XXVII at the end ofthe sonnet sequence, he simultaneously returns us to
XXVII’s opening situation; to the original unresolvable cosmic and moral dilemmas of “In
Time 0f War;” and to the openings both of Isherwood’s “Travel Diary” and of Joumey as a
whole. As with the ending oflsherwood’s “Travel Diary,” the first three endings Auden is
responsible for frustrate rather than assuage our desire to sec things rounded off
The problem of endings is a central thematic and formal preoccupation in Auden
and Isherwood. 0f the multiple revisions to the ending off, Auden eventually admitted
“we neyer did get that ending right” (cited in Carpenter 217), and Mendelson details the
persistence oftheir difficulties devising endings for their plays (for The Dog see Plays 554,
573-597; for F6, 632-652; for Frontier, 655), but their problems with endings are not signs
ofmere incompetence. In their collaborations, and especially in Journey, there is a
simultaneous rehearsal and refusai of everything that the idea of an ending implies.
McDiarmid observes that “Auden and Isherwood’s resistance to giving final endorsement to
any particular resolution indicates a greater confidence in disestablishing than in
establishing (or asserting) authority” and observes further that to “create some form of
closure would be to affirm a fixed set ofideas” (“Liberating” 139). McDiarmid proposes
that the “only discernible ideology is subversion.” For McDiarmid, such an ideology of
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subversion explains “the authors’ reluctance to assume authority” and expiains why to
Auden and Isherwood the “notion of a completed, stabilized script seems to have been
anathema” (138). Joumey’s problematization ofthe idea of an ending is consistent with
their work elsewhere. Isherwood makes the endings of Mr. Norris and Goodbye stark
moments ofethical discomfiture. In Anxiety, Auden reprises Journey’s technique of
multiple cndings, giving the poem four contrasting endings, the respective Jewish and
Christian meditations of Rosetta and Malin, the narrator’ s closing unes, and the omitted
“Anthem” (y. Gottlieb 128-9, 130). The issue ofJoumey’s endings is directly relevant to
the infinite ironic restlessness that we observed in the structure of Joumey and to Auden and
Isherwood’s ideology of subversion and their resistance to closure. Their resistance to
authority, closure, and ideological stability also involves a constant self-criticism, SO that
their moments of subversion are entangled with the contradiction ofthem enjoying their
own considerable authority to disestablish authority, and especially in Journey, of their
betraying their class ideology while enjoying the very class and national privileges which
afford them the necessary security from which to plot their betrayal. The infinite regress of
XXVII’s closure, Journey’s systematically reflective irony, its authors’ dwelling on the
issue ofendings and beginnings, ail are deliberate explorations ofwhat an ideology of
subversion entails; ail are part of a conscientious questioning of ideological and cultural
givens; and ail involve the authors’ representative self-consciousness.
In spite of the recurrent frustration of the desire for closure, Auden and Isherwood
reserve for themselves—contra McDiarmid’ s idea of anti-ideological open-endedness and
contra Fussell’s idea ofmythic failure—a last chance to redeem themselves, our desires,
and the book’s multiple earlier endings, in a way that fulfihis the imperatives ofthe hero’s
reintegration. For the ending that should really count. the ending to put an end to ail these
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unfinished endings, is the concluding two-hundred and eighty-three une “Commentary.”
“Commentary” needs to be seen ideologically and aesthetically as an atternpt to provide the
book with an appropriate dénouement to Auden and Isherwood’s journey and their self
consciousness about endings. In “Commentary” Auden finally begins to display the
authority required to create closure for a book whose program has been irony, ignorance,
uncertainty, disorientation, the fluidity of human nature, and infinitude.
Before, however, we can explore the ending “Commentary” provides for Joumey
and for the entire series of Auden-Isherwood collaborations, we have much to leam from
the details ofthe dissatisfying premature ending oflsherwood’s “Travel-Diary.” Once
again, though, we have to speak in the plural of endings. for “Travel-Diary,” like the book
as a whole, has multiple endings. In chapter ten, there is the inconclusive conclusion in
Shanghai, which Fusseli incorrectly represents as the end of the book. Prior to that there are
the last few pages of chapter fine, when Auden and Isherwood leave the Republican
Chinese port of Wenchow for foreign controlled $hanghai; and even earlier than that there
is the Joumey’s End episode of chapter seven. In the latter two ‘endings,’ Isherwood
entertains and then deliberately rcjects untenable ideas with which he might bring Auden
and Isherwood’s journey to a close. Siginificantly, the Wenchow ending and Joumey’s End
endings occur in retrospective late-1938 chapters in which those untenable final ideas are
already relegated to the past, while the present tense early- 193$ ending with Rewi Alley in
$hanghai emphasizes the openness of the present moment of decision. In ail three
endings—much as Auden in his mature poetry will first invoke the tempting charni ofrnyth
only to then break k and retum us to the world disenchanted—Isherwood acknowledges
then actively resists the allure and comfort of ideological and mythic patterns of
homecoming and reintegration.
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A LATE MODERNIST, LAIE COLONIAL END 0F THE TRAVELLER’S DREAM
The easiest ofthe “Travel-Diary” endings to read, chapter nine’s Wenchow passage
suggests how one can place Journey in a literary historical context. For Auden and
Isherwood’s preoccupation with endings is an aspect flot only oftheir ideological
predilections but oftheir own sense oftheir position in literary history. “More than many
Ïiterary periods,” observes Peter McDonald, “the thirties in Britain is a decade defined by its
conclusion” (71), and Journey’s insistent foregrounding ofthe problem ofits ending makes
it a representative text of this quality of its literary historical moment. Joumey performs a
complicated balancing act on a late-modemist cusp. Behind it is the modem tradition of
British travelogue issuing from Victorian imperial conditions and continuing through the
late-colonial period between the wars. Afier it, and afier the Second World War, will corne
an efflorescence ofpost-colonial, post-modern travel writing that has not yet fun its course.
Whatever the precise chronological sense of terms like modemnisrn, late modernism, post
modemisrn, and post-coloniality, such theoretical notions help explain the situation of
Joumey. For as a literary-historical artifact, Joumey embodies elements proper to all those
terms and constitutes a case study of their developmental overlap and mutual inextricability.
The literary historical timeliness of Journey is most conveniently seen at the end of
chapter nine where Isherwood recounts his and Auden’s last few days in China on board a
steamer moored in the river at Wenchow. A city which has otherwise remained off the
beaten track for Western visitors to China, Wenchow by May 1938 was one of the very few
Chinese ports not in Japanese hands, so that until the city feil in July 1942, travellers ofien
entered or exited the country there. Looking out from shipboard, in that obscure, exotic,
temporarily strategic port, Isherwood lias himself take his leave of China:
A cabin port-hole is a picture frame. No sooner had we arrived on board than
the brass-encircled view became romantic and false. The brown river in the
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rai the boatmen in their bat-wing capes, the tree-crowned pagodas on the
foreshore, the mountains scarved in mist—these were no longer features of the
beautiful, prosaic country we had just left behind us; they were the scenery of
the travellers’s dream; they were the mysterious, l’Extrême Orient. Memory
in years to corne would prefer this simple theatrical picture to aIl the subtie
and chaotic impressions ofthe past months. This, I thought—despite ail we
have seen, heard, experïenced—is how I shaH finally remember China. (234)
Bryant notes the passage’s standard ‘Orientalising’, colonial-aesthetic motifs, but she does
not emphasize enough how critical ofthem Isherwood is (Bryant 159-160).
Isherwood is clearly aware of the pitfalls of exoticizing his picturesque last
impressions, calling them “false, romantic,” and “the traveller’s dream.” Isherwood
confines lis classic, kitschy fantasy to a single paragraph, and the false vision is proposed
only to be tumed away from. For in a grotesque, seif-critical contrast, Isherwood
immediately describes how he and Auden amused themselves “by dropping coins and ten
cent notes on the quayside” and watching the waifs cautiously take possession of them.1
The sudden shifi underscores the incongruity of the travelers’ presence and emphasizes the
contrast ofthe scenic daydream to the actual hurnan degradation. Isherwood tums away
from exotic picturesqueness to abject poverty, from the appeal of a timeless, traditional
China to the pathos ofpoverty and to the world’s moral, social, and political disorder.
lsherwood’s refusal ofthe exoticizing and comforting coloniaÏ-aesthetic as welI as his
unsentimental inability to embrace the coÏonized and native are dharacteristic ofthe
ambivalent critical perspective on coionialism and imperialism that le develops elsewhere
inhiswork.
lsherwood might be interested to know that Wenchow (now spelled ‘Wenzhou’) is now among the
most prosperous ofcoastal China’s cities and ofien considered a model for the new capitalist China,
a regional capital of contemporary conspicuous consumption. 0f the Ou River, in whose delta
Isherwood’s ship was rnoored, the news is not so good. Though the green mountains in the distance
are stiit mistity alluring, the Oui iang has become a toxic sewer down whose ma]odorous current
swirl and bob an uninterrupted stream ofhuman waste, consumerist debris, and agricultural and
industrial effluent.
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This concem of Isherwood’s work with late-colonial and post-colonial matters is flot
widely enough recognized. Just as Isherwood’s queer sensibility and long attentiveness to
the social position ofthe male homosexual have been precursor and example for the gay
liberation movement and for both gay studies and queer theory, so does Isherwood’s work
anticipate issues associated with post-colonialism. Journey is one of a series of texts in
which Isherwood adumbrates late-colonial and post-colonial concems. The first ofthese
late-colonial texts is where Auden and Isherwood satirize European colonialism by
means of Sudoland, a country which is ‘pseudo’ in so far as it is a fictitious composite of
East African and Tibetan topoi, but as “Sudo” is representative of ail backward, subjugable
‘southem’ lands. ‘s political satire on colonialism remains less developed than it should
have, as it is displaced by the Freudian themes which dorninate the play’s ending.
Isherwood, however, returns to his interest in the problems and challenges of
cultures in colonized and/or non-Western lands. Later there would be The Condor and the
Cows, a neglected travel book on South America which in its themes and division of
responsibilities revisits Journey’s collaborative forrnulae and which Upward rightly ranks
among Isherwood’s rnost successftil works (Notes 24). There would be too Isherwood’s
turn to Hinduism and Vedantic ideas. Isherwood’s original engagement with the Indian
religious thought which defines so much of bis later work cornes in the context ofhis
experience ofthe civilizational crisis ofthe Second World War and his concomitant
spiritual crisis. Isherwood’s Hinduism needs to be cornprehended as well in the contexts of
British irnperialism and oflndian and third world decolonization, and Journey and F6 are
the two texts in which Auden and Isherwood first attempt to confront these issues. Though
Auden would not follow Isherwood in his post-colonial Indian explorations, it is from the
early Auden’s revamped Anglo-Saxon diction and versification that Isherwood improbably
191
derived a poetic style for his rendering ofthe Bhagavad Gita (1944), his first major
American and ‘post-colonial’ literary effort subsequent to Joumey. Given that Britain was
then losing its colonial hold on India through the combined if utterly dissimilar efforts of
Gandhi and Hitler, it is ironically appropriate that Isherwood and Swami Prabhavananda
should accomplish the major wartime English language translation ofthe classic Hindu
presentation of the philosophical problem of war in the idiom of Auden, the British poet
whose work through the 1930s wams prophetically ofthe coming European and world war.
Whereas Isherwood would go on to develop his concem with reemerging post-colonial
lands that he and Auden first articulate in F6 and Joumey, Auden would become ever more
absorbed in the Western tradition and the reexamination of Christianity and Euro-American
culture. In spite ofthis divergence, or rather partly because ofit, the works ofAuden and
Isherwood afier their 193 Os collaborations remain relevant to that of the other. Taken
together, their work anticipates the related literary developments referred to as post
modemism and post-colonialism, with Auden frequently being identified as a precursor of
the former (y. Emig), and Isherwood being in some ways a precursor ofthe latter.
Isherwood is an obvious point ofreference, for instance, for V.$. Naipaul. Naipaul’s
work develops an Isherwoodian approach to prose style and Isherwoodian narrative
techniques, such as the use of sequences of loosely related stories. He also furthers
Isherwood’ s circumspection about the identity of his narrators, about the relationship of an
author and narrator, and about the relationship of fiction and autobiography. Thematically,
Naipaul and Isherwood have in common concems with misogyny, with the outsider, with
travel, and with diverse geographical and cultural settings. They have shared as well an
interest in adapting Indian and Hindu perspectives in fiction and in exploring the moral
relationships ofthe developed and developing worlds. In eveiy respect, except the
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misogyny, Naipaul surpasses Isherwood, but even Naipaul, who so oflen emphasizes his
lack ofantecedents, acknowledges the example oflsherwood and ofJourney in particular.
for fusseli Journey’s “self-consciousness about the traveÏ book genre itself’ marks
“the decadent stage in the course ofthe between-the-wars travel book,” and in the elegiac
conclusion to Fusseil’s study, Journey is the prime exampie ofthe decline ofa rich genre.
Naipaul, in contrast, sees the book as pointing forward to the post-war and post-colonial
transformation of the genre of the travel book in the hands of writers like Naipaul himseif.
Referring to a fictional author in his Way in the World, Naipaul writes
He was aman ofthe Thirties, very much part ofthe intellectuai current ofthe
time, one ofthe radicals waiting for the war, each man in his own way, and in
the meantime going abroad on travels, flot the cruise travels, not the travels of
Victorian times, but travels that were heiping to undermine the nineteenth
century European empires. Auden and Isherwood went to China; Orweil and
others went to Spain. Graham Greene went to West Africa and then to
Mexico. ($1)
Journey, for Naipaul, is subversiveÏy anti-imperiai and knowingly anti-colonial. The
abandonment ofthe “colonial aesthetic” ofthe traveller’s dream in Wenchow at the end of
Isherwood’sjourney marks a significant aesthetic and ideological reorientation. The stark
contrast that Isherwood presents between the pretty scene out the porthole and his own
implication in the impoverished scene on the wharf in Wenchow signais that for Isherwood
the conditions for a pleasing adventurousness which was possible in Victorian and earlier
entre deux guerres travel has, as fusseli regrets, vanished. It signais for us also that the
conditions for a post-coionial and postrnodem ethical and aesthetic self-consciousness in
travel writing have already corne into focus for lsherwood in 193$.
The turning away in the Wenchow passage from the temptations ofthe picturesque
is representative ofthis turn to the post-modern, post-colonial travel writing that Naipaui
alludes to. It is representative of Isherwood’s tuming away throughout Joumey from a
I
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“colonial aesthetic” to the moral and political problems of colonialism or semi-colonialisrn
in China. This sort of writerly tuming away from something easy and attractive but false. to
something more difficultly ambivalent is an essential aspect, not just of the Wenchow
ending, but also ofthe other two endings to his Chinesejoumey that Isherwood presents in
the book’s “Travel-Diary.” Those other endings—above the Yangtze ValIey at the
Journey’s End mn and finally in Shanghai with Rewi Alley—involve more complex and
extended instances of Isherwood tuming away from aesthetic, political, and erotic
temptations to discomfiting truths.
AT THE JOURNEY’S END
Before the fareweli to the tourist’s dream of China that he sketches from shipboard
in Wenchow, Isherwood has already bid a more ambivalent and subtie adieu to another
traveler’s dream to which he himself is particularly susceptible. Ibis is the dream of a
queer Shangri-la that Isherwood unfolds in the Journey’s End episode of chapter seven.
There is a burlesque lightness to the episode that masks the radical implications ofthis
earlier fareweil and has inhibited commentators from perceiving the shocking nature ofthe
issues it puts into play. Just as the popular image of Isherwood as a photogenic gay
liberationist icon can distract attention from distasteftil aspects of his work such as its
pervasive misogyny, and from Isherwood’s seriousness as an immoral moralist, so the
campy gayness ofthe Joumey’s End episode can barely support Isherwood’s interweaving
of sexual, moral, political, and spiritual themes. Yet like the quayside waifs whose
indigence gives the lie to the picturesqueness ofthe Wenchow landscape, Isherwood’s
attention to incongruent human details troubles his fantasy of Shangri-la and reveals instead
the viciousness of a space haunted by the spectre of fascism and inhabited by Satan. What
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is more, in the context of Isherwood’s career, the holiday at the Journey’s End in the
mountains around Kuling2 represents a watershed that reveals unexpected ideological
horizons that lead to the permanent reorientation of Isherwood’ s work. We need only
follow the lead ofthe intertextual implications oflsherwood’s surprising interweaving of
religious, hornosexual, fascistic, and other political themes in the passage to discover the
directions it is pointing.
William Plomer identifies the episode at the Joumey’s End mu, along with the final
chapter with Rewi Alley in Shanghai, as one of two “where Mr. Isherwood gets a chance to
be cornpletely himself’ (Haffenden 293). Even Evelyn Waugh, afier clairning that the rest
oflsherwood’s “Travel-Diary” lacks originality, writes that “There is only one portrait in
Mr. Isherwood’s collection that does flot recali a farniliar type; that is the host ofthe
Journey’s End hotel, Mr. Charleton, and for the few pages ofhis appearance the narrative
suddenly cornes to life, and one is reminded that Mr. Isherwood is not only the companion
ofMr. Auden [Waugh’s Auden-scoming, homophobic sniffis audible here], but the creator
ofMr. Norris and Miss Bowies” (Haffenden 290). Plomer, forhis part, concurs with
Waugh that “Mr. Isherwood was at home with Mr. Charleton.”
Plomer’s conventional figures of speech—’being oneseif and ‘being at
home’—betray a misunderstanding ofsome key objectives oftravel and travel writing. A
Kuling or Lu Shan, to use its Chinese name, is a highly symbolic place in Chinese history. The
poet Su Shi wrote of the cloud-bewrapped mountain that even when on the mountain one cannot
“see the true face ofLushan.” Established as a resort by late-nineteenth Western missionaries in
need ofrest from the rigours of evangelical work in the steaming Yangtze plains below, Kuling ta
pun on the English ‘cooling’) developed into a secular resort as well. Chiang Kai Shek bought
Soong Meiling a villa there; the invading Japanese cleared it ofmissionaries and foreigners; Mao
held festive conferences there complete with purges and intra-party machinations as tens of
millions of Chinese starved to death during the Great Leap Forward. Isherwood’s superimposition
ofhedonism, spirituality, and vicious politics in the “Joumey’s End” passage is uncannily
suggestive ofthe true face ofKuling in modem China.
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more perceptive response would speak ofhow Isherwood’s Chinese joumey undoes his
sense of self and estranges him from his home. For Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” records a
process ofprofound and permanent self-transformation, and nowhere is that transformation
more acute than in the passages with Alley and Charleton. One wonders, in any case, what
sort of home would suit a restless traveler like Isherwood. One wonders too whcther the
idea of ‘being completely onesel? has any positive value in discussions of an author whose
narrators’ characters are ofien suggested only obliquely through their relationships with
other fictional characters or by what the nanators leave unsaid; an author who is
fiirthermore so fastidiously circumspect about the gaps between his fictional and real selves
and between earlier and later versions ofhimself. Moreover, how could Tsherwood ever
present himself as “completely himself’ when Joumey’ s representation of Auden and
Isherwood depends on the “omissions and codings” (Bryant 146) ofthe “necessary drag” of
“concealing overt references to homosexuality while at the same time providing coded
references to it” (144)? Stiil, thinking oflsherwood as temporarily feeling at home and
being himself does help solve the riddïe ofthe disconcerting episode at the campy Joumey’s
End.
Both Bryant and Anne-Marie Brady note that much later in Kind, Isherwood drops
the pretence of”necessary drag” when he decribes his and Auden’s “sampling ofthe
delights ofthe bathouse scene” in 193$ Shanghai (Brady “West Meets East” 105).
“Toward the end oftheir visit,” remembers Isherwood, “Wystan and Christopher began
taking afiemoon holidays from their social consciences in a bathhouse where you were
erotically soaped and massaged by young men” (Kind 30$). (In an earlier draft, he
describes in somewhat less prudent terms these holidays from their consciences as occurring
“Every afternoon” when “Auden and Christopher would visist [sicj a steam-bath within the
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Lntemational Settiement wliere you were washed, massaged and otherwise sdrviced [sic] by
goodlooking [sic] Chinese boys. (Kind ts CI 1029 170)). Kind continues
You could pick your attendants, and many ofthem were beautiful. Those who
were temporarily disengaged would watch the action, with giggies, through
peepholes in the walls ofthe bathrooms. What made the experience
pleasingly exotic was that tea was served to the customer throughout; even in
the midst of an embrace, the attendant would disengage one hand, pour a
cupfiul, and raise it, tenderly but firmly, to the customer’s lips. If you refused
the tea at first, the attendant went on offering it until you accepted. It was like
a sex fantasy in which a naked nurse makes love to the patient but stili insists
on giving him his medicine. (30$)
The relative explicitness here contrasts to the indirection with which Isherwood allows
Charleton to reveal that at Joumey’s End “each guest has a boy attached to him” and to the
indirection with which Isherwood
closes his account of Journey’s End by describing the fareweil tipping ofthe
boys, who ‘giggled shamefacedly—as Europeans giggie over Sex—and asked
for a littie, a veiy littlc, just a trille more.’ Like Isherwood’s remark about
available $hanghai boys, this one linking boys, money, and sex serves as a
textual wink at readers who can see through the author’s drag performance”
(Bryant 147).
Bryant adopts Kostenbaum’ s terrn “double talk” to argue that in Journey through the
“textual-sexual” strategies (144) ofthe indirection, omissions, and codings ofnecessary
drag, Isherwood and Auden “cail into question traditional masculinity” (147).
Traditional rnasculinity is satirized repeatedly in Journey, and Bryant quite properly
wonders if the underlying issue for Journey’ s detractors is the authors’ failure “to measure
up as real men” (142). We will consider this issue at length in our next chapter when we
examine Ishenvood’s sudden moment offruitiness at the end ofthe “Travel-Diary” with the
activist Rewi Alley. Bryant identifies that moment as one of several instances in Journev
where Isherwood “confronts the politics ofgender” (147). The campiness which Isherwood
himself displays so brielly afier AlIey’s grim concluding tour of Shangliai is a vital elernent
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elsewhere too, but nowhere is it displayed in more Ïeisurely fashion than in the episode at
the Joumey’s End. Here, unlike the conclusion with Alley, the fruitiness is embodied in the
person ofthe inn-keeper Mr. Charleton.
The Charleton episode is one instaiment in an extended examination ofmasculinity.
The inn’s mountain setting and the insistence on the unattempted climb up the mountain to
Kuling (590-1) anticipate a section in which Auden and Isherwood finally do climb their
mountain, and in which Bryant argues the questÏoning of traditional masculinity is crucial.
This later episode is the strenuous and climactic -1ike expedition with the Etonian
journalist-adventurer Peter Fleming (brother of lan, the creator of indefatigable, lady
killing, ubermensch James Bond). The tourist’s dream at Joumey’s End contrasts with the
fleming passage which follows it, and with the descriptions of a deadly Japanese air raid
and ofAuden’s meeting in Wuhan with the revolutionaries Agnes Smedley and Chou En
Lai which precede it. Those contrasting framing episodes are as important to understanding
the Joumey’s End episode as is the lively affinity that Waugh and Plomer perceive in
Isherwood’ s handling of Charleton.
In contrast to those harsher episodes with Fleming, or Smedley and Chou, up in the
Kuling Huis at the Joumey’s End, “ail is fresh, clean, and beautiful,” as Charleton’s
advertisements promise; and life, like the view in the next chapter ftom the porthole in
Wenchow, is “far, far too beautiful to be real” (590). Joumey’s End’s delicacies,
picturesqueness, tranquility, cleaniiness, and genial apprentice boys, appear removed from
the disorder and deprivation elsewhere in China. Journey’s End appears as a gentiy
homosexuai lotus land with Charleton queening it over “house-boys in khaki shorts and
white shirts, prettily embroidered with the scarlet characters of their names.” Charleton
allows the boys to leam how to box and to swim, and obliges them—”it depends [.. .] on
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my mood”—to leave their “beautiful legs” stockinged “up to the knee” or bared “down to
the ankles.”
Mr Charieton’s boys were famous, it appeared, in this part of China. He
trained them for three years—as servants, gardeners, carpenters, or
painters—and then placed them, often in excellent jobs, with consular
officials, or foreign business men. The boys ail iearnt a hile Engiish. They
could say: ‘Good moming, sir,’ when you met them, and commanded a whole
repertoire of sentences about tea, breakfast, the time you wanted to be caiied,
the laundry, and the price of drinks. Whcn a new boy anived one ofthe third
year boys was appointed as his guardian. The first year, the boy was paid
nothing; the second year, four dollars a month, the third year, ten. (589)
The discrete indiscretions of “necessary drag” make it somewhat difficuit to know whether
Bryant is correct in associating Charleton’s well-trained boys’ expectations ofmoney with
sex and with the bathouse attendants of Kind, but it seems hikely that she is. Certainly,
other details seem calcuiated to aliow us to infer that Charleton’s boys are intended as sex
partners. Charleton himself mocks his guest Meyer’s frustration regarding Charieton’s
refusai to allow him to take a particular house boy away with him: “We’ve ail had that
picture ‘Love Locked Out’ in our rooms!” (592).
Charleton may flot be a “familiar type” for Waugh, but his gay little fiefdom is
reminiscent ofMr. Norris’s fruity Baron Von Pregnitz’s boy-supplied estate and
homosexual reveries of a boy-populated island—just as the “volume of French
pomographic literature” with which, along with a Bible, Charleton supplies each room is
reminiscent of “some very amusing books” that Mr. Norris has in his study. Charleton and
Von Pregnitz are genteel aesthetes with sufficient means to ensure a pleasing hedonism in
their boy utopias. A suggestive gloss on Charleton’s “textuai-sexual” utopia is George
Hogg’s contemporaneous description ofthe rougher living conditions ofthe more
vigorously masculine Rewi Aliey. Hogg finds Ailey (whose case in Joumey, as Plomer
conectly suggests is compiementary to that ofCharleton) living in a cave:
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The main distinctive feature ofRewi’s cave in Shuangshipu is exactly the
same as that of his former house in Shanghai—that at any time out of school
hours it is fihled with boys. Boys looking at picture magazines and asking
millions of questions. Boys playing the gramophone and singing out of tune.
Boys doing gymnastics off Rewi’s shoulders or being held upside down. Boys
being given enemas, or mbbing suiphur ointment into each other’s scabies.
Boys standing in brass wash-basins and spiashing soapy water about. Boys
toasting bare bottoms against the stove (the scar across Rewi’s own nether
portions testifies to his own indulgence in this form of amuse- ment). Boys
pulling the hairs on Rewi’s legs, or fingering the generous proportions ofthe
foreigner’s nose. ‘Boys are just the same anywhere,’ says Rewi. (13 1-132)
Oddly enough, we will have occasion to retum to the issue of the size of Alley’ s nose—for
now, though, one merely asks whether the homoerotic glow ofthis passage and Hogg’s
descriptive attention to enemas, bottoms, and Alley’ s nether portions and hairy legs
inevitably leads one to the psychoanalytical question ofthe size of another ofAlley’s
anatomical protuberances. Is the seemingly eamest Hogg (his I Sec A New China appeared
under the imprint ofthe Lefi Book Club) suddenly being sophomorically coy here, or is he
naively displaying a lewd freudian descriptive logic? The posthumous controversy over
Alley’s homosexuality (y. www.nzedge.comlheroes/alley-postscript.html) renders these
questions far less amusing than they might at first seem. If Isherwood’s entertaining light
satires on Charleton’s and Von Pregnitz’s paedophilic and youth-loving utopias cast a lurid
light that transforms Hogg’s description of Alley and his boys into at best fruitily Iewd
comedy and at worst a moral infemo, Alley’s compromised and contradictory case forces us
to read attentively what is going on in the cases oflsherwood’s Charleton and Von Pregnitz.
Whatever we make ofHogg’s and Isherwood’s respective presentations ofAlley’s
and Charleton’s interest in Chinese boys, we must bear in mmd flot the comedy ofthose
presentations, but Alley’s knowledge ofthe tragic circumstances of such boys’ lives:
“There was a dump here,” Alley said [escorting Edgar Snow through the ruins
of Shanghaij, “run by a bastard who bought sixty-four [boys] from an
orphan’s home. Nearly ail the orphans’ homes here are slave labour or white
slave rackets. The buzzard slept his boys on shelves over their machines they
200
neyer got out. They worked fourteen hours a day; there were no guards on the
machines. When I examined the lads’ hands, I found twenty-six ofthem had
fingers missing. There was a total ofthirty-eight fingers amputated in that one
dump.” (Snow Scorched $6)
Alley shames Robin Hyde for criticizing “the harsh voices ofthe singsong girls”: “Most of
them,” scolded Alley, “have been kidnapped, or were flood and famine chiidren, mortgaged
out to the brothels when they were eleven [. . .] They’rc what they have to be” (Hyde 71).
further glosses on Journey’s comic presentation of Charleton and bis system of
apprenticeship and on Kind’s supposed frankness about bathhouses are Soulié de Morant’s
description in Pei Yu Boy Actress ofthe cruel apprentice system for training boys for
prostitution and female opera roles and the discussion of Chinese pederasty in Matignon’s
La Chine hermétique. (Matignon, a former attaché to the French legation in Peldng, was a
long serving and widely travelled medical officer in China; his Chine hermétique was
reissued in an illustrated sixth edition in 1936). Matignon is neither coyly titillating nor
frivolously risqué on the rigourous training of boy prostitutes:
Il y a, en effet, au moins deux catégories bien distinctes à établir, parmi les
représentaants de la prostitution mâle. Dans la première, rentrent, seuls, les
sujets qui, dès leur enfance, ont été particulièrement élevés, entraînés pour ce
but, tant au point de vue physique qu’intellectuel [. .
Cette première catégorie de prostitués est fort intéressante, du fait de son
organisation et du recrutement de son personnel. Elle est formée de sujets
jeunes, vendus par leurs parents, dès l’âge de quatre ou cinq ans, et souvent
volés par des industriels qui font le métier de fournisseurs pour la prostitution.
Le vol des enfants, mâles et femelles, est un fait bien connu en Chine [. .
Les jeunes sujets sont, à partir de l’âge de cinq ans, en général, soumis à un
entraînement physique et intellectuel, qui doit les rendre aptes à jouer leur
rôle. Cette préparation est longue, car ce n’est guère que vers treize ou
quatorze ans qu’ils sont jugés conmie étant à point et mis en circulation.
Inutile d’ajouter que, bien longtemps avant cette époque, leur propriétaire n’a
pu résister au plaisir de leur enlever leur virginité anale.
On commence par leur faire un massage régulier de la région fessière, pour
les rendre callipyges; puis, peu à peu, on habitue l’anus au passage de
dilatateurs, de volume progressivement croissant. Cette dernière opération est
toujours pénible, l’enfant s’y prête mal, et pour ce fait reçoit des coups. On
m’a assuré que certains proxénètes, plus humains que la majorité de leurs
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congénères, pour éviter les douleurs de ces débuts, faisaient prendre à leurs
victimes une drogue, autre que l’opium, qui non seulement facilitait la
dilatation des sphincters, mais qui en provoquait J’anesthésie.
En même temps qu’on prépare la voie inférieure, on ne néglige pas les soins
de l’esprit. Les enfants reçoivent une certaine instructions, on leur apprend le
chant et la musique, à dire et à faire des vers, le dessin, l’écriture des beaux
mots et anciens caractères, manoeuvrent le calembour, ont le talent de servir à
point quelques maximes de Confucius, ou des adages de la dynastie des
Soung. Ce sont là autant de petits agréments dont les Chinois sont amateurs.
(270-272)
And:
Ces établissements se trouve à Tien-Tsin et les Européens y sont admis sans
difficulté, car beaucoup, m’a-t-on affirmé, chose que j’ai hésité à croire—sont
des clients assidus de ces bouges [.
. .1.
Dans une maison de Tien-Tsin, sur cinq enfants qui nous furent présentés,
deux portaient de superbes plaques muqueuses aux commissures labiales,
visibles à distance [. .
Dans ces établissements, les enfants sont bien nourris, mais maltraités, et par
Je patron et par le client. Les rapports sont souvent douloureux; le petit garçon
essaie de s’y soustraire, à la grande colère du pédéraste, qui rudoie, le frappe,
voulant en avoir pour son argent. (275-6)
Matignon did not want to believe that Europeans patronized such establishments, but The
League of Nations’ 1933 “Commission of Enquiiy into Traffic in Women and Children in
the East” confirms the existence of racially separate brothels for Chinese and for Eurasians
or Europeans providing “catamites (or sodomites passive)” (270). It reports too that in
Hong Kong pimps could purchase boys oftwelve for the purpose of prostitution for $120.
We must sigh indeed “For the taste ofjoy in the innocent mouth.”
Ruthless and sordid, the facts of twentieth-centuiy Chinese poverty and juvenile
prostitution tum Kind’s supposedly ground-breaking honesty about Shanghai bathhouses
into deceptive self-delusion. Isherwood’s real moment of candour on the matters of
bathhouses, sex tourism, and adolescent prostitution occurs not in Kind, but in his 1956
preface to Gerald Hamilton’s Mr Norris and I when Isherwood writes “What repels me
about Mr Norris Changes Trains is its heartlessness” (Exhumations 86). Isherwood in the
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thirties was “on the lookout for civil monsters,” but “the only genuine monster was the
young foreigner who passed gaiiy through these scenes of desolation” (86-7). By the time
ofthe better known Kind with its amused descriptions of”the delights” of Shanghai
bathhouses, Isherwood had lapsed from the seif-condemning scruples of 1956 back into
mere sexual gossip and into his characteristic heartlessness. The guilty conscience evident
in 1956 is, however, at work at the Journey’s End. As rnuch as any necessary drag, or any
questioning oftraditional masculinity, the “sexual-textual” strategies ofthe humourous
vision ofthe Joumey’s End operate to reveal a moraÏly repellent gay heartÏessness
indifferent to the fates of Charleton’ s Chinese boys. The ultimate point of the episode is not
the celebration ofprostituted homosexual delights, but the rejection of Charleton’s self-
indulgent monstrous Shangri-La.3
The rejection ofthe Joumey’s End has analogues elsewhere in Isherwood’s work.
Charleton’s resort is only one of several examples oflsherwood’s attention to ail maie
milieux, to homosociality, and to their potential for homoeroticized or homosexual
utopianism. In addition to Von Pregnitz and Charieton’s boy utopias, there are the British
public schools of Lions; the Nazi and Communist youth clubs in Goodbye; the climbing
expedition of F6; the anarchist female-exciuding Greek island that Ambrose sponsors in
Down There; and the Hindu monastery of Meeting. As in those instances, at the Joumey’s
End the horrible world ofpolitics soon troubles the calmness of homo lotus land. Thus, it is
that the turn away from the erotic temptations of the Joumey’s Ends coincides with a turn
The ambivalence ofthe Journey’s End episode illuminates a moral dimension ofAuden and
Isherwood’s entirejoumey. for Kind is misleading flot just when it suggests that they “began
taking afiemoon holidays from their social consciences” only at the end of their stay in Shanghai,
but also when compared to the the diary they kept in the course of theirjourney. The diary records
that our internationally engaged, lefi-wing authors were happy to satisfy their louche ctlriosity
about sexuality and, when possible, their taste for foreign sex workers in Cairo, Djibouti, Colombo,
Saigon, Shanghai, Nagasaki, and onward to New York.
ri-,
LUi
away from the contemporary political temptation of fascism.
They are, in fact, one and the same tum because the homosexual and the fascist are
disturbingiy and inseparably entangied at the Joumey’s End. If campy old Charleton “saw
that you didn’t want to talk he passed your chair with a simple fascist salute” (590), and it is
with one “last Roman salute” that Charleton bids the young authors fareweil (592).
Charleton’ s regime shows signs of a campy fascistic rigour: the house-boys run out as “a
drilied troop” (58$); “Charleton exercised a more than miiitaiy disicipiine” (5 89). Other
details too remind us that 193$ is the year of fascist and Nazi ascendancy: the “black shirt
and shorts” ofthose ‘stupid boys’ whom Charleton relegates to the kitchen; the flag,
presumably swastika-emblazoned, lefi behind by a previous German guest. There is also the
presence at Joumey’s End of Herr Meyer, “the most senior of ail the German [i.e. Nazi]
military advisers” (591). As with the tourist picturesqueness glimpsed through the porthole
in Wenzhou, Isherwood presents the Joumey’s End as something that must be turned away
from. One easily sees it would be morally fatal to remain in such a womanless, hedonistic,
and aesthetically and racially ordered paradise. It is not so easy to know how to read the
fascist inflection Isherwood gives to Charleton’s homosexual idyli.
The giimpses ofnazism and fascism in the course ofthe homosexual daydream of
the Joumey’s End suggest some vague controversial vistas. For homosexuality and fascism
have been associated since the eariy days ofthe Nazi and fascist movements. During the
1930s in Germany, including during the period that Isherwood was living in Berlin, the link
was frequent in the popular and partisan press as well as in scholarly and literary contexts.
In 1932, Die WeltAm Abend, the communist daiiy from which Isherwood later lified the
titie for his World In The Evening, “flatly maintained that the Nazi party was founded on
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homosexuality and hypocrisy” (Oosterhuis in Hekma et al 232), while tHitier Youth “was
disparagingly referred to as Homo Youth tbroughout the Third Reich” (Steakley 13$).
According to Oosterhuis, German Social Democrats and Communists considered that
homosexuality was “an essential character of the fascist system” (Male Bonding 251).
Influential social theorists also believed in the association ofhomosexuality and fascism. In
Massenpsychologie des Faschismus (1933), Reich “regarded homosexuality as an outcorne
as weIl as the breeding ground offascisrn” (in Hekma et al 239). In Studien tiber Autoritt
und Familie (1936), fromm (whose later reconciliation of Marx with Biblical messianism
has, as we have seen, deep affinities with Auden’s sonnets in “In Time of War”) “used the
homosexual to interpret mass support for fascism” (in Hekma et al 300). This “nexus ofthe
homosexual and the fascist” persists in the work of Adomo and Horkheirner. Kiaus Maim.
a friend oflsherwood’s from 1931 on5, recognized and, like Isherwood, objected to the fact
that in anti-fascist and socialist circles “Man ist nicht mehr weit davon, die Homosexua1itit
und den Faschismus miteinander zu identifizieren” (236). Isherwood’s objections to the
antifascist identification offascism and homosexuality as well as bis objections to the then
current left-wing condemnation of homosexuality make the coincidence of homosexual and
4
Manfred Herzer defends Die Welt Am Abend from the charge that the paper equated homosexuality
with Nazism, and argues rather that the paper objected to the hypocrisy of Nazi hornosexuals and of
flic Nazi Party in so far as the former were hornosexuals and the latter tolerated homosexuals within
its ranks and yet both promoted strongly anti-homosexual policies (Hekma et al 214-2 15).
5
Kiaus Mann would have become Isherwood’s brother-in-law in 1935 had Isherwood accepted Erika
Mann’s request for a marnage ofpolitical convenience. lsherwood demurred, but directed Mann to
Auden who accepted imrnediately. Erika Mann had been previously married to the actor Gustaf
Grtindgens. GrUndgens “had started out as a left-wing sympathiser, but was converted to the
doctrine of National Socialism and vas later made Director of the Berlin State Theatre” (Fryer
107). The homosexual Grtindgens was the model for the protagonist ofKlaus Mann’s Mephisto
(1936), but Mann transformed his erstwhile brother-in-Iaw Grundgens “into a heterosexual
masochist” (Oosterhuis in Hekma 248), just as Isherwood had done when he turned the homosexual
Gerald Hamilton into the protagonist ofMr. Norris (1935).
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fascist motifs in the Joumey’ s End altogether curious.
A similar conflation of the homosexual and the fascistic militarist occurs in
Auden’s “For The Tirne Being” in the case of George, who enlists in the armyjust in time
to massacre the innocents (Collected 395) and who is “the only gay man explicitly
represented” in the poem (Cesario 101). The introduction of the reprehensible, child-killing
queer misogynist into the Gospel story is a “shocking intrusion” which, for Cesario, is flot a
sign of seif-loathing homophobia on Auden’s part, but which rather makes a point about the
proper nature ofthe queer’s uncertain allegiances to political states. In Joumey’s
“Commentary” as well there is a tendentiousness to the associations ofhomosexuality and
heterosexuality with the terms of that poem’ s central ethical opposition between democratic
humanisrn and fascistic tyranny. The good humanistic side ofthat opposition is not only
free of any hint ofhomosexuality, but also implicitly heterosexual (in the bathetic image of
the production of knowledge—”Some took Necessity, and knew her, and she brought forth
Freedom”—and in the ungendered allusion to Blake’s heterosexual answer to the question
ofwhat men and wornen want: “For what is happiness 11f not to witness joy upon the
features ofanother?” (686)). In contrast, the bad fascistic side ofthe tyrants includes the
political homosexuals Plato, Frederick the Great, and Chaka “the psychotic founder ofthe
Zulu Empire” (Fuller 243) who “segregated the two sexes” (685). This curious alignrnent
of proto-fascistic male violence and homosexual figures in “Commentary” recurs in the
“Ganymede” sonnet of”In Time ofWar,” and recails Charleton’s fascistic homosexuality at
the Joumey’s End. Such glimpses in Audcn’s work ofa homosexually-inflected fascism
seem significant, but are perpiexing. They clearly require careful interpretation if we are to
corne to terms with Auden’s understanding of sexuality and fascism.
The fascist overtones ofthe Joumey’s End episode also cali for careftil consideration
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of what Isherwood intends. Isherwood seems to be allowing for a specifically homosexual
fascination with fascism, but he can hardly be suggesting, as fromm and Reich or as
homophobic ideologues stiil do (y. Igra and Lively), that homosexuality is essentially
fascist, and fascism, essentially homosexual. Much later Isherwood would reflect on the
controversial association of homosexuality and fascism in his own work:
I don’t like that [unfavorable mention in The Berlin Stories ofthe German
Youth Councils] and I don’t know why I put it in. It strikes an insincere,
rather puritanical note. I may have written like that because I feit that these
people were in a fair way to becoming fascists. But that in itself has an unfair
implication and a very dangerous one. I should have discussed the whole
question fully or lefi it alone. Does homosexuality predispose you to join
group movements ofyoung men and hence, in certain historical
circumstances, to become part of a totalitarian group? Maybe so. But that
isn’t the whole story. An awful lot ofhomosexuals who were conned into
doing this in Gerrnany later discovered to their cost how totalitarian regimes
deal with homosexuals. (Conversations 102)
No more than in Stories, has Ishcrwood in Joumey “discussed the whole question” of
homosexuality and fascism, and the Joumey’s End episode like episodes in Mr. Norris and
Goodbye could be taken to involve “an unfair implication and a very dangerous one”
regarding a link between homosexuality and fascism.
It is one thing, though, for Goodbye to imply carelessly that homosexual individuals
may be prone to join fascistic youth movements; it is quite another thing to do so in
Journey. The former book is set in Germany from 1930 to 1933 before the Nazis came to
power. In that period, as Isherwood’s acquaintance the Jewish homosexual activist Magnus
Hirschfeld lamented in 1934, there were many hornosexuals “who could not praise Hitler
enough for his tolerance of [the homosexual leader ofthe SA] Rihm and his cronies and
who therefore switched to his camp in droves (cited in Hekma et al 207). Joumey,
however. is set in 193 $—afier the murderous purges ofRôhrn, other Nazi homosexuals. and
the SA, and afier the Soviet recriminalization of homosexuality, both of which occurred in
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1934; after Mann’s plea for an end to Ïeflist homophobia; after Isherwood witnessed the
Nazi buming ofthe books and papers ofHirschfeid’s histitute for Sexual Research; afier the
Himrnier-led Nazi campaign against German homosexuals; afier Isherwood has had his own
Nazi-conned homosexuai Baron Von Pregnitz commit suicide as a resuit of being
blackmailed and ofbetraying the Nazi government in whose service he was; and afier
several young British homosexuais like Auden had done so much to distinguish themseives
on the anti-fascist left. Yet, despite ail that, the Journey’s End episode is ambiguous on the
question of the link between homosexuaiity and fascism.
Was Isherwood in 193$ less certain than he later became that there was no such
Hnk? He weaves a fascist aesthetic and ethic into Charleton’s homosexual idyli. Was lie
simply satirizing the coincidence “in certain historicai circumstances” of homosexual
homoeroticism and fascist trappings? Isherwood presents in Charleton a campy version of
the “nexus ofthe homosexual and the fascist” as a troubling aspect of 1930s ideology and
politics, but his touch is so light and ambiguous that it remains very difficuit to decide what
Isherwood’s point is. The Joumey’s End episode is about more than the amusing
singularity of Charieton’s character. The likeiy moral point is that any potential
homosexual and homosocial fascinations that fascism might have must be recognized so
that they may be deliberateiy rejected. For the Joumey’s End episode is uitimately flot a
moment ofbeing oneself or at home, but one ofrejection and renunciation.
The Journey’s End episode, even more than the scene in Wenchow, is about tuming
away from temptation. If in Wenchow Isherwood tums away from an irresponsible kitschy
traveler’s dream, at the Joumey’s End lie is turning away from more elaborate and for him
more morally and spiritually destructive temptations. Plomer and Waugli see the Joumey’s
End as a place where Isherwood could feel at home and be himself, but they miss the point
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ofthe passage. from beginning to end the episode is about turning away from a
comfortable but false home, about turning away from that part ofhimselftempted by the
“delights” of fasci stic, youth-corrupting homosexuality and Charleton’ s self-indulgent
aesthetically pleasing, heartless queer-topia. Recognition ofthese sorts oftemptation and of
the need to resist them recurs in Isherwood’s work from Mr. Norris to A Single Man, but it
is in Journey that Isherwood offers his most enigmatic representation ofthis resistance.
Stiil, more is going on in the episode than the rejections ofthe delights ofjuvenile
prostitution and offascistic eroticism. The passage is full ofethical ambivalence and
muffled dissonances that derive from ideological elements beyond those of homosexuality
and fascism. Along with the homo-fascist nexus, the episode presents a similarly sinister,
amusing, and inconclusive satire ofcontemporary international politics. In an allegoiy for
Anglo-German relations, the Brit Charleton and the “Fritz” Meyer engage in a noisy mock
taunting of one another in their muti.tally incomprehensible native languages. Against their
disputatiousness Isherwood sets the silence (no doubt inscrutable, as befits the silence of
one of Confucius’s descendants) ofMr. Kung, “brother ofthe great banker” Dr. H.H.
Kung.6 The trio of Charleton, Meyer, and Kung constitute a farcical East Asian political
Though H.H. Kung had a sister, I have found no evidence, afler considerable searching, that he
actually had a brother, nor that the Journey’s End and Charleton actually existed. There is no
mention ofthe Joumey’s End in the original Auden-Isherwood diary or in the typescript “From
Hankow to Shanghai, Through the Back Door” that Ishenvood prepared from that document. The
typescript describes the journey from Hankow to Nanchang thus: “At the end ofApril, when we
left Hankow, it was stili possible to travel down the Yangtsze by river-steamer, as far as Kiukiang.
From Kiukiang, we took the train to Nanchang” (Ts tulsa 7:2 p.l). Kuling and the Journey’s End
lay just outside Kiukiang. h is odd that Auden and Isherwood do flot record the interlude at the
Journey’s End in either document. Could it be that the sojourn at the Journey’s End is lsherwood’s
invention? Or is it that a record ofsuch an episode did not appear suitable for the book that two
politically engaged authors were expected to write? Whether the episode is a fabricated tail tale or
is based on an actuat briefholiday, the attention Ishenvood devotes to this interitide indicates that it
lias a special significance within Joumey. The Journey’s End episode is also as close as lsherwood
gets to recordïng in Journey the various instances of ccsex tourism” that occur during Auden and
Isherwood’s trip around the world.
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miniature comprising the British colonialist and the Nazi emissary, with the enigmatic
Chinese establishment sbrewdly evaluating them both. The charming picture ofthe charade
of Meyer, Charleton, and Kung is incomplete, however, until the moment Isherwood
reminds us that both their geopolitical farce and the peaceftil idyli ofthe Journey’s End are
threatened by the spectre of international communism.
“If I make the sign ofthe Hammer and Sickie,’” remarks Isherwood, ‘“everything
will disappear” (590). To which Auden responds: “It’s the Third Temptation ofthe
Demon.” The entanglement ofpolitical realities, paradisal themes, sexual innuendo, and
Biblical allusion in the Joumey’s End episode compares to the way such themes merge into
one another in Auden’s XXVII. Just as in XXVII, these elements combine to render the
passage ambiguous and dense. Isherwood’s insistence on Christian themes throughout the
Joumey’s End episode is a surprising deviation in the context of his entire oeuvre, but the
sexual, false paradisal, and political aspects ofthe passage are quite in character.
Isherwood’s proposition about the magical powers ofthe Hammer and Sickie is
difficult to interpret. It could involve an oblique criticism of left-wing and Communist
wishful thinking as compared to Journey’s evocations ofthe global realpolitik ofNazism,
imperialism, and colonialism. Its conditional “if’ raises the question of why Isherwood is
not invoking the Hammer and Sickie more adamantly in Journey. On this point, Fleming
anticipates the observations of disappointed lefi-wing critics when lie confesses “to a relief
that we weren’t hundred per cent ideologists: ‘I’d expected you two to be much more
passionate” (214). Or, perhaps remembering the homophobic threat that appeared in
Pravda in 1934, ‘exterminate ah homosexuals—and fascism will disappear!’ (Manu 237),
Isherwood is warning readers ofthe ‘magical’ power ofthe Hammer and Sickie to do away
with bourgeois epiphenomena like the Journey’s End, Charleton, and liomosexuality. If
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Isherwood’s conditionai invocation ofthe Hammer and Sickie is ambiguous, so is Auden’s
allusive response. What is it that is supposed to 5e “the Third Temptation ofthe Demon”?
Is it the whoie homosexual I fascist / colonial idyli at the Joumey’s End itseif? Or,
aitemativeiy, is The Third Temptation the temptation to invoke the power ofthe Hammer
and $ickie to do away with those inconvenient realities?
There are actuaiiy two third temptations in the Gospels, one in Luke and one in
Matthew. In Luke, the devil tempts Christ to jump from “the pinnacle ofthe Temple” to
prove He is “the Sonne of God.” In Matthew “the Devil taketh [Christ] up into an
exceeding high mountaine” and “sheweth him ail the kingdomes of the world, and the giory
ofthem: And saith unto him, Ail these things wiii I give thee, if thou wiit fail downe and
worship me. Then saith Jesus unto him, Get thee hence, Satan: for it is written Thou shait
worship the Lord thy God, and him onely shait thou serve” (IV 8-10). Given the
mountainous setting ofthe Joumey’s End, and the symbolic importance ofmountains in
Journey, Isherwood and Auden are probabiy referring to Matthew.
The third temptation in Matthew is the temptation to succumb to devii worship for
the sake ofthe glories ofthe world. The secular kingdoms whose power and glories
impinge on the Joumey’s End are those ofthe Hammer and Sickie, British imperiaiism and
colonialism, fascism / Nazism, Chinese authoritarianism, and capitaiism. Isherwood and
Auden seem abie enough to recognize and resist the temptations ofthose kingdoms; so
rather than promising the glories ofthe world’s kingdoms, two pages later the Demon tries
a subtier tack when “Next moming the Demon began to excercise his power.” Isherwood
begins to see their iives as devoted to nothing more than another form oftemptation
anyway:
Were we, perhaps, going to stay on here for ever? The ram was so
soothing. . . .Afier ail, why go to Nanchang? Why go anywhere? Why bother
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about the Fourth Army? It could take care of itself. What was this joumey?
An illusion. What were America, England, London, the spring publishing
season, our families, our ftiends, ambition, money, love? Only modes of the
First Temptation of the Demon—and why should one temptation be better
than another? (591)
But Isherwood is misreading the first temptation in an odd way. In the Gospels the first
temptation occurs when $atan says to the hungry Jesus, “If thou be the sonne ofGod,
command that these stones bee made bread,” and Jesus answers that “it is written, Man
shall flot live by bread alone, but by eveiy word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God”
(Matthew IV 3-4). For Isherwood the temptations to take a reporter’s interest in the New
Fourth Army, to pursue his literary career to flattering success in England and the U.S., to
continue this publisher-commissioned Chinesejoumey are ail modes ofthe first temptation
to tum stones into bread and to live by bread alone rather than by the words of God’ s
mouth. While the private unpartisan Isherwood is relatively safe from Matthew’s version of
the third temptation as the temptation of the glory of the kingdoms of the world, once he
finds it is “no longer difficult to tear ourselves away from Joumey’s End” (592), he readily
resumes the literary career he has presented as a worldly mode ofthe first temptation.
Isherwood, however, is confused about the nature ofthe first temptation. There are
two sorts of confusion here. One is the confusion ofthe first temptation with Matthew’s
third temptation; the other is the confusion over the nature ofthe first temptation. Perhaps
this dual confusion is only at the level of Isherwood the traveller who, as Isherwood the
narrator teils us, is falling into the Demon’s power. Whether it is Isherwood the author
carelessly misreading the Gospels, or Isherwood the traveller in a demon-befuddled state
seeing the first temptation as another temptation to worldly glory and power, more or less
indistinguishable from Matthew’s version ofthe third temptation, is too subtle a
metafictional point to be decided here. The crucial points are that flot ail temptations are
212
the same and that Christ’s rejection ofthe first temptation to tum stones into bread is flot a
rejection of worldly success. In Isherwood’s terms, the rejection ofthe first temptation is
not simply a rejection ofthe worldly literary ambitions and desire for fame that have
motivated this journey and his own career. Christ’s rejection is flot principally a rejection of
the world or even its bread. Rather, in resisting the first temptation, Jesus rejects
worldliness without spirit, and affirms the demands of the spirit and of the dual poles of
bread and the Word.
The tuming away from the first temptation in the Joumey’s End passage is flot
identical to its rejection of sexual and political temptation, but it is noteworthy that this
spiritual turning away and Isherwood’s reconception of bis literary career occurs with those
other moral turns. Certainly this spiritual literary tum is as significant as those other turns,
and in 193$ during the period of the writing of Joumey and in 1939 at the time of its
publication, it introduced into Isherwood’s work a novel and permanent element, the
appearance ofwhich is generally dated somewhat later. In the text’s erroneous presentation
ofthe nature ofthe first temptation, this temptation becomes the temptation to a literary
career deriving entirely from Isherwood’s worldly sophistication and seeking first and
foremost worldly fame. Christ’s resistance ofthe first temptation is an affirmation ofthe
demands of God and the spirit over a vision of human life and activity that sees only the
imperatives ofbread. In Isherwood’s peculiar presentation ofthe first temptation implicitly
counterpoised to the recognition ofhis own need to resist a literary career motivated by a
sophisticated desire for acclaim is an affirmation of a literary career that must recognize the
demands ofthe spirit.
Isherwood remembers his antipathy in 193$ to “the smugness of Wystan’s Christian
dogmatism,” but also remembers that when “Christopher raged against religion, Wystan
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wouid laugh and say, ‘Careful, careful, my dear—if you keep going like that, you’ll have
such a conversion one ofthese days!” (Kind 306). And indeed Isherwood wouid take just
such a radical Paulinian religious turn afier his emigration to the United States.
Isherwood’s tums to pacifist wartime activism with the Quakers; to the spiritual discipline,
texts, and doctrines ofVedantism; to his Vedanta-informed later fiction with its attention to
his characters’ spiritual states and relation to God; and to the (for Isherwood) unachievable
ideal of a rnonkish renunciation of sexual desire—are ail anticipated in the spiritual tums of
the Journey’s End episode. for Auden too, Journey anticipates the religious tum his work
was to take in the United States. Auden’ s “In lime of War,” however, is a prelude flot to an
indefinite reiigious tum, but is a proto-Christian anticipation of his retum to Christianity. In
contrast, Isherwood in 193$ has not encountered the Hinduism that wouid teach him a
spiritual vocabuiary and discipline more congenial to him than the Christianity he found
antipathetic because of its condemnation of homosexuality. In Journey, without that
exofically toierant Hindu alternative, Isherwood stiil has only the example and texts of
Christianity. These he adopts, freeiy or confusediy, but for entireiy negative, ironic, criticai
ends. Isherwood tums to the Gospels in his rendering ofthe holiday at Journey’s End not
yet to announce his own religious conversion. Rather Isherwoood uses the Gospels to
signal the need to tum from corrupt heartless sexual hedonism and the erotico-aesthetïc
temptation ofFascism. Signaling his renunciation ofthose temptations, Isherwood also
signais his intuition ofthe spiritual ends ofhis vocation as a writer. Like the “Travel
Diary” as a whole, the Journey’s End episode deserves to be recognized as a crucial
moment in Isherwood’s lifelong record ofhis personai and literary development, a pivotai
moment announcing the shifi from the perspectives of his early work to those he wouid
reveal in the American phases of his work.
CHAPTER 6
A GOOD PLACE TO START
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THREE APPROACHES TO THE END 0F “TRAVEL-DIARY”
In the actual ending ofthe “Travel-Diary,” Isherwood is guided through the final
pages describing bombed-out industriai Shanghai by Rewi Alley. The strange construction
ofthis conclusion makes it Joumey’s most intriguing passage. It is an ending whose sense
is anything but seif-evident. Yet, like the Wenchow and the Joumey’s End passages, this
conclusion is a defining moment in Isherwood’s work. Rareiy in his early work does
Isherwood reveal so boldly who he is, or present such a prescient political and historical
vision. As with XXVII in Auden’s work, the conclusion ofthe “Travel-Diary” records a
pivotai moment in Isherwood’s ideological development that also reflects the ideological
history ofthe twentieth-century. The conclusion presents a stark instance ofliberalism’s
seeming helplessness before catastrophic injustice, while sirnultaneously evoking the
spectre ofthe liberal individual’s resistance to tyranny. As at the Journey’s End,
understanding the entanglement ofhomosexuality and 1930s politics is essential to
comprehending the passage with Alley. Here, though, rather than a case of Isherwood
turning away from troubling aspects of 1 930s politicized homoeroticism, we see his
political insight proceeding from the queemess ofhis perspective. for along with the
questions conceming liberalism that Isherwood raises, the conclusion with Alley presents a
moment of resistance to the effacement of the homosexual individual, as well as an
intimation of one of the great tyrannies of modem history.
The closing section of “Travel Diaiy” is complex in its ethical implications, in its
relations to an extensive network of historical detail, in its uncertain ironies, and in its
technical literary construction. Three ideas articulated in our discussions ofthe poetics of
Joumey help us approach the complexity ofthe “Travel-Diary”s conclusion. First, this
ending is another tum, another ending and new beginning, with important ideological
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consequences. As with Auden’s XXVII, as with Isherwood’s two previous mock endings at
the Joumey’s End and on shipboard in Wenchow, the ending ofthe “Travel-Diary” is a
throughly negative moment. As in those earlier endings, we see Isherwood turning away in
his conclusion from a simpler, false political vision ofthe world and from an inadequate
version ofhimselfto something more difficuit, ambivalent, and uncertain.
Second, it is essential to read the ending ofthe “Travel-Diary” as a moment in the
overail narrative structure ofJoumey. When Fusseil finds fault with Journey because the
book “simply cornes to a stop, for no particular reason, with the two travellers in Shanghai”
(220), he sees the end point ofthe story oftheirjoumey, but misses the structure extending
beyond Isherwood’s geographical breaking off point through Auden’s long subsequent
ideological labour to make sense of it ail. For fusse!!, Journey faiis because its mythic
structure is incomplete and Iacks the moment ofthe retum ofthe hero ofthe Quest
Romance. However, the final passage ofthe “Travel-Diary” with A!ley actually does fit
into a quasi-mythic narrative structure that coherently organizes the whole ofJoumey. The
ending of the “Travel-Diary” represents the low point in a myth of descent and ascent. For
this ending is a nadir of faceless despair and confused hopelessness in the story of Auden
and Isherwood’s joumey, and afier this low point, the succeeding sections of Journey
present a mythic ascent to a renewed, if diffuse, hopefulness. The “Travel-Diary”s ending
is thus a turning point in this larger spiritual narrative. Imrnediately afier the faceless
statistics which dorninate Alley’s section come the human faces ofthe photo essay. Then
cornes the sonnet sequence’s grand narrative ofthe difficult, discontinuous, but potentially
forward moving development of the seif-liberating human subj ect out of the immemorial
past into the ethically uncertain present. finally, will corne “Cornmentary” with its tyranny
defying, life-affirrning voices and its closing “voice of Man” praying for strength “for the
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forces ofthe will” to build “at last a human justice” (688). Though he may miss this
overarching mythic structure, Fussell’s characterization ofthe Travel Book as a “displaced”
Romance which has been “brought down to earth” enables us to see Isherwood’s “Travel
Diary” as a thorough-going dispiacement ofthe Romance myth into the actuality of China
in the Sino-Japanese War, into 1930s history and politics, and finally in its ending into the
ethical-numerical alienation of socio-industrial policy.
A third perspective from which we can comprehend the technical dimensions ofthe
end ofthe “Travel-Diary” proceeds from the idea ofthe mise en abyme DÈillenbach’s
discussion of mise en abyme helps clarify Isherwood’s remarkable dependence on Rewi
Alley to articulate his conclusion. Particularly useful is Dillenbach’s analysis ofthe
poetics ofwhat he cails the mise en abyme ofthe enunciation. An enunciative mise en
abyme makes present the producer or receiver of a narrative and reveals the actual process
of textual production or reception (75). Dll1enbach argues that such “mises en abyme of the
work involved in producing the text are found in narratives concerned with continually
reflecting the adventure oftheir own generation” (77). We see such a concern to show the
process ofproducing the text throughout Isherwood’s work. In Joumey, this concem is
evident in the attention Isherwood draws to the difference between the original diary and the
retrospective composition. It is also evident in the frequency with which he includes
vignettes of others who are also engaged in articulating visions of China: Agnes Smedley,
Peter Fleming, various foreign and Chinese joumalists, Chinese propagandists, Auden and
Chinese poets, and, at the end of “Travel-Diary”, Rewi Alley. Di1lenbach describes how in
realistic, naturalistic texts that nonetheless artfully display the processes ofthe producer’s
production and the receiver’s reception ofthe text, an author can recruit a qualified
authorial substitute “from among those who specialize in, or make their living from, the
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truth” such as the priest, the writer, or the fool (53), around whom to construct a reflexive
mise en abyme of the enunciation. The efforts of such figures to interpret China and
Isherwood’s reception oftheir interpretations are analogous to Isherwood’s efforts to
interpret China for his readers and his readers’ reception ofhis text.
Bryant discusses the importance ofthe analogous, but farcically contrasting,
identities of fleming as accomplished foreign correspondent and Isherwood and Auden as
amateurs writing about China. Alley, however, is also a producer of meaning about China,
and Isherwood’s remarkable dependence on Alley makes the enunciative mise en abyme at
the end of “Travel-Diary” especially significant. As political activist, AlIey is the
supremely qualified truth-speaking figure in engaged 1930s writing, and it is in his role of
truth-speaking authorial substitute that Alley, and flot Isherwood himself, solves the
difficulties which both the historical and the textual Isherwoods have been having in
coming to terms with what Isherwood’s China material ultimately means. for an authorial
substitute like Alley does not just make possible the presentation of the roles of producer
and receiver and ofthe processes of production and reception. He also makes possible a
presentation ofthis purportedly engaged, realistic, if also seif-reflective, text’s meaning
when he suggests he knows the answer to Lenin’s and the Waste Land’s overwhelming
question of what is to be done.
Isherwood’s text, however, complicates this scenario because, although Isherwood
incorporates Alley’s truth directly into his text and in fact plagiarizes Alley’s own writing to
a stunning degree, he does flot allow us simply to accept Alley’s truth as the tnith of
Isherwood’s text. Isherwood is notjust relaying Alley’s message to us. Rather, as much as
Isherwood allows Alley as a figure to speak his truths in Isherwood’s conclusion, Isherwood
is also compelled to show his ambivalence toward this truth. Dillenbach notes that the
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effect ofthe enunciative mise en abyme “varies according to the degree of analogy between
the (activity of the) author and the (activity of the) substitute” (78). In the case of f leming,
the effect of the mise en abyme is a fiinction of the contrast between Isherwood and
Fleming’s similarities (public-school Britishness, modest fame, their reporting on China)
and their differences (professionalism, degree of competence, masculinity, sexual
orientation). In the case of Alley, a comparable, but less conspicuous play of similarity and
difference complicates the effect ofthe meaning-making analogy between Alley and
Isherwood. It will become apparent as we look at Alley and Isherwood that, more than an
authorial substitute, Alley is an intimate kind of double to Isherwood.
To sum up, then, we have tbree ideas with which to approach the ending of the
“Travel-Diary:” the ending as an enunciative mise en abyme with Alley as authorial
substitute; the ending as a low point in Journey’s comic narrative structure; the ending as
another ethical turn comparable to those at Wenchow and the Journey’s End—with these
three governing ideas in mmd, we can begin to consider the literary, historical, and
ideological complexity of the way Isherwood brings his section ofJourney to a conclusion.
SAILING THROUGH SHANGHAI
from Wenchow Isherwood’s travelogue proceeds to $hanghai. This move at the
end of the “Travel-Diary” corresponds to the joumey from Hong Kong to Canton with
which the diary opens. Wenchow and Canton, remember, are in free China; Hong Kong
and Shanghai are under foreign control. In $hanghai, just as in Auden’s “Macao” and
“Hong Kong,” we are flot properly in China at ail. We are in the twilight zones of
colonialism, the international concessions, extraterritoriality, and Chinese alienation. This is
why the journey to China and the journey from China both occur in two stages: going there,
first from London to colonial Hong Kong, then from intermediate Hong Kong to Chinese
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Canton; and returning, from Chinese Wenchow to intermediate colonial Shanghai. The
narrative symmetry is emphasized through the common mode of transportation—the sea
and river voyages from Europe to Hong Kong to Canton and from Wenchow to Shanghai.
Fusseil objects that the ending oflsherwood’s diaiy lacks the completion ofa retum
from Shanghai to England. Neither Isherwood’s “Trave Diary” nor Journey as a whole
offers such a geographical return, perhaps because there is no need to, since semi-colonial
Shanghai is already more than halfway to England and the West. Auden’s hometown even
makes an appearance of sorts in Shanghai as at a critical moment in a discussion with
distinguished Japanese personages “through the dining-room window which over-looked
the river, the gun-turrets offl.M.S. Birrningharn sud into view” (629). Shanghai’s colonial
situation partly explains why in the Iast chapter, Isherwood devotes as much energy to
evoking Western comforts as to exploring the Chinese city—just as Auden’s photo ofthe
“Shanghai Businessman” somewhat unexpectedly depicts a Caucasian, not a Chinese (y.
Bryant 131). The colonial situation of Shanghai also partly explains why Isherwood
devotes less attention to Chinese politics than to Western and Japanese mutual suspicion
and their blatant political and military manoeuvring.
The mythic archetype of homecoming also tends to be rendered obsolete by the
modem feasibility oftaking so much of one’s own world with one, as the Shanghai
businessmen and diplomats have, and by the homogenizing dynamics of urban
cosmopolitanism, even in mukiple-identitied Shanghai. It may 5e true that in 193$ “there
was no $hanghai, just many Shanghais” (Wasserstrom in Esherick 207), but certainly flot
least among the various pre-1949 Shanghais was the International Settiement where the
British Embassy, like the H.M.S. Birrningham, welcomed Isherwood and Auden home. The
mythic satisfactions of a neat English homecoming would also have been ideologically and
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narratoiogically compiicated by Auden and Isherwood’s stop in Japan, their detour through
the imperial immensities ofthe Dominion of Canada and tbrough the alluringly modem
U.S.A. In fact, biographically, geopolitically, and in some respects even culturally
speaking, their arrivai in the U.S.A. and New York City, not their temporary return to
London and Engiand, is the ultimate destination of Joumey.1 In any case, rather than an
English homecoming, “Commentary” finishes with a totalizing view of an intelTelated
global geography.
Modem cosmopolitanism and the dissolution of the mythic pattems ofhomecoming
aside, Auden and Isherwood’s eagemess to get to New York meant that their Chinese
joumey had for ail intents and purposes ended psychologically once they reached Shanghai.
We “have now definiteiy finished with this Chinese war,” Isherwood wrote to bis mother
on May 26, the day afier their arrivai from Wenchow2, “Our plans are to stay just as long as
it takes to find a ship going to U.S.A. and then set off.” Indeed the two traveilers took care
ofthe arrangements required to get to the U.S.A. before they took in Shangliai, since on that
same day, “they went to the U.S. Consulate to apply for a transit visa, because they wanted
to visit New York on their way home” (unused chapter (ts CI 1029b). The ship they found,
Canadian Pacific’s luxury liner the Empress ofAsia, would flot sail until the evening of
June 12, which gave them eighteen days to explore Shanghai.
Oddly, the collaborative journal that they kept while on their trip has only two
‘Before Auden and Isherwood received their commission for a travel book on the Far East, Auden
had been planning atour ofthe U.S. and a travel book on America with Stephen Spender
(Carpenter 223). Auden at least and perhaps Isherwood too would decide to move to the U.S. while
visitingNew York on the way home from China. In August 1938 in the midst of the writing of
Journey, Auden told his brother John that he wished “notjust to retum to America for a visit but to
stay there and become a U.S. citizen” (242). By the time Auden and Isherwood finished the book,
Isherwood had agreed to accompany Auden to the U.S.
2The text of Journey in Mendelson’s edition ofAuden’s Prose 1926-193$ erroneously dates the
arrivai in Shanghai from May 15 (625) rather than May 25.
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entries that record their impressions of the city a well-known 1935 guidebook refers to as
“Shanghai the Incomparable” (Wasserstrom in Esherick 192). One would have expected
Isherwood, who cultivated his image as chronicler of urban life in Mr. Norris and Goodbye,
to have been determined to impress upon readers his ability to get to the heart of a second
great foreign metropolis, but this does flot seem to have been the case. Isherwood’s account
ofhis Shanghai experience suffers in comparison to Hyde’s Dragon Rampant, perhaps the
book against which ail Chinese travel books ofthe late-1930s must ultimately be measured.
Isherwood’s account sometimes suggests a lack of curiosity and a general authorial
negiigence. Only the first $hanghai entry is in Isherwood’s hand, and it is dated June 3,
already halfway through their stay; the second in Auden’s hand dated June 13 was written
on shipboard bound for Japan. Auden writes that they were “both a littie iii after a fortnight
in [Shanghai’s] lucrative overcrowded swamp, and very glad that we didn’t go there first [.
• .1 Shanghai must be one ofthe most terrible cities on the earth.”
The paucity of diary material, however, cannot be simpiy a resuit of the distaste they
feit for the city, though it is partiy no doubt a consequence ofthe painfril intestinal iÏlness
Isherwood describes in his draft of Kind (y. Chapter 3 above). A second reason for the
dearth ofjoumal material, and it is a reason which along with the security situation also
helps explain the iack of direct description of Chinese Shanghai, may be that their only
regular contact with Chinese people occurred during the homosexual encounters with young
“attendants” (Kind 30$) in bathhouses refened to in the last chapter. The fact that so much
oftheir potential Shanghai material had to do with “a rather long diet ofAsians
--- those
too-perfectly goldskinned somewhat remote aimost Mrtian [sic] creatures” (Kind ts 17$
1030i) made it unsuitable for publication in 1938, though not in 1976 when the somewhat
franker Kind appeared. Through the summer and fall of 193$, however, references to
“V-’-,
Shanghai in Isherwood’s private diary do indeed recali its steam baths: “Holding my
cigarette, and giving it to me occasionally to puff, he [a current English lover] reminded me
ofthe Chinese boys in the Shanghai bathhouse” (entry for August 21).
The unpublishable nature of this Shanghai material combined with the fact that
Auden and Isherwood’s joint travel journal contains such an incomplete record oftheir time
in Shanghai would have lefi Isherwood littie to work with as he tried to bring his prose
account of theirjourney to a close. Isherwood, however, had other difficulties when he was
working on the book back in England. For one thing, he was bored: “Transcribing the
travel diary kept by Wystan and himselfwas boring toil, but it had to be done before he
could edit and rewrite the diary as a coherent narrative” (Kind 320). He seems to have
become bored with the whole topic of China. A diary entry as early as July 30, 1938
observes that “China is, once more, 8,000 miles away: it is a lesson I have learnt, and can
repeat, without remembering how or why. ‘Who do you think will win, Mr. Isherwood?’
‘Well...that ah depends.. .You see, militarily speaking, the Japs can occupy any place they
please. On the other hand, China....’ etc, etc, etc.” What is more, in the context ofthe
growing European crisis, the undeclared Sino-Japanese war was begiiming to seem
irrelevant. Isherwood seems no longer to have believed in the projected book: “What’s the
use of ail this? Who’ll want to read about your faraway out-of-date war when the bombs
start falhing on London?” (Kind 320). Given the scale and dire consequences ofJapan’s
military campaign from June through October 1938 to capture Wuhan, this Eurocentric
indifference to the war in China, though understandable, is a major failure on Isherwood’s
part.3 Isherwood’s lack of interest in the battie of Wuhan is particuiarly surprising since in
3After the Chinese government retreated to Wuhan when the Japanese took Nanking in December
1937, the Japanese waited for about halfa year before ttying to capture Wuhan. Then, “For nearly 5
months, the Battie ofWuhan raged. Several hundred major and minor combat operations were
conducted, over 200,000 enemy [Japanese] troops were killed or wounded, over 100 enemy ships
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Joumey he describes Wuhan suggestively as being a city “at the very end ofthe world,” and
as the city where History “has fixed her capricious interest,” the apocalyptic world
historical city where Auden and he had agreed they would rather be “than anywhere else on
earth” (5 12-3).
In his diary from late- 193$ the Munich crisis is such an ail absorbing distraction that
Isherwood’s remarks on his China projects invariably read as meagre afierthoughts: “OId
Chamberlain is with Hitler at Godesburg today, to be told where he gets off. The one brigbt
spot, as far as I’m concemed, is that on the 1 9th, I started the China book. God knows how
I’m to finish it by December 1—even without interruptions” (Entry for Sept. 22, 53).
“Today I got fitted for a gas mask. You can hardly breathe through them at ail. Managed a
littie work on the Chinese book” (Sept. 27, 55).
Isherwood’s anxiety about the situation in Europe, his dotïbts about the book he and
Auden were trying to finish, and his boredom with their material and with China were flot
his only difficulties. His diary ail through the late summer and fall of 193$ is full of
ruminations on his appearance, bis health and habits, bis relationships with friends, and bis
love life. In contrast, his work on Joumey seems to have concemed him only fitfuliy,
whenever he periodically took stock of himself and his progress. Thus, the entcy for August
27, 193$, “At ieast I’ll go to my grave with my bowels in working order. I am in perfect
health, today; and fully loaded with sex, like a gun. finished first China article for
and craft were sunk or drowned and over 100 enemy planes were destroyed” (Hsu 245). For the
out-gunned Chinese defenders, though, the losses were incalculable: “In less than a year United
Front forces lost up to a million men, wounded or dead—more than their combined losses over the
next seven years of war. At the level of leadership the losses were even more devastating. Eighty
per cent ofChiang Kaishek’s office corps [.. .1 were lost” (MacKinnon “Tragedy” 933). lsherwood
only rnonths earlier had witnessed a remarkabte spirit ofpolitical cooperation in 193$ Wuhan.
Though he must have had an inkling ofthe stakes involved for China and the world, the Battie of
Wuhan, one of the most consequential batties of the battle-scarred twentieth-century, scarcely
seems to have registered for an Ishcrwood preoccupied with Europe and himself.
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“Cosmopolitan”; or the entry for September 8, “No work on China articles ail day-
masturbation, over-smoking, newspaper-gazing, futile idiing. But T read Inez’ novel.”
Isherwood’s distracted state ofmind in late 193$ is ofinterest because ofthe dual
contexts for the composition of “Travel-Diary” and Joumey. One context is the first haif of
1938 when Auden and Isherwood were keeping their original diary as they were travelling
through China. The other context is the second half of 193$ when they were back in
England and Europe working their material up into Journcy. As has been noted, Isherwood
underscores the importance ofthis temporal spiit by structuring his “Travel-Diary” so that
haif of it is set immediately in the context of early 1938 and haif of it looks back at that
earlier context from late 193$. The difficulty Isherwood was having concentrating on his
China book in late-193$, along with the rneagreness ofthe Shanghai material Auden and he
had recorded while in China, accounts no doubt to sorne degree for the unusual procedures
he adopts in order to, at last, bring his “Travel-Diary” to its close.
REWI ALLEY, AND THE PAST AND FUTURE 0F CHTNE$E COMMUNISM
It is the oddness ofthe very end of “Travel-Diary” which prompts Fussell to
complain that Auden and Isherwood’s joumey just cornes to a baffled stop. There
Isherwood—afier having followed for several pages Shanghai Municipal Council factory
inspector Rewi Alley as Aliey surveys the manifold terrible problems evident in $hanghai,
and afier having described how humanity seems so “grossly” divided into the conquering
haves and the conquered have-nots, and having admitted (un)comfortably to which ofthese
halves he belongs—finally tums his attention to himself. Isherwood is “the well-meaning
tourist, the liberal and humanitarian intellectual, [who] can only wring his hands over ail
this and exclairn: ‘0h dear, things are so awful here—so complicated. One doesn’t know
where to start.” This wishy-washiness is immediately followed by Alley’s response, which
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concludes the “Travel-Diary:” “I know where J shouid start,’ says Mr. Alley, with a
ferocious snort. ‘They were starting quite nicely in 1927” (634). The anticiimax and the
sharply contrasting tones here, Isherwood’s futile hand wringing and the incongruous
lightness ofthat “Oh dear,” make these final sentences Joumey’s most provocativeiy
puzzling moment. Fusseil calis it “ail just a bit Camp” (209). The Communist Ronaid
Swingler in his “Daily Worker” review finds it annoying (Haffenden 291). The contrast
between the horrifying situations Isherwood and Alley have been describing and the
spectacle oflsherwood’s “liberal and humanitarian inteilectual” heiplcssness and inability
to respond appropriateiy is indeed maddening. The sense of being lefi hanging between a
requisite cail for action in the face of injustice and a fussy preoccupation with what
Swingler cails Isherwood’ s “psychologicai plight” (Haffenden 291) has exasperated readers
as different as Swingler4 and fusseil from the beginning.
Surely, though, Isherwood knows how weak, anticlimactic, even offensive, his
diary’s ending will seem. His reader’s exasperation is no doubt exactiy what Isherwood
wants to provoke. The exasperation derives from the facile expectation that Isherwood will
have a more morally bracing and effective response to the situation we have been presented
with in Shanghai. Isherwood’s inappropriate ending is more ethically complex than critics
have perceived. Isherwood’s incapacity involves an implicit challenge: ‘shouldn’t you, dear
reader, mon semblable, mon frère, proceed from your dissatisfaction with my hand wringing
4The poet Swingler, a member ofthe British Communist Party from 1934 to 1952, was in 193$
editor of the Daily Worker’s book pages and an editor ofthe Left Review. His position is a useful
point of reference when we evaluate where Auden and Isherwood stood in 193$-39, not only
because his response to Joumey ïs so negative, but because Swingler and Auden were closely
associated on the left-wing Iiterary scene. Britten selected texts by Swingler and Auden to
commemorate Spanish Civil War International Brigades volunteers in his Ballad of Heroes. When
Ballad of Heroes was first performed on April 5, 1939, just weeks afier Journey came out, Swingler
vas a committed communist writer, but Auden, already in New York, was quickly disengaging
himselffrom activist writing and politics, announcing, to the perplexity and pemianent dismay of
many, in his elegy for Yeats, that “poetiy makes nothing happen.”
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to raise the question of where and how exactly you or anyone would start to address the
injustices of Shanghai?’ Isherwood’s “disparaging self-portrait” at the end of”Travel
Diary” is also, as Wilde observes, “an oblique affirmation ofthe need for invoïvement”
(Isherwood $5) on his and everyone’s part. Yet, however urgent the whole disastrous
situation in wartime China may be and however urgent the activist program Alley sketches
may seem, Isherwood is very far from Auden’s injunction in “Birthday Poem” for
Isherwood to “make action urgent and its nature clear;” and from the widespread 1930s
“hopes for literature as a guide to action” (McDonald $1). Isherwood in “Travel-Diary” will
not pretend to know what is to be done. Rather, at the very moment when a cail to action
seems most in order, Isherwood insists on his own confusion and peripheral status.
The concluding affirmation ofthe need for action is so oblique and negative because
under the circumstances it is ail Isherwood can manage. Anything more would be a lie.
Unlike the activist Alley who has immersed himself in Shanghai, Isherwood does not
pretend to be on top of the situation. Even more significantly, from both an ideological and
an ethicai perspective, Isherwood does not avow or even hint at his own unswerving
commitment to China or to some partisan program for China. That this is an important
source of engagé compiaints about Journey is indicated by the sarcastic title—”On Being
Uninvoived, Two Inteliectuals in China”—of Swingler’s Daily Worker review.
Isherwood, though, is being characteristically honest about his own, and almost
everyone eise’s, capacities and willingness to do anything to improve the world. Something
similar is found at the ends of Mr. Nonis and Goodbye. In both endings the Isherwood
narrators take their leaves of Berlin knowing full well that they are leaving behind friends
and acquaintances that they have not helped, or not helped much, and will flot be able to
help survive the looming Nazi disaster. In Mr. Nonis there is a sense ofhorror and guilt
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deriving from the narrator’s implication in the hard fates ofhis friends; in Goodbye, the
guilt and horror have more to do with the nanator’s awareness ofthe gap between their
suffering and his own freedom and indifference, even happiness. This awareness ofthe
incommensurability ofthe suffering in Shanghai and Isherwood’s fteedom is again at issue
in the ending of “Travel-Diary.”
The related issues of commitment and of courage and cowardice are also
foregrounded in this ending. Whenever these intertwined themes corne to the fore,
Isherwood deals principally with the experience of ambivalence, with the difficulties of
knowing what one should do, of distinguishing prudence from cowardice, and of evaluating
the nature of courage itself. Throughout his work from Mr. Norris to Kind, Isherwood
avoids the rhetoric of resounding but facile righteousness in favour of an unheroic telling of
the disconcerting ethical truth about his own cowardice, indifference, and selfislmess.5 At
the end of the “Travel-Diary,” Isherwood does not focus on the outrageousness of the
atrocious situation in Shanghai and the need for a visionary activism, even though such a
rousing conclusion would be rhetorically more effective and winning than the text’s actual
ending with its disconcerting focus on the problems of the lack of understanding and the
sense ofhelpless uselessness.
Though Isherwood shies away from committing himself to explaining how one
5This point regarding people’s moral indifference is a simple one, but one which is basic to
lsherwood’s work. He was stiil stuck on it forty years later: “so often we pretend to care more than
we do, when mostly we don’t really give a shit” (Conversations 181). Though people’s moral
indifference is a reality, it is not the only reality about people’s responses to the suffering ofothers,
and Isherwood is exaggerating the universality of an attitude he recognized in himself. Referring to
Isherwood’s own retrospective comments on Mr. Norris’s moral indifference, Hynes remarks on the
defining role of heartless indifference in Isherwood’s work: “Isherwood, a mature writer now at the
height ofhis powers and reputation, asserts the heartlessness ofhis early work, but redeems it by
turning it into a theoiy of art. ‘The heartless delight ofthe artist’: do we accept that as a general
premise about the creation of art? I don’t think we do. Do we accept it as a description of
Isherwood-the-artist? Yes, we must” (Norris xii-xiv). This idea of the heartlessness oflsherwood’s
art and moral vision deserves more discussion.
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shouid start to rectify situations like those he has encountered in Shangliai, he does let Alley
suggest that Alley at least knows where one shouid start—presumably, wherever things had
lefi off “in 1927.” Isherwood refrains from elaborating on Alley’s remark which closes the
“Travel-Diary” uncommented upon. Alley’s knowing arclmess implies that the significance
ofwhatever was beginning to happen in 1927 went without saying, but this lias flot proved
to be the case. Alley’s final remark may be ferocious, but its meaning is obscure enough to
have led Fuller astray when he explains the reference to 1927 as an allusion “to the
introduction of Chinese members on to the Council ofthe International Settiement in 1927.
This hopeful beginning ha[d] been broken off by the actions ofthe Japanese” (240). Fuller,
however, is mistaken to identify the introduction of Chinese into the municipal government
ofthe SeUlement as the defining event of 1927. Yet the emphasis which Isherwood throws
onto Alley’s ciosing reference to “1927” suggests that understanding the conclusion ofthe
“Travei-Diary” depends on understanding the significance of 1927.
If we proceed on the internai evidence of Journey, there are only three references to
1927 in the entire book. One is the implicit allusion involved in using the titie La condition
humaine, Mairaux’s nove! about the 1927 Chinese communist coup, as a caption in the
“Picture Commentary.” 0f this caption and photograph, Bryant writes, “Mairaux was
considered one ofthe ‘committed’ artists ofhis generation and an unwavering feliow
traveller with communists” (166) and argues !ess convincingly that “Auden’s photograph
may be taken to concur with Malraux by impÏying that Shanghai wouid have been better
served by the communist revolutionaries” (167). There are aiso explicit references to 1927
in two closely related passages: “Afier the Communist coup d’état in 1927 which put
Chiang Kai-shek into power, it was Du and his men who helped Chiang to tum on his
former allies, and kil! or drive into exile ai! the most dangerous radicals among them”
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(584), and one ofthe top names on Du’s “1927 black list had been that of Chou En-lai”
(585). Early in 1927, Chinese labour unions in Shanghai. leU by the Cornrnunist dominated
lefi wing of the Kuomintang, had risen in a general strike and “put Chiang Kai-shek into
power” (584), only to be crushed soon afier when Chiang slaughtered tens ofthousands of
his erstwhile Communist allies, along with the left wing ofhis own Nationalist party.
“1927 becarne a year of disaster for the Communists as they tried to outmanoeuvre their
Nationalist allies and change the direction of the new state, only to see their movement ail
but crushed in the attempt” (Spence 272-3). For the future Communist-apologist Alley,
who had first arrived in Shanghai in April 1927 during Chiang’s ‘white terror’ (16 Brady
Friend), the principal events of 1927 were, not the reform ofthe Council ofthe
International Settlement, but the successful Communist coup d’état, the internecine political
massacres, and the ensuing Chinese Communist nadir. Those anti-communist massacres of
1927 “had lefi a permanent scar on [Alley’s] psyche” (Helen $now 300).
Understanding such things about 1927 and Alley, and trying to understand who
Alley might have seemed to be to Isherwood in 1938, is crucial to comprehending
Isherwood’s procedures in the last pages of”Travel-Diary.” Alley, who would later turn
himself into perhaps the most prominent of the Communist era’ s ‘Friends of China,’ was,
when Auden and Isherwood met him, on the verge ofbecoming one ofthe best known
foreigners in the Nationalist China ofthe Kuomintang (KMT). By 1938, Alley had been in
Shanghai for eleven years, having first arrived from his native New Zealand looking for an
opportunity to better his circumstances which had been straightened since his retum from
the Great War. In Shanghai he soon turned himself into a reforming factory inspector who
was responsible for “supervision over ail safety conditions in industrial plants” (Airey 113).
Alley also worked SO effectively in flood and famine relief that the League of Nations
-Li
appointed him to supervise dyke repairs for hundreds of kilometres above and below
Wuhan (Chapple 58). Alley’s crowning achievement was the conception and
implementation ofthe famous system ofindustrial cooperatives that Isherwood has Alley
sketching in the “Travel-Diary” and that became known variously as Gung Ho, Indusco, or
Chinese Industriat Cooperatives (CIC). By the end ofthe thirties, through lis work with the
cooperative movement, Alley had become “a world figure” (Airey 11).
In 1938 the Americanjournalist Edgar Snow was a key collaborator with Alley in
the conception and promotion of Indusco, and Alley’s friendship with Snow would be
crucial to Alley’s eventual celebrity. Snow became Alley’s first, though flot last,
hagiographer when his 1941 Saturday Evening Post cover story consolidated Alley’s
reputation as a progressive China-loving humanitarian. Snow’s celebration ofAlley was
exaggerated, but flot without foundation. Alley’s numerous impressive admirers included
the ground-breaking historian of Chinese science Joseph Needham, who was also an
admirer of Auden’s work (Izzo Encyclopedia 246), and who would write exultingly of
Alley: “I admit him unhesitatingly among my haif-dozen immortals” “in whom it bas been
possible to see and touch what constitutes human greatness” (cited in Chapple 181).
Almost two decades after his death in 1987, AÏley’s life story continues to fascinate,
but it has become impossible to enthuse over the idea ofhis greatness. The fascinations of
Alley’s life now derive rather from its many contradictions and from the gap between bis
public persona and what was hidden about both his political views and bis private life.6 0f
6lfby the mid-1930s AIley was already well-known for his reforming humanitarian work, and from
193$ Ltntit 1942 (before Kuomintang suspicions of Alley’s closeness to the Communists leU to his
dismïssat from Indusco) he was intemationally celebrated for his work directitig Indusco, afler 1949
among China watchers Alley would remain prominent Iess as a reformer than as a China loving
author and an apologist for the Communist regime. Each of bis many books from the first two
decades ofthe People’s Republic of China promotes whatever happened to be the party-line at the
time. They are marked by their earnestness and a naivety oftone, but are also rationalizing and
shamelessly partisan in their presentation ofdevelopments in China. The sardonic comments of
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the numerous controversies regarding Alley, there are three questions which we cannot help
but ask and the answers to which, could they be had, woufd allow us to read the nuances
and possible ironies oflsherwood’s presentation of Alley with more confidence than we
actually can. One ofthese questions is ‘would Alley in June 1938 have unequivocally
identified himself as a Communist?’ Though Brady shows that the authorized versions of
the story of Alley’s political development between 1927 and 193$ exaggerate his syrnpathy
with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and must be read in light ofAlley’s need during
the Cornmunist era to enhance the credibility of his procommunist persona (friend 26), she
also notes that he did have “contact with left-wing forces” and “wrote for the Comintem
supported magazine Voice ofChina (friend 2$). Helen Snow remembers that in the 1 930s
Alley was “already committed to what he thought was ‘Marxism’ ofthe orthodox Soviet
variety. None of us wanted to be called ‘social democrats’, which was a terrn of contempt”
(303). The fact that Alley’s two adopted Chinese sons “elected to join the Communist
forces in the northwest” (Brady 31), even as Alley began the Indusco program under the
Marcuse on the friends of China are unfortunately relevant to Attey’s books: the friends “tend to
be solemn, and they will remain so even or especially when they wax lyrical or lapse into political
babytalk. In verse or prose, they are atrocious writers” (11 8-119).
In retrospect one wants to condemn Alley for promoting an incompetent, oppressive
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) even as it was inflicting on the Chinese its most notoriously
cataclysmic policies. There is also the familiar, if more forgivable, hypocrisy of Alley as an
apparently closeted homosexual who in public uncritically supported the CCP as it systernatically
obliterated homosexuality from Chinese life. The reflex to condemn Alley’s propagandizing bas
become irresistible ever since the murderous crushing ofthe democracy movement (1989) and
growing awareness of chronic human rights abuses and corruption in China have done so much to
change world opinion about the CCP.
However the story ofAlley’s imperfect idealism, determination, kindness, and courage
between 1927 and 1949 during the dangerous years of Kuornintang corruption, the Civil War, and
Japanese aggression, the years when, with the endorsement of progressive sentiment worldwide and
ofpowerful geopolitical interests, Alley travelled “the roads ofwartime China like a seismograpb
needle” (Chapple 112), remains so admirable that one feels more sorrow than outrage over bis
subsequent role as a compromised hypocritical public relations flunky for the tyrannical CCP.
When Anne-Marie Brady’s revisionist Friend of China - The Myth ofRewi Alley appeared in 2002,
it radicatly challenged our understanding ofAlley’s private and political life. A review ofthe
responses to Brady’s work is availabte at www.nzedge.com/heroes/alley-postscript.html.
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auspices of the suspicious KMT, seems to confirm his undeclared sympathy with the
Communists. The second related question of whether Isherwood identffied Alley as a
Communist is more difficuit to settie. Nowhere does Isherwood openly associate Alley
with the Communists, and in 1932 Inspector Alley would have found it professionally very
awkward, in both foreign-controlled $hanghai and KMT-govemed China, to reveal a strong
sympathy with the Communists. $till, Alley’s conspicuous snorting reference to 1927
suggests that Isherwood did regard Alley as at least a proto-Comrnunist, and that this
association of Alley with Communism is an important dimension of the treatment of Alley
in “Travel-Diary.” As important as the issue ofAlley’s politics is the question ofAlley’s
sexual identity. Brady has convincingly, if controversially, shown that Alley was a closeted
homosexual attracted to Shanghai by the Chinese tolerance ofhomosexuality and by young
Chinese men. The issue of Alley’ s homosexuality leads to speculations about whether
Isherwood suspected that Alley might be homosexual. No satisfactorily conclusive answer
can 5e had to that question, but as with the question oflsherwood’s assessment ofAlley’s
political views, the question ofwhether Isherwood perceived Alley to be a homosexual
must colour any reading of his representation of Alley with an uncertain hue of perhaps
witting, perhaps unwitting, irony.
Even without ultimately knowing the answers to the above questions, it is possible
to sketch a reading ofthe conclusion ofthe “Travel-Diary” that, taking those questions into
account, situates the ending of the “Travel-Diary” in a complex historical and ideological
context. If we knew nothing ofAlley’s life, we would still know that homosexuality is
aiways central to Isherwood’s work. We would also stili know that Alley’s briefsnorting
allusion to 1927 introduces crucial political issues into the conclusion of the “Travel
Diary.” It tums attention to the central conflict within modem Chinese political culture, the
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then barely dormant conflict ofthe CCP and the KMT. It forces us to ask what Isherwood’s
Alley wants us to think was “starting quite nicely” in 1927, and in so doing, forces us to
consider the place of Communism in twentieth-centuiy Chinese history.
Certainly Auden reread Journey in terms ofthe subsequent triumph ofthe CCP.
With the benefit ofhindsight, Auden writes for the 1973 edition ofJourney, reissued in the
midst ofthe Cultural Revolution, that though “for obvious reasons it is flot overtly stated in
our book, already in 193$ Isherwood and I had the hunch that the future of China lay with
Mao and the Communists, flot with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang” (Prose 1: $30).
Virtually the only support Auden could have adduced for his daim that they had seen the
future this way are a few brief passages in Isherwood’s “Travel Diary:”
It was interesting to notice [. .j how the missionaries had modified their
attitude since the war towards Communism and Communists in China. Two
years ago, the Fathers themselves admitted, they had regarded the Communists
simply as bandits—or, at best, as Robin Hoods, who robbed the rich to feed
the poor. Now they were beginning to take the movement seriously, and to
recognize the part it might play in determining the future development of the
country. (622-3)
Other than in a small handful of such passages, Journey cannot be said to envision explicitly
a Communist future for China. What Auden thought the “obvious reasons” were for not
stating overtly that the future of China might be communist may have seemed clear to him
at the heights of the Cold War and the Cultural Revolution, but they are flot as clear in
today’s post-Cold War world, nor in the context ofthe 1930s when many people would
have welcomed the exaggeration of such a hunch. for it was possible to hope openly for
just such a future for China and the world, as several ofAuden and Isherwood’s card
carrying Communist friends did, and given the proto-communism often attributed to Auden
at least, one would expect Auden and Isherwood to have devoted some energy to
considering the justice ofthe Chinese Communist cause.
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Isherwood too reread Joumey in the early 1 970s, and bizarrely claimed Auden and
he did state overtly that China needed a communist revolution: “China, for Auden and
Christopher, had been a classroom in which the economic and political facts of life had
been brutally demonstrated --- oversimplified, some would say. They came away from it
having learned to repeat the lesson it taught. The book which they jointly produced repeats
it, word-perfect. They declared that conditions in China would only be bettered by a
communist revolution” (Kind ts CI 1029 173). A more misleading characterization of
Journey’s politics is hard to imagine. The Cornmunist Swingler sees no such revolutionary
lesson in Journey, and Isherwood drops this daim in the published version of Kind. Auden
gets doser to the spirit of Journey’s vision of Chinese communism when he remembers that
“we were fools, of course, to swallow the propaganda, so zealously spread by certain
Western journalists, that Chinese communisrn would be different and innocuous” (Prose 1:
$30), but even he is flot accurately representing Joumey. for the larger point is that the book
in its focus on the evils of Japan’ s invasion and of fascism does flot say anything very
criticaf about the KIvIT, the CCP, or any other aspect of Chinese political culture.
Whatever pro-Communist propaganda and whichever j ournalists Auden is referring
to in 1973, the only Western journalists who are identified by name in Joumey are Agnes
Smedley and Edgar $now. Their favourable presentations of the Chinese communists to the
world were indeed influential: “for a variety ofreasons (including the fact that they had
been the first writers and correspondents interested in the Sino-Japanese War), the
American friends of the Chinese Communists got into a position to block out contrary
opinions” (Utley Story 140). However, far from foolishly swallowing Snow and Smedley’s
vision ofthings, Isherwood seems untempted by the lures oftheir propaganda. He portrays
“Miss Agnes Smedley”s commitment to the Communists, flot as innocuous, but as
something like a sexual pathology (519, 581). for his part, Snow, whose Red Star Over
China (1936) played a major role in making Chinesc communism palatable to the world,
appears only in the book’s acknowledgements where he is thanked with Alley for providing
“information and introductions” (495). What is more, as we shah sec, the only part of
Journey to which Snow can be directly linked is the Afley-dominated conclusion ofthc
“Travel-Diary,” and Isherwood’s handiing ofthe conclusion with Ahley reveals, flot a sense
ofthe innocuousness ofthe Communist cause, but an alienation and diffidence regarding it
and other such causes.
If Auden and Isherwood had reahly had a hunch about the future importance ofthe
CCP, or believed that Chinese Communism would be iirnocuous, and been inchined to say
so—both doubtful propositions—they could have let it be known. The Communist
movement in China, however, receives relatively hile attention in Journey. This is partly a
result oftheir having decided flot to visit the “much-described” Communist Eighth Route
Anny in the North-West and oftheir faihing to locate the less reported on communist New
fourth Army (Kind, ts CI 1029 page inserted between pages 165 and 166, with reference to
an April 27, 1938 letter to Stephen Spender). However, an ideological reticence regarding
the CCP is also at work. One obvious reason for flot predicting a Communist triumph in
1938-39 probably derived from the fact that the KMT’ s Chiang Kai Shek, whom Time had
made its Man ofthe Year for 1937 two weeks before Auden and Isherwood sailed for
China, had become a key British ally whose leadership seemed crucial to the united Chinese
cause and to a more global united front. Their reticence would also have derived from the
fact that, afier the ordeals ofthe Long March had reduced the Communists to a small
remnant in Yenan, Auden and Isherwood shared a pessimistic Agnes Smedley’ s doubts
about “the ultimate future of the Chinese Cornmunists when this war is over” (Prose 1:
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440). In either case, the imperatives ofthe tacit anti-Japanese anti-fascist alliance between
Britain and the KMT probably precluded any overt promotion ofthe CCP at the expense of
the KMT.
Whatever the reasons for their reticence regarding the Chinese communists, Auden
and Isherwood’s book “does flot score highly for prediction,” writes Kerr, precisely because,
contrary to Auden’ s 1973 daim, “it seriously underestimates Mao and the Cornmunists”
(Izzo Auden 287). Joumey actually contains littie explicit prognostication of any kind, and
though the “Travel-Diary” in its own way may be “excellent reporting,” it is “remarkable in
its freedom from political speculation or interpretation. This may be because, in the state of
mental confusion he has since described himself as experiencing during 1938, Isherwood
simply did not know what to write” (Hoskins 181).
Despite this reticence on political matters, Isherwood’s speculation in Journey that
hidden in Hankow “are ail the dues which would enable an expert, if he couid oniy find
them to predict the events of the next fifiy years” (513) is borne out by the evidence of his
own book. For though it is the emotionally off-putting ethical oddness, rather than the
political far-sightedness, of the “Travel-Diary” and its conclusion that has struck
commentators from Swingler to Hoskins to Fusseil to Kerr, it is true that, almost by
accident, through perverse intuition, Isherwood does establish a position which allows us to
describe his final paragraphs as propheticaiiy and tragically astute. Isherwood’s position
offers a radical perspective on political issues and developments that will be central to
China and the world’s destiny.
PLAGIARIZING ALLEY
As we consider the conclusion ofthe “Travel-Diary,” it is essential to note that this
part oflsherwood’s text is thoroughly plagiarized. Over the course of four pages,
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Isherwood draws extensively, more or less verbatim, and without acknowledgement, on a
CIC bookiet that Alley and Edgar and Helen Snow had written and published anonymously
while Isherwood and Auden were in Shanghai (sec Appendix 1 for evidence oflsherwood’s
plagiarism). When the older Isherwood thinks of Joumey as repeating an economic and
political lesson learned “word-perfect,” he can only be remembering his use of AÏÏey and
the dc pamphlet at the end ofhis own part of the book. The charge ofplagiarism is
mitigated somewhat when he puts one bit of the information he has lifled from the bookiet
into the mouth of Alley or refers once to the “planners” (633) and once to the “organizers”
(634) ofthe cooperative movement, and somewhat mitigated by the fact that Joumey’s
foreword does thank Alley and Edgar, but not Helen, Snow, grouped with fine others
unrelated to the anonymous bookiet, “for information.” Stili the plagiarism demands an
explanation. Isherwood’s unusual dependence on the unacknowledged anonymous text is
perhaps related to his growing borcdom and his gencral ignorance regarding the topic of
China. However, the ways that Isherwood, in the course of incorporating the CIC
pamphlet’s original text, presents Alley and his vision reveal that more is at issue than lazy
or inesponsible plagiarism. Isherwood’s conclusion constitutes one ofthe most politically
incisive moments in Isherwood’s entire oeuvre. Isherwood’s perspicacity is not 50 much a
matter of what he draws directly from the CIC pamphlet; it springs rather from the critical
personal perspective that Isherwood insinuates into the ending of “Travel-Diary.”
Isherwood’s reliance on Alley in the closing section ofthe “Travel-Diary” shows
that the travellers knew whom they should listen to for an engaged, ground-level
perspective on Shanghai. Isherwood’s reliance on Alley and the anonymous CIC pamphlet
solves the problems oflsherwood’s lack ofappropriate Shanghai material, ofhis own
distracted Ïack of interest in China, of his being too confused to know what to write. His
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recourse to Alley also helps Isherwood resolve the compositional and moral difficulties lie
lias been drawing attention to in his approaches to bis ending.
Here we should recali Di1lenbach’s idea ofthe enunciative mise en abyme and the
idea of Alley as authorial substitute and double for Isherwood. Isherwood shows us an
Alley producing a meaningful activist interpretation of China which Isherwood receives,
records, and relays to us. We get Alley and his CIC text second-hand, but to an extreme
degree Isherwood reduces himselfto a transparent medium for transmitting Alley’s
message, essentially copying directly from Alley’ s text, and keeping himself invisible in his
own text until lis puzzling exclamation at the very end. There is an analogy of semantic
production and reception here such that Alley’s production is to Isherwood’s reception as
Isherwood’s production is to his own reader’s reception. Isherwood allows the forceftilness
and apparent precision ofAlley’s information and agenda to fill the blankness of
Isherwood’s ignorance and distracted lack of interest in China. In the absence of a
meaningful and intelligible vision of China of his own, Isherwood can at least convey to bis
readers this Alley-derived vision. Alley solves Isherwood’ s problem of having to find
something appropriate to say about China and provides Isherwood with a way to end his
“Travel-Diary.” With his final disconcertingly campy “Oh dear,” Isherwood completes the
process of reception represented in his enunciative mise en abyme by introducing the
unexpected and complicated moment ofhis subjective reception ofAlley’s vision. This
moment too will have its analogue in the process ofthe reader’s response to Isherwood’s
text. In fact, that final campy moment seems intended to provoke the subjectivity ofthe
reader and to highlight, not the possibility of a direct comprehension, but ambivalent,
problematic aspects ofthe reception of Ishcrwood’s text. This analogy ofAlley and
Isherwood to Isherwood and us is made ail the more forceful by the degree of similarity
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between Isherwood and Alley. The similarities between Alley and Isherwood will emerge
more ftilly in our discussion ofthe textuai and historical dimensions ofthe conclusion of the
“Travel-Diary,” but for convenience let us list those similarities now. Briefly, Alley and
Isherwood resemble one another in their role as authorial figures, as writers and foreign
interpreters of China; in their personal proximity to the homosexual and proto-Communist
undergrounds; in certain physical and temperamental characteristics; and in a similar degree
ofvirtual invisibility in the final passage oflsherwood’s text.
If Isherwood can reiy on Alley as a recognizabie authoriai substimte, it is also true
that Alley seems to have been ready to rely on Isherwood as an authorial intermediary in
Alley’s own project. Isherwood’s access to Alley and Alley’s evident generosity with
Isherwood indicate that Auden and Isherwood’s fame as engaged writers and Alley’s faith
in the congruence oftheir views with bis were secure enough for Ailey to entrust his vision
of China to their care. As much, though, as the lefi-leaning Alley must have hoped
Isherwood would portray him and his vision in congenial terms, I doubt whether the
publicity-loving Alley was any more satisfied with the perpiexing rendering of their
interview than Isherwood’s other readers have been.
In the context of 1938-39, the sketch of CIC policy conveyed in the pages dealing
with Alley constitutes a significantjournalistic scoop. Isherwood, despite his fashionable
contempt for joumalists, shows himselfpicking up almost before anyone else what would
soon become a major story in Chinese and Anglo-American relations. When Isherwood
interviewed Ailey in June 1938, the industrial cooperative movement was stili littie more
than an amateur scheme (Snow Scorched 99), conceived earlier that spring by Alley and the
Snows in discussion with a group of friends and associates. Allcy had only recently sent the
proposai for cooperatives to the KMT government in Hankow. Within a month of
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Isherwood’s departure from Shanghai, however, Alley would begin to implement his ideas
under the sponsorship ofthe KMT and of important foreign sympathizers like Eleanor
Rooseveit and Clark-Kerr, and by the time Isherwood was completing bis “Travel-Diary” in
late 1938 the CIC movement had become established policy in China. Giving his Chinese
Industrial Cooperative Association the slogan “Gung Ho”, Alley inadvertently gave to the
Englïsh language the term that describes the idealism and over-ready team spirit he came to
be identified with for the rest ofhis life. Though its success as an industrial program is
debatable, the CIC movement did succeed in doing what Auden and Isherwood tried to do
through the taiks and magazine articles on China that they temporarily devoted themselves
to in England and the U.S.; that is, Gung Ho did bring “liberai world opinion to bear in
favour of China’s resistance to Japan at a time when China had littie reason to be grateful to
{arms-dealing] America or [Japan-appeasing] Britain” (Snow $corched 138).
Not only does Isherwood in Joumey offer a glimpse of Alley’s vision in the three
month lui! between the time Alley submitted bis proposai and the time when he was called
upon to put it into practice, but some have suggested that Isherwood and Auden themselves
facilitated the adoption ofAlley’s policy by the KMT. While they were in Shanghai, Auden
and Ishenvood were bouse guests of the British ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.
After Edgar and Helen Snow introduced Rewi to the two writers, Isherwood and Auden
“tried to get the ambassador into a more active stance, helping Indusco” (Helen Snow 306).
Alley, for his part, remembers that Indusco went forward when the Snows “through their
connections, arranged for Clark Kerr to take [the proposai] to Hankow, and which resulted
in rny being invited to set up Gung Ho” (page dated Oct. 9, 1968, appended to “Village
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Industriai Cooperatives”, ts7). Perhaps resentfully remembering the plagiarism and the
uricnthusiastic portrait of himself in “Travel-Diary,” perhaps prudently flot wanting to
associate himself with two famous bourgeois homosexuals who had long ago taken their
distance from Communism, Alley does not name the Snows’ “connections” as Auden and
Isherwood. In any case, until Auden and Isherwood introduced it to Sir Archibald, Gung Ho
had “remained a radical programme, stonewalled by the Chinese governrnent” but “$ir
Archibald represcnted Britain, and Britain was stili the power with the biggest investments
in China. His access to high Chinese officiais was immediate. On condition that Rewi
Aliey had agreed to lead the scheme, he accepted the task of salesman for CIC [. . .J and
without further hedging, the Chinese government agreed to it” (Chapple 106).
Several underground cunents are at play in this coming together of Alley the proto
Communist political activist, Auden and Isherwood the lefi-leaning writers, and Clark-Kerr
the international diplomat. Their collusion is fascinatingly suggestive ofClark-Kerr’s
association with obscure mid-twentieth century connections between Comintem and
Homintem, that subversive nexus of the homosexual and the communist which in the
Anglo-American Cold War context seems more familiar than the nexus of the hornosexual
and the fascist that we encountered at the Journey’s End. Clark-Kerr, whose well-known
“professions of socialism” were much suspected (Gillies 95), would remain a “benevoient
friend ofthe Chinese Communists for many years” (Utley 106). Furtherrnore, Isherwood’s
speculations that Clark-Ken was spying on their trysting in Shanghai bathhouses—
7
I obtained a copy ofthis document from Dr. Anne-Marie Brady. Dr. Brady was given her copy by
Lu Guangmian, “from his personal papers.” Dr. Brady writes that “Lu Guangmian used to head the
Baoding Gong He office in the 1940s and was a close friend ofAlley’s [. . .] The 196$ article “as
written when Alley and many ofthose involved in Gong He were under attack during the Cultural
Revolution. The later articles were wriften by Alley to help get the reputations of some former
Gong 11e cadres cleared post-CR” (E-mail to the author, 23 feb. 23 2006).
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Every evening, when they retumed [from the steam-bath] for cocktails. Achie
would ask them what they had been doing and every evening they told him a
different story of where they had been--out shopping, or to visit some local
beauty spot, or to interview someone. Archie accepted ail these stories with a
straight face. But they liked to believe that they had alays [sic] been followed,
for security reasons, and that a police report of their actual doings lay on his
desk. (Kind ts CI 1029 170)—
are flot so conspiratorially juvenile as it might seem. Such spying may have been in
character for Clark-Ken, a “favoured focus of [whose] outrageousness was sex [. . . .] he
neyer lost an amused interest in the topic and an undoubtedly rnorbid curiosity about its
diverse manifestations, as demonstrated in the various corners of the globe in which he
laboured” (Gillies 13). If the issues of homosexuality and proto-Communism complicate
Clark-Ken’s attentiveness to Alley, Auden, and Isherwood, how rnuch more would they
complicate his courting of the young British left and his later closeness to the infamous pro-
Soviet homosexual or bisexual moles Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean (Gillies 226, 140).
Clark-Ken’ s courtship of the educated, frequently homosexual, British lefi is a consistent
feature ofthe “Peter Pan politics” ofhis diplomatic career (95, 140), and Clark-Kerr’s bitter
disappointment over Maclean and Burgess’ treachery (226) conforms to a pattem of
enthusiastic patronage and eventual disappointment already observable in his relationship
with Auden and Isherwood. Clark-Kerr had been “a staunch supporter ofNew Writing and
ail the young authors associated with it, but when [John Lehmannj met him in London
under bombardment he was very much disappointed that the two whose company he had
enjoyed so much in China and for whom he had done 50 much, had opted for America”
(Lehmann 205). The later association ofClark-Kerr, Burgess, and Maclean, the latter two
Cambridge-educated like Isherwood, makes the coincidental evocations and allusions to
Communism, homosexuality, and international dipiomacy in the last chapter oflsherwood’s
“TraveÏ-Diary” seem curious. The coincidences grow curiouser when one remembers the
244
controversy over Burgess’ repeated attempts to contact Auden on Ischia in the days before
Burgess defected with Maclean to the Soviet Union in 1951 (Carpenter 369-70). And stili
curiouser when one sees Maclean’s biographer, in his account of Maclean’s defection,
invoking Joumey’s critical vision ofthe significance ofthe voyage: “The journey is false;
the false journey really an illness” (Davenport-Hines 275)—lines which recali both the
modem medical conception of homosexuality as illness and the complex deceptions ofthe
modem homosexual’s political joumeys. It is significant too that Auden, initially reluctant
to believe Burgess could be guilty of spying (275), eventually equated Burgess’s defection
with his own adoption of American citizenship, seeing both expatriations, like the
queemess and the alcoholism they also shared, not in Cold War terms, but as revoits against
English provincialism (Davenport-Hines 79).
Suggestive as such evocations of a Comintern / Homintern underground may be, it
is clear that given the endorsement of Alley and Indusco that Isherwood and Auden
reportedly conveyed to Sir Archibald, and given the compatibility of Gung Ho with the
activist and geopolitical objectives ofAuden and Isherwood in 1938, one finds it difficuit to
explain why Isherwood’s presentation ofAlley and his vision are so ambivalent and
oblique. The treatment ofAlley seems even odder when one considers the scoop he had
delivered into the hands of an Isherwood looking for copy and imagines how easy it would
have been for Isherwood to portray himself in the flattering role of insider and
accomplished foreign correspondent rather than as an ineffective annoyingly campy
outsider. However much he depends on AlYey and the dc bookiet as his guides,
Isherwood’s choice ofwhere to lay the closing emphasis in his “Travel Diary” is entirely bis
own. The oddness oflsherwood’s conclusion has much to do with Isherwood’s insistence
on the intractable idiosyncrasy and irreducibility of the human individual. However, his
245
treatment ofAlley also reveals an astute clairvoyance on Isherwood’s part regarding Alley
and regarding China’s future and mid-twentieth century political ideologies, a clairvoyance
that approaches the dystopian visionary and the unfortunately prophetic. The “Travel
Diaiy”s conclusion, while neither explicitly making predictions nor explicitly endorsing
any political programme, does flot just point in the direction of Alley’ s inchoate Gung Ho
movement. It also illuminates the hidden, self-denying, self-distorting, personal situation of
Alley’s disturbing and enigmatic life. Furthermore, it points to the wartime industrial and
social conditions which are in part the empirical basis and justification of an eventual
victory ofthe Chinese communists, something that hardly seemed likely in 1938. Those
final pages point too to the potential individual-obliterating inhumanity ofthe CCP’s
materialistic regime. The puzzling conclusion oflsherwood’s “Travel-Diary” turns out to
be less inconsequentially eccentric than readers have thought. To the contraty, Isherwood’s
conclusion is a fascinatingly complex moment in the narrative oftwentieth-century Western
attempts to comprehend modem China politically and indeed a revealing moment in the
story of modem China’s central political conflicts.
Iwo competing versions of whence the CIC booklet drew its original inspiration and
ultimate authority situate Isherwood’s conclusion in the context ofthe conflict ofthe KMT
and the CCP. Thus, in the original pamphlet, intended as it was to appeal to the KMT
administration, the authors and publishers relied heavily on excerpts from the
pronouncements and writings of Chiang Kai Shek, and those close to him like Mme.
Chiang, H.H. Kung, and delegates of a KMT congress, to lend authority to the anonymous
CIC document. Much later, though, Alley would daim that his veiy first attempt at
sketching a proposal for industrial cooperatives was written “after studying the original
translations ofthe two articles that came to Shanghai in late 1937 [. . .]. In their correct
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translation they may be found in Vol. Il, pp.35 on, in the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.
[...J. h was from this document that the Snows helped draw up the first promotion
pamphlet” (page dated Oct. 9, 1968, appended to “Village Industrial Cooperatives”. ts). As
with the later Auden and Isherwood, Alley must be seen here as revising his 1938 state of
mmd in the light of subsequent Chinese history. By associating the origins of CIC with
Mao, he is also protecting himsclf in the context ofthe Cultural Revolution from whose
depredations he had no immunity. Alley’s daim that CIC was initially inspired by Mao’s
writings is, though, consistent with Alley’s links to Western Communists in China and to
the CCP underground, and with the fact that the KMT fired Alley in 1942 for allowing
“CIC factories to make guns and blankets for the CCP” (Brady friend 37).
The point for us is that just as Alley and the CIC booklet are perrnanently caught
within a KMT/CCP conflict that was merely dormant in 1938, so is Isherwood’s conclusion.
When Isherwood tums to Alley as authorial substitute, he involves his own text in the same
struggle for power and authority within which Alley and the CIC comrnittee were operating.
Isherwood’s reliance on Alley’s authority at the end of “Travel-Diary” is a sign of
Isherwood’ s lack of authority and his incapacity to make sense of China and to decide what
must be done. Behind Isherwood’s reliance on Alley’s authority lies, however, a fascinating
series of appeals to such authority figures, and implicit transfers of responsibility to them.
Thus, the text of Isherwood’ s conclusion is largely a revised version of an entiy, the final
one in their jointly-kept diary, written by the more confidently objective, more ambitiously
systematic, Auden. Auden’s entry, for its part, copies passages wholesale from the
anonymous CIC pamphlet, which itself reflects the combined Chinese and political
expertise ofAlley and the Snows. Furthermore, this document, while relying explicitly and
thorougffly on Chinese and Western journalists and theoreticians ofthe cooperative
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movement, refers uitimately to the political authority of in one account, Chiang and the
KMT, and, in another account, Mao and the CCP. In recruiting Aiiey as authorial substitute
and by incorporating so much of the CIC pamphlet, Isherwood involves his text in this
chain ofderived authority and ultimately, if probabiy inadvertently, positions the
concluding moment of his text within modem China’s principal contest for political power.
The KMT I CCP contest is at play during the two principal sojourns of”Travel-Diary,”
when in Hankow Isherwood relies for information and introductions on Hoiiington Tong,
KMT propagandist and author of a biography of Chiang, and in Shanghai on Alley and
Snow, author of the CCP-ceibrating Red Star. Isherwood’ s dependence on these guides
draws his text into the matrix of the KMT / CCP rivalry.
Even though an appreciation ofthe dominance ofthe KMT and ofthe nature ofthe
Japanese invasion are essential to understanding the “Travel-Diary,” it does make sense to
think ofthe conclusion ofthe “Travel-Diary” as more pertinent to the specific context of
Chinese Communisrn. Within that conclusion, Isherwood unfolds a vision of China that is
principally the work of Alley and the Snows, ail of whom, but especiaiiy Ailey and Edgar
Snow, had significant roles in shaping Anglo-American and world comprehension of
Chinese communism. Snow’s Red Star remains one ofthe most influential books, both
within and outside China, ever written on the Chinese communists. Red Star’s sympathy is
not without guile—in spite of Snow’s lies about his impartial independence, Mao flot oniy
dictated to Snow “a mixture ofvaluable information and colossal fabrication” for Red Star,
he also “took the added precaution of checking everything Snow wrote afterwards,
amending and revising parts” (Chang 192). As for Ailey, he became one ofthe most
prominent foreigners in mid-twentieth century China, an icon in both KMT and CCP
propagandizing and a prolific purveyor of propagandistic views of China under the CCP. In
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Isherwood’s “Travel Diary,” we see Alley in 193$ already assuming the role which would
later become one ofhis principal functions as a ‘friend’ in Communist China, i.e. “playing
an active part in the reception and guidance of important foreigners” (Hollander 332). In
Shanghai, Auden and Isherwood had stumb!ed upon two interlocutors who would be
instrumental in articulating the dominant English-speaking vision ofmid-twentieth-centuiy
Chinese politics. When Isherwood, as much through private reasons of temperament and
personal limitations as through actual political prescience, is compelled at the end ofthe
“Travel-Diary” to take his distance from the emerging Alley-Snow account of Chinese
Communism, he was proleptically taking his distance from an account of modem China that
would become the dominant paradigm for political thinking on China from 1949 through
1989.
MEN WITHOUT QUALITIES
A mix of apotropaic intuition and ideological discomfort explains Isherwood’ s odd
treatment of Alley. The oddness of that treatment becomes clearer when one contrasts
Isherwood’s Alley to the versions ofAlley that other authors offer us. for Alley seemed, at
least as Edgar Snow would mythologize him in the Saturday Evening Post, to mean “to
China today at least as much as Colonel Lawrence to the Arabs, and perhaps more. Where
Lawrence brought to Arabia the destructive technique of guerilla warfare, Alley is teaching
China the constructive organisation of guerilla industry” (12). “Alley’s efforts,” writes
Snow, again comparing him to Lawrence, “may yet rank as one ofthe great human
adventures ofour time” (Battie 100). The obviousness ofthe comparison to Lawrence
would have been clear to the Lawrence-fixated Isherwood too. Yet lsherwood does flot
imbue Alley with any ofLawrence’s heroic glamour.
We can interpret in various ways the fact that Isherwood does not present Alley
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heroically as Snow and others do. To some extent Isherwood’s portrayal ofAlley antedates
the orthodoxy regarding Alley was Snow’s hagiography would heip create. Isherwood’s
odd presentation of Alley also needs to be appreciated against the politicai and social
background ofBritish class and national identities. Uniike the aristocratic Lawrence, Alley,
as a colonial of Irish extraction with a farming background who was named afler a renegade
Maori chiefiain, is Isherwood’s social inferior. Evelyn Waugh easily imagines Isherwood a
a fellow public school snob:
The quality which makes Americans and colonials excel in news-reporting is
the ease with which they are impressed by fame. Mr. Isherwood met nearly ail
the public characters in his district; he feit it his duty as a war correspondent to
be interested in them. But they were bores—or rather the kind of contact a
foreignjoumalist establishes with a public character is boring—and he is too
honest a writer to disguise the fact. Nowhere in China did he seem to find the
particular kind of stimulus that his writing requires. (Haffenden 290)
How easy it would have been for Auden and Isherwood to look down their noses, not so
much at the Chinese who were too exotic to fit into British social hierarchies, but at the
other, particularly English-speaking, Westemers whom they encountered in China. There
is, however, remarkably liffle ofthis ldnd of snobbishness in Journey. Compared to
Waugh’s own travel books or a book like Robert Byron’s Road to Oxiana, Isherwood
displays a generous degree of patience with “Americans and colonials.” “Travel-Diary” as
well as being the story of Auden and Isherwood’sjoumey across the Otherness of China, is
also the occasion of an encounter with a more proximate Other. For Joumey marks the first
time the public-school, Oxbridge, Europe-touring pair ventured into the larger English
speaking world. They flot only travelled across Canada and the U.S. on their way back from
the East, but in China the English-speakers they met were more frequently Canadians,
Americans, Australians, and New Zealanders than English. Unlike Waugh, Auden and
Isherwood, at the very moment that Britain’s cultural hegemony over the anglophone world
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was coming to an end, seem in Joumey to have rather liked the “Americans and colonials”
and would soon shock their foïlowers in England, and annoy Waugh in particular, by
emigrating to the U.S. Waugh fails to appreciate that for Isherwood, as lie articulates in
Lions and recails in Kind, the Truly Strong Man lias become, flot the hero who must
distinguish himself as exceptional by doing something like travelling through wartime
China, but the man who “travels straight across the broad America of normal life” (Kind
258). The attention Isherwood pays to Americans and colonials like A1}ey is an expression
of his efforts to take that truly strong journey across the broad America of the twentieth
century and to disavow the relative privilege ofhis class position within the English
speaking imperium. If this explains in part bis attentiveness to figures like Alley,
Isherwood’s treatment of Alley requires a far different explanation. The peculiarity ofthat
treatment lias less to do with class and nationality than with political ideology, specifically
with Isherwood’s concem about the relationship ofhuman individuality to the purely
materialistic and collectivist qualities ofwhat lie represents as Alley’s ideological position.
The peculiarity ofthe presentation ofAlley is illuminated through a comparison to
the treatment of another ideologically strong, imperialÏy marginal cliaracter, the Canadian
medical missionary Dr. Robert McClure. If Alley’s stature is magnified by his presence in
the “Travel Diary”s conclusion, no other figure in Joumey is allotted so many pages or
allowed to dominate them to the degrec that McClure is. Isherwood is excessively neutral
and objective in his portrait ofAlley. He lets Alley’s concem for the seriousness ofthe
Chinese socio-political situation speak for itself and elevate Alley, so that Isherwood can
seem to be describing Alley “in tones of awe” (Brady Friend 29). Witli the obviously
meritorious McLure, however, Isherwood allows himselfto tum, however benignly, the
good doctor into a figure of fun. Certainly Isherwood is obliged to acknowledge McClure’s
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courage and vigour, but he clearly enjoys sending up McClure’s eager-beaver boy scout
comportment.
Isherwood’s understated mocking ofMcClure can seem typical ofthe
condescending treatment of missionaries, particularly North American ones, in snobbish
1930s Oxbridge travel writing. In a survey ofthis literary reflex, Cunningham cites several
examples from Journey (389), but he does flot mention McLure, who is the book’s most
prominent religious figure, and who in important respects does not conform to
Cuimingham’s thesis,8 anymore than Isherwood’s text conforms to Waugh’s snobbish
views. Stili, Isherwood’s humorous treatment ofMcClure contrasts significantly with his
impersonal treatment ofAlley. 1930s political correctness and literary bohemian orthodoxy
seem to require that Isherwood defer to proto-communist pieties and to avoid making fun of
AlÏey the way he has McClure, even though the nickname “Screwy Rewi” (Marcuse 119)
suggests that Alley too was easily mockable. Surprisingly, despite the seriousness of
Isherwood’s Alley and the lightness ofhis McLure, Isherwood’s presentation ofAlley’s
ideological and personal positions is much more critical than Isherwood has been of
McClure.
Ideologically both McClure and Alley belong to what Isherwood jokingly refers to
as “The Moscow-Heaven Axis.” This was the name that had been given to the house of
8Cunningham does cite Journey’s anecdote regarding Auden’s “delighted fury” with the “lady
missionary” at the American Mission Hospital who asked him “Are you insured with Jesus?”; and
whose admonitoiy finger Auden “wishes he had bitten”(Prose 1: 596)—no doubt because of her
presumption in lecturing Auden on anything but even more probably because of bis disdain for ber
bad taste in kerygmatic rhetoric. Ironically, the snootily outraged, uncertainly secularist Auden,
who is in this passage represented as a snob, would soon hear the Good News himself. In a further
irony, one ofAuden’s exemplary Christians to be, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, whose martyrdom at Nazi
hands Auden would commemorate with “Friday’s Child,” would see in insurance a revealing
phenornenon ofChristian faith and Western culture, and moreover a phenomenon whose
motivation—human independence from nature—is identical with one ofthe principal tbemes of
Auden’s “In Time ofWar” and indeed ofAuden’s work as a whole (Bonhoeffer 337). See note2,
chapter 2 for the relationship between insurance and homosexual identity in Goodbye.
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Bishop Roots, the Episcopalian bishop of Hankow, afier the Communist Agnes Smedley
began living there (514). More than a passing joke, however, the Moscow-Heaven Axis
should be thought of as the actual ideological axis along which Auden and Isherwood
oriented themselves throughout their joumey. Thinking of it as an ideological, ethicaÏ pro
Chinese continuum, one imagines that towards the Heaven end, Isherwood would place the
self-described “Christian revolutionary” Bishop Roots and Roots’ daughter who had
recently visited the communist Eighth Route Army in Yenan, as well as the Presbyterian
McClure and his associate the Anglican medical missionary from Toronto Richard Brown
(whom Isherwood presents as the straight man to McClure’s clown and who is encountered
for a second time just before Brown leaves for Yenan to assist the recently anived Canadian
communist Dr. Norman Bethune). Towards the Moscow end ofthe Moscow-Heaven axis
are Smedley and Alley, even Mao Tse-tung, who is “said to have attended Mass as a gesture
ofgoodwill towards the missionaries” (580). This tolerance ofMao’s, and phenomena like
the Moscowtrained, Methodist convert Chiang Kai Shek broadcasting his April 16
“Message to Chinese Christians” are signs that the ‘Moscow-Heaven axis’ was in the
context ofthe Anti-Japanese War a significant element in Chinese political life and
geopolitical strategy.9 In 1938 Isherwood and Auden, as “In Time of War”s fusion of
Christian and Marxist themes shows, were looking for a place in an ill-defined middle
9Variants on Hankow’s and China’s Moscow-Heaven axis, such as Latin American Liberation
Theology, have arisen over the last hundred years, and in comparison to other political movements,
including the contemporary 193 Os alliance of right-wing Catholicism and fascism, have been
among the more attractive ideological alignments of modem times. One indication ofthe affinity
between the Moscow and Heaven parties in mid-twentieth century China is their shared taste in
film scores. As Jay Leyda points out in his history of Chinese film, Auden and Isherwood report (y.
Prose 1: 536) hearing the 1935 song “The March ofthe Volunteers” from the Chinese film “Sons
and Daughters ofthe Storm” “adapted as a Protestant hymn in a Canadian mission near Hankow.”
The same song “was adopted by the Red Army and in 1949 became the national anthem ofthe
People’s Republic of China” (Leyda 99). In 1982 “The March ofthe Volunteers” was officially
named China’s national anthem.
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region ofthis axis. Joumey reveals, however, that they were moving decisively away from
the outskirts of the Soviet capital in the direction of what tumed out to be their separate
religious destinations. “Afier two months,” Auden wrote a friend, “we are pro Chinese and
pro missionary” (Carpenter 23$).
Why, given that Isherwood and Auden were closely identified with the secular
political lefi is Isherwood more at ease around Christians like McClure and Brown than
around politicos like Smedley and Alley? The contrast of his treatment ofmissionaries and
left-wingers is telling. 0f both he can be admiring; ofboth he can be critical, but the nature
ofhis criticism is far grimmer in the case ofthe ieft-wingers. Ris presentation ofthe
missionaries is frequently comic, but contrary to what Cunningham suggests, Isherwood’s
humour is flot dismissive ofthe Christians. b borrow a nuance from Evening’s discussion
of Camp, Isherwood is flot “making fun of’ the missionaries, he is “making fun out o?’
them (110). He may tum McCiure into a figure of fun, but nothing seems seriously,
pathologically wrong with McClure. In contrast, Isherwood’s Alley is no fun at ail. With
Alley, he may be deferential, but he makes Alley appear inhuman. 0f Alley’s person, ail we
ieam is that he is “a stocky New Zealander with light cropped ginger hair and a short rugged
nose” (630). The brevity ofthis description of Alley and his nose is more significant than
one might first suspect. Isherwood needs to get Alley’s nose into the picture because it is
through that “short rugged nose” that Isherwood wiii signal his ambivalence to Alley and
Alley’s poiitics when he describes Alley’s “snort” as “ferocious” (634). AIley’s ferocious
snort hints at something beastiike and terrible in Ailey’s character or in Alley’s vision ofthe
future. This suggestion goes against the grain of other contemporary representations and
later reminiscences ofAlley. Aside from the odd exception, most notably Hyde’s diffident
portrait of an iil-tempered, judgmental Alley as Caley in Dragon Rampant, early
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representations ofAlley dwell on the singularity and goodness ofAlley’s character: his
physical strength and stamina, the memorable cragginess ofhis face, the moral qualities of
his bearing, his determination, simplicity, altruism, openness, compassion, and capacity for
friendship. The comment ofthe foreign medical specialist flown to Kiangsi by the Bishop
of Hong Kong to treat Alley for life-threatening typhoid in 1940 strikes the predominant
note in representations ofAlley: “for days [the specialistj went about Hong Kong taiking of
Alley. ‘A saint,’ he told everybody in an awed voice. ‘I went in there and found a saint”
(Snow “Blitzbuilder” 3$).
Isherwood’s portrait is an anomaly, and there is no Iack ofrepresentations against
which to measure Isherwood’s Alley. By the time Alley passed away in 1987, there had
been two English-language biographies; an autobiography; several documentary films, a
New Zealand opera, a Canadian play, and a thirty-two part Chinese TV series on Alley’s
life; sculptures ofAlley; innumerable articles on Alley and references to him in memoirs;
Alley’s own lamentable outpourings offellow travelling chinoiserie; and a Rewi Alley
Research Centre. The anomalousness oflsherwood’s Alley explains why Alley’s
authorized biographers Airey and Chapple and even the revisionist biographer Brady,
though they acknowledge Isherwood’s interest in Alley, can incorporate no more from
“Travel Diary” into their accounts of Alley than Fusseil and Swingler can into their
understandings ofJoumey. Anomalous though Isherwood’s portrait of Alley may be, Helen
Snow’s much later recollections ofAlley confirm Isherwood’s suggestion of a funless
ferocity in Alley: Alley’s “sense of humour had been arrested, and he was God’s angry man,
volcanically alive with ail kinds offrustrated indignation. ‘I’d like to get behind a machine
gun,’ he announced, cmshing walnuts with his fingers” (301). Isherwood could hardly help
recognize his own much remarked upon angriness in the ferociousness of Ailey, and their
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common irascibility is an important similarity between the two men.
The ferociousness of Alley’s snort occurs at a crucial juncture in the story of
Journey. Well before Alley’s ominous snort, it is clear we have entered a reaim that is more
intensely cruel than the diffuse, confused, relatively uneventful war zones that Auden and
Isherwood have encountered earlier in China. Isherwood spends most ofthose final pages
listing, enumerating, tabulating, and projecting rates of pay, daily working hours,
registration fees, black market mark ups, labour costs, costs of accommodation, rates of
profit, resuits of questionnaires, percentages, sizes of workforces, phases of action plans,
industrial requirements, numbers offactories, numbers ofpeople needed, and rates of
mortality.
In comprehending the significance of all this quantffied, organized, mortal
information, we should recali Isherwood’s persistent sense in the “Travel-Diary” of the lack
of congruity between things and human efforts to represent, categorize, and name them and
his sense ofthe constant siippage ofsignified and signifier. This preoccupation with
numbers and quantifiable hard facts is also, as elsewhere in Auden’s and Isherwood’s work,
a sign of the infernal and inhuman. We see this in the “Bureau of Statistics” in Auden’ s
“The Unknown Citizen” from early 1939, a poem satirizing the use of instrumental reason
as a measure of human experience. We see this in Auden’s mature distinctions between, on
the one hand, the Natural World ofthe Dynamo legitimately “describable not in words but
in terms of numbers, or rather algebraic terms” where “freedom is the consciousness of
Necessity” and, on the other, the Chimerical World of “mechanized history” where faces
illegitirnately become masses and the Virgin a statistic (Hand 61-2). We see it when, as
Lucy McDiarmid remarks in a discussion of the subordination of Art to the morality of
Hunger and Love in Auden and Isherwood, “The deadpan listing of facts [. . .1 gives notice
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that [the radio script] Hadrian ‘s Wall is another piece about tyranny” (“Liberating the
Pseudoese” 145). At the end ofthe “Travel Diary,” Isherwood presents the capacity of
impersonal quantitative data to tyrannize and efface the human individual.
Alley is the guide who leads Isherwood and his readers to Joumey’s lowest, most
dispiriting, moment and into the numerical and ethical infemo whose roaring threatens to
enguif the human. The catastrophe of war, the heu of infinite enumerability and of
meaningless tabulation; the suggestion in Alley of a beast-like ferocity—these signal that
we have reached the low point in the quasi-mythic narrative structure of descent and ascent
sketched at the outset ofthis chapter. However, it is flot just that through Alley Isherwood
descends into a dehumanizing infemo that the rest of Journey must struggie to get out of.
Something more is amiss. Even before Isherwood’s confusion about how to proceed and
before Alley’s frighteningly ferocious snort, the very manner in which Isherwood refers to
Alley’s activities and interventions shows that Isherwood is flot as well-disposed to Alley as
might be expected. We learn surprisingly littie about Alley’s appearance and comportment.
Through several pages, Alley is the subject of only four verbs, ail describing impersonal or
officiai actions: “he has had its owner into court three times” (630); he “estimates” that
forty thousand chiidren will die (631); lie “is convinced” China wiil not win the war without
an inland industrial co-operative movement (632); lie “points out” the Chinese
government’s success with agricultural co-operatives (633). This depersonalized Alley is in
his element as Virgil-like he guides Isherwood through Shanghai’s infrastructural and
superstructural disaster. Isherwood’s Alley remains faceless, except for his ginger hair and
“short rugged nose,” and reveals nothing ofhimselfuntil lie snorts ferociously through it at
the thought ofthe once and future Communist initiatives of 1927.
The aimost absolute impersonality that results from Isherwood’s effacement of
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Alley contrasts with the fascinated amusement of his memoir of McClure, or the fascinated
gush in his cameo of Madame Chiang: “The poet-joumalists Auden and Isherwood had
been so impressed by Madame Chiang that they almost exhausted the English language of
adjectives. In one short paragraph they used: vivacious, cultivated, simple, affectionate,
terrible, gracious, mthless, and clinging. They were also impressed by her perfiirne” (Scott
23$). Isherwood’s non-portrait of Alley is therefore a radical contrast not only to other
writers’ portrayals ofAlley, but to Isherwood’s treatment of other individuals. The
blankness of Alley is reminiscent ofthe blankness ofthe Isherwood nanator ofGoodbye. In
fact, at the end of “Travel-Diary” both Isherwood and Alley approach states of textual non
entity. As he relays Alley’s vision ofthings, Isherwood completely absents himselffrom
the picture, until, that is, his sudden final reassertion ofhis own incongruous, useless
presence—a reassertion ail the more forceflil for his preceding absence. The blankness of
Alley and Isherwood in the conclusion of “Travel-Diary” is comparable to Auden’ s absence
in Joumey’ s sonnets as evident in bis avoidance of first person singular pronouns, his
adoption ofthird person pronouns, bis episternological objectivity, and bis single recourse
to the objective pronoun “me.” What is more, Isherwood’s concluding reassertion of
individual subjectivity recurs, in the case ofAuden, in the conclusion of”Commentary”
when Auden finally ullers, once, a first person subjective “I”.
In the diary Isherwood kept as he worked on Journey in the fait of 193$, Isherwood
cails himself a man without qualities: “I once read the titie of a German novel (I forget the
author’s name) Der Mann ohne Eigenschaft. That, I’ve corne to feel more and more, just
describes me. for the more I think about myseif, the more I’m persuaded that, as a person, I
really don’t exist” (“Diary” 1935-3$ 3$). There is an obvious link between this private
self-perception oflsherwood’s and bis presentation of bis textual nanators. The lack of
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affect and sexuality, the qualitylessness, oflsherwood’s namesake narrator in Goodbye is a
passive aggressive expression of Isherwood’s unrepresentable homosexuality. So, when
Isherwood tums both himself and Alley into barely perceptible Men Without Qualities at
the end of “Travel-Diary,” it is reasonable to wonder about the connection between the
absence ofpersonal characterization and the issue oftheir homosexuality.
Isherwood’s Alley is a Man Without Qualities for virtually the entirety ofthe
“Travel-Diary”s conclusion. What is more, when Isherwood does hint at the idea of
Alley’s fleshly person, his description of the physical feature that will be most significant,
Alley’ s nose, misrepresents Alley’ s actual appearance. Photos reveal that far from having a
“short rugged nose,” Alley had a prominent, long and markedly sharp nose. We have
already seen Hogg’ s eyebrow-raising reference, in his description of Alley’ s boy-swarming
cave, to the “generous proportions ofthe foreigner’s nose” (132). When Simone de
Beauvoir met Alley in Peking in the 195 Os, she too noted that “de près on remarque [.
. .1
son grand nez” (24). Alley’s nose is, in fact, much remarked upon. A New Zealand school
journal, Aotearoa, refers to Alley by the nickname “Kao Pi-tzu—tall nose” (cited in Brady
7), and Brady confirms that Alley’s nose “was big like an eagle’s beak, ah the Alley
relatives on the male side seem to have this nose” (E-mail to author. 3 July 2002). Snow
describes being strnck by “the man’s great head, with a profile like something carved from
Stone Mountain” (Battie 92), “those long-view eyes, his reddish hair, and his hawkhike
nose” (93); and later revisits that description: “Flaming red hair, a big head, a hawkhike
nose. He’s built like a bulldozer” (Beginning 201). Peck concurs with Snow: Alley “was
not a large man, but built on such rugged lines with wide shoulders and a strongly aquiline
face”; “with his prow of a face turned into the wind, he Ïooked like a seer” (1 50).
Alley’s nose utterly dominates the bust of Alley entitled “Profile ofTomorrow”
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which francis Shurrock did for the Royal Academy in 1937 and included in the Academy’s
193$ exhibition. There is no evidence that Isherwood saw the bust there afler he retumed
from China, but a photo ofthe bust in full-snouted profile later illustrated Snow’s Saturday
Evening Post piece. The Chinese too, impressed as aiways by the size of occidental noses,
could flot help noticing Alley’s snout. Alley told Snow ofthe impression bis nose made:
Alley “was riding on an ancient bus through Kiangsi one day when a bearded eider in front
ofhim spoke to a youth seated aiongside. ‘Chinese make better aviators than foreigners,’
the eider enigmatically remarked, ‘they can see on ail sides.’ [. . .] ‘Just take a look at that
Tau Nose behind us. How can he see around an obstacle like that?” (Battle 200). “In
Alley’s case,” continues $now, ever a promoter of Alley’s vision, “the English proboscis
proved no handicap.”
If otherwise there is unanimity that Alley’ s nose was big, long, and sharp, why does
Isherwood represent it as short? In the diary that Isherwood and Auden kept during their
China trip, Isherwood describes Alley as a “stocky rugged nosed New Zealander” (entry for
June 3), and it is out of that phrase that Isherwood generates the image of “A stocky New
Zealander with [. . .] a short rugged nose.” Whether this is an unconscious metonymic lapse
ofmemory in which Aliey’s nose stands flot so much for itself but rather for Alley’s entire
short rugged stature, or whether Isherwood lias deliberately distorted the nasal aspect of
Alley’s physiognomy, the falsification ofthe dimensions ofAlley’s nose emphasizes the
contrast between Alley and Isherwood. Isherwood earlier has Auden remarking on to the
largeness oflsherwood’s own nose—”You looked wonderfui,’ [AudenJ told me [afier
photographing Isherwood iying on lis back during an air raid], ‘with your great nose
cleaving the summer air” (552), a comment which Ishcrwood thought worth quoting again
forty years later in Kind (303).
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The issue of Isherwood’s nose arises in a peculiar diaiy ently made when he was
back in England mulling over his China material. Recognizing that war with Germany
seems imminent, Isherwood decides to keep a journal that “may even be of some value, to
somebody, later” (“Diary 1935-3$” 3$). Rather, though, than a meditation on the global
political crisis, Isherwood writes, with characteristic narcissism that “if I am to do these
notes properly, I’d better begin with a portrait ofmyseÏf’ (39). In the course ofthe same
entry where he applies Musil’s titie “Man Without Qualities” to himself, he also provides
an inventory ofhis features and a self-assessment at age thirty-four. Isherwood observes
“My nose is too big, of course, and it will become fleshy later; but even if it were small and
straight, I certainly could neyer be called good-looking: my head is such an odd shape.”
Like Alley, Isherwood had a short body, but a large nose on a large head (“your
enormous head,” Auden cails it, with a boyish double entendre, in “Birthday Poem”).
Photos in the biographies ofthe two men reveal the resemblances oftheir faces: high
foreheads, same hair cuts, similar eyes, similar smiles, big noses. Yet when he writes in
Joumey of his encounter with Alley, Isherwood does not just ignore his physical similarity
to Alley. He transforms their most prominent similarity, their large noses, into a point of
contrast between them, as if to draw attention away from how similar—physically similar;
and both angry; both gay; both writers; both traumatized by the Great War; both vaguely
left-wing; both, in Isherwood’ s text, men without qualities—they in fact were. The
presentation ofthe single emphatic physical difference ofAlley’s short rugged nose and
Isherwood’s great air-cleaving nose coincides with the jarring idea at the end of “Travel
Diary” of a great difference between their respective practical and ethical stances toward the
socio-political challenges confronting them in China.
The near effacement ofAlley as a person in Isherwood’s conclusion has a political
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and social significance in so far as it presents the liquidation of individuality in materialistic
corporatist or Communist thought and the public invisibility ofthe homosexual. Certainly
there is something unnerving about Alley’s facelessness, just as in Auden’s poems “killing
is aiways an effacement” [original italicsj (Mendelson Later 156). The shock ofthe faceless
Alley’s ominous final ferocious snort is an instance oflsherwood’s progressive revelation
of character through the technique of his “dynamic portraits’ in which “a portrait grows”
through successive revelations “until finally it looks completely different” than it did at first
(Isherwood Conversations 6). The distortion ofAlley’s facial features is harder to account
for, especially since the theme ofthe face is central in both Isherwood’s and Auden’s work.
It is worth recalling that Auden dedicated his Poems (1930) to Isherwood with the
epigraph “Private faces in public places I Are wiser and nicer / Than public faces in private
places”; and that the first page ofMr. Norris focuses on Norris’ face; and that Isherwood’s
work contains so many portraits of individuals to whose faces Isherwood is particularly
attentive. In Joumey, the theme of the face is ubiquitous. In contrast to lis presentation of a
faceless Alley, Isherwood immediately personalizes Charleton as “a big, bald man with the
face ofa good-humoured don orjudge” (587). The ideas ofthe face and ofthe individuality
offeatures recur in Joumey’s sonnets, as does the word “face,” and Auden’s photos in
“Picture Commentary” are predominantly individual portraits. For his part, Isherwood
frequently turns his attention in the “Travel Diary” to reflecting on faces. Leo Oufan Lee
appreciates Isherwood’s perceptive comments on Chinese film acting styles and the then
unrealized expressive potential ofthe Chinese face (109). In fact, analogies to the
photographic and the cinematographic are basic to Isherwood’s understanding of bis own
work, especially texts, like “Travel Diary,” from the late 193 Os. “I am a camera”, writes
Isherwood’s narrator in the opening of Goodbye, and in Lions, the “cinema [. . .1 coincides
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with his fascination for ‘the outward appearance ofpeople—their facial expressions, their
gestures, their walk, their nervous tricks” [sic] (Mizejewski 75 I $5-$6).
The emphasis on the face in Journey contrasts with the facelessness of the Chinese
in Julia Kristeva’s Des chinoises and Roland Barthes’ Alors la Chine?. In those later texts,
“no one person is ever engaged or described. China exists only as a vast landscape of
faceless indistinguishable people—’ce peuple immense’—who are ofone homogeneous
character” (Lowe 181). In L’empire des signes as well, Barthes reads “the Japanese face as
‘un signe vide” (159). Criticizing the persistence of an Orientalizing insistence on the
complete otherness of China and Japan in Kristeva and Barthes’ postcolonial texts, Lowe
explains the recurrence of classical Orientalist motifs in their texts in terms of the umeal
utopian significance “as absolutely nonoccidental phenomena” (17$) that Maoism and the
Cultural Revolution had for much ofthe French left in the early 1970s. Isherwood and
Auden’s insistence on the individuality ofthe Chinese testifies to the radically different,
richer perception of China possible in 193$ when China appeared not as a “utopian
antithesis” (140) to Western culture and Western categories, but, however disorientingly
foreign, appeared also as a real and essential military ally, as a local variant on a global
political crisis, as a cultural interlocutor on par with the West, and as a potentially
democratic as well as a potentially Christian society. In contrast to Barthes, who in
rendering China a transcendent Other “allows little correspondence between the China of
Alors la Chine? and the historical circumstances of strnggle and chance in the People’s
Republic of China” (175) (and who reveals no concem for the circumstances of an
enormous tyranny), Auden and Isherwood do perceive the accidents of individuality,
circumstance, and history in 193$ China.
Though there are photos in the “Picture Comrnentary” of individuals and types
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described in the “Travel Diary,” there is no photo ofAlley. Alley was famous and
photogenic, and his picture would have enhanced the “Picture Commentary,” but a photo of
him would have undone the operations of effacement and defacement that Isherwood has
performed. Alley’s facelessness and the disturbing lack of humanity it implies are
anticipated by Ishenvood’s portrayal ofAgnes Smedley, a friend of Alley1° and unlike Alley
a declared Communist: “That Miss Smedley had agreed to be photographed at ail was a
great concession. ‘If you weren’t a leftist writer,’ she told Auden, ‘I shouldn’t let you do
this. I hate my face” (585). But there is no photo of Smedley either—as if in confirmation
ofthe lady Communist’s willful self-effacement, the photographs Auden had taken of
Smedley were “to our lasting regret [.
. .] ail bluned or spoilt” (586). In contrast, the
inimitable Mme. Chiang has the distinctions of appearing first in the “Picture
Commentary,” of being the only person whose photo appears twice, and of being the only
woman other than a surgically masked nurse to make it into Auden’s gatlery of notable
men. Smedley and Alley share qualities besides facelessness. Like Alley, Srnedley is “so
grim and sour and passionate” (519). There is too their common asceticism: for “Miss
Smedley”, the Red Army is her “whole life—her husband and her child” (581).
Isherwood’s suggestion of Smedley’s total sublimation of her sexuality to her cause
matches the absence of sensuality and subjectivity in Isherwood’s Alley.” Indeed the
10Smedley was also a friend of Clark-Kerr, who totd Freda Utley “he thought Agnes xvas ‘the
greatest woman he had ever met” (Utley Story 107).
111n spite oflsherwood’s impertinent remarks, Srnedley’s love life in China was respectably
passionate. Her loyers included Chinese patrician poet Xu Zhirno; a Manchurian transiator ten
years het junior; a Western surgeon; and a German masquerading as a correspondent while spying
for the Soviets. “Smedley determined to ‘take sex like a man’. for several weeks she seemed to
bring home ‘anything in pants that she found arotind town” (Mackinnon Smedley 140-1). Smedlev
vas “sent packing” from Yenan afier square-dances she organized became occasions for Mao’s
philandering and caused some vociferous marital discord in which Mao’s wife called Smedley an
“Imperialist whore” and Mao a “Son ofa pig, turtle’s egg, whoremongering no-good!” (Chang 194-
5). Ironically, considering his uneasiness in Joumey with what he saw as a pathological seif-denial
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apparent Iack of erotic love in Alley’s life is a striking negative aspect ofthe Airey and
Chapple authorized biographies ofAlley. Only with Brady’s strong recasting ofAlley as a
closeted homosexual riven by contradictions were the erotic dimensions ofAlley’s life
given the attention they deserve as a critical part ofhis human, ail too human. story.
It is as if Isherwood’s dehumanization ofAlley indicates an intuition on Isherwood’s
part ofthe silence and taboo with which Alley managed to cloak lis erotic life. Few were
more sensitive to that kind of silence and taboo than the author of Goodbye, that
masterpiece ofhomosexual indirection and revealing seif-erasure. There is no way to know
for certain whether Isherwood saw Alley as gay, even if popular ideas about the immediacy
ofhomosexuals’ mutual recognition suggest he would have, but Isherwood’s portrayal of
Alley does imply something is amiss. In the overail context ofthe inchoately spirittial
Journey Isherwood’s concluding portrait ofAlley surely makes a humanistic, incipiently
religious point about the omission ofthe individual in collectivist, materialist political
thinking. By contrasting so starkly Isherwood’s own inconveniently fruity self to Alley’s
impersonality, Isherwood dramatizes the risk of the obliteration ofthe individual in AIley’s
objective, narrowly politicised, inhumanly numerical perspective, and reminds us more
generatly of the obliteration of individuality in warfare and in mid-twentieth century
collectivising political movements like Nazism and Communism, and in the modem
reliance on instrumental statistical reason to conceive ofhuman life. Isherwood’s
conclusion also has a specifically homosexual significance. It records the falseness ofthe
lack of affect in the public mask adopted by the closeted homosexual, and enacts the special
risk of the (self-) obliteration of the homosexual in the face of ideological and social
ofsexuality in left-wingers like Alley and Smedley, Isherwood would soon try to escape or
sublirnate his sexuality as he prepared to become a celibate Hindu monk in bohernian Santa
Monica.
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conformism. In this context, the sudden shattering oftheir common qualitylessness through
the revelation oflsherwood’s fruitiness and Alley’s pent up anger becomes an act of
homosexual resistance on Isherwood’s part. This resistance involves, not just Isherwood’s
timid seif-exposure, but in his depiction ofAlley’s nose an implicitly aggressive criticism of
Alley too. The hornosexual context oflsherwood’s conclusion allows us to see in the
dirninishment ofAlley’s nose relative to the insistence on Isherwood’s own big nose a
gesture of symbolic castration. It is as if Isherwood is confirming Alley’s self-excision of
his own phallus, in order for Isherwood to preserve himself from a sirnilar psycho-sexual
mutilation.
SISSYWOOD VERSUS ALLEY-MAN
If Isherwood is ambivalent towards the sexless, faceless ideologues Smedley and
Alley, he also feels that they and others no doubt retum the favour. Alley probably despised
Isherwood’s ineffectual “liberal and humanitarian intellectual,” for as Helen Snow teils us,
Alley “had a blind spot when it came to ‘intellectuals’, who refused to work with their
hands” (301). Isherwood certainly believes that Smedley (who resembles Isherwood in the
way she is “so mercilessly critical ofeveryone, herself included”) judges the young authors
“suspiciously, with her fearless, bitter grey eyes,” and gives Auden and himself “a bad
mark” (519). Even the good natured, fun, but exceedingly vigorous McClure, suspects
Isherwood, “considered our possession ofbeds and a private servant as slightly sissy” (530).
Whatever McClure, Smedley, or Alley (colonials or Arnericans all) thought of
metropolitan Isherwood, the issue oflsherwood’s sissiness cornes to the fore in the
campiness ofhis diary’s closing unes. Isherwood’s suspicion regarding others’
condemnation ofhis sissiness is consistent with Bryant’s question about whether some
critics object to Joumey because ofits authors’ “failure to measure up as ‘real’ men” (142).
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That final picture of the “well-meaning tourist, the liberal and humanitarian intellectual”
wringing his hands and exciaiming “Oh dear” is the book’s most obtrusive moment of
sissiness. The campiness which Isherwood displays so briefly afier Alley’s grim concluding
tour of $hanghai have already been displayed in much more leisurely and hurnourous
fashion at the Joumey’s End, but there the fruitiness is Isherwood’s by association, and is
embodied rather in the person of the risible Mr. Charleton.
The ending’s ftuity “Oh dear” is clearly set in contrast to Alley’s ferocious snorting.
When critics judge Isherwood’s fruitiness harshly, as Swingler does for Isherwood’s
uninvolvement or as fusse!! does for his campiness, they forget to read bis “Oh dear” in
relation to Alley’s snorting reference to 1927. It is easy to reject Isherwood’s fairyishness
and self-conscious helplessness, even easier to do so when we recali Isherwood’s
narcissism, vanity, immoral whoring, taste for impoverished boys, and heartless self
centredness. Less immediately obvious is the sinister potential ofAlley’s asceticism,
faceless selflessness, and bis fierce evocation ofthe Chinese communists. Isherwood’s
persona is rightly an object of criticism, as is Isherwood, but that criticism needs to
engender an equal!y critical evaluation of Alley’s persona. for Isherwood is presenting for
contemplation the tension between irreducible poles ofhuman incompleteness: the
subjective and the objective; the individua! and the collective; the self-indulgently self
involved and the self-abnegating community-minded; the ineffectua!!y benevolent and the
decisively violent.
To use a quintessentially Chinese expression, which Isherwood must have
appreciated, Isherwood allows himselfto lose face. By presenting himself as an impractical
sissy, he invites criticism ofhimself but he is losing face precisely because he shows,
instead of what the suffering of the Chinese and the need for a wartime strategy cail for,
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something ofhis real face. For Isherwood, the human face, the private face in the public
place, flot faceless numbers, flot a public mask, is an uncircumventable bearer ofhuman
truth. This is flot sentimentality, since the truths of the human face are flot necessarily
comforting, but can be as unwelcome as any other form oftruth, including Alley’s. Yet the
unwelcorne truth conveyed through Isherwood’s loss of face must be embraced. As
Cunningham observes, the “reluctant acceptance of lowliness, cowardly baseness, heroic
failure, may be [. . .] the best thing about the ‘30s business ofheroics” (176).
The contrast ofAlley’s compelling impersonal collectivist altruism to Isherwood’s
disturbingly self-centred personal truth involves dimensions in which Isherwood’s political
idiot begins b look more attractive than Alley’s gung-ho cadre. for in the context of 1938,
Isherwood’s campy tourist embodies Isherwood’s demurral ftom a vicious fellow-travelling
ideological conformity. The pressures on young British writers to adopt a proto-Communist
position in the 1930s were enormous, especially in “Hitler’s year” as John Lukacs has called
1938. 1938 was, however, also the year of Stalin’s show trials, and in any case Soviet
atrocities had by then damaged the Communist cause beyond repair, no matter how long the
list is of people who did not accept that it was so. In Joumey, Isherwood reveals that he
will no longer pretend to be or let others imagine that he might be a fellow-traveller. Just
as Auden in “In lime of War” paradoxically tums away from a Marxist position at a
moment of maximum engagement with Marxian perspectives, and does SO by implication,
by omission, or by creative ideological inclusiveness, so Isherwood’s turn is signalÏed
unexpectedly, idiosyncratically, and indirectly, and occurs as he relays AIley’s proto
Communist perspective almost without impediment.
More than just a demurral ftom proto-Communist commitment, however,
Isherwood’s presentation of himself at the end of”lravel Diary” implies an act ofresistance
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specifically to Communist orthodoxy in so far as it challenges current left-wing
condemnation and oppression of homosexuals. When the 1917 Bolshevik revolution
repealed Russian anti-homosexual laws, homosexuals and others had been able to look to
the Communist lefi as the vanguard of a movement to put an end to the legai prohibition of
homosexuality and of a more general sexual liberation. However, “the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union became increasingly puritanical and homophobie under Stalin and finally
promulgated a new anti-sodomy statute in 1934” (Hekma et al 23). Isherwood remembers
being disturbed by Soviet sanctions against homosexuality:
I neyer really joined the Communist Party in any way. [...j the tremendous
stumbiing block to me personally was the homosexual question: the treatment
of homosexuals in Russia—which was absolutely in contravention to their
original declarations, that the private life was no concem—was something
which kept being brought up again and again with my friends [....]
The point was that the Russians started to equate homosexuality with fascism.
And this in itself was such a loathsome piece of hypocrisy that, while I hardÏy
admitted it to myself at the time, I see now that a government that can lie like
that about one thing is really profoundiy rotten ail the way through, and just
like any other government, in fact—and not at ail the Kingdom ofHeaven! So
that alone would prevent me. (Conversations 65)
As an instance ofthe individual’s resistance to political conformism, as a defence ofthe
subjective, idiosyncratic, ineducibly imperfect in human experience, Isherwood’s
foregrounding of the individual situation of his frail self in the final paragraphs of the
“Travel-Diary” has broad political significance. As the assertion of his own fagginess in the
face ofaggressive collectivist prohibition and condemnation, Isherwood’s campy narrator
has a specifically homosexual significance. Between the destruction ofthe Weimar
homosexual emancipation movement, which Isherwood witnessed, and the post-$tonewall
formation of a gay liberationist scnsibility, which in the 1 960s and 1 970s Isherwood helped
usher in, there were many dark nights for homosexuals, whether in Nazi Germany, the
Soviet Union, the McCarthyite United States, or Maoist China. 1938, however, is perhaps
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close to the nadir ofhomosexuais’ public fortunes and ofthe ‘hiding’ period of gay
pubiishing that iasted from 1933 to 1967 (Bergman 6). In this other political context, the
context in which Isherwood’s work is consistently engaged, his public display of sissiness,
rather than being a revelation of apolitical unmanliness, is politically defiant and
courageous.
It is flot that one must now choose the sissy Isherwood as the true hero over the
more heroically masculine Alley. Rather the opposition ofAlley and Isherwood presents a
crucial moment in Isherwood’s development ofthe dialectic ofthe Truly Strong and the
Truiy Weak Men. Beyond Isherwood’s own preoccupation with the Truly Strong and the
Truly Weak, however, Alley and Isherwood, as opposed, but inseparably related terrns,
provide an instructive variation on a contemporary idea ofthe modem hero less ironically
expressed in 193$ in the comic book debuts of the meek, inhibited Clark Kent and lis alter
ego the crusading world-saving Superman. Any evaluation ofthe opposed Alley and
Isherwood personae at the end of “Travel-Diary” must also consider them in the particular
political context ofhomosexuality. Alley’s apparent impersonal objectivity and ferocity
mask personal realities which are flot shown in the “Travel-Diary,” either by Isherwood or
Alley, and which in fact ail bis life the historical Alley would be too weak and vulnerable
to show, and would work diligently to hide. Alley’s whole life, or at least his personally
compromised, ideologicaliy sycophantic post-1949 adventure as crusadïng champion for the
tyrannical CCP, can look from an Isherwoodian perspective like a long self-evading and
futile version ofthe search for the North-West passage. By contrast, it takes some personal
strength for Isherwood to display his weakness and his sissiness in the face of political and
moral prohibitions against homosexuality and unmanliness and in anticipation ofthe certain
condemnation ofreaders like Swingler and Fusseil. Weighing the Alley and Isherwood
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personae in the balance, one must admit that however much falsehood and imperfection
each bears, neither possesses the whole human truth. If each figure is threatened by that
part ofthe truth embodied by the other, surely in 193$ with murderous anti-individualistic
homophobie totalitarianism ascendent in the world and with actual oppression and murders
in the offing for hornosexuals world-wide, the threat ofAlley’s ‘selfless’ truth to Isherwood,
as to Alley hirnself, is much more dangerous than the threat oflsherwood’s selfish and
private sissy truth to Alley. We cannot but be provoked by Isherwood’s out of place
fagginess and uninvolvement in bombed-out Shanghai, but we must also understand that for
good reason the ferociously snorting Alley may be a figure to fear. The danger to individual
integrity inherent in Alley’s position in 193$ has been amply born out not only in the
obliteration ofhomosexuals and human individuals in the history of Communism in China,
but also in the sad fakeness and moral confusion ofAlley’s singular life story. The intuition
ofthis danger seems inextricably part of Isherwood’s portrait ofAlley. Paradoxically, in the
end of the “Travel-Diary,” a moment of apparently maximum objectivity and deferential
substitution of Alley for hïmself, Islierwood crafis a conclusion that lias turned out to be
politieally prophetic, by relying on his own subjective intuition and most private personal
truth.
The end ofthe “Travel-Diary” is not fussell’s moment ofhomecoming and social
reintegration, even if in Shanghai, Auden and Isherwood encounter Auden’s hometown in
the H.M.S. Birmingham and dimensions oftheir cultural selves in the embassy ofthe
British Empire. The ending with Alley is, though, a moment of minor reflection in
Joumey. for in coming face to face with Alley, the reflective authorial substitute,
Isherwood cornes face to face with a version of what he himselfwould have become had he
denied himself rather than weakly defying his own effacement. Isherwood’ s encounter with
271
himself in Shanghai aiso reveals the true obstacle to his integration into society, nameiy
Isherwood’s homosexuality. The final moment of”Travel-Diary” is therefore a crucial
moment in Isherwood’s Chinese joumey “au fond de la connaissance de soi.” As with the
previous endings at the Joumey’ s End and in Wenchow, the painful moment of self
knowledge and seif-revelation with AÏiey in $hanghai requires that Isherwood enact a
wrenching tum away from the faise ideological and personal terminus that Alley represents.
In each of the endings of “Travel-Diary,” Isherwood tums away from a powerful
contemporary vision ofthe world: away ftom a sentimental colonial vision in Wenchow;
away from fascistic erotic hedonism at the Joumey’s End; away from seÏf-denying
impersonal Communist commitment in Shanghai. Together the three endings constitute an
almost compiete, if negative, political programme for the 1930s. Isherwood does flot offer a
concluding moment of social reintegration in “Travel-Diary,” no positive moment of
ideological homecoming. The positive reintegrative moment is left for Auden to achieve at
the end of Joumey afier a long labour of ideological reconstruction by way of the faces and
human categories of “Picture Commentary,” the historical review of the sonnet sequence,
and the sublime messianic reconciliation of”Commentary.” Isherwood does flot represent
such a moment for himself partly because Isherwood’ s homosexuaiity in itself impeded his
reconciliation with any place or world view available in 1938. It is also true, however, that
“Travel-Diary” is not relentiessiy negative. The negative turnings away in the successive
endings of “Travel-Dairy,” as well as the criticai use of the Gospel to present erotic and
spiritual temptation and the surprisingly sympathetic portrayal of missionaries, ail of these
impiicitly aimounce new beginnings as well as endings. They point to the world views and
place where Isherwood wouid begin to make his political and ideologicai homes. They
point to the actually existing electoral republicanism of the United States (which Isherwood
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had encountered between his early 193$ Chinese j oumey and the late 193$ composition of
Journcy); and point to the pacifist Christian activism ofthe Quakers, and beyond that to an
imperfectly realized Vedantic spirituality; they point too to Isherwood’s later gay
f iberationism. It is in the course of his detour through China, which began as lis own
search for the North-West passage, that Isherwood admirabiy, but not recklessly, initiates
these new beginnings by tuming away in “Travei-Diaiy” from the falseness of fascism,
coloniaiism, Communism, sexual heartlessness, and homosexuai seif-denial. It is during bis
Chinese journey that we see a baffled and gay Isherwood encountering the individual
Chinese faces, the “Americans and colonials,” and the genial Christian missionaries, who
direct him away from ail that to the strange place that wili become his home.
CHAPTER SEVEN
A HUMAN APOCALYPSE
Literature is a human apocalypse, man’s revelation to man,
and criticism is not a body of adjudications, but the awareness
ofthat revelation, the lastjudgement ofmankind.
Northrop frye, The Educated Imagination
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FROM THE SONNETS TO “COMMENTARY”
A neglected poem, “Commentaiy” is a defining moment in Auden’s work. Its poetic
shortcomings have prevented critics from perceiving the poem’s thematic soundness. In
“Commentary,” two major themes corne together in a late modemist presentation of
Auden’s emerging postmodern notions ofredemption and ofthe modem city.
“Cornrnentary” constitutes a missing link that joins McDiarmid’s discussion ofthe theme of
the city in Auden and Mendelson’s discussion ofredernptionism in Auden. In
“Commentaiy,” Auden strives to reveal the grounds for an irnperilled human hopefulness
and gestures towards an idea of a paradisal condition that, though an essential aspect of his
vision, remains elusive throughout his work. “Comrnentary” uncovers complementary
messianic principles that become permanent features of Auden’s work.
Few will ever read “Commentary” for pleasure. The cumulative effect of the poem
is of a long droning. Reading it, one sees the pertinence of complaints about the willed
prolixity of some of Auden’s work (Rowse 17). Orwell’s sarcastic comment that with the
work ofthe ‘Auden generation,’ there is a shift from a high modemist “twilight ofthe gods
into a sort of Boy Scout atmosphere of bare knees and community singing” (“Whale” 510)
captures some aspects ofthe ‘later early’ Auden of”Commentary.” The imagery ofthe
poem at one point—”[our dead] aid us everywhere, that in the loyers’ bedroom, [.. . I. ..]
the public meeting, I The enemies of life may be more passionately attacked” (686)—flops
into laughable bathos. In contrast to the assuredness ofJourney’s sonnets, the poem
displays the uncertainty oftone that Fusseli condemns. Despite its defects, though,
“Comrnentary” rewards close attention. Read in the context ofJourney, the poem’s
ambitious vision complements the humorous personal uncertainties of “Travel-Diary” and
the historical perspicacity ofthe sonnet sequence. $een in the context ofthe rest ofAudcn’s
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oeuvre, “Commentary” fascinates, because of the contrast of its aesthetic failings to its
complex thematic success. In our reading, the poem has a special importance because
“Comrnentary” finally resolves the aesthetic and thematic problems of how this book will
end.
One might expect its function as conclusion to make critics attend carefully to
“Commentary,” yet no critic has given “Commentary” a remotely adequate reading. fusseil
in his criticisms ofthe way Journey ends gravitates mistakenly to the ending oflsherwood’s
“Travel Diary” and lumps “Commentary,” with the sonnets, as “among Auden’s very worst
things.” Most critics seem to discourage the idea that “Commentary” is worth trying to
understand. This state ofaffairs is unsurprising. For replete as it is with abstract thouglit,
dense moral argument, heterogeneous historical information, and long complex, sometimes
imperfectÏy structured, sentences, “Commentary” is the book’s least pleasurable section.
“Commentary” is also the culmination one ofthe least aesthetically accomplished strands in
Auden’s work. “Commentary” belongs to a series ofpoems expressing the early Auden’s
Bloomean struggie with his Modemist predecessors, specifically with the unrnastered
influence of Dante as lie had been defined by Eliot and with the modernist-Dantean
aesthetic that the older Stevens and Pound were working through at the same time. This
somewhat neglected strand ofAuden’s work is nonetheless essential in his aesthetic and
ideological development. “Commentary” is a crucial moment in that development and its
engagement with some ofhis most persistent philosophical preoccupations is as profound as
that of the sonnets that precede it. Thus, Biimi’ s description of “In Time of War” as “la più
decisa operazione audeniana del decennio 1930” (25) embraces both the sonnets and
“Commentary.” In contrast, Mendelson, who praises the sonnets as “magnificent” (Early
202), as a “moral achievement” (Later 305), as “Auden’s most profound and audacious
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poem ofthe 1930s, perhaps the greatest English poem ofthe decade” (Early 24$), joins
fusseli in dismissing “Commentary.” For Mendelson, the poem is propagandistic (200),
inauthentic (246), leaden (301), wordy, wooden, lame, tired, circular, simplifving, and self
contradictory (35$). When great poets write as badly as Auden seems to in “Commentaiy,”
particularly when “Cornmentary” is the second part of a sequence whose first part contains
some ofhis best work, it is worth questioning the causes of his lapse.1 This questioning
becomes more urgent as it becomes apparent that the aesthetic failure of “Commentary”
stands in contrast to its thematic accomplishment.
Auden himself was dissatisfied with “Commentary” as a work of art. In the midst of
its composition, he was “uncertain whether this kind ofthing is possible without becoming
a prosy pompous old bore” (Carpenter 242). He later revised “Cornrnentary” for the 1945
American edition ofhis Collected Poetry, though his revisions concern the matter and flot
the maimer ofthe poem. That revised version survives in the 1950 British edition ofhis
Collected $horter Poems, afier which Auden excluded “Commentary” from his canon
(Prose 1: 831). He did, though, allow it to reappear in the 1973 edition of Journey when,
forgetting or undoing his earlier revisions, Auden made new changes to the matter of
“Commentary,” while apologizing for the poem in a preface as far too “preachy in manner”
($31).
Though the revisions of 1945 and 1973 shed no light on Auden’s discontentrnent
with the manner of “Commentary,” they draw attention to ideological nuances in the
original version and to the continuing significance ofthe poem in Auden’s work. More
1One reason for the dullness of”Commentaiy” relative to the sonnets is its diminished
engagement with sexuality’. Whereas an oblique, subtie, or playfuÏ attentiveness to Eros runs
through the sonnets’ review of human conditions past and present, erotic concerns seldom gleam
through the dense dullness of”Commentary.” The inconspicuousness ofEros in “Commentary”
makes more curious the discretely tendentious associations of homosexuality and heterosexuality
with the different terms ofthe poem’s opposition of fascistic militarism to democratic humanism.
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importantly, given the controversies associated with Auden’s revision or rejection of some
early poems, those revisions reveal that Auden neyer repudiated “Commentary.” Auden
may have recognized that “Com;nentaiy” was potentially boring and preachy. Mendelson
may feel that “Commentary” is inauthentic dross, but unlike various unpublished, revised,
or disowned poems such as “Spain 1937” and “September 1, 1939” with which Mendelson
groups “Cornmentary,” Auden neyer condemns “Commentary” as morally or ideologically
offensive, other than in his mild remark that the poem was “too New Deal” (Mendelson
Early 200n)—a belated confirmation that the U.S. ofRooseveit is in sorne ways Joumey’s
real ideologicai destination. Rather than reject it, Auden even gave the poem a retrospective
emphasis when, violating the chronological order ofhis work, he used it pointedly as the
conclusion to the Coilected Shorter Poems (Beach 8). furthermore, writing in 1973 in
defence ofthe function ofthe poet as preacher, Auden implies that, though he “should do it
very differently,” he might even “preach the same sermon to-day” (Prose 1: 830). In spite
ofhis uncertainty about the poem’s style, Auden stands by the substance of “Commentary.”
One aesthetic difficulty in “Commentaiy” derives from Auden’s efforts to write
about human virtue to resolve not just the compositional problem of how Journey should
end, but to resolve the ethical problems of what the End of Man is, of how one should live,
and how one should act in the political crises of 1938. One easily imagines how urgent this
task must have seemed. “Conimentary” is a flawed poem in part because ofthis topical
urgency, but also because, as Auden wouid write later, without the exceptional assistance of
Ariel, the description of virtuousness, of “Thick-headed goodness,” is ofien a “bore”
(CoÏlected 406). k is also true, though, that “neyer / to be duli shows a lack oftaste” (693),
as Auden notes ofpoetry and truth in “The Cave ofMaking,” and for ail its duilness,
“Comrnentary” deserves attention as one ofAuden’s most ethically, conceptually, and
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ideologically fraught poems.
“Commentary” is also a key poem because it participates in Auden’s discovery of
lis mature rhetorical pattern. Mendelson’s description ofthe rhetorical pattem of myth and
parable, enchantment and disenchantment, in the later Auden corresponds to the pattern of
rhetoric in Joumey’ s sonnet sequence and to the inherent Before and Afier structure of a
sonnet’s octave and sestet. We have also seen the Before and Afier, or Then and Now,
alternation that structures successive chapters in Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” and seen how
this temporal binarism is analogous to a set of interactive binary structures developed
throughout Joumey. The whole example of Joumey makes it imperative that we examine
closely the binary relationship ofthe parts of”In Time ofWar.” The exact arithmetical
analogy that we noted in chapter three between the ratio of the two parts of a sonnet and the
two parts of “In Time of War” suggests that “Commentary” follows the sonnet sequence of
according to an intentional logic. Formally, the relationship ofthe first and second parts of
“In Time of War” looks like the conventional relationship of the first and second parts of a
sonnet. As a purely proportional relation, this is merely curious. However, as an aspect of
Auden’s fascination with sonnet structures in Journey and an indication of a semantic
dimension in the relationship between the sequence of sonnets and “Commentary,” the
formai relationship of the two parts of “In Time of War” helps us interpret the significance
ofboth parts. Semantically, the crucial aspect of this relationship relates to the idea ofa
turn. Just as there is a tum between octave and sestet, so is the sonnet-like relationship of
parts in “In Time of War” indicative of a turn occuring between the sonnets and
“Commentary.”
Although the precision of the formal relationship of “Commentary” and the sonnet
sequence indicates that there is a comprehensible logic to the relationship between the two,
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no one has ever discussed the relationship ofthe different parts of”In Time ofWar.” It is
flot enough to note that the sonnets are more successful than their “Commentary.” Nor is it
enough to note that “Commentary,” in some unclear way, “performs the service promised
by its title. It elucidates at great length the historical sonnets in the first haif of the
sequence” (Mendelson EarÏy 358). In fact, this is untrue, since “Cornmentary” is as
concerned with the present moment of 1938 and the Sino-Japanese War as are the sonnets
ofthe sequence’s first half. “Comrnentary” actually reveals, relative to the sonnets, a much
more conscientious and systematic effort on Auden’s part to integrate an awareness of
Chinese history and culture into a large historical vision and into his perception ofthe
present geopolitical moment. Though critics have neglected “Commentary” and the
multifaceted relationship of the two parts of “In Time of War,” “Commentary” is at least as
historically and cosmically comprehensive, and as thematically and dialogically rich, as the
sonnet sequence; its poetic has its own complex inner workings to which only close reading
grants one access.
The complexity of both parts of “In Time of War” and the overlap of their subj ect
matter obscure the nature ofthe tum that occurs as we move from Auden’s epic sonnets to
his “Commentary.” Yet given the semantic, syntactic, and rhetorical emphases on the turn
in the sonnets, and given the defining significance in Auden’s work ofthe turn ftom mythic
enchantment to parabolic disenchantment, it is critically important to understand the tum
between the parts of”In Time ofWar.” The principal qualities ofthis turn are quite simple,
though the development of its implications is not. The turn from the sonnets to
“Commentary” confirms Fichte’s insistence on the ethical necessity oftuming from
speculative, self-reflective irony to “action” and “determinate knowledge,” and confirms
Mileur’s insistence on the need for authentic desire to find an accomodation with the world.
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Leaving behind the speculative irony that has characterized Joumey so far, “Commentary”
moves toward what Booth describes as stable, though still infinite, irony, and toward a
starkly determinate vision ofactual political and ethical choices. In so doing,
“Commentary” outlines a definite political position and articulates a positive vision ofthe
infinite condition of human discourse in which an authentic human desire can accomodate
an authentic temporality.
Another essential aspect of the tum is that, while “Commentary” revisits both the
sonnet sequence’s ‘historicai’ review ofthe human past from Creation onwards and its
survey ofthe war-torn present of 193$, it distinguishes itselffrom the sonnets (and from the
conclusion oflsherwood’s “Travel-Diary”) in the way it proceeds to turn toward the
perspectives ofthe future and to reveal how we are to live for the future. It is not that the
sonnets are neyer concemed with the future. The future tense occurs a half-dozen tirnes in
the second halfofthe sequence: the actions ofthe Japanese bomber pilots in XV show that
at “any time it will be possible / To turn away from freedom” (674); the death in XVIII of
the Chinese soldier whom we will forget raises the question ofthe more dignified future bis
death may have made possible; in XXVII, the future tense is used negatively to insist “we
neyer will be perfect,” and the future implicit in XXVII’s concluding infinite regress is a
future of the etemal recurrence of the alternation of our flight from fteedom and our
recognition of our freedom. The future is also envisioned negatively in XIV where there is
the siim chance we might one day be free of “the intelligent and evil” because after ail “they
die” too.
Only in the sestet of XX, however, does Auden raise the issue of the future as an
explicit question to which it is possible to imagine a substantial response, as a problem that
is something more than a purely formai temporal category. XX tums to the question of the
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future tbrough a riddlingly metaphoric linking of present to the future:
We live here. We lie in the Present’s unopened
Sorrow; its limits are what we are.
The prisoner ought neyer to pardon his ccli.
Can future ages ever escape so far,
Yet feel derived ftom everything that happened,
Even from us, that even this was well? (676)
There are two metaphoric ideas here. One is the idea ofthe present as a prison-ceil, a
metaphor developed more fully in “In Memory ofW.B. Yeats” where “each in the celi of
himself is almost convinced of his freedom” and “In the prison of his days / Teach the free
man how to praise.” In XX, though, the unpardonable prison ofthe prescnt is made
tolerable, flot by some iilusory freedom or inextinguishable capacity to praise, but by a
future which stiil offers the possibility of escape. There is a progressive or dialectical hope
implicit in the sonnet’s final question about whether the future will ever be able to cscape
from the past and present, even “from us,” to the point that everything, including the
unpardonable “this” of our present, will seem to have been well because, presumably, it will
have been a step on the way to an emancipated future. It is unlikely, however, that many
future-dwellers like us would agree that we have far enough escaped from the horrors of the
twentieth-century that we can indeed fcel that even they were well.
The possibility ofhope in the future that XX’s question evokes has, however,
already been betrayed by the sestet’s opening metaphor: “We lie in the Present’s unopened /
Sonow.” There is a pun on “present” here; so that the unopened sorrow ofthe poem’s
present moment is also the gifi ofthe present. As fuller notes, the unopened gifi ofa
present moment is that moment’s future (239), and in XX what lies in the unopcncd gifi of
193$ is a future of neither hope nor emancipation, but of sorrow. The sorrow that is the
content ofthe punningly metaphoric present suggests that the hope implicit in the sestet’s
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final question may be a lie told by those who must otherwise live within the present’s
imprisoning limits. At the same time, the future “actually is unlimited, and need not be
sorrowful at ail” (239); thus the idea ofa future of sonow may be as much a lie as the idea
ofa future ofhope. XX’s sestet suggests that anything we imagine about the future
contained within the limits ofthe unopened present is almost ofnecessity a lie.
The sonnets’ various glimpses ofthe future and particularly XX’s riddling
problematization ofthe relationship ofthe present to the future are hardly insignificant, but
it is really in “Commentary” that the perspective ofthe future becomes a primordial concern
in “In Time of War.” The turn to the future in “Commentary” is, however, a temporal tum
only in a purely formai, empty way. The future in “Comrnentary” is flot a futurologist’s
concretely imagined future; it is flot a predicted, foreseeable, future; it has no time-line; it is
flot even announced with the future tense. The turn to the future is an ethical, apocalyptic
tum that seeks to reveai what it is we are to live for. The future in “Commentary” is a
question ofa choice. In “Cornmentary,” ‘choice’ ceases to be, as it has been in die sonnets,
an abstract theme through which Auden contemplates historical, developmental, or
metaphysical aspects of the human condition. As we turn from the sonnets to
“Commentary,” the theme of choice mutates into a presentation of the actual choices facing
mankind, the political, ethical choices ofthe historical moment of 193$. The principal
choices presented in “Commentary” are the immediate choice between Fascisrn and anti
fascism and the teleological choice ofhow and for what humanity shouid choose to live.
In “Commentaiy,” as the theme of choice narrows to the urgent ethical-political
issue that hinges on the endorsement or rejection of fascism, the future becomes a
prophetic, apocaÏyptic, messianic horizon. After the poem’s reviews ofthe past ofthe
cosmos and ofhuman history and ofthe current geopolitical moment, “Cornmentary” opens
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onto its closing revelation ofthe ends for the sake ofwhich individuals and humanity
should live. Identifying three messianic ends for which we should live—Jen, Justice, and a
united world—the poem explicitly defers their achievement to an indefinite futurity, but
offers them as ethical orientations for the future. As one might expect of a work that plays
with the problems of beginnings and endings, Joumey ends, flot with satisfying closure and
the sense of an ending, but with an opening onto the indefinite perspective of an infinite
future that hangs on our uncertain choice. But then, as Gottlieb writes of the messianic,
“the teÏos of human life is precisely not to reach an end—either in the sense of achieving a
purpose or coming to a conclusion. On the contrary, the end is to begin” (141). What
“Commentary” reveals at Joumey’s end is precisely the End of Man, that for the sake of
which we are to live; and this final revelation tums out to be the new beginning Journey bas
been seeking from the outset.
THE PLACE 0f “COMMENTARY” iN AUDEN’S WORK
In his 1973 preface, Auden cails “Commentary” a sermon, thus providing a due to
what one should expect ofthe poem: some public oratory, some seriousness, some dullness,
some edification. Characterizing “Commentary” as a sermon recalis two earlier sermons in
Auden’s work. The first is The Orators’ “Address for a Prize-Day” whose opening is
Auden’s “parody ofa sermon from his schooldays” (Mendelson Early 9$). The second is
the Vicar’s sermon in The Dog, beginning “What was the weather on Eternity’s worst day?”
and first published as “Sermon by an Armament Manufacturer” (Auden English 423).
Thematic elements from both earlier sermons recur in “Commentary.” The address from
Orators shares with “Commentary” an explicit orientation to the “here now,” allusions to
Dante’s example, concems with the relationship ofthe living to the dead, and a
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comprehensive wish to cure humanity, while “Sermon by an Armament Manufacturer”
prefigures the concem in “Commentary” with eternity. the cosmos, combat, freedom,
tyraimy, the power of the State, the absence of God, and the contrast of spiritual wish and
worldly violence.
Both those earlier sermons, however, are in prose and parodic. These differences
throw into relief the stylistic difficulties in “Conmientary.” for one thing, Auden writes in
verse where prose might be the more congenial form. frye describes the sermon as a “prose
form founded on the exhortation” (Anatomy 296) which emphasizes “social action and
individual thought” (326-7). A sermon is to prayer, rhetorically, as epos is to lyric, where
epos designates literature in which “the radical of presentation is oral address” and
embraces “ail literature, in verse or prose, which makes some attempt to preserve the
convention of recitation and a listening audience” (248-9). Reading “Comrnentaiy” flot for
lyrical inwardness but for outward-directed oral address, one begins to find its discursive
clunkiness as poetry less off-putting.
In “Commentary” Auden also tries to write seriously in a genre which he lias
hitherto parodied. This new seriousness, along with the idea that a sermon is intended to
provoke thought and action in its audience and with the poem’s concem for mankind as a
creature who “conmmnicates, and chooses” (682), suggests that interpretation cannot avoid
the elucidation of what Auden is attempting to communicate. “Commentary,” as Spears
perceives, “is of special interest as an explicit statement of Auden’s ideas in this transitional
period” (Disenchanted 132), and clarification ofthe arguments of “Commentary” is
frmndamental to readings ofthe poem. More, though, than a transitional period in Auden’s
thinking, 1938 is a critical year in Euro-American and Asian civilizations, and
“Commentaiy” gains in interest when read as a record ofthose interdependent public crises.
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Just as “Commentary” cornes into focus through comparisons to Auden’s earlier
sermons, so other poems reveal other essential features of “Commentary.” Replete with
recycled material, the poem grows out of a compost of earlier writing. It appears alternately
as a barely serviceable patchwork ofrecycled odds and ends, and a phllosophicaÏly topical
collage ofheterogeneous insights. Perhaps having “lefi China empty-handed” (Carpenter
Auden 239), Auden like lsherwood who had to rely on Alley’s pamphlet to conclude his
“Travel-Diary,” was so strapped for material that he had to mine his old notebooks in order
to fit! out Journey. few poems better illustrate Isherwood’s rernark that sorne ofAuden’s
poems resemble anthologies of unes rescued from rejected poems and reworked into a new
one (Exhumations 19).2 It is, though, notjust a matter ofAuden opportunistically salvaging
reusable material, for “Commentary” involves an ambitious rethinking of thematic and
philosophical concerns. The poem restates conclusively themes, intuitions, and concerns
that had preoccupied him through the thirties. Key series ofpoerns lead up to
“Commentary” and another key series extends beyond it. Though any judgement about its
meaning must derive from the poem’s own argument, those other poems provide important
glosses on “Commentary.” Approached through those poems, “Commentary” becomes a
missing link in Auden’s ideological and thematic development between urgent, but
frequently unachieved work from earlier in the 193 Os and major subsequent work ofthe
1940s. Much ofthe poem’s difficulty arises from the fact that several complex themes that
Auden has been thinking through intersect in it. The intersection of such themes and the
2
“Commentary” echoes two stanzas ofthe 1932 “0 Love, the interest itself in thoughtless Heaven,
a formai and thematic precursor of “Commentary.” “Comrnentaiy” aiso adapts, from an
unpublished 1933 sequence of love sonnets, the phrases “the zone where casualties begin,” “the
great trackways where our tribe is nothing, ““the night’s tiny noises everywhere / Beat vivid on the
owl’s developed ear, I Vague in the watchman’s” (English 146-7), and from a 1937 poem, “The
moon [lights] / The sleepers ruined in a brief embrace” (288). Mendelson, McDiarmid, and fuller
identify further materiat dating from 1927 through 1938 that is recycled in “Commentary.”
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affiliation of”Commentary” with other poems indicate its thematic and developmental
importance. As this thematic significance of cCommentary becomes clearer, so does the
relation of its ideological ambitions to its poetic flaws.
One important series ofpoerns with which “Commentary” bas significant
affiliations derives from Auden’s unfinished 1932 epic “In the year ofmy youth.”
Mendelson characterizes “In the year of my youth” as a poem in cantos based on Langland
and Dante which Auden abandoned “at the point where its structural logic required him to
compose a third canto portraying the Communist paradise to foÏlow the capitalist heu and
revolutionaiy purgatory oftlie first two” (Later 103). The original matrix of a rich thematic
complex that Auden develops throughout his work and the source of materials for poems
and plays throughout the 1930s, “In the year ofmy youth” “makes visible patterns and
relations” within Auden’s work and puts the “rest ofAuden’s poetry in a new perspective”
(McDiarmid “Year” 279). In “Commentary” Auden reuses fifieen unes from the
unpublished earlier poem and further develops themes that poem had originally broached.
“In the year of my youth” shares with several of Auden’ s greatest poems—”New Year
Letter”, Anxiety, “Memorial for the City”, and “City Without Walls”—the expression of
“certain attitudes to the city” (McDiarmid “Year” 279-2$ 1). In particular, those later poems
borrow ideas and images from the infernal vision of the city in “In the year of my youth.”
Whether the later poems “are concerned with the redemption ofthe contemporary city”
(280), or show “the contemporary city flot as a ‘chaos of values’ but as a deviation from
Value” (280), or involve a “notion ofthe city as a nightmare ofimpersonality and
mechanization” and a “notion of an historical ‘fali’ in the seventeenth century” (281), the
attitudes of”In the year ofmy youth” function in those subsequent poems as views to be
rejected (280). For McDiarmid, “Auden’s later poems propose, and then deny, that the city
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is a waste land, or that history is a process of decline. The resolutions are various—loving
your crooked neighbour, seeking God in the Kingdom of Anxiety, or building the Just
City—but the poems generally begin with the vision of autumn, 1932” (2$ 1).
Though McDiarmid fails to consider “Commentary” as part ofthe series ofpoems
deriving from “In the year ofmy youth,” ail the rejected attitudes ofthose later poems are
present in “Comrnentary.” In fact, since it antedates the poems McDiarmid identifies, those
poems must be read as reaching back flot just to “In the year of my youth” but to
“Commentary,” one oftwo published works (the other is The Dog) in which versions ofthe
vision of”In the year ofmy youth” actually appeared during the 1930s. Thus, the unes
“His predilection / As we wander and weep is with us to the end” (Collected 535) ftom
Anxiety’s conclusion quote “We wander on the earth {. . . f. . .] and weep for the lost ages”
(684) from “Commentary.” Furthermore, Anxiety with its interlocking set of four endings
is a more focussed and controlled version of the technique ofpresenting multiple endings
that Auden and Isherwood develop in Joumey, and, as we shah see, the orthodox
concluding messianism that Auden articulates at the end of Anxiety also reaches back to a
similar, if more improvised and idiosyncratic, concluding salvationism in “Commentary.”
For its part, the opening section of “New Year Letter” provides justifications for that
poem’s disowning ofthe “preacher’s loose immodest toile” and the “slip and slapdash” of
earlier poems such as “Commentary” (Collected 204), and for its adoption of a tone that is
less self-serious, and more intimate, light, and informaI (206). In “New Year Letter,” his
earlier tone is expÏicitly associated with his time and mood in Brussels (199), the city where
he composed “Commentary.” That earhier tone is contrasted with bis mood in Manhattan a
year later where he is writing “New Year Letter,” even as the latter poem revisits, flot to
disown but to expand on, a great number of concems that first appeared in the earlier poem.
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“New Year Letter” extends, for instance, specific metaphysical and historical arguments
from “Commentary” (y. Fuller 321). Characteristically, Auden’s use ofform signais the
relationship between the poems. “New Year Letter” was first published in The Double Man
with the sonnet sequence “The Quest” following it. The correspondences between the parts
of “In Time of War” and The Double Man—the “Quest” revisiting themes first explored in
the sonnets of”In lime ofWar” and “New Year Letter” standing in the same relation to
“Commentary”—as weIl as the fact that the order ofthe corresponding parts is inverted,
suggest that “Commentary” and “New Year Letter” should be considered together.
Mendelson allows that Auden wrote “The Quest” on the model of the 193$ sonnet
sequence, and as a corrective to those earlier sonnets (Later 135), but bis distaste for
“Commentary” does flot allow him to see it in its similarly rich relationship to “New Year
Letter.” In Auden’s Collected Poems which, as his preface notes, is arranged according to
the chapters ofhis life, lis Chinese sonnets appear immediateiy before “New Year Letter,”
while the “Quest” has been dissociated from the latter. This suggests a development from
“In Time of War” to “New Year Letter,” and suggests that the latter is the adhieved
commentary on the former’s sonnets ofwhich the uncanonical “Commentary” was the
original sketch.
“Commentary” anticipates “New Year Letter” and ail the other offspring of “In tIc
year of my youth.” The seuing of “Comfflentary” is bombed out, divided, occupied
industrial Shanghai: “For this material contest that lias made Hongkew I A terror and a
silence, and Chapei a howiing desert, I Is but the local variant of a struggie in which ail [are
implicated]” (681 -2)—and the poem intimates the redemption of war-tom Shanghai and
China: “As now I hear it, rising round me from Shanghai, / [The voice ofMan crying] [... /
] RalÏy die lost and tremblingforces ofthe wiÏl / [...] Tili they construct at last a hurnan
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justice (6$7-8). This bleak redemptive vision of the modem city degraded or laid waste
recurs in “Memorial for the City” and “New Year Letter.” With its juxtaposed “cities,
deserts” (682) and its comparison ofwar-ravaged Shanghai to a desert, “Commentary” is
the origin of Auden’ s contrast of the desert and the city in the concluding prayer of “New
Year Letter” (Collected 242). This contrast recurs in Hand and in The Enchafèd flood in a
concluding apology for the civilizing persona of the later Auden: “We live in a new age [..
.J in which the heroic image is not the nomad wandering through the desert [. .] but the
less exciting figure ofthe builder, who renews the ruined walÏs ofthe city” (150). This later
observation, for Jed Esty, summarizes “beautifully” the “thematic shifi from discovery to
rebuilding in late modernism” (224). It is an observation whose details are aH predicated on
lessons learned in Journey. If the renovative vision ofthe war tom city in “Commentary”
represents a shift from high to late modemism, the uncertainties ofthe poem’s manner
express the instabilities ofthis transition as Auden moves toward the great late ‘city’ poems
that are artful and enduring achievernents of bis late modemist condition. Indeed from this
late modernist perspective, Auden articulates a founding post-modern vision to which his
career-long aesthetic and ideological interests in cities, building, and architecture are
central.
The Shanghai of”Commentary” belongs with London, Berlin, New York, Brussels,
Madrid, Rome, and other modem cites that figure prominently in Auden’s work, and behind
which hovers the spectre of Eliot’ s Waste Land and the modem theme of the degraded,
dehumanized city (“Metropolis, that too-great city,” as Auden describes it in “Memorial for
the City, or “Megalopolis” as he cails it later in “City Without Walls”). It is well to
remember, however, that though the explicit setting of “Commentary” is Shanghai, two
other Chinese cities are also significant in Joumey. For the writing of Joumey must be
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conceived of as suspended between the Rape ofNanking in December 1937 and the Fail of
Wuhan in October 1938. Nanking, afier its infamous massacre was stili smoking when
Isherwood and Auden departed for China, and Wuhan was falling, at the cost of $00,000
lives, as they submitted their completed typescript.3
The desire to salvage civilization defines a series of redemptive poems in which
“Commentary” figures prominently. Mendelson gives the fullest discussions ofthe
deveiopment ofthe redemptive messianic idea and experience in Auden’s early work.
Unfortunately, Mendelson is no kinder to “Commentary” as a redemptive poem than he is
to the idea of its poetic competence. He far too quickiy throws “Commentary” on the
ideologicai rubbish heap with earlier flawed redemptive poems. Consequently, he misjudges
“Commentary,” in terms of its redemptive argument, its function in Journey, and its place
among Auden’s poems ofredemption. Nonetheiess Mendelson establishes a context for the
messianic features of “Commentary.” Mendelson shows where “Commentary” occurs in the
deveiopment ofAuden’s redemptive ethicai and social thought through the 1930s.
“Commentary” concludes a series ofpoems in which Auden works through the themes of
social redemption and of individual redemptive heroism. “It ail began”, writes Mendelson,
“in the autumn of 1933” (Early 239) when Auden began seeking for prophets of”a new
life” and for “a brief and secret interval” sought a role for himself “that was nothing less
3lndeed, since the atornic bombings of 1945 need to be remembered flot only in relation to Japan’s
war with the United States, but also to Japan’s invasion of China with its innovative bombing of
civilian populations, its calculated atrocities, the intensity ofthe slaughters ofNanking and Wuhan,
and the doggedness ofa Chinese resistance which tied up most of Japan’s army, we can add
Nagasaki and Hiroshima to the cities whose redemption “Commentaiy,” even with its cali for the
defeat ofJapan (687), seeks to envision. The stalemate in the Sino-Japanese theatre that followed
the Batties ofNanking and Wuhan would only be broken when, to adapt Auden’s retrospectively
ominous phrase, the two Japanese cities “receive[dJ the slanting radiations” (687). This
interpretive drift from an image of solar radiation to nuclear radiation is encouraged by the previotis
year’s une in “Spain” about “the graduai exploring ofall the I Octaves of radiation.” Leaving
behind the wasteland of Shanghai, Auden and Isherwood themselves passed through Nagasaki, as
Isherwood reminds us, “seven years before the atomic bomb” (Kind 310).
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than redemptive—the role ofthe poet as messianic prophet, healer, and reconciler” (238).
Auden unfolds the poetic and ethical implications ofthe ideas ofredemption and the
redemptive hero, beginning in 1933 with what Mendelson describes as “the most
problematic poem Auden ever wrote” (Early 241), and culminating in 1938 with
“Commentary.” The unpublished 1933 poem which first states Auden’s “redemptive
ambition” is problematic for technical and conceptual reasons. Expressing the desire that
the world, or at least the poet’s “generation” and “race,” be saved, the poem is a “self
preventing” testament that involves a paradox of prophetic writing, namely that it is
“written in order that it may flot be written” (242). In Auden’s case, the poem ends up more
“concerned with its own composition, and ultimately with preventing itself from being
written” than with “the purpose of saving his generation” and helping “rescue an
endangered public” (243).
The poem’s argument is circular. What will save humanity is “the testament
[readers] themselves would write had they flot been changed by reading it” in Auden’s
poem first (242). The poet charges a “prophetic friend” to write this saving testament,
which is actually humanity’s own testament, though it is the poet himselfwho irnmediately
proceeds to write it (243). A similar circularity and short-circuited ventriloquism occurs at
the end of “Commentary” when the poet hears the messianic speech of the “human cry” that
he himself is actually articulating. In “Commentary,” rather than seeming hopelessly
contradictory, this representation of intersubjective redemptive reciprocity is ethically
interesting and conceptually defensible as, among other things, a means of reconciling
authentic temporality with authentic desire. That it is a view of human interdependence
which lends itselfto gushy idealism or to delusional self-importance does not entirely
invalidate it.
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More problematic than the 1933 poem’s compositional and generic complications is
the fact that Auden himselfwrites as the saving prophet. for Mendelson, this is an episode
ofhubris with far reaching consequences for Auden. Only a saving reticence about publicly
assuming the role ofredeemer explains why Auden neyer “could finally bring himselfto
publish his early redemptive poems” (252). Unpublished or uncanonical, though they
would remain, Auden’s adaptions ofthe 1933 poem and bis reexaminations ofthe idea of
himself or others as redemptive heroes are crucial to bis development through the 193 Os. In
1934 Auden reuses stanzas from the 1933 poem twice. He first transfened seven stanzas
that presented the earlier poem’s saving testament (242) to “The Malvems,” a poem in
which Auden is wTitlng about “secular redemption” (240). In “The Malverns” Auden
avoids the objectionable “circular argument of their original context” when he attributes the
poem’s testament to “a generation already dead, the fallen of 1914-191$” (242). The role of
the dead as redemptive spokesmen also recurs in “Commentary.” Several other stanzas
from the original 1933 poem were transferred to another poem which like the original and
like “Commentaiy” was written in unrhymed triplets and which opens with an “apocalyptic
warning” (243) in unes that Auden later adapts in F6 and “Commentary:” “Sweet is it,’ say
the doomed, ‘to be alive though wretched’; / But here the young emerging from the closed
parental circle, / To whose uncertainty the certain years present / Their syllabus of limitless
anxiety and labour (“five Early Poems” 52). This poem constitutes Auden’s “most detailed
program for salvation.” In contrast to the 1933 poem, Auden “was more wary ofdeclaring
bis personal role.” The redemptive responsibility “he now assigned to real contemporaries
whose names he listed and whose wisdom lie conveyed” (Mendelson 243). freud,
Groddeck, Marx, Lenin, the two Lawrences, Gerald Heard, Schweitzer, and others
(including physicists who made the atomic bombs of 1945 possible) somehow all “promise
rescue.”
So “magical is the power ofthe healers’ names that by the latter part of the poem the
disaster that seemed inescapabie in the beginning now seems easy and exciting to avert”
(244). When “Commentary” revisits the theme ofintellectual and scientific heroes, they do
flot appear as secular redeemers. Rather we find a trahsion des clercs in which “many
famous cierks,” including Piato, Shang-tzu [sic], Machiavelli, Hobbes, Regel, and
Bosanquet, act as insidious apoiogists for falsely redemptive, fascistic power politics. Or,
we find that in the cases of Descartes and Galileo, their historic roles, while flot evil, are
entirely negative and critical. In a poem much concemed with building and renovation,
their role is deconstnictive rather than constructive; and, in the crucifixion-evoking phrase
“flot knowing what they did, [they] sapped belief’ (683), they are inadvertently offensive to
some divine principle as they render obsolete the messianic dispensation of medieval
Christian culture.
One reason why Auden had to keep taking his earlier redemptive poems back to the
drawing board is the sophomoric vagueness oftheir imaginary solutions to real disasters.
The 1934 poem, notes Mendelson, remains “oddÏy reticent about the pioneering choice” it
demands (245). The poem’s final lines—”And to our vision lead of one great meaning /
Linking the living and the dead, within the shadow / 0f which uplifiing, loving, and
constraining power / Ail other reasons do rejoice and operate”—are very close to the
concluding “vision of human justice” in “Commentary.” In the 1934 poem, however, “by
defining his redemptive program aimost entireiy by negatives, or by terms that cancel each
other out, Auden managed to avoid giving any precise indication of what he had in mmd”
(245). One way to evaluate “Commentary” is to ask whether Auden manages in 1938 to
speli out a more convincing program than that ofthe 1934 poem. What we will find is that
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wbife the nature of both the apocalyptic tbreat and its solution are indeed clearer in
“Commentary,” the hopefulness in the poem also seems more tenuous.
In 1934 Auden, however, immediately rcjected his redemptive fantasy. In May of
that year he wrote the sonnet “A Misunderstanding,” which Mendelson identifies as “the
first of bis poems in which he writes as his own severest critic,” developing a “precise and
devastating critique ofAuden’s fantasy that the world needed him to save it” (247). In
1936’s f, Auden equates the “redemptive hero and fascist dictator in an explicit rebuke to
his fantasy” (248). It is easy to appreciate the motivations of such a seif-rebuke given that
Auden’s 1933 and 1934 ‘fantasies’ ofhimselfand others as redeemers had coincided with
Hitler and the Nazi’s ascension to power and with such Iandmarks of redemptive
propaganda as Riefenstahl’s “Triumph ofthe WiIl.”4 Ins exploration of the theme of
the redemptive hero, the “significant parallel is between Ransom and Auden” (251) so that
at “his most seif-important—and sometimes hysterical—mornents, Ransom’s speeches turn
into exact transcriptions ofAuden’s unpublished poems in triplets” (249). Tbrough
Ransom, Auden is disowning the “part of himself for which the character stands” (251) and
Auden’s treatment of Ransom “amounts to a psychological critique ofthe redemptive
fantasy, but with theological overtones” (253). For Mendelson, Auden in F6 exorcises “the
private disorders that gave rise to the redemptive ambition in the first place” (255) and
“buries the notion that he himself could save his readers” (256). By 1936, Mendelson
concludes, “redemptive heroism is dead as a possibility, for himselfand for everyone else”
(256).
The next item in Auden’s development of the redemptive idea is “In Time of War,”
with X’s anonymous messiah and “Commentary” itself. Mendelson’s use ofthe term
‘ Auden alludes critically to Riefenstahl’s film in “Canzone” (y. Gottlieb 170, 262n37).
295
“fantasy” to describe Auden’s messianic poems precludes the possibility of taking such
poems seriousiy. Certainly this possibility is dead for Mendelson after ‘s association of
the dictator with the theme ofredemption, and his remarks on “Commentary” in Early
condemn the poem as a dead end and as mere inauthentic repetition of ideas Auden had
outgrown. Nonetheless, there is more to “Commenta;y” than Mendelson’s dismissive
comments suggest. Rather than the end ofthe redemptive theme in Auden, “Commentary”
is its consolidation, a summing up ofAuden’s entire previous development ofthe theme,
and the poem which allows Auden to proceed to redemptive poems such New Year Letter,
Anxiety, “Memorial for the City,” and “City Without Walls” which McDiarmid identifies as
growing out of “In the year of my youth.” As with the theme of the city, “Commentary” is
pivotai in Auden’ s deveiopment of the theme of redemption. It revisits and extends
virtuaiiy ail Auden’s earlier explorations ofthe theme: 1932’s epic “In the year ofmy
youth,” the 1933 presentation ofAuden as redeemer, “The Malverns” and the other untitled
poem from 1934, and l936’s F6. “Commentary” also points to further transformations in
Auden’s understanding ofthe nature ofredemption. Those iater messianic elaborations are
more poetically assured than “Commentary” and their other precursors, and in association
with the theme ofthe city, constitute one ofthe major accomplishments ofAuden’s late
modemist renovative vision of twentieth-century civilization. “Commentary,” however, is
flot a transitory moment in the story ofAuden’s development ofthe idea ofredemption; like
the sonnet sequence of “In Time of War,” which has been too facileiy read as merely
transitionai, “Commentary” is in its own right a major statement ofAuden’s redemptive
theme.
SAVING “COMMENTARY”
In “Commentary,” Auden reconceives the relationship ofredemption and the figure
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of the dictator. Rather than identifying Audenesque redemptive heroism with the fascist
dictator in order to discredit the idea ofthe redemptive hero, “Commentary” dissociates the
issue of redemption from the figures of fascism and tyranny. The contrast of the false
messiahs of fascism to what Auden presents as the true redemptive heroes and true nature of
human redemption structures much of”Commentary.” Fascism may be an ideology in
which strong chiliastic or messianic components are essentiai (Passmore 19), but it does not
follow that when iE satirizes the idea ofthe fascist dictator as redemptive hero, Auden must
give up the idea ofredemption or redemptive heroism. “Commentaiy” articulates a new
vision ofredemption in contrast to the contemporary examples ofGermany, Itaiy, and
Japan; and in contrast to the examples of “Ail the great conquerors [who] sit upon their
platform” in Auden’s “thumb-nail sketches ofcelebrated proto-fascists from histoiy” (Fuiler
243); and in contrast to the “many famous clerks [who] support their programme.”5
5
Earlier we noted that one ofthe rare instances in Journey where Isherwood and Auden echo one
another to speak flot so much dialogically but with one voice occurs when Isherwood refers to one
ofthose great conquerors, “the Emperor Ch’in Shih Huang Ti (200 BC), who burnt the scholar’s
books” (56$), and Auden to “Ch ‘in Shih Huang Ti who burnt the scholars’ books” (684). The
repetition here and their shared ernphasis on Ch’in Shi’s infamous crime no doubt has much to do
with the fact that the story ofthe burning ofthe books by China’s founding emperor inevitably in
193$ evoked Hitler, his thousand year Reich, and Nazi book burnings like the one Isherwood had
witnessed in Berlin (Kind 129). Auden and Isherwood’s single-voiced rejection ofCh’in Shi as a
political role model contrasts starkly to Ezra Pound’s ridiculously sympathetic reference to him in
“Canto LIV”. Cantos LII-LXXI, having been written “in no more than six months, beginning no
later than the summer of 193$” (Carpenter Serious 569), are exactly contemporary with the
composition ofJourney and “Commentary.” The progress from an examination of China in the
Chinese History Cantos to the example ofthe United States in the John Adams Cantos can be
compared to Auden and Isherwood’s ideological trajectory in Journey and to the historical sweep of
“Commentary.”
Politically, the contrast between the Ieftist, liberal democratic Auden and Isherwood and
the fascist Pound could hardly be starker; Pound’s foolish viciousness leaves one speechless.
Pounds alludes to the same book burnings—
CHI HOANG TI that united aï! China
who referred to himself as the surplus
or needless bit of the Empire
and jacked up astronomy
and after 33 years bumt the books
because offool litterati (Cantos 275)—
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The vision of possible redemption in “Commentary” unfolds in opposition to fascist
dictatorship and in spite ofthe troubling fact that “every family and e’ery heart is tempted”
by the “brazen offer” and the “simple message” of fascism’ s corporatism, violence, anti
and interestingly, virtually every single point in this brief passage has its counterpart in “In lime of
War”: the idea in “Commentary” and sonnet VI ofthe Leader as redundancy; the association of
astronomy with civilizing progress in sonnet VI and “Commentary;” the catalogtie in
“Commentary” ofwrong-headed “famous clerks,” to which we can add Pound. However, unlike
Auden or Isherwood, Pound presents the Emperor’s bibliophobic conflagration in a positive context
and suggests that “Cm HOANG li” and Hitler probably had valid motives by implying that the
book burnings were really the fault of the “fool lifferati.” Such an attitude on the bookish Pound’s
part seems incredible, though, given the recurrent human embrace of perverse self
contradictoriness, perhaps it should not. In any case, Jater in the same “Canto”, the library
inhabiting Pound revels in the thought of “great works by oppression / by splendid oppression
(285). Ah yes, those great works accomplished under Stalinist, Hitierian, Maoist, and ail the other
varieties of modem oppression, I’d completely forgotten them. Though to be fair to Pound, one
should note that Benjamin makes a similar point, albeit to ufferly different effect and for different
motives, wlien lie writes that there “is no document of civilization which is flot at the same time a
document ofbarbarism” (Illuminations 258). Certainty, Pound’s vision is diametrically opposed to
the vision Auden presents in “Commentaiy” ofhuman creativity as depending on diligence and
concentration applied in spite of and in opposition to the splendid oppressors. The appropriateness
ofrelating the ancient Chinese bumning of the books to Hitler and the Nazi’s book burnings is
substantiated in the same Canto when Pound draws a parallel between the visit of a Tartar king to
the Chinese Emperor “HAN SIEUN” and a visit ofAdolph Hitler to Mussolini in October, 1938:
And the Tartar ran from his car to HAN SIEUN
held out his hand in friendship
and then remounted his war horse...
to the joy of HAN SIEUN TI
(Pretty manoeuvre but the technicians
watched with their liair standing on end
anno sixteen, Bay ofNaples). (279)
That’s “anno sixteen” ofMussolini’s fascists’ rule. The dangerous “Pretty manoeuvre” that Pound
is celebrating was that of”a group ofsubmarines diving and surfacing in formation in honour ofthe
[visitingJ Ftihrer” (Carpenter Serious 571). The parallel is a little complicated: in ancient China it
was the visiting Tartar who performs the gallant but risky manoeuvre for the hosting Chinese
emperor; but in 1938, it was the hosting Mussolini’s submarines that performed for the visiting
Hitler (Kenner 435). For Pound, which ofthe two contemporary authoritarian Eminences is the
gallant Tartar and which the well-pleased Emperor? Perhaps the confusion of roles here, with
Hitler and Mussolini each ftilfihling aspects ofboth the Tartar king and the Chinese emperors’
moles, is meant to suggest that the two modem figures are equally gallant, equally imperiai, equally
deferential to the power ofthe other. However Pound imagined the parallel, his poem excuses
Hitler’s hate-filled totalitarian book-burning and revels in the antics ofoppressors.
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individualisrn, mindlessness, police statism, paternalism, and racial pride (684-5).
“Commentary” offers no easy redemption from the false salvation ofthe fascists. For
fascism tempts everyone, meaning even the purportedly anti-Fascist, meaning even Auden
and his readers. If in 1934 Auden couÏd imagine a list of secular redeemers who “promise
rescue,” in the political crises of 193$ he has no leaders to set in opposition to the fascist
conquerors: “Nor do our leaders help; we know them now / For humbugs.” Political
leaders, democratic no more than fascist, are simpÏy flot candidates for redemptive heroism
in “Commentary.” Yet in spite of the incompetence of leaders, in spite of Auden’s
renunciation of the role of redemptive hero, “Commentary” does raise some sort of
redemptive hope. The question wilI be what the nature ofthis hope is.
Besides the redemptive poems to which he links “Commentary,” Mendelson groups
“Commentary” with “Spain” and “September 1, 1939,” poems which Auden infamously
disowned for reasons that Mendelson lucidly details. Both “Commentary” and “September
1, 1939” refer, for instance, to “the Just”, whom Mendelson, endorsing Auden’s rejection of
the latter poem, describes as “unportrayable figures of political fantasy [. . .] called into
being by the rhetoric of poetic endings” (Later 103). This idea of the Just resembles the
1 930s theme of “the small circle” that occurs elsewhere in Auden’ s work—this is the idea
of”a private community, a miniature saved civilization” (McDiarmid Saving xvi) which is
“the gerni ofa new society” (16). A more public and loosely defined version ofthe “small
circle” appears in the conclusion of”September 1, 1939” when Auden presurnptuously, if
tentatively, includes himselfamong “the Just/ [who] Excharige their messages.”
“Commentary,” however, only partially conforms to Mendelson and McDiarmid’s
descriptions ofAuden’s treatment ofthe themes of”the Just” and “the small circle.” When
in 1973 Auden drops from “Commentary” the stanza with which humanity’s “faithful swom
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supporters” (683) conclude their response to the fascist temptation—”Only a whole and
happy conscience can stand zip /And answer their bleak lie, among the jïist, /And onÏy
there, is Unity compatible with freedom” (687)—he flot only excises some rank stupidity
(why, afier ail, can a broken, unhappy conscience, Hegelian or otherwise, flot answer a lie?
); he also rejects his recunent ViSion of an inexplicably just, civilization-saving grouplet that
is akin to the disowned vision ofthe conclusion of”September 1, 1939.” (Easy as it is to
scoff at the pretensions of the various groups Auden or anyone presents in this saving role,
it is hardly possible to conceive of society without ‘the group’ as an essential term between
the individual and the collectivity as a whole. An important dimension ofAuden’s
conception of groups is the moral obligation of ‘private communities’ to exist in a
concemed relationship to other human beings). In “Commentary,” however, the
uncapitalized just” are not realiy a srnall circle at ail. “Commentary” bas already rejected a
facile version ofthe small circle which in the face of suffering, fear, and other pressures of
the present finds its solidarity and efficacity breaking down as “the Thirteen gay
Companions / Grow suilen now and quarrelsorne as mountain tribes” (684). The satirical
image is seif-critical. The gayness ofthe bickering companions evokes the youthful high
spiritedness and the predominant homosexuality of Auden’s literary circle; the unlucky
number thirteen ironically recalls the archetypal sacred small circle of Christ and his
disciples; the adjective “mountain” recails the insurmountable moral difficulty of XXVII.
Finally, the designation “tribes” evokes a breakdown of civilization, but aiso reminds us
that “Commentary” describes a world “Where flot a tribe exists without its dossier” (682)
and an indifferent universe where each “tribe and truth are nothing” (680). In that world
and universe, ail human tribes, ail small circies, are, if flot doomed to defeat, then incapable
of victory.
jIf they are neither tribe nor small circle, who are “the just”? The grammar of the
poem is ambiguous. “Thejust,” though, must be one ofthe following: they are “our faithful
swom supporters;” or “the Invisible College ofthe Humble;” or, if those two groups are one
and the same, then thejust are both ofthose; or lastly, “thejust” are a subset ofone ofthose
groups recognized by the larger group as specially just. In any case, “the just” in
“Commentary” are flot really so unportrayable. They have at least some ofthe qualities
attributed to those larger groups: faithfulness, diligence, absorption in the task at hand,
concentration, hospitableness, humility, and the qualities ofbeing dead, self-conscious, self
critical, and able to give counsel and encouragement (685-7). The only characteristic
common to “our faithful sworn supporters,” “the Invisible College of the Humble,” and “the
just”—whether those phrases designate a single group or an interlocking set of groups—is
opposition to tyranny through history and to its contemporary fascist version.
For Mendelson, a common flaw of “Spain” (Auden’s most famous anti-fascist
literary contribution), “Commentary,” and “September 1, 1939” as “large public poems” is
their “daim to have joined the realm ofthe private will to that ofthe public good” when
“the union had been made through the force ofrhetoric alone” (Early 201). Mendelson’s
reading of “Spain” provides the terms for his dismissive view of “Commentary.” For
Mendelson, “Spain” joins “private emotion to a public myth ofmeliorative history” (230)
and asserts that “a certain form of partisan political action can express the will to love and
foster ultimate justice,” even though Auden “knows that the political action [. . .] claiming
to express these things in fact does nothing ofthe kind” (315). “Spain” also involves
contradictory arguments about human action as a matter of choice and freedom and human
action as an expression of natural and historical necessity (317-323).
In “Comrnentary,” Mendelson discems similar attempts to “reconcile private
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intentions and public acts” and similar suggestions of optimism conveyed through moral
paradox, self-contradictory metaphor, and propagandistic sleight of hand, (Early 198-9).
Though these objections are flot irrelevant, the failings of “Spain,” cannot be projected
directly onto “Commentary.” for the latter’s review ofthree successive epochs ofGreat
Disappointment and its preoccupations with failure, grief, ruin, uncertainty, obsolescence,
and decay do flot a meliorative historical vision make, even if there are some glimmers of
optimism. There is a vague idea, for instance, that those disappointments and negative
resuits have their lessons and “in the interest of intelligence were necessaiy” (687). On the
other hand, the meliorative line “Man can improve himself but neyer will be perfect” (680)
is actually the response of “our faithftil sworn supporters” to the totalitarian speakers’
daims about the perfectibility ofman. far from ignoring, XXVII’s conclusion that
humanity will neyer be perfect (Mendelson Early 200), “Commentary” insists on human
imperfectibility.
Mendelson’s strong objection to the hope that the poem expresses, particularly at the
end of its concluding speech, remains the defining response to the substance of the poem.
Mendelson correctly identifies the final hope in “Commentary” as a vital issue, even while
his aversion to the poem leads him to misrepresent the nature of its final hope:
[...] O teach me to outgrow my madness.
It ‘s better ta be sane than mad, or llked than dreaded,
It ‘s better to sit down to nice meais than to nasty,
It ‘s better ta sieep twa than single; it ‘s better ta be happy.
Ruffle the perfect manners ofthefrozen heart,
And once again campe! it to be awkward and ative,
Ta ail ii’ suffered once a weeping witness.
Clearfrom the head the masses of impressive rubbish;
Rally the lost and tremblingforces ofthe wiÏl
Gather them up and let them base upon the earth,
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Titi they construct at last a hwnan justice,
The contribution ofour star, within the shadow
0fwhich upflfting, ioving, and constraining power
Ail other reasons may rejoice and operate. (687-8)
It is alrnost plausible to argue that the suggestion that “the will” might “construct” one day
“a human justice” participates in the same kind of delusion of perfectibility that Auden puts
into the rnouths ofthe fascist orators when they say “We build the Perfect City time shah
neyer alter” (684). Significantly, in the revised version ofthe conclusion of
“Cornmentary”—”Till, as the contribution ofour star, wefollow / The clear instructions of
that Justice, in the shadow / 0f Whose uptfting, toving, and constrainingpower /Att
human reasons do rejoice and operate” (Shorter 296)—Auden alters the nature of the
process by which humanity might achieve perfection. Rather than constructing an ultimate
justice, it seems “the will” might eventually operate in a way allowing us to conform finally
to a Justice which apparently bas aiways existed. Even in the original, though, there are
major differences between the hints ofperfectibility in the conclusion and in this speech of
the fascists:
Man can have Unity fMan will give up Freedom.
The State is real the Individual is wicked,
Violence shah synchronize your movements like a tune,
And Terror like afrost shah hait theflood ofthinking.
Barrack and bivouac shah be yourfriendly refuge,
And racialpride shah tower like apublic column
And confiscatefor safety evetyprivate sorrow.
Leave truth to the police and us; we know the Good;
We build the Perfect Clly tirne shah neyer alter;
Our Law shail guardyou aiways like a cirque ofrnountains,
Your ignorance keep offevil like a dangerous sea;
You shah be consummated in the Generat Wihl,
Your children innocent and charming as the beasts. (684)
The promise of the fascist orators and the concluding hope of the voice of Man contrast, of
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course, in terms of who is speaking, but there is more to the contrast than that. In spite of
the fact that the fascist speech is a supposedly “simple message,” its abstract nouns,
multiple intimidating similes, and menacing imperatives constitute a more elaborate
rhetoric than the self-directed, prayerful imperatives and modest hopes of the final passage
where the only allusion to perfection—”the perfect maimers of the frozen heart”—actually
identifies a human failing. An equally crucial difference is that, whereas the fascist speaks
ofthe wickedness ofthe Individual in order to replace it with the State, in its concluding cry
the voice ofMan speaks as an individual who wishes “to outgrow my madness.” Auden
modified this to a collective “teach us to outgrow our madness” in 1945, but in 1973
restored the original une identifying the individual as the locus of hope. Finally, whereas
the fascists allude to violence, terror, the army, and the police, the force invoked in
humanity’s concluding hope is not political or armed force, but “the lost and trembling
forces ofthe will.” Unlike the fascists, “We cannot postulate a General Will” (498), an idea
rejected at the outset of Joumey, but can only assume the feeble personal will.
It may be an exalted-sounding “voice ofMan” whose “cry [.. .1 streams out into the
indifferent spaces” (687), but Auden is the intermediary—”As now I hear it, rising round
me from Shanghai”—who transcribes what he hears and telis us what that human cry is
saying. This is the first and only time Auden uses the first person singular pronoun in the
whole of Joumey. The lateness and singularity of the shifi to the first person give it an
emphatic ethical significance.6 The sudden insurgence of the heretofore objective and
objectifying Auden as a responsive subject at the end of “Commentaiy” recails the contrasts
between the impersonal erasure ofRewi Alley and the reassertion oflsherwood’s indecisive
private, subjective, self at the end ofthe “Travel-Diaiy.” It is as if, at the end of
6Contrasting Auden to Isherwood, Izzo and Kerr mistakenly assert that “not once does Auden speak
in the first-person singular in this book” (lsherwood Encyclopedia $2).
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“Commentary,” the “voice of Man” with its hopes and ethical imperatives must, if it is to be
heard at ail, be heard by an individual in his active subjectivity.
Here we reencounter the circuiarity ofAuden’s original 1933 redemptive poem. In
that poem, the poet telis the prophetic friend to preemptively provide humanity with its own
saving testament which the poet then proceeds to write. In “Commentary,” the voice of
man streaming into space is overheard by the poet who proceeds to articulate it for readers
who are themselves part of that crying humanity from whom the message purportedly
originated. The recurrence ofthis reciprocal communicative relationship, like Auden’s
persistent interest in the question ofthird person plural subjectivity evident in poems from
the same period, is flot a symptom of incoherence, but an indication that a fundamental
intuition ofthe source ofa poet’s meaningfulness is at stake in Auden’s insistence on the
‘circular’ mutually reinforcing relationship between the poet and society or hurnanity. The
poet and humanity stand here in the original pre-decadent relationship depicted in VII in
which the poet “was their servant [. . .J I Their feeling gathered in him like a wind / And
sang: they cried—’It is a God that sings” (670). The quasi-divine hermeneutics ofthe
relationship ofpoet and humanity lead Aquien to misread the ending of”Commentary”: “Le
commentaire [. . .1 se termine par une prière adressé à Dieu, dans l’oeuvre d’Auden, l’une
des premières manifestations du sursaut du religieux contre la menace de l’apocalypse”
(102). Aquien rightly notes the significance of”Commentary” as an early stage in Auden’s
religious turn in the face of an apocalyptic threat, but he is wrong to describe the concluding
prayer as addressed to God. It is flot to God, but “into the indifferent spaces” that the voice
ofman streams. Binni more accurately describes that prayer as “un’ invocazione della voce
dell’Uomo ad un potere superiore” (Saggio 123). The higher power at issue is not a theistic
personal God, but the power deriving from the mutually-reinforcing circular relationship of
3the poet and humanity, or ofany individual voice and ofthe collective human voice.
Decadent the deliberate poet of Joumey may be, but afier the formalism of Journey’ s verse,
afier the erasure ofhis subjectivity, Auden represents himself at the end of”Commentary”
in a symbiotic, hermeneutically circular, relationship with his audience and humanity, in
which if humanity hears anything divine in his “Commentary,” it is because it overhears
itself.
What the poet of the voice of Man says at the end of “Commentary” is, though,
decidedly ungodiike. The final hopeful cry in “Commentary” may be a crucial moment in
his ideological history and a crucial expression ofthe dialect ofAuden’s messianism, but it
is an odd moment. Rather than prophetic or divinely inspired, the modest wisdom offered
in the “It’ s better to be sane than mad” stanza is trivially seif-evident, to the point of being
anti-climatic and agnostic. The unprophetic, unassuming imperatives which follow are a
faint echo ofthe supplications ofAuden’s early “Sir, No man’s enemy.” They ask flot for
Salvation, but personal sanity; flot Revolution, but personal emotional renewal; flot
Revelation, but an uncluttered head; flot for the Triumph ofthe Will, but for the forces of
the will to be gathered only to be immediately dispersed to construct a constraining human
justice. The impatience ofMendelson’s rejection ofthe conclusion of “Commentary” is
inversely proportional to the modest hope expressed. Certainly the representation of such
hopes, or the mere acknowledgement ofthe desire for hope, and even the identification of
Justice, as the thing to be hoped for, does flot commit one to a meliorative view ofhistory.
The contrast of the lost and trembling hopefulness of its ending to the pessimistic historical
vision of “Commentary” exemplifies Gramsci’s motto “Pessimism ofthe intellect,
optimism ofthe will.” The messianism of “Commentary” prefigures Benjarnin’s epiphany
in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” regarding the weakness ofthe messianic force
jthat every human generation possesses (Illuminations 256). As in other late modemist
works, in “Commentary” the “vectors of despair and utopia, the compulsion to decline and
the impulse to renewal, are not just related, they are practically indistinguishable” (Miller
14).
Mendelson’s rejection ofthe “rhetoric ofpoetic endings” in “Commentary” obscures
the anticlimax ofthe poem’s ending, and the fact that the poem is ethically and rhetorically
so circumspect that it tends to the “mock prophetic.” Mendelson’s observation that “Spain”
and “Commentary” are better understood “flot as public poems but as utopian poems” (202)
exaggerates the utopianism of “Commentary” and diminishes its resolutely public
dimensions. Mendelson does suggest something ofthe abyss between the severely limited
hope that the conclusion of the poem manages to represent and the catastrophic state ofthe
world that it has depicted, but the hope at the end of “Commentary” does flot constitute an
optimistic program. The poem does flot assert an expectation of the fulfilment of the hope
it alludes to. The conclusion of “Commentary” amounts to littie more than a review of some
ofthe necessary conditions for hopefulness. As such, the concluding speech becomes a
catalogue ofpersonal and psychological impediments to the individual’s ability to
contribute to the realization ofjustice. Justice, or rather the repeated acknowledgement of
its absence, flot any falsely utopian hope or fantasy, is the essential concern in the
conclusion of “Commentary.”
Mendelson sees a contradiction ‘erupting’ in the last stanza where ‘justice is a gifi
of light, the contribution of a star, and a barrier to light, as it casts a shadow,” and daims the
contradictions in these metaphors undermine the poem’s argument and the coherence ofits
concluding hope for justice (199-200). But the metaphors of light and shadow emerge quite
coherently. They have antecedents beginning at the outset of Journey in the “evil star” of
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“The Voyage” and “the tortured stubbom star” of “The Sphinx” and later in V1’s scientist
who “watched the stars” (669), with such antecedents proliferating in “Commentary.” “Our
star”, the sun, is present from the poem’s second une with its descriptions ofour solar
system; and present in the image ofJapan’s “biood-spotted flag” (681); in the prehistoric
“warrn sunshine ofthe Laufen Tee Retreat” (682); in the modem notion of “a neutrai dying
star, / Where Justice could flot visit” (683); in Galiieo’s impiied heliocentricism (683); in
the “dust of ail the dead that reddens every sunset;” in the assertion that “commonjustice
can determine privatefreedom, /As a clear sky can tempt men to astronomy” (686); in the
image of”the cities that receive the sianting radiations” (687).
The sun may be an ever-present, central fact ofearthly life, but it has nothing to do
with justice, except insofar as it sustains us, like everything else about the earth, while we
construct our human justice. We depend on the sun, but justice must be our creation. Only
the justice we couid create wouid shade us from our neutrai dying star. Protective in the
final stanza, the image of shadow elsewhere can be ambiguous. There is the child’s
“clandestine evolution in the mother’s shadow” (680). There are the privileged and
compromised “European shadows” cast by Auden and Tsherwood (681); there are the
medieval men “camped like tourists under [thel tremendous shadows” of the Universal
Churches (682); there is human fear “casting shadows / [.. .1 upon the outer world” (683);
and at the limit ofthe sunlight, there is the “great arc of travelling shadow [that] / Moves
over land and ocean, altering life” in the various countries and climates ofthe globe (687).
The mother, Europe, medieval churches, the psychology of fear, the earth, ail stand against
some light, and in every instance except that of fear, the light is the sun. In every instance,
except fear, the ensuing shadow is, if not wholly beneficent, then in some respect enabling.
Similarly, in the poem’s final stanza, justice is interposed between the sun and
jhumanity whence its shadow would allow other reasons to rejoice and operate. The
chiaroscuro metaphors imply that our “reasons” can only “rejoice and operate,” not in the
glare ofthe sun, but within the protective shadow ofthe justice only we can create: “It is
strange but true that human life depends on something as fleeting and fragile as shade”
(Kapuscinki The Shadow ofthe Sun 31 8). It is worth noting that, as with the Japanese flag,
the sun (in the form of the swastika) was the symbol on the German flag of 1938; and
recalling Auden’s satire on sun-worshipping modem utopian naturaÏists at the beginning of
The Dance of Death; his trepidation before “the unshadowed sand” and “plain sun” of
“Pleasure Island” (Collected 343-4); his skepticism in “In Praise ofLimestone” about the
“eamest” Wallace Stevens-like “habit of caïling / The sun the sun” (540); his description in
“Nones” ofthe hour ofthe crucifixion as “too hot, too bright” (634); his designation in
“Good-Bye to the Mezzogiorno” of “the Sun / [as] He-who-smites-from-afar” (644); his
evocation ofthe dystopian dog days in “Under Sinus” and “Cattivo Tempo”; his disavowal
ofphotophilism and preference for “some sheltered shade” in “Stark bewôlkt” ($46); and
his late gratitude for extremes ofnebulousness in “Thank You, fog.” In “Commentaiy”
Auden’ s nuanced, abstractly symbolic metaphors of light and shadow evoke those of the
Paradise of Dante, the poem’s principal poetic forefather. “Commentary” resembles an
“Infemo” and a “Purgatory” more than a “Paradise,” but the poem’s final gesture towards
the idea of humans acting to create or conform to justice is a gesture towards paradise, using
a language of light and its shadow to suggest a state which remains as unrealized as its
nature remains ineffable. Subtie metaphors of light and shadow recur in Auden’ s moving
elegy for Louis MacNeice when Auden presents the negative relationship of poetry to a
second ineffable absolute, which like that of Justice is also a concem in “Commentary,”
namely Truth: “Speech can at best, a shadow echoing / the silent light, bear witness to the
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Truth it is not” (Collected 693). far from contradictory, such images in “Commentary” are
grounded in a scientific perception of our place in the solar system in which Justice is
neither the cosmic principle of a supematural sun-god, nor a natural emanation of a material
sun, but can oniy be a human creation. The metaphors at the end of”Commentary” are
consistent too with Auden’s overarching concem with freedom and necessity, with the light
ofthe sun being associated with the necessity of nature and justice with humanity’s
responsibility for the recognition, exercise, and realization of its own freedorn.
There is no eruption of metaphoric incoherence in “Commentary,” but there is an
irruption in its conclusion of a redemptive tone and orientation. Only with the final
quatrain, do this tone and orientation mutate from a weak messianism to something that
sounds and looks strongly messianic. A similar irruption ofthe messianic was to have
occurred at the end ofAnxiety in a brief anthem praising the Lord and presenting avision of
paradise. The conclusions of “Commentary” and Anxiety with their coincidences of
messianic and paradisal motifs represent Auden’s achievement of an abstract, detached
vision of paradise, afier his apparent inability to articulate a more extended Paradise in the
abandoned “In the year ofmy youth.” The final celebration ofparadise was cut from
Anxiety, perhaps because none ofthe voices in the poem “is in a position to deliver the
anthem” (Gottlieb 129), and perhaps also because the horrors ofthe Second World War
simply precluded it.
Auden did pubiish “Anthem” in lis 1946 Litany and Anthem for S. Matthew’s Day
where he remarks of history and the messiah that
It is the particular gloiy ofMatthew that he recognizes in Jesus the Messiah
foretold by the Prophets, that his witness emphasizes the Christ who gives to
history its meaning, and wams us against the idolatrous fancies ofthe gentiles
who would either, like the pagan Greeks regard time as the Evil One or, like
the romantic apostates, bow done before the historical process. Let us pray
especially therefore at this time to be delivered from ail such heresies and
nfouies; from making our society or our age the final revelation oftruth, from
justifying present sin as a historical necessity that future good might corne.
May we worship neither the flux of chance, nor the wheel of fortune, nor the
spiral ofthe zeitgeist but, following the comrnandment of Christ, take up our
cross ofthe moment on which alone the past is redeemed and the future is set
free. (quoted in Gottlieb 242n. 114)
The Christian inflection Auden gives to the themes of fteedom, necessity, and redemption,
to heresies resembling fascism and Marxism, and to the relationship ofthe past, present,
and future, is consistent with the treatment of those themes in XXVII and “Commentary.”
Brief as it is, “Anthem,” which in Anxiety would have corresponded structuralÏy to the last
quatrain of “Commentary,” occupies an essential position in Auden’s work as his most
direct evocation ofParadise. “Anthem” finally appeared in Epistle to a Godson, the last
book of verse Auden saw through to publication. It is as if the Dantean vision ofparadise
that eluded him in 1932’s “In the year ofmy youth” and that we glimpse at the end of
Joumey had to be held back, at least from the general public, until the end of bis life where
it could be properly revealed. Judging by critics’ rejections of “Commentary,” even its
inchoate concluding vision of Paradise was, in the hellish heart of the twentieth-century,
premature to the point of seeming offensive. But then Auden too recognized that it is not
the Resunection, but the crucifixion which must be believed. “Today, we find Good friday
easy to accept: what scandalises is Easter: Modem man finds a happy ending, a final victory
of Love over the Prince ofthis World, very hard to swallow” (cited in Kirsch 21).
VERSIONS 0F THE MESSIANIC
In his Making ofthe Auden Canon, Beach provides the only substantial response to
“Commentary” other than Mendelson’s dismissal and Fuller’s annotations, the one response
to explicitly question the religious dimensions ofthe poem’s conclusion. Beach correctÏy
identifies Auden’s revisions to “Commentary” as a tuming point in the ideological
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definition of Auden’s work. Scandalized by those revisions, Beach highuights differences
between the 1939 and 1945 versions while remaining blind to relevant features common to
both. Beach’s conclusion is that through his revisions to “Commentary,” Auden gave to the
entirety of”In Time ofWar” a “more distinctively reiigious cast than [it] had when first
written in 193$” (10). Beach approves ofthe original closing quatrain of”Cornmentary” as
a completion ofthe “In Time ofWar” sequencc’s “eloquent and inspiriting pica for the
humanistic ideal ofthe good life, to be built up on earth by the earnest pursuit of social
justice supported by generous fellow-feeling” (7). However, he rejects the religious tenor of
Auden’s revisions (9-10). Beach writes that instead of
‘constructing at iast a human justice,’ man is adjuring himselfto ‘follow the
clear instructions’ of a Justice not human—a Justice capitalised and thereby
signalized as divine. The divinity ofthis Justice is further ernphasized by the
capitalized personal pronoun ‘Whose’ in the foliowing une, in place ofthe
neutrai ‘which,’ and thc substitution in the final line of ‘human reasons’ for
‘other reasons,’ where (in the revision) the human reasons ofa secular or
purely humanistic philosophy are opposed to the divine reasons derived from
God’s will. (7-8)
For Beach, Auden’s religious revisions might lead readers to take “In Time of War” to be
“an anticipation ofthe most orthodox Christian views” (7), as indeed many readers have
donc. He observes further that since the revised version of “Commentary” closes the
Collected Shorter Poems, the concluding religious emphasis there threatens to affect the
reading of Auden’s entire oeuvre (7), as indeed it probably should.
Beach’s strong objections to Auden’s Christianizing retrospection resembles
Mendeison’s impatient dismissal of”Commentary.” Beach’s ncgativity involves the false
assumption that the “more religious cast” ofthe later version of”Commentary” is
diametrically opposed to the more secular original version. As Fuller remarks “Auden’s
conversion ofthe phrase to ‘Justice’ [. . .] was, given the sermon-like character ofthe
speech in the first place, understandable” (244). Moreover, regardless of whether it is
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justifiable to consider Western secularism and theistic religious belief as diametrically
opposed, what Beach does flot sec is that such an opposition is flot at play in “In Time of
War.” Beach neglects to mention—probably because ofthe ideological prohibitions ofthe
McCarthyite 1950s—that the secularism ofthe sonnets of”In Time ofWar” is tbroughly
inflected with elements drawn from Marx and Engels. This omission precludes any
consideration ofthe compatibility in “In Time ofWar” ofthe emancipatory and messianic
themes common to the Bible and secularism, Marxist or otherwise. Beach could also flot
have known that in the 1973 edition of Journey the later Christian Auden would restore and
endorse the original supposedly ‘secular’ ending.
Beach is right to consider the Christianizing revisions in the 1945 version of
“Commentary” controversial. The shortcomings of Beach’ s reading derive from his failure
to consider the inherently Biblical qualities of both “Comrnentary” and “In Time of War” as
a whole. For, however secular or Marxian the original version of “In Time of War” may
appear, the sequence’ s overali mythic structure and many of its rhetorical features are
essentially Biblical. Like the Bible, the sonnet sequence begins with Creation, first ofthe
plants and animals and then ofman. I’s account ofcreation is more Darwinian than
Biblical, but it is followed by II’s unmistakable evocations ofthe story ofthe Garden of
Eden and X’s version ofthe Messiah. “In Time ofWar” goes on to end in “Commentary”
unrnistakeably on late-Biblical messianic, apocalyptic, and prophetic tones. In fact,
“Comrnentary” opens with a retum to I’s secular creation story and in several passages
reprises the sonnets’ review ofthe history ofhumanity as a series of falis up to the Japanese
invasion of China and to the sense of 1938 as an “hour of apocalypse” (Lehmann 179) that
informs the messianic, apocalyptic, and prophetic vistas of “Commentary.” The
overarching structures of “Comrnentaiy” and “In Time of War” as a whole are analogous to
313
the mythic structure ofthe Bible, from Creation to Apocalypse. What is more,
“Commentary” abounds in allusions to ‘the forever’, ‘the limitlessness’, ‘the etemal’, ‘the
everiasting’, to Evil and goodness, to Heaven and Heli, to faith, to prayer, and to God and to
Christ. The poem is ciearly the expression of a sensibility for which Christianity’ s
conception of ail these things and the modem history of Christianity are centrai references
and for which mankind’s reiigious relationship to the etemal is a living issue. That “In
Time of War” rests so squareiy on a foundation of Biblicai myth and rhetoric and manifests
an essentially religious concem for etemity mitigates the severity ofBeach’s charge that the
iater theistic revisions to specific passages are incompatible with Auden’s original meaning.
We have seen that there are Biblical and religious dimensions to the sonnets of “In
Time of War,” but even Beach admits that the later version of “Commentary” has, flot an
entireiy new, but only “a more distinctively religious cast.” Stan Smith who has at times
articulated a view of Auden of the thirties as a secular and proto-Marxist writer, has also
come to emphasize the importance ofBiblical and Christian aspects ofAuden’s early work.
“for Auden, the perspectives offered by his Christian upbringing provided a narrative
paradigm which underiies” many of bis early poems (Smith “Ruined Boys” 117). This
conclusion of Smith’s does flot necessarily negate his eariier condemnation of Cailan’s
Christianizing reading of XXVII, but it does require Smith to conciude that “Auden’s
‘communist’ gospel of love in the 1930s {. . .] repeatedly finds its imagery and idiom in that
earlier gospel [ofthe Bible], which in an essay such as “The Good Life” is explicitly
recruited as the authentic tradition of revoit” (127). Smith emphasizes Auden’s affinity
with prophecy and apocalypse, traditions especiaily relevant to “Commentary.” Thus in
Auden’s eariy work, Smith perceives an archaic “eschatological vision that looks down the
generations ofmen with the ciaiiwoyant ferocity ofa Biblical prophet” (114). In various
n
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Auden’s work “sonorously proclaim a prophetic rhetoric which fuses revelationary and
revolutionary modes” (114), or “is a compendium ofBiblical prophetic semes” (117), or
“calis up the dies irae, the ‘day ofwrath’ ofthe Apocalypse” (116), or involves “an easy
transition from Revelation to Revolution and back again” (117), or alludes to apocalyptic,
prophetic, and chiliastic passages in the New and Old Testaments (117, 119, 120).
Though Smith like most critics neglects “Commentary” and the question of its
“archaic” Biblical elements, McLeod, like Mendelson, notes the poem’s messianic features.
Where Smith argues that Auden’s recourse to the rhetoric ofBiblical eschatology and
prophecy is consistently in the service ofhis proto-communist revolutionism, McLeod
describes “Commentary” as “an appeal to modem man {. . .] to reassume his traditional
responsibility for the establishment ofthe Messianic ideal” (116). For McLeod, messianism
is “a spiritual tradition hmndamental to the Western way ofthinking” (116), and Auden in
“Commentary” reasserts the Messianic ideal “by exhorting man to recognize the necessity
of certain conditions to his existence as a human being” (99). McLeod’s vague statements
regarding teleological aspects ofAuden’s messiansim and Smith’s more detailed
endorsement of ‘revolutionary’ eschatological elements in Auden’s early work stand in
contrast to Mendelson’s view of “Commentary” as an incoherent poem whose
“contradictions [as in Auden’s otherj redemptive poems are signs ofhis buried distrust of
the messianic ideal” (Early 249). McLeod and Srnith’s readings ofmessianic dimensions of
Auden’ s work also stands in contrast to Kirsch’ s daim that “Auden had little interest in
eschatology” (20). Kirsch is right about the later Auden’s skepticism about dogmas ofthe
last things, but Kirsch’s study ofAuden’s Christian faith ignores the process ofits
reemergence out of an phase in which eschatological and teleological elements inform a
sustained messianic vision.
3If Auden becomes wary of redemptive ideals, this neither prevents him from
continuing to endorse, wearily, important versions of the messianic later, nor from openly
and systematicaÏly displaying more of its contradictions as he does so. As Gottlieb points
out, Anxiety displays two major endings, not including the postponed Paradise of
“Anthem,” which shifi in their conclusions to a messianic or salvationist perspective.
Those endings articulate respectively a Jewish and a Christian understanding of salvation,
but, as Gottlieb insists, Auden does flot seek “to resoïve the conflict established by [this]
double conclusion ofAnxiety” (130). Rather he recognizes the integrity ofthe opposing
Jewish and Christian meditations ofRosetta and Malin. The unifying ecumenical moment,
fusing Jewish and Christian horizons, which could have been provided by the concluding
“Anthem” does flot occur in Anxiety (Gottlieb 12$-1 31). This preservation in Anxiety of
the distinctiveness of Jewish and Christian messianic horizons should 5e appreciated in
contrast to the revelation ofthe affiliation ofMarxist and Biblical messianism and ofthe
conciliatory mingling of Marxian and Biblical themes in “In Time of War.” In both the
latter case and in Anxiety, Auden’s approach involves a strategic choice to preserve and
protect where destruction threatens. In 193$, while there is stiil an at least possible hope
that global conflict might be averted, he seeks to overcome destructive and aggressive
polarization through the revelation of the affinity and commonality of Marxian and
Christian views. In 1944-46 in the face of civilizational annihilation and genocide, he
preserves the separate integrity of Christian and Jewish partïcularities. Gottlieb’s explicitly
Jewish approach to messianism in Anxiety responds to Auden’s effort to preserve the
Jewish experience of the messianic.
The redemptive theme in “In Time of War” and generally in Auden clearly avails
itself of both Christian and Marxian readings, but there are several reasons why it, as indeed
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other significant aspects ofAuden’s oeuvre, also requires a Jewish reading. Auden’s
sensitivity to the threats facing European Jews is an important element of his well-known
opposition to fascism and is explicit in Joumey’s XIV and XVI (“And life can really point
to places / Where life is evil now: I Nanldng; Dachau.”), and in the only slightly later
“Refugee Blues.” There are too key personal experiences such as his love for Chester
Kailman, his familiarity with Jewish life in New York, and his friendship with (to borrow a
phrase from Auden’s elegy for Freud) an “important Jew who died in exile” like Hannah
Arendt. Auden even entertained the idea of converting to Judaism, and traces of his
engagement with figures such as Spender, Hirschfeld, Freud, Arendt, Buber, Wittgenstein,
Kailman, Elizabeth Mayer, Richard Howard, Oliver Sacks, Joseph Brodsky, and Edward
Mendelson who are or were Jewish in varying respects, are found throughout lis work. In
light ofAuden’s philosemitism, it is fitting that Anxiety be recognized as “the first major
poem in English that touches on the extermination camps” (Gottlieb 19); and the preser
vation ofthe Jewish experience ofthe messianic in Rosetta’s speech be recognized as well.
A full account ofthe messianism of “Commentary” requires the inclusion, along
with Christian, Marxian, and secular perspectives, of an explicitly Jewish perspective.
Interestingly, just as it was the lapsed Jew Kallinan who, in the shadow ofthe Holocaust,
persuaded Auden at the last minute to drop the ecumenical paradise-evoking “Anthem”
from the conclusion ofAnxiety and to replace it “with a deliberately anticlirnactic prose
paragraph in which the narrator reports that Malin has retumed to duty (Mendelson Later
273), some ofMendelson’s strongest objections to “Commentary”—his sense ofthe poem’s
concluding vision ofParadise as paradoxical (199); as a “dream ofa world only imagination
can build” (202); as “a Utopia defined in vaguely religious terms, wherein love’s will is our
peace, and the present ‘work’ ofthe will may somehow bring about the rule of love”
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(293)—occur precisely where the poem’s messianism, in tuming inward and focussing on
individual psychology, takes a typically Christian and decidedly unJewish tum. “The major
difference,” writes Dan, between messianism in Judaism and Christianity “is that
Christianity spifltualizes the concept of messianic redemption, rernoving it from the
historical to the inner, spiritual reaim, whereas Judaism has aiways insisted that messianic
redemption is a historical occurrence” ($0). The messianic conclusion of “Commentary”
moves Christian-wise away from engagement with the reality of history to the idea of a
messianic arrivai which could oniy happen outside, beyond, or in spite of, any conceivable
history and for which the responsibility is put on the individual and his inner condition.
Later we wilÏ consider the relationship of the messianism of “Commentary” to
history, but it should be noted that the proto-Christian Augustinian spiritual tum from
history does flot mean that Auden’s messianism is flot historical. The period ofAuden’s
sustained interest in messianism is, for instance, coeval with Hitler’s Reich. Distrust it he
might, but in his fascination with “the messianic ideal,” Auden manages between 1932’s “In
the year ofmy youth” and lis 1933 redemptive poem and the later Anxiety to rehearse an
encyclopaedic series ofthe most compelling versions ofthe messianic ideal in Western
culture: Dante’s saving cosmic vision of heu, purgatory, and paradise; the ‘Romantic’ idea
of the poet as redeemer; the idea of cuitural, scientific, political, and philosophical heroes as
discoverers ofthe way to a secular salvation for humanity; F6, “Comrnentaiy,” and
Frontier’s negative examples ofthe dictator as redemptive hero; the satirical “Lament for a
Lawgiver” in Anxiety praising the democratic politician as redeemer; the idea in
“Commentary” of an unheroic, but just, sizeable, and saving portion of people who
virtuously withstand tyranny; the meditation on the birth ofJesus as the Messiah in Time
Being; and in Anxiety, Jewish and Christian perspectives on the conditions of salvation.
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Tellingly, of ail versions ofthe messianic, it is the concluding Communist ‘scientific’
paradise of”In the year ofmy youth” which the purportedly proto-Cornmunist Auden was
neyer able to commit to paper.
As with Auden’s preservation ofthe distinctive Jewish and Christian versions of
salvation, none of these variations on the messianic ideal really ever renders the others
entirely obsolete, or will ever manage to shut down the messianic dialect ofthe others.
Even Auden the mid-twentieth-century poet ofmessianism, who considers but rejects the
role ofmessiah for himself, may be recuperabie as a version ofthe redemptive hero in so far
as his timeiy meditations c1arif’ the messianic ideal and constitute a modest messianic gifi
to humankind. Reflecting on a similar recognition of the plurality ofmessianisms and on
the messianism implicit in Marxist ontology, Derrida argues that the “messianic eschatology
conniion both to the religions it criticizes and to the Marxist critique [is flot simply to bel
deconstructed” (59). Though clearly irritated by American “neo-testamentary” (56) “neo
evangelism” (61) and “Christian eschatology” (60), Derrida emphasizes the common
promise in competing messianisms. However incompatible their eschatological picture
books may be, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Marxism ail share a messianic eschatoiogy
whose “formai structure of promise exceeds them or precedes them” in their doctrinal
particularity. for Derrida, this formai promise is flot to be deconstmcted because “what
remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructible as the
possibility of deconstruction is, perhaps, a certain experience of emancipatory promise; it is
perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without the religion,
even a messianic without messianism, an idea ofjustice” (60).
Derrida’s comments retum us to the specificity of the messianic concem of
“Commentary.” Not only is there the poem’s concluding hope to “construct at last a human
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justice,” but there are references throughout “Cormnentary” to justice, injustice, judging,
judges, being just, and the just. In the twenty-three-line speech of humanity’ s “faithful
swom supporters,” there are five such references, while in the thirteen-line speech of the
fascist dictators, we find references to the State, violence, terror, the police, and the Law,
but flot one allusion to justice. Implicit in “Commentary” with its hope for justice and its
opposition ofthe ideas ofjustice and fascism are the philosophical and ethical motives for
Auden’s religion: “The novelty and shock ofthe Nazis was that they made no pretense of
believing in justice and liberty for ail,” Auden would write later, explaining his eventual
conversion to Christianity as in part a result of the incapacity of “liberal humanism” to
provide a convincing answer as to why bis concem for justice and the Nazi’s disregard for it
were flot merely matters ofpersonal taste or relativistic value (Pike Canterbury Piigrims
40). Derrida’s (undeconstructed) insistence that justice is the undeconstructible
emancipatory promise common to Marxist and religious messianisms is an endorsement of
the final emphasis on justice in “Commentary.” If the presence ofthe theme ofjustice is
common to several variants of messianism, however, it alone is not enough to distinguish
one messianic dialect or vision of redemption from another, even though for Auden the
essential difference between Nazi messianism and the version he expresses in
“Comrnentary” is their respective attitudes to the idea of’justice for ail.” It is possible,
though, to look beyond the undeconstructible kemel ofjustice to sketch the distinctive
qualities ofthe flowers ofmessianism in “Commentary” and relate them to the larger field
of competing messianisms.
Even within “Commentary” several messianisms are at play. Afier the false
messianism of fascism and the past exampÏes of insidiously critical secular messianism, the
poem setties on two positive sources ofmessianic hope. There is the Christianizing
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messianism ofpersonal spiritual renewal in the concluding speech; and there is the earlier
messianism ofthe ‘supporters’ ofhumanity. The poem’s principal justification for the
messianic hope it expresses actually rests on the example of humanity’s “faithful swom
supporters” whose weakly messianic lives bear witness to practical human creativity.
Despite the special dullness of Auden’s writing in this part of “Commentary,” its vision bas
redeeming ethical, conceptual, and even poetic features. The messianic role ofthe “Invisible
College ofthe Humble” stands in contrast to the assumption of the role by the fascistic
conquerors. This contrast between the sinister brutality of fascist politics and an ideal
ageless human community is essential to the messianic vision in “Commentary.” Fuller
points out that “Auden’s description of [the Invisible College of the Humble) accords with
positions like that of Forster in the essay ‘What I Believe” (Commentary 243). Written
while Auden and Isherwood were in China, forster’s essay “made a considerable
impression,” annoying “orthodox patriots and orthodox Marxists” (Furbank 225), and was
published in time for Auden to draw upon it thoroughly as lie was finishing Journey (Auden
would draw on it again in the last stanza of”September 1, 1939” (Mendelson Later 371)).
Journey, then, ends as it begins on a Forsterian note. The book opens with its
dedicatory sonnet to Forster, and moving to a conclusion presents a forsterian vision of the
saving capacity ofhuman decency. Forster’s vision and the people it relies on are at once
idealistic and skeptically practical, utopian and modestly quotidian, abstractly idealist and
plainly materialist: “They represent the true human tradition, the one permanent victory of
our queer race over cruehy and chaos. Thousands ofthem perish in obscurity, a few are
great names” (Forster 87). Adapted and expanded in “Cornrnentary,” forster’s redemptive
vision with its contrast of rampaging history and bumbling but triumphant human goodness
remains permanent in Auden, sustaining his subsequent work. Auden retums to the vision
several times; nowhere more tersely than the conclusion of “Archaeology,” the last poem he
wrote for publication (Mendelson Later 512). That poem closes bis Collected Poems with a
retrospective gloss on the first three quarters of “Commentary:”
What [our school text-books] cali History
is nothing to vaunt of,
being made, as it is,
by the criminal in us:
goodness is timeless. (896-7)
Its connection to common-sensical Forsterian idealism situates the homey messianism of
the just, humble, and faithful in “Commentary” in the context of Forster’ s defence of British
Ïiberalism and parliamentary democracy. It is worth noting that forster’s essay was
originally entitled “Iwo Cheers for Democracy” and that it explicitly, though flot entirely
convincingly, daims to rest on a secular non-doctrinaire argument for the power of ordinary
human decency to redeem. Auden would soon demur from Forster’s secular position, but
even “Commentary” includes a corrective to the quiet confidence offorster’s vision.
Where Forster describes “the true human tradition” as “invincible” (87), Auden substitutes
“invisible” and emphasizes, the perilousness of its present challenge, the uncertainty of its
future, its liability to defeat, the stark possibility that it wiÏl perish.
There is, though, that other strand of positive messianism in “Commentary” deriving
from Auden’s cultivation of the redemptive theme from 1932 through 1938, and grafied
onto the poem in its recycled last stanza. The specific nature of that messianism, which is
more original to the Auden than his borrowed Forsterian vision, is clarified by the debates
ofJewish thinkers on the distinctions between varieties ofthe messianic. Dan’s conception
of Christian rnessianism as involving a non-chiliastic spiritualization of redemption (80)
highlights a quasi-doctrinal dimension ofAuden’s proto-Christian tum from history, but
Buber provides terms for a detailed classification of the messianic qualities of
“Commentary.” Distinguishing between prophetic and apocalyptic modes, Buber explains
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the motive for messianism through the opposition of resignation in the hour of crisis and
activation ofhope through the two available messianic modes (173). The contrast between
resignation and messianism is “the dilemma whose discursive expression is the old
philosophical quarre! between indeterministic and deterministic views ofthe world” (173).
“Commentary” rejects resignation in the face offascist power in the stanza on those who
“have accepted Fascal’s wager,” and chooses instead the freedom ofthe messianic. Such a
choice, argues Buber in terms recalling the etemal return of the problem of freedom in
XXVII, involves “the life experience in which the moment ofbeginning the action is
illumined by the awareness of freedom, and the moment of having acted is overshadowed
by the knowledge ofnecessity” (173). Pertinent as is this association ofthe origins ofthe
messianic with an awareness offreedom, Buber’s privileging ofprophetic over apocalyptic
messianism provides the terms for a more thorough evaluation of “Commentary.”
For Buber, prophetic messianism is undogmatic. It emphasizes both a “dialogical
intercourse” of God and man, and man’s power ofchoice. The prophetic is spoken in the
“present historical-biographical hour,” and there is a clear involvement with “thefactuaÏ
character ofhuman experience.” In this prophetic mode, the future is unfixed; salvation and
disaster are both stili possible (177-20). In the contrasting apocalyptic mode, a fictionalized
speaker “has no audience tumed toward him” in the present historical-biographical hour;
the ‘speaker’ is detached, is perhaps a writer who recounts conversations with angels and
the succession of historical epochs. The apocalyptic evinces a literariness rather than an
engagement with actuality. Finally, the apocalyptic future looks determined and the power
ofthe community to tum to good “is no longer thought of’ since “turning no longer has
history altering power” (181-2). There is a whiff ofdogmatism in the opposition Buber
proposes, but its contrasting terms help situate “Commentary” among the messianisms.
Though the poem’s review ofhistorical epochs and its conspicuous learnedness seem
apocalyptic, the rest of “Commentary” tends to Buber’ s prophetic pole, displaying
variations on ail the prophetic characteristics Buber identifies. Dogmatic certitude is
associated with the false fascistic messianic, or shown to be historically transitory. The
Forsterian review of the redemptive work of humanity is rooted in the facticity ofthe
practical. Only the god-like nature ofthe circular dialogue ofpoet and humanity is
unorthodox and obscure enough to make its compatibility with Buber’ s notion of the
prophetic somewhat less obvious.
The question of “the catastrophic nature of the redemptive process” (Dan $1) in the
apocalyptic is aiso relevant to “Commentary.” For though it describes a catastrophic
historical situation with an obvious potential to become more catastrophic,
“Commentary”—both in its celebrations of the timeless, decent and creative goodness of
the “just,” the “faithful swom supporters,” and the “Invisible College ofthe Humble,” and
in its final prayer for personal transformation which would open onto a messianic
future—offers redemptive possibilities independent of catastrophe. Redemption in
“Commentary” only requires us to follow the example ofthejust and humble and to
conduct our own inward renovation in order to tum away from history and catastrophe to
our better natures. As an instance of messianic writing, “Commentary” reveals Auden’s
notions of how individuais should act and of what a redeemed and redeeming humanity
would look like. Gottlieb’s recent expression ofa desire for “a messianic idea that, while
resolutely opposing any hint of [catastrophicj apocalypticism, nevertheless refrains from
neutralizing messianism” as an effective force (251) has aiready been partly fulfihled in the
neglected “Commentary” with what became for Auden a lasting vision of an ahistorical,
non-catastrophic messianism.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE BLOODY HOUR
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“Out of the future into Actual History”
Important as comprehending the messianism of “Commentary” in its thematic,
literary, and doctrinal dimensions is, it is more urgent to understand its historical and
political implications. The poem’s antifascist messianic vision is complicated by the
problem of violence and by the national and cultural idèntity ofthe messianic subject whom
the poem addresses. Surprisingly, Auden’s vision has no place for Communism or a Soviet
Union on which the messianic subject ofhis poem actually depends. Instead, Auden’s
historical vision involves an Anglocentric bourgeois subject presented in a relation of
dependence on the U.S.A. and, especially, on the fate-colonial world. The implicit global
coalition required by Auden’s messianism is sustained by an ideal ofreconciliation. A
central theme throughout Auden’s work as well as a response to strategic KIvIT and CCP
cooperation in the China of 1938, the idea of reconciliation is crucial to the vision of
“Commentary.” Reconciliation in the poem is a function of a recognition of self-interest
and seeks an achieved condition of Confucian Jen. An estranging analogue of
Christianity’s Agape, Jen retums us to a long view in which the Sino-Japanese War
becomes representative ofmankind’s permanent messianic struggle to achieve its essential
humanity. That long view encompasses past and future, a present of struggie and choice,
and an awareness ofthe presence ofdeath. The sublime conclusion that “Commentary”
provides for Joumey as the book struggles with the reality ofdeath in the mid-twentieth
century rejoins other sublime moments and reveals Joumey as a response to its authors’
encounters with a series of overwhelming realities.
Auden’s messianism may be ahistorical and non-catastrophic, but “Commentary” is
nonetheless overburdened with history, and it is catastrophe, not paradise, which is pending.
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The doctrinal and imaginative qualities of “Commentary” as an instance of messianic
writing are easier to grasp than the poem’s representation ofthe confusing historical and
political contexts in which its messianism is embedded. The examination of the poem’s
political dimensions will necessarily be more consequential and controversial than a strictly
religious readings of its version of the messianic, for such an examination exposes the
Realpolitik of the messianism of “Commentary.” Gottlieb’ s discussion of messianic hope
in Arendt helps us move from Auden’s ahistorical messianism to the catastrophe of history:
Messianic hope expresses itself in the idea that time is coming to a close.
Although this idea can then be represented in apocalyptic imagery, such
imagery is flot only flot necessary; it may have littie—and, as some [notably
Buber] have argued, absolutely nothing—to do with messianism. Apocalyptic
messianism from The Book ofDaniel and The Apocalypse ofJolm to modem
totalitarian ideologies represents the competition in terms ofclashing armies.
The violent imagery of a final and decisive battie is in no small measure the
reason for mistrusting anything associated with militant, apocalyptic
messianism. But the presentation oftwo times in competition with each other
need not adopt any martial imagery, and messianism need not be confused
with millenarianism. (140)
In “Commentary,” the epoch ofthe Third Great Disappointment is indeed coming to a
close, and the poem is organized by a contrast of ethical alternatives (the authoritarian
fascistic option and the peaceable humanistic option). Furthermore, each option bas
temporal, historical dimensions. fascism’s is a “feudal ethic” (685), while the option of
“our faithful sworn supporters” is explicitly post-feudal (687) and relies on the agelessness
ofanonymous human creativity. Both options involve present choices opening onto the
future. The fascist future will be built by fascist leaders afier humanity surrenders its
freedom to them, and significantly they speak of their vision ofthe future with a ‘shah,’
which resounds as both an older form of a predictive future tense and the imperative voice
ofauthority (684). The building ofthe humanistic future is scarcely alluded to in the speech
of the “faithful swom supporters” of humanity who actually do the building. Rather the
nidea of building such a future appears at the end ofthe poem as an effect ofthe rallying and
letting loose of impersonal forces of the individual will, or in the revised ending as an effect
ofthe forces ofmany individual wills following an extemal justice.
In presenting the poem’s central ethical opposition, Auden avoids the martial
imagery that Buber and Gottlieb eschew. Indeed, a year after Joumey appeared Auden in
“New Year Letter” explicitly wams against the descent into violent apocalypticism:
Who, thinldng ofthe last ten years,
Does flot hear howling in his ears
The Asiatic cry of pain,
The shots of executing Spain,
See stumbling through his outraged mmd
The Abyssinian, blistered, blind,
[ ]
The Jew wrecked in the German ceil,
Flat Poland frozen into hell,
[ ]
[and is notj tempted to surrender to
The grand apocalyptic dream
In which the persecutors scream
As on the evil Aryan lives
Descends the night ofthe long knives,
The bleeding tyrant dragged through ah
The ashes ofthe capital. (Collected 206)
This 1940 daydream of apocalyptic anti-Nazi anti-German violence may end with images
that foreshadow the desecration ofMussolini’s corpse and the destruction of Berlin, but its
intention was cathartic rather than prophetic; the apocalyptic dream is depicted so that it
may be resisted as the vengeful fantasy it is. In “Commentary” too Auden raises the issue of
violence on the good side ofthe poem’s messianic options, but to more ambiguous effect
when “our faithful swom supporters” insist that “Now in the clutch ofcrisis and the bÏoody
hour I You must defeatyour enemies orperish, but remember I OnÏy by those who
reverence it can lfe be mastered” (687). This stanza begins as a conscientious
acknowledgement ofthe regrettable necessity of violence, somewhat reminiscent ofthe une
n“the conscious acceptance of guilt in the necessary murder” from “Spain 1937” (a une
whose moral implications both Orwell and Mendelson linger over; y. Early 32 1-2). The
passage in “Commentary,” however, passes far too rapidly over the issue of violence
between the two competing camps whose apocalyptic opposition organizes the poem.
Rather than dealing with the issue of the violence of apocaÏypticism, the passage
actually masks the military reality of violence, and diverts attention from the fact that the
competing messianic alternatives of “Commentary” do involve the opposition of clashing
armies. Immediately afier calling on us to defeat our enemies “in the bloody hour” (that is,
to kil! enough of them to bring about their defeat), the voice of our faithful sworn supporters
begins taiking, flot about the deaths on which our victory depends, but about mastery
through a reverence for life. The notion of a reverence for life is certainly worth raising in a
military context, but raising it at this point avoids the reality of violence precisely when the
poem is supposedly facing up to that very issue. The messianism of “Commentary” looks
non-apocalyptic, non-militant, and non-catastrophic because it avoids dwelling on its OWfl
violent implications. We need only recall XXVII’s ambivalent phrase about “the
disciplined movements ofthe heart” foïlowing “its harmless ways” to remember how
sinister are the elisions that skirt the reality of violence.
Afier this siide into worthy talk ofreverencing life, the poem immediately proceeds
to the stanza about only “a whole and happy conscience” being able to answer fascism’s
“bleak lie” and about unity being compatible with freedom only “among thejust.”
Unconvincing in themselves, these propositions go against the grain ofthe poem’s
conscientious, though inadequately explicit, presentation of the historical geo-political
context. “Commentary” begins to involve itself in contradictions not because the
Christianizing inward turn of its messianism at the end is illegitimate or because the
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messianism of its non-catastrophe forsterian humanism is untenable. Where messianic
rhetoric is recognized as deriving from an unavoidable impulse and a moral obligation to
articulate one’s experience ofthe principles ofhope and justice, those dual redemptive ideas
of “Comrnentary” are defensible enough as elements of a messianic vision. Mendelson
objects to the spiritualised messianic conclusion of “Commentaiy” because he takes it as an
instance of”the ‘subjunctive mood’ of ‘bad’ or premature utopianism [whichJ grabs
instantly for a future, projecting itself by an act of will or imagination beyond the
compromised political structures ofthe present” (Eagleton 25). for Eagleton a more worthy
“utopian thought” must “attend to those forces or fault lines within the present that,
developed or prised open in particular ways, might induce that condition to surpass itself
into a future [... .] To ‘know the future’ can only mean to grasp the present under the sign
ofits internai contradictions” (25-6). In these respects, Auden’s attention to the present’s
complex forces and contradictions is sufficient to preserve his poem’s intimations of a
redeemed future from charges ofempty utopianism.
Important objectionable difficulties do, though, arise when Auden links, as he must,
the messianism of”Commentary” to the poem’s historical and international context. b
quote one of the poem’s earliest precursors, it is when “Commentaiy” moves “out ofthe
future into actual History” (Auden English 119) that its messianism approaches a
significant condition of self-contradiction and inconsistency. The poem’s presentation of
‘actual history’ provïdes, for instance, no place for “a whole and happy conscience,” or for
the association of violence with conscience-salving pieties like ‘reverence for life.’ The
poem also does flot permit one to imagine that the possibility of a militant opposition to
fascism is a question ofthose actually opposed to it being themselvesjust.
Rather, the poem repeatedly notes the guiltiness and injustice ofthose who are to
‘n
oppose themselves to fascism and defeat it, bloodily or otherwise. At its outset, Journey’s
dedicatory sonnet evokes the guilt ofthe British Empire, whose inescapable white man’s
burden of guilt Auden assumes for hirnself and Isherwood: “For we are Lucy, Turton,
Phulip, we / Wish international evil” (494). Not only does “Commentary” present the
English as guilty and unjust, but it repeatedly suggests troubling similarities between the
British and the Japanese and the other fascist powers. The parallels between Japan’s and
England’s relationships to China are implicit, but obvious: “For centuries [the Chinese]
looked in fear towards the northern defiles, / But now must turn and gather like a fist to
strike! Wrong coming from the sea, from those [.. .] / Who even to themselves deny a
human freedom” (681). As with the Japanese, the Chinese thought of British and Western
European wrong as coming to China from the sea, and just as the Chinese had tried to do in
the unsuccessful anti-European Boxer rebellion, the Chinese must “gather like a fist” in this
anti-Japanese war. (The ‘gathering’ here is an unsettiing contrast to the concÏusion’s
transformative gathering ofthe forces ofthe personal will, but there the will’s forces were
gathered flot so that they may strike like a clenched fist, but only so that ffiey may be
unclenched to do their creative work). Similarly the poem’ s “material contest” between
Japan and China which bas ravaged Shanghai—a city itself created by a “material contest”
between China and the West—must be remembered as having been motivated in part by a
material contest between Japanese and Western, notably British, imperialisms. Thus, the
June 193$ issue ofPacific Affairs called the undeclared Sino-Japanese war “Great Britain
and Japan’s War in China.” In that contest, Japan, Britain and the other powers share
responsibiÏity for the “colonial suffering” ofthe Chinese. Occupying somewhat analogous
positions with respect to China, Japan and Britain appear more as rival brothers than as
utterly dissimilar antagonists.
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However great the historical differences betwcen British and Japanese impcrial
actions in China, in “Commentary” the difference between the Eurasia-bracketing island
nations ofBritain and Japan does not lie so rnuch in their respective historical relationships
to China. The difference is that the Japanese “dwell in the estranging tyrant’s vision ofthe
earth” (681) and deny themselves freedom, whereas the British, however much they may
deny the freedom of others, grant it to themselves: “You taÏked ofLiberty, but were flot just;
and now / Your enemies have calÏedyour bluff for in your city, / Only the mon behind the
rifle hadfree-wiÏÏ” (687). Such acknowledgements ofthe West’s double-standard on the
issue of freedom, along with acknowledgements of Britain’ s colonial guilt and troubling
resembiances to Japan, complicate the subsequent call for the violent defeat ofthe fascist
enemy, making the confrontation between them anything but a clear cut battie between good
and evil. The fascists too cal! for violence. Acknowledgement oftheir cal! for violence
cornes after a review of the civilizational deveiopments that have led to the “experienced
hatred” of the industria! proletariat and the “colonial suffering” of China, and afler an
acknowledgement ofthe apprehension that such hatred and suffering cause “in every body,”
among the rich, among the gay companions, and among a “we” that for reasons outlined
below inclines towards Britishness.
In humanity’s apprehension and confusion, the “base hear us, and the violent / Who
long to cairn our guilt with murder” (684). The seductive fascist offer to cairn ‘our’ colonial
or class guilt through violence contrasts to the explicit reminder of ‘our’ own injustice and
guilt when ‘our’ supporters acknowledge the necessity of violence in their speech. The
frank self-criticism of ‘our’ supporters is clearly more admirable than the soothing fascist
offer. Immediately, though, their shifi to talk of reverence for life tends to calm anxiety
over the realities of the anti-fascist violence, and their subsequent suggestions of the
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possibilities of a happy conscience and ofthe just reconciling unity and freedom minirnize
further the compromised nature of ‘our’ guilty colonial past and ‘ouï’ violence. These
guilt-calming aspects in our supporters’ apology for violence tend to undo the earlier
critique ofthe guilt-calming ftinction ofthe violence ofthe fascists. That the fascists offer
to use violence to calm our guiit; while ‘ouï’ supporters speak in such a way as to calm our
gullt about ouï violence is flot an unimportant difference. But the risk remains that both
situations amount to the same neutralization ofthe reality of violence, and surely in the
Anglo-American sphere, a sense ofthejustness of ‘our’ violent resistance and eventual
victory over fascisrn lias indeed been used to help cairn ‘ouï’ guilt about colonialisrn.
The troubling half-revealed resemblances of ‘our side’ to that ofthe fascists has a
further aspect. Not only are ‘we’ comparable to the Japanese in their colonial aggression
against China, flot only does the association of ‘ouï’ violence with reverence for life and
happy consciences draw attention away from ‘ouï’ guilt, but ‘we’ share with the fascists a
fiindamental objective: “One wish is convnon toyou both, the wish to buiÏd/A world united
as that Europe was in which / Theflint-faced exile wrote his three-act cornedy” (687). The
idea of a world as united as was the Christian Europe of the Middle Ages supposedly
animates both fascist and unfascist parties here. We will retum later to the political
implications of this ideal of a united world. f irst, though, it is important to pause over the
“you” that occurs at this point in the speech of “our faithful swom supporters.” for the
difference between this “you” and the other you’s that occur in their speech is critical.
Unlike ail those other ‘you’s, and unlike ail the ‘we’s elsewhere in the poem, this “you
both” refers flot to a single collective subject, but to two different subjects. It is a dual
“you” which embraces fascists and non-fascists, who paradoxically are united by their
common wish for global unity even as they are divided in their opposition to each other.
-D-)-)
Here an ethical, political, and conceptual rnuddle emerges that is of more consequence than
any muddle flowing from the poem’s utopianism or from any Jewish, Christian, or Marxian
nicety. This more substantial muddle issues from the question, so familiar from the
sonnets, ofwhom ‘we’ refers to in this poem. First person plural subjectivity is alluded to
throughout “Commentary,” but as with the sonnets, flot always the same subject involved.
In the sonnets, Auden’s circumspect examination of the puzzles of plural subjectivity is
reflective and instructive. In “Commentary,” however, what happens is that one conception
ofthe first person plural subject eventuaîly crowds out ail others. These unacknowledged
substitutions of a certain plural subject for others obscure rather than illuminate the
identities ofthe plural subjects at issue and consequently obscure the poem’s moraily
crucial movement out ofthe messianic present and future into actual history.
It is easy to identify exactly where Auden’s references to a first person plural subject
shifi from something comparable to the intelligent fluidity of reference in the sonnets to
something involving incompatible notions ofthe plural subject. Early in the poem, the
possessive pronouns of “ouf grief’ and “our failures” (6$ 1) introduce an idea of first person
plural subjectivity which involves humanity as one collective subject. This broadest
possible plural human subject is innnediately followed by references to the nanower sub
category of the human which is the Chinese nation (“Tarim nursed them”), and somewhat
later by an even narrower European “we” that seems to refer specifically to Auden and
Isherwood (681). The human species as one plural subject recurs when “we emerged [. J /
And blinked in the warm sunshine ofthe Laufen Ice Retreat” (682), and recurs once “the
machine has taught us how, to the Non-Human, / [. . .j Our colours, creeds and sexes are
identical.” Even if Auden usually associates the Machine with the modem West in Journey
and elsewhere, this last phrase defines the human subject as broadly as possible, flot against
-‘-7
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itself but in its contrast to the non-human. Each ofthese cases occurs in the flrst third of
the poem, and context allows us to ascertain unproblematically whom the ‘we’ involved is.
and the relations between the various plural human subjects remain clear. Later also, when
we read “we know the Good; / We buiÏd the Perfect Cily” (684), context makes clear that
this ‘we’ is the fascist leadership of Italy, Germany, and Japan.
The reference of every other instance of first person plural subjectivity in the poem
is harder to determine. At about the mid-way point, there is a flurry of such references:
fear builds enormous ranges casting shadows,
Heavy, bird-silencing, upon the outer world,
Huis that our grief sighs over like a Shelley, parting
All that we feel from ail that we perceive,
Desire from Data; and the Thirteen gay Companions
Grow sullen now and quarrelsome as mountain tribes.
We wander on the earth, or err from bed to bed
In search of home, and fail, and weep for the lost ages
Before Because became As 1f, or rigid Certainty
The Chances Are. The base hear us, and the violent
Who long to cairn our guilt with murder, and already
Have flot been slow to tum our wish to their advantage. (683-4)
Here it is impossible to establish with any certainty the identity ofthe first person plural
subject or subjects. Does that wandering ‘we’ refer back only to the “Thirteen gay
companions,” or back to the subject of “our grief’? Does “our wish” at the end refer to the
same subject who possesses “our grief’ here? Is the subject ofthis “our grief’ the same as
that ofthe “our grief’ which introduced into the poern the issue of first person plural
subjectivity? On the last question, context argues no. The fear that builds those shadow
casting ranges between the inner and the outer world, so that what we feel and what we
perceive are sundered, is “intrusive as a siil.” Like a sili, and like the enormous ranges or
huis “that our grief sighs over,” the fear remains interposed between inner and outer, but it
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cornes frorn outside. The provenance of that fear is the same as that of the apprehension feit
by the rich and the disturbance felt by “every body.” That fcar is a response to the
“experienced hatred” of people who resemble the proletariat of industrial Britain and to
Chinese knowledge oftheir own “colonial suffering.” $uch a fear would properly belong,
then, to those who have reason to fear that proletarian hatred and to fear whatever the
“attack of shyness” affecting the Chinese conceals. It is a properly British or Western
European bourgeois fear, and the grief that is sighing over those fear-built ranges is not
universally human, but Western European. The comparison to $helley also gives our griefs
sighing, which recails the mountain-bound sighs of XXVII, a specifically British inflection.
Here we corne to the crux of the problem. What makes first person plural
subjectivity in “Cornmentary” so problematic is that the identity ofthat subject drifis from a
humanity imagined universally to something which at critical moments looks like a
collective European, or British, or bourgeois subject without ever being named as such.
There is an intimation of this transformation in our Shelley-like grief, but we sense it more
in the following passage:
Nor do our leaders help; we know them now
for humbugs full of vain dexterity, invoking
A galleiy of ancestors, pursuing stiil the mirage
0f long dead grandeurs whence the interest has absconded,
As Fahrenheit in an odd corner of great Celsius’ kingdom
Might mumble ofthe summers measured once by hirn. (685)
The passage is an allegory derived from a bit ofnonsense verse by Christian Morgenstern
for Anglo-German relations, with Hitler as Celsius and Chamberlain as Fahrenheit.7 The
7Fuller identifies the allusion to Morgenstern’s “Kronprtendenten,” a poem in which Reamur
scoms the apostasy ofthose who have abandoned Fahrenheit for Celsius. Auden’s very early
allusions to that poem (in Auden and Day-Lewis preface to Oxford Poetry 1927 and in Auden’s
192$ amateur first collection initially entitled “The Megalopsych”) were made in contexts having to
do with sexuality and subjective excess (Fuller 3). In this passage, then, “Commentary” alludes not
just to Morgenstern, but to the beginnings of Auden’s own work, and we note again the significance
336
shifi in diction to the idiomatic British “humbug,” and the dig at a late-imperial Britain still
clinging to Fahrenheit and its Fahrenheit dominions in contrast to Germany which had been
using Celsius for half a century, allow us to associate “our leaders” with the antiquated
Chamberlain ofthe Munich Crisis which overlapped with the writing of”Commentary.”
Thus, the ‘us’ lcd by those hapless leaders seems by implication flot only anti-fascist, but
also vaguely British. This drift towards a British identity for the poem’s first person plural
subject occurs even though the moral sense established early in the poem of humanity as
one single subject continues to resonate in the poem’s later sections.
The dismissal of ‘our’ ineffectual Chamberlainesque leaders precipitates an
intensification of attention to the first person plural subject two-thirds ofthe way through
“Commentary,” as if the recognition of ‘our’ leaderlessness necessarily throws attention
onto ‘us’. References to ‘us’ proliferate over the next ten stanzas: there are “our faithful
sworn supporters” (685), “ouf dead,” “our lives,” “our gratitude,” “our struggle,” “our
living,” and “our enemies.” Then, “we praise [theJ names” of our dead, and it is the dead
who give “us courage” and “aid us everywhere;” it is the dead whom, “if we care to listen,
we can aiways hear” (686). The dead’s twenty-three line speech then keeps ‘us’ as a plural
subject in play by addressing ‘us’ a halfa dozen times as a plural “you.”
The proliferation of such references tlwough this section defines the poern’s actual
addressee. Noting that at this point “the tone becomes most preachy” (FuJier 243), and
recalling that an important concem in a sermon is social action, we realise that
of”Commentary” as a summing up ofAuden’s deveiopment to 1938. By the time of
“Commentary,” however, the valence ofthe thermometric rivaiiy in “The Crown-pretenders” bas
become, flot sexual and subjective, but politicai. In the context ofthe 1930s, this ailegory for
Anglo-German rivahy looks ail the richer if one thinks ofthe hopeful reciprocity involved in the
Anglophile Morgenstern imitating English nonsense verse and the Germanophile Auden then
borrowing Morgenstern’s nonsense to satirize Anglo-German political relations. Auden’s
incorporation ofMorgenstern’s silliness into the seriousness of”Commentaty” ittustrates too the
uncertainty regarding diction that funs through “Commentary.”
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understanding the social action it envisions also involves understanding whom
“Commentary,” and particularly this section ofthe poem, is addressed to. The speech of
“our faithful sworn supporters” speils out most cieariy the program for social action which
the poem recommends. The “you” which is that speech’s addressee and which is to adopt
that program coincides with the plural subject ‘we’ in whose pronominal name the poem
has been spoken from the beginning. In this respect the address ofthe supporters stands in a
mise en abyme relationship to the poem as a whole, and the social action which their
address recommends is the social action promoted by the entire sermon-Iikc poem. This
recursive structure is compatible with the circular, mutually reinforcing relations presented
elsewhere in the poem between what the poet, humanity, and their supporters articulate or
hear. Ail ofthis constitutes a comprehensive hermeneutical vision ofthe nature ofthe
meaningflulness ofhuman dialogue, a vision of hurnanity as a self-comprehending whole,
involving individuals, groups, and even the total species. This exalted and complex vision
is, however, undermined by shifis in the identity ofthe plural subject from one part ofthe
poem to another.
Scrutinizing the qualities ofthe first person plural subject in the middle sections of
“Commentary,” we can establish with some precision its problematic identity or identities.
A sense ofthe reference ofthat ‘we’ can be gained through ‘our’ association with “our
faithful swom supporters” whose unshakeable “faith in knowledge and man” identifies
them as humanists. Those supporters exhibit qualities cutting across the broad human
categories ofchiid, eider, gender, and nation. furthermore, Auden’s high-brow allusions to
Kuo Hsi, Engels, and Blake, and to the Grand Canal and Madrid reveal the supporters as
ideally intemationalist. The supporters are, then, drawn from human categories diverse
enough that both they and, by extension, ‘we’ suggest a broad conception ofhumanity as a
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single human subject. The comprehensiveness ofthis collective subject is, however,
reduced in the list of the places where the dead can help it. There, ‘we’ are distributed
through an idealized set of human types: the lover, the scientist, the teacher or student, and
the political or social activist. Though this selection is sentimentally compatible with a
general sense of the first person plural as referring to humanity as an idealized whole, it also
identifies humanity far too closely with select petty bourgeois figures. Auden’s middle
class humanist ‘we’ might be said to represent humanity as a whole only in the way that the
earlier ‘we’ ofthe fascist leadership, like other political leaderships, think ofthemselves as
a part embodying a whole.
Further problems regarding the core collective hurnan subject that “Commentary”
addresses arise in three stanzas from the dead’s address to ‘us.’ The first of these is the
tercet beginning “You talked ofLiberty, but were flotjust” which identifies the poem’s
collective subject as a liberty-espousing Western subject, and perhaps a specifically British
national subject, compromised by its injustice to both the proletarian and the colonized, and
challenged by its fascist enemy. The second is the tercet in which ‘we’ are told that the
wish to build a world as united as was medieval Europe “is common to you both.” Here the
sense ofthe Western identity ofthe collective human subject is reinforced by the reference
to a Western and Christian historical ideal, but far more significantly, that human subject
suddenly and only momentarily becomes dual. “You” and “your enemy” involve two
subjects whose common wish to unite the world obscures the fact that the stanza’s “you
both” refers, flot to a single universal human subject, but to a humanity divided against
itself as rival human collectivities. This division goes against the notion of humanity as a
single collective subject established early in the poem and against the portrait ofthe human
collectivity as a peaceable bourgeois humanistic subject presented subliminally in the
n,
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immediately preceding passages. In the light ofthe intemecine human conflict at issue in
the poem, it is hard to accept the implicit daim of universalism for the vision of a bourgeois
humanity that the poem promotes. We might conclude that ‘our’ side ofthat “you both” has
gathered to itselfthe daims ofhuman universality and civilizing hurnanism. There is scant
hurnanity left for the other fascistic ‘you,’ or rather that second ‘you’ must represent a less
hopeful aspect of what humanity is which “Commentary” at this point prefers to ignore.
A third tercet ftirther undermines the character ofthe imagined universal bourgeois
human subject that the speech ofthe dead and the poem itselfaddresses. The potential of
the collective humanistic subject to defeat its enemy “in the clutch ofcrisis and the bÏoody
hour” is inconsistent with the presentation ofthat subject’s peaceable qualities and with the
attribution of violent qualities solely to the fascist alternative which constitutes the
humanistic subject’s enemy. Somehow the humanistic bourgeois subject has a violent
military capacity that Auden does not emphasize. Furthermore, since we are talking about a
real world crisis, in which the enemies are identified explicitÏy as fascist Italy, Germany,
Japan, and potentially a host of lesser states who are tempted by fascism, the collective
human subject that is called on to defeat violently those enemies must also have a real
world political identity or identities. Even if the messianism of”Commentary” is ahistorical
and non-catastrophic and avoids the imagery of militant apocalypticism, even if the
forsterian humanity of its vision cannot be identffied with any national group, it
nevertheless remains true that the ‘us’ who is called upon to defeat its enemies, or perisli,
implicitly relies upon the involvement of the anti-fascist military force of specific nations
and states. It is the violent anti-fascist work of that multinational force that will render
possible the humanistic messianic work ofthe humble, thejust, the faithfiul, and the petty
bourgeois who lie at the heart ofthe messianic vision of “Commentaiy.” The principal
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candidates for such a fascism-defeating role in 193$ were, of course, Britain and its empire.
France and its empire, China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and a coalition of lesser
states scattered across the globe. In actuai political and historical tenus, we have, then, a
situation where a portion of humanity is being called upon in “Commentary” to defeat
another portion ofhumanity. The poem’s notion ofhumanity as a single collective subject
is incompatible with this situation ofacute international human division. We might think of
the splitting of the human ‘you’ into an antagonistic “you both” in tenus of a civil war
between two human factions. What then of the notion of the anti-fascist bourgeois
humanistic subject of the middle section of “Commentary” as a universal human subject?
That universal subject which, though manifesting no signs of omnipotence, tends to the
exalted condition of a complete self-contained subject communing with itself in a quasi-
divine manner, founders on the rocks of international politics and human division, and
stands revealed as a iimited and compromised set of national subjects.
The universality of this subj ect might, however, still be saivageable if one accepts
that those potential allies are being called upon to defeat their fascist enemies in the name of
humanity. When ‘our’ supporters insist ‘we’ must defeat ‘our’ enemies, the idea of ‘us’
representing any sort ofuniversal humanity can be saved only if it is accepted that one
portion of humanity will defeat another portion of humanity on behaif of ail humanity. This
is the position of Joris Ivens in the documentary he shot with Robert Capa and John
Fernhout during the same period that Auden and Isherwood were travelling in China. The
prologue oflvens’ The 400 Million presents a dichotomy similar to that ofAuden’s poem8:
8lsherwood reports that he and Auden met Ivens with Femhout and Capa in Hankow (515).
femhout and Capa, they had met on the voyage from Europe to Hong Kong. Ivens and Fernhout,
like Auden in “Spain 1937,” had documented the Spanish Civil War in the film The Spanish Earth
the previous year, and were now with Capa set to “make a film about the life ofa chuld soldier, a
‘11111e red devil’, in one ofthe mobile units ofthe Eighth Route Army” (515). Like Auden and
Isherwood, the cinematic trio neyer reached the Communist northwest, making instead The 400
-D
On one side—CH1NA——which has enriched the world for 4000 years
with its treasures and wisdom. On the other side —the Rulers of
JAPAN—determined to capture ah China and with the aid of her immense
resources seize the world for their empire. China was forced into this war to
protect her national independence, freedom and precious culture.
On one side, the Japanese military machine, ally ofthe Rome-Berlin
Axis, brutal and merciless. On the other side, just as in Europe, victims of
fascist attack.
Europe and Asia have become the western and eastern front ofthe
same assault on democracy.
Leaving aside problems such as China’s questionable status as a potential democracy and
Britain and other countries’ own imperial appetites, we easily see that Ivens’ dichotomy
corresponds to the fascist / humanist opposition of “Commentary,” and that for Ivens
fighting against the fascists amounts to fighting for humanity. The idea that the anti-fascist
alliance fought for humanity as a whole is indeed an understanding of the victory over
fascism in the Second World War that has become an ideological reflex of the West,
particularly the Anglo-American world, in its seif-representation internationahly. The
vahidity of such a democratic bourgeois world view is debatable, but more pertinent to our
reading of”Commentary” are the implications ofAuden’s representation ofthe geopolitical
situation and ofthe potential international coalition which must do the messianic work of
defeating the fascist enemy.
Two geographical features of that representation have noteworthy ideological
dimensions. One is the absence in “Commentary” of references to Russia or the Soviet
Union. Clearly any anti-fascist coalition would need to be international, and Auden in the
course of the poem alludes to several potential members of such an alliance, including
france, the USA, China, and Britain. “Commentary” surveys a wide-ranging
Million. This documentary on KIVIT-led resistance provides instructive points ofeomparison to
Isherwood’s “Travel-Diaiy” and Auden’s “In Time of War,” even if The 400 Million remains anti
fascist boosterism and avoids the uncertain irony of Isherwood’s travelogue and the ideological
complexity of “Commentary.”
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geography—East Asia, India, Arabian West Asia, Africa, Europe, the USA —and aside
from the British dominions and Latin America, the Soviet Union is the only major geo
political entity which the poem overlooks. Given the leading role the Soviet Union would
perform in the defeat of Nazi Germany, its omission from the messianic coalition of
“Commentaiy” is a colossal distortion ofthe historical situation. As the Second World War
was to show “the only effective anti-fascist alliance was one that included the USSR”
(Hobsbawn 151).
In the context of 193$, the absence of the Soviet Union in a poem with the
historical, political, and ideological motivations of “Commentary” is stunning. Searching
for signs that that absence is flot absolute, one might take the “dust of ah the dead that
reddens every sunset” as wistfully suggesting that the true human tradition is Red. Or, when
the “voice of Man” mingles with “the distant mutter of guerilla fighting,” one might wonder
whether that guerilla warfare was a tactic ofthe Chinese communists and by association
proceed to link this muttering to the Soviet Union, the one actually existing Cornmunist
state. By 193$, however, the KIVIT too had adopted guerilla tactics, which in any case
Auden probably associated more with Lawrence-inspired Arab nationalism than with I 930s
Communism. finally, one seizes on the reference to Engels’ formula on the relationship of
freedom and necessity which in 193$ would have been recognized as a bit ofCommunist
and Soviet orthodoxy. Auden’s sexualization ofthe formula and his insertion ofit into a list
of modestly beneficent human activities hardly suggests the certitudes of scientific
socialism and the political infallibility of Stalin. Stili the Engels quote along with the
allusions to Kuo Hsi and Blake in the descriptions ofthe ‘good guys’ could be said to evoke
the Chinese, British, and Communist alliance which was so crucial to the anti-fascist cause.
None ofthese faint suggestions in “Commentary” cornes close, however, to compensating
for the deafening silence on the topic ofthe Soviet Union’s place in the poem’s global
messianic vision.
How to expiain that, a year before the shock of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the
joint Nazi-Soviet invasion ofPoland did so much damage to Soviet credibiiity, Auden has
already written off the Soviet Union? How to explain that a poem that articulates a
messianic hope that is idealized and comprehensively geo-political has no place for the
revolutionary state which embodied the messianic hopes of so many? In the overali context
ofJourney, the absence ofthe Soviet Union in “Commentary” recalis the scepticai treatment
and generai absence ofCommunism in Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary.” Coming imrnediately
after the sonnet sequence, the absence ofthe Soviet Union makes the speculative
transformation of Marxian thought in the first part of “In Time of War” seem less a
synthesis ofMarxian and Christian themes than a reabsorption ofMarxism into a proto
Christian and implicitly bourgeois world view which Auden can then proceed to commit
himselfto in “Commentary.”
In the context of “Commentaiy” itself, there is a more important reason for the
omission ofthe Soviet Union. For, despite that fact that the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany were thought of as antagonists, it is obvious that as political cultures they belong
on the same side ofthe poem’s organizing opposition between violent authoritarianism and
forsterian humanism. The “Stalinist tyranny in the USSR was at that time, by general
consent, at its worst” (Hobsbawm 143), and what could be more apropos of 1 930s Soviet
politics than Auden’s survey ofthe fascist cause, beginning with “the violent / Who long to
cairn our guilt with rnurder,” through its intimidating reasoning “The $tate is real, the
Individual is wicked,” “Terror like afrost shah haït theflood ofthinking,” “Leave Truth to
the police and us,” to its “great” leaders and the trahsion des clercs. Yet, though, Stalin’s
9
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Soviet Union cÏearly resembles the fascist states, the international alliance upon which the
hurnanistic Forsterian pole depends just as clearly will have to rely on the Soviet Union to
defeat its fascist enemies. The coalition is therefore compromised, flot only by its part in
the oppression ofthe proletarian and the colonized, but by its reliance on the Soviet version
ofthe fascistic hatefulness to which it is opposed. Rather than the poem’s opposition of
bourgeois humanism to totalitarianism, the actual historical situation opposes compromised
bourgeois humanist imperialist states along with one big imperialist totalitarian state to a
group of fascist states with rival imperialist ambitions. Whatever Auden’s ideological
positions regarding Communism, Marxism, or Christianity in Journey, it would have been
hard for him to include references to the Soviet Union in “Commentary” while maintaining
the poem’s opposition of gentle Forsterian humanism and violent totalitarianism. In the
face of anti-fascist Realpolitik, the multifaceted messianism of “Commentary” and of
Auden’s poetry between 1932 and 1946 is unable to represent, whether out ofbad faith,
political discretion, or ideological aporia, the Marxist and Soviet versions ofthe messianic.
This in spite ofthe fact that the period ofAuden’s messianic attentiveness coincides with an
“exceptional and comparatively short-lived” period of sympathy for the Soviet Union over
Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1947 (Hobsbawm 143).
The other noteworthy feature ofAuden’s representation ofthe international political
situation is also geo-ideological. When Bryant cails the geography of “Commentary” a
“colonial geography” (168), she identifies an important feature of Auden’s own “estranging
[....J vision of the earth” (Prose 1: 681). Even with the continental lacunae noted above,
however, the geography ofthe poem is less ‘colonial’ than it ‘global,’ as befits a poem
composed afier its almost perpetually travelling author’s trip around the world. The
sweeping geography of “Commentary” is another example of Auden’ s uncanny capacity to
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anticipate ideological and historical dcvelopments, for the poem prefigures the imminent
“lesson in world geography” (24 Hobsbawm) occasioned by the Second World War. A
specifically colonial geography unfolds only towards the very end, immediately afler the
completion of the poem’s presentation ofthe messianism ofhumanity’s “faithftil sworn
supporters” and oftheir case for enlightened violent opposition to fascism.
Night falis on China; the great arc of travelling shadow
Moves over land and ocean, altering life:
Thibet already silent, the packed Indias cooling,
Inert in the paralysis of caste. And though in Africa
The vegetation still grows fiercely like the young,
And in the cities that receive the sianting radiations
The lucky are at work, and most stiil know they suffer,
The dark will touch them soon. (687)
Given the westward movement from Chinese night through late Tibetan and early Indian
evenings to African afiernoon, the lucky should probably be thought of as at work in
European cities. Fuller notes the “peroratoiy character” ofthese lines, and how “the pace
and variety ofthe busy world is finely conveyed as a backdrop” for the poem’s third speech
with its own messianic conclusion. It is significant that the poem’s specifically colonial
geography unfolds between the poem’s two positive messianic moments. The perspectives
ofForsterian humanism with its fragile hopefulness and humble determination issue onto a
geographical interlude that links the great colonial prizes of China, India, and Africa to a
fortunate industrious metropolitan Europe whose colonial and class guilt the poem lias
conscientiously traced. By contrast, earlier the tempting fascist offer of Germany, Italy, and
Japan issues onto a geographical survey that, while mentioning China and the fertile
Crescent, pays more attention to England, America Hungary, france, and the rival parodic
kingdoms of Fahrenheit and Celsius. The debate over whether to opt for fascism belongs
principally to the Euro-American sphere. In contrast, the viability ofthe two
messianisms—first, the social messianïsm of human creativity and decency; second, the
enabling messianic inwardness of personal transformation—that the poem counterposes to
fascism depends, flot just on the political choices of Euro-America, but on the involvement
ofthe countries surveyed in the immense colonial geography linking the poem’s two
messianic possibilities.
The poem’s anti-fascist hope, then, depends upon the potential ofcountries within
both the Euro-American and the colonial spheres to choose forsterian humanism and
individual renovation over fascist totalitarianism. The poem’s hope resides in the idea of an
alliance of the anti-fascist West and the colonial world, a situation which invests the
colonized world with an implicit, if uncertain, messianic potential. One can see in this
aspect ofJourney, flot just an acknowledgement ofa new reliance ofBritain on her
colonies, but also a prefiguration of the period of decolonization in which the messianic
potential ofhumanity is projected onto the formerly colonized world of China, India, and
Africa. Interestingly, afier surveying the colonial geography of the world, Auden does not
proceed to speak in the name of colonized people, but rather effects the inward tum of the
concluding messianic speech. A similar concluding tum away from the social and political
realities of the colonial world to a psychological epiphany occurs in i. In both cases, it is
as if Auden and Isherwood recognize the emancipatory and messianic role that the colonial
world will be obliged to assume, but unable to imagine the actual fulfilment ofthis role,
they must tum or retreat into an inward, spiritual or psychological, reaim.
To a significant extent, post-colonial ideological developments would soon cast
much ofthe former colonial world in this messianic role, as was notably the case with
Mao’s China, Gandhian India, and post-colonial Africa, in spite ofthe long complication of
the Cold War and the rivalry between the USA and NATO and the Soviet Union and the
jEastem Bloc. For Auden in “Commentary,” that Cold War could only be a dangerous
distraction from the messianic future because no messianic hope is invested in the Soviet
Union. The redemptive perspective of “Commentary” does flot embrace the Soviet Union,
but neither does it adopt what Esty calis a “redemptive discourse ofAnglocentrism” whose
emergence in writers like forster, Eliot, and Wooif is more or iess contemporaiy with
“Commentary.” for Esty, messianic Anglocentrism among writers who were effectively
Auden’s eiders is principally a “cultural response to fascist aggression,” but is aiso a
response to “imperial contraction” (10). Indeed, “most English intellectuais could see by
the 1 940s,” that antifascist war and imperial contraction “were not just coincident in time
but structurally intenelated” (10). The distinction ofAuden in “Commentary” is to have
perceived and envisioned this interrelation aiready in 193$. “Commentary” presents neither
Soviet redemptionism ofthe lefi-leaning “Auden generation” nor Anglocentric
redemptionism of the Bloomsburian patriotism of Journey’ s dedicatee Forster. In that hour
of crisis, Auden and Isherwood tum away from both the Soviet Union and Engiand, and
turn not only to the U.S.A., but also to late colonial Africa, Tndia, and China. In 193$ the
antifascist redemptionism of “Commentaiy,” inherent in no single nation, depends on the
perilously uncertain messianic choices of both Europeans and Americans, colonizers and
colonized. forcing his vision out of a messianic human future into the crucible of actual
history, Auden moves towards the problems of the actual future.
“O Reconcile”
Just as the “Now in the clutch ofcrisis and the bloody hour / You must defeatyour
enemy orperish” stanza grants access to the implicit politics ofthe messianic vision of
“Cornmentaiy,” an earlier stanza is no less crucial to the representation ofthe Chinese and
global political situations. “Here,” reads that earlier stanza, “danger works a civil
34$
reconciliation, / Interior hatreds are resolved upon this foreign foe, / Ami will-power to
resist is growing like a prosperous city” (681). Mendelson objects (and, ironically, in so
doing employs a verb that has a numinous significance in Auden) that in this stanza the
poem “praises” the “civil reconciliation” even as it “tactfully ignores the enrnity between
Communists and Nationalists that made reconciliation necessary, and also made it limited
and pragmatic” (Early 358). 0f the same stanza he writes that Auden “tried to reconcile
private intentions and public acts,” but the images and logic of the stanza “did flot
cooperate”:
There is nothing “prosperous” about armed resistance, and the unes uneasily
recali Auden’s less encouraging argument {. . .] that only hatred can unify
individuals into purposive groups. $hould the foreign foe be defeated, the
resolved hatreds would once again unravel in civil strife; which is precisely
what happened. Even in the same poem, a few stanzas later, Auden severely
qualifies his vision of prosperous unity by observing that thousands are
prepared to give up freedom as the price ofunity, ready to heed the dictators
who urge them to “Leave Truth to the police and us.” Millions more, he adds,
are almost ready to follow. (199)
But this distorts the civil reconciliation Auden envisions.
It is flot armed resistance which is “growing like a prosperous city;” it is “will
power.” This optimistically growing will-power is related to the poem’s uncertain closing
plea to rally “the lost and trembling forces ofthe will.” In the earlier stanza, the will to
resist is linked not just to arrned conflict, but to the ideal of an eventually “prosperous city,”
an ideal city which stands in contrast to the devastation, poverty, and injustice ofthe
Shanghai of this poem and to cities like Hong Kong, Macao, Hankou, and Nanking written
about elsewhere in Joumey. The “prosperous city” is not an incoherent image for “armed
resistance;” it is the ideal shining beyond the terms ofthe “limited and pragmatic”
reconciliation ofwartime China.
Reconciliation is a particularly important theme in Auden—”0 reconcile” exclaims
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the prayerfiil conclusion of 1934’s “Sweet is it’, say the doomed,” a key formai and
thematic precursor to “Commentary” (“Five Early Poems” 52). The idea ofreconciliation
guides Auden’s theorizing on almost ail social, historicai, aesthetic, or psychologicai
matters. for Deane, Auden’s persistent attempts in the 1930s to reconcile Christianity and
Marxism, such as that of the sonnets of Time of War,” derives from
the conventional belief in a god whose function is to unite alpha and omega,
gather ail diversity into himself. [.. .] Auden’s favored metaphor ofthe Just
City is derived from that biblicai tradition [ofthe City of God as an ordered
equilibrium of parts], however idiosyncraticaily his social and psychological
preoccupations ofthe thirties moved him to conceive it [.. . his] inclination
was to reach always toward a larger synthesis which perhaps only afier 1939
he was prepared once again to eau God. If”God” is the way in which we
designate a principle oftotality, inclusion, and balance, then it is probably
correct to say that lis belief in God was intractable and consistent, the
occasion ofhis ‘conversion’ merely an acquiescence in traditional ways of
expressing that belief. (40)
Auden was like “others ofhis class and upbringing—whether the decade saw them develop
into Christians or into Communists—devoted to ‘discourses oftotality’ (41).
Reconciliation is a methodical and ethical ideal which invoives Auden in Hegelian
techniques of philosophicai synthesis, religious conceptions of God as totality, and the
Christian vision of the City of God. Even with ail those conceptual, doctrinal, and idealistic
overtones ringing in the word “reconciliation,” however, the “civil reconciliation” tercet
does not ignore the enmity ofthe KMT and the CCP. Their enmity is directly evoked in the
phrase “interior hatreds.” This hateful interiority is at once the interiority ofthe private
individual’s psyche (“Behind each sociable home-loving eye,” XIV reminds us, “The
private massacres are taking place; / Ail Women, Jews, the Rich, the Human Race” (673)),
and the interiority of the domestic political situation of China. Private and public hatreds
“are resolved” by the Japanese danger. Such psychological and social reflexes are easily
recognized, as is their potential for faciiitating poiitical control and for creating an iliusory
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unity. Far from ignoring it, Auden’s tercet clarifies the precariousness ofthis provisional
resolution of interior strife, even as the ideal of the “prosperous city” points to the positive
hope that a “civil reconciliation” should raise. The idealism ofthe stanza’s “civil
reconciliation” encompasses much more than the precarious “United Front” of Chinese
Nationalist and Cornmunists. The severe qualification ofAuden’s vision of”prosperous
unity” that Mendelson says occurs afier only a “few stanzas,” actually occurs forty-nine
stanzas later. That particular qualification concerns the fact that not only elsewhere in the
world is “every family and eveiy heart [. . .] tempted” by Fascism, but even in China “where
the rice-grain nourishes these patient households” already “Thousands believe, and millions
are halfway to a conviction” that the “brazen” fascist offer is acceptable (684-5). Much
more must be said about how the forty-eight intervening stanzas expand the hopeful “civil
reconciliation” Auden observed in China.
The first thing to note is that the civil reconciliation was real and praiseworthy.
Auden and Isherwood’s visit coincided with one ofthe most hopeflul moments in China’s
long history, flot just because of the importance of Chinese resistance to Japan in uniting the
modem Chinese nation, but because ofpossibilities that opened up in Chinese politics and
culture in 193$ when Wuhan became China’s wartime capital. If it is important to recali the
occupation of Shanghai when we read Journey and “Commentary,” it is even more
important to remember wartime Wuhan. Isherwood and Auden saw more of Wuhan than
any other place in China. They visited the city twice, from March 7 to March 17 and then
again from April 14 to April 29, which is significantly longer than their whoring sojoum in
Shanghai from May 25 until June 12. Wuhan is the centre ofAuden and Isherwood’s
Chinese experience. Wuhan was the apocalyptic “city at the end of the world” where they
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agreed they would rather be “than anywhere else on earth” (51 2).
Auden and Isherwood were right. “Hankow in 193$ was surely one of the most
exciting cities in the world [. . . j the atmosphere wasn’t just martial; it was giddy”
(friliman 3). To visit Wuhan in 1938 was to be granted a glimpse ofa possible non
totalitarian future for China and the world. “The winter of ‘37-’38 worked a miracle in
China [.. .j the most complete unity of spirit and motive that China had ever known existed
there for a few months” (White 57). What happened in Wuhan in 193$ lias no parallel in
Chinese history. Wuhan had been at the center of Chinese politics in 1911 and 1927 when
the city represented “the Chinese republican revolution in its most liberal anti-imperialistic
form” (MacKinnon “$earch” 161), but 1938 in Wuhan was unique. “for a rare moment in
Chinese history, a unity forged through toleration of political diversity became more
important than the politics ofcontrol” (167-8). More “than in any Chinese capital before or
since, there was public debate, and political experimentation, the flowering of a free press,
and an unleashing of enormous creative energies in the arts” (16$). Rather than
“brutalization, the effect ofthe war and mass mobilization was liberalization of politics,
culture, and social distinctions” (MacKinnon “Tragedy” 939). The city “assumed some of
the seedily anarchic qualities of Shanghai, becoming an ideological capital of China, a place
through which men and women of all conceivable political persuasions passed en route to
somewhere else” (Winchester 207). In such a city, foreign press and diplomats “were flot
seen as a threat to Chinese sovereignty, but as witnesses to the resistance to Japan”
(MacKinnon “Search” 172-3). “Wuhan came to symbolize notjust the nation, but the active
imagination of a new political future for China” (Esherick 15). Indeed, because of its role
9Wuhan is the cunent name for the tri-city compiex ofWuchang, Hanyang, and Hankou. from the
fail ofNankïng in December 1937 to the fali of Wuhan in October 1938, Hankou or Hankow was
effectively the provisional Chinese capital. Different sources refer to Wuhan or to Hankou. for our
ptirposes, the two toponyms are interchangeable.
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in Chinese and world history, pluralist anti-imperialist Wuhan should be “the most revered
city in ail China” (Winchester 196). “The tragedy was that the Hankou experiment vas so
shortlived” (MacKinnon “Tragedy” 939). Shortlived, and quickly forgotten under the
accumulating debris of the decimating Battie of Wuhan, the Japanese capture of the city in
October 193$, the Second World War, and the renewed civil war between Communists and
Nationalists in 1945, but principally under the catastrophes and propaganda of six disastrous
decades of a Chinese Communist regime which cannot tolerate the idea that Nationalist
China could have produced anything like Wuhan in 1938.
Wuhan in 193$ was forgotten in the West as well as in China. Western historians
have devoted “scant attention” to social and cultural dimensions ofthe Sino-Japanese War
(931); and flot “until the 19$Os was the memoiy ofwartime Hankou in 1938 revived on
either Taiwan or the PRC [sic] [....] Remembrance today is focused on the unity and
heroics ofthe ten-month Hankou defense. The openness to foreign influences and
toleration of opposing views ofthe period is celebrated” (942). If the “story ofHankou”
needs to be remembered “less as a tragedy than a promise of alternative directions in
twentieth-century Chinese history” (942), we also need to remember the reality of Wuhan in
1938 if we are to perceive that the “civil reconciliation” of”Commentary” and the poem’s
intermittent flashes of idealism are not utopian, but characteristically Audenesque in their
reticence. They must be compared to the giddy hope that had broken out in Wuhan with the
establishment ofpolitical tolerance, and the optimism that reigned afier military successes
inearly 193$
misled the defenders of Wuhan into the romantic notion that the city could be
saved: that high morale and massive numbers could offset the overwhelming
fire power and discipline ofthe Japanese onslaught [. . . .] at least until mid
summer, 193$, Chinese commanders, including Chiang Kaishek, were
convinced that they could tie up the Japanese outside of Wuhan and produce a
stalemate in the war. Thïs was the consensus among the large foreign press
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corps reporting to the world on the defense of Wuhan at the time. (932-3)
As Auden and Isherwood were working on Journey back in Europe, any such optimism
would fade with the progress ofthe Japanese campaign to take Wuhan—just as any
optimism engendered by the peaceful resolution ofthe concurrent Munich Crisis remained
unconvincing. But when Wuhan feu that October, it is entirely appropriate that what hopes
Auden had had for a possible Chinese victory or for the survival of the Wuhan Spirit,
though drasticaily tempered, would flot necessariiy have been killed, since the political and
military reconciliation in China stiil held uneasily, and would hoid until 1945.
In any case, Auden’s elaboration ofthe hopeful idea ofthe “civil reconciliation” of
193$ in the stanzas that foilow is actually part of a non-partisan, aimost apoliticai
representation ofthe Chinese political situation. For in spite ofhow succinctly he evokes
both the precariousness and the hopefulness of the reconciliation of the CCP and the KMT,
and in spite of the reticence with which he acknowledges the idealism such a politicai
reconciliation can occasion, Auden immediateiy turns away from a representation ofthis
reconciliation as an accomplishment ofpolitical parties to the evocation ofa much broader,
non-partisan, societai and human reconciliation. The reconciliation that Auden presents in
the nine tercets following his evocation of a provisionai hope-engendering, war-time
reconciliation is indeed a “civil” one. It is reconciliation through a recognition, on the part
of different humans presented as parts of a social whole, of mutual interest and common
implication in a situation. What the danger ofthe foreign foe and the undiscriminating
anger ofthe “invader” do is force everyone—the rich and poor, the old and young, “the
amorous [. . .j the handy and the thoughtfùl, / Those to whom feeling is a science, those to
whom study / 0f ail that can be added and compared is a consuming love,” and others,
including the two European authors ofJourney—to realize that they ail “In ail their living
-7-
J)
are profoundly implicated” in the “material contest” that lias Ïed to destruction of Shanghai.
It is just such a broad social and international reconciliation of interested parties which was
necessary to the historic anti-fascist coalition—that “astonishing unity of opposites”
(Hobsbawm 162)—and which is implicit in Auden’s messianism in “Commentary.”
“Commentary” represents everyone’s realization ofone’s implication in a crisis as
the starting point of a response to the crisis. Auden then does something less obvious,
which in its detachment is hard to follow. Tuming attention from the particularities of
Japanese aggression and the existential and geopolitical crises of 193$, he converts the
example of the destruction of $hanghai into a “local variant” of “the generai war / Between
the dead and the unborn, the Real and the Pretended, / Which [. . .1 / In essence is eternal.”
The eternity ofthis stniggle allows Auden to retum to the poem’s initial long view ofthe
biological and historical emergence ofhumankind. This long view reveals that “to the Non
Human / [. . .j I Our colours, creeds and sexes are identical.” The long view also reveals that
for ail humanity there is at least one unifying issue. This universal human issue is that the
objective of the human campaign in humanity’s eternal, general war in the present between
the dead and the unborn, the Real and the Pretended, is “Stili unachieved.” This common
unachieved end is “Jen” which, echoing Isherwood’s notions ofthe Truly Weak and the
Truly $trong, Auden calis “the Truly Human” (682). The achievement ofJen, or Ren in
today’s alphabetization, is the objective ofthe eternal human campaign. Thus, it is Jen, and
flot any provisional outwardly-directed hatred, which “Commentary” presents as the
unifying objective ofthe historical development ofmankind and ofthe actual civil
reconciliation of 193$. It is the acknowledgement ofthe failure to achieve Yen that prompts
the review of the three epochs of Great Disappointment, the Classical failure of the Roman
Empire, the Catholic failure ofthe Middle Ages, and the current failure ofthe scientific,
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industrial, and colonial developments that began with the Renaissance. It is subsequent to
this review that Auden presents the two contrasting contemporary messianic options open to
mankind in the face of the Third Great Disappointment and of the continuing failure to
achieve Jen. One of those options is the brazen offer of the fascists, by which everyone is
tempted, even those who have realized their implication in the fascist crisis. The other is
the humanistic option sketched by humanity’ s “faithful sworn supporters.” In the argument
of”Commentary” and from the poem’s most detached philosophical and ethical point of
view, Jen is the pivotai term. Just as the politically, socially, theologically, and
conceptually rich theme of”civil reconciliation” points to the unachieved objective ofJen.
so the ensuing choice between opposing messianic options is ultimately a choice between
means of achieving Jen.
Along with the undeconstructible redemptive principle of Justice and a problematic
modem version ofthe ancient wish for political unity (namely, the wish for a united world),
Jen is one ofthree principles underlying the messianic vision of”Commentary.” The poem
may state that ail creeds are the same to the non-human, but the differences between creeds
are not therefore unimportant to humans, and Auden’s creed in “Commentary” rests on the
idea that the truly human end of man is Jen. Jen is that fundamental virtue whose position
within Confucian thought and ethics is analogous to the position of Agape within
Christianity. The two virtues are in many ways comparable, with one crucial difference
being that the Christian Agape involves a relationship to the love of a transcendent God
while Confucian Jen remains a human phenomenon and virtue. The Western recognition of
the role ofJen in Chinese thought and civilization has tended to reinforce the Christian idea
ofa universal and primordial Agape-like virtue as the chiefunifying hurnan virtue. In that
respect, Auden’s identification ofthe achievement of such a virtue as the end for which
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humanity must strive is compatible with the Christian conceptual and rhetorical structures
of”Commentary.” The purely human nature of Jen. however, allows Auden to remain
strictly speaking a philosophical humanist even as his thinking inhabits the teleological and
eschatological structures of his poem and points towards his reemergent Christianity
Because “Commentary” presents it as the universal end of being human, Jen, despite
the foreignness ofthe word, should be something recognizable even for Westerner readers;
in so far as Westemers have taken Jen as analogous to Agape, this has been the case. This is
the opposite of the situations observed in the “Travel-Diary” where the Chinese context
could flot be contained by Western categories and where Isherwood emphasizes the mutual
incomprehensibihty of different cultures and languages. In “Commentary,” the truly hurnan
is rendered in Chinese, and Jen, the finally essential Chinese content of Journey, tums out to
be analogous to the essential content that Christian thinking has aiways conveyed.
“Commentary” may display more estranging non-Western and Chinese historical and
cultural information than Auden’s other poems in Journey, but the messianism of
“Commentary” depends on a civil, international reconciliation of opposites that leads to the
discovery that the East and West meet in the human ideal ofJen. However, though its
similarities to Agape render Jen familiar, the foreignness ofthe word Jen does have an
immediate and lasting disorienting effect. If Jen is like Agape, it is an Agape made
strange. By designating this virtue with the untranslated Jen (the only Chinese word other
than proper nouns that Auden employs in Journey and probably anywhere in his corpus) and
by qualifying Jen as the “Trnly Human,” Auden presents his readers with an estranging
view ofthe essence ofbeing humait This is consistent with Christie’s description ofthe
“Occidentalizing” strategies ofAuden’s sonnets from China whereby Auden’s inscription of
the signifier ‘China’ allows him to relativize “Western impositions of value” (152). In so far
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as in “Commentary,” Jen represents the messianic value par excellence, its strange Chinese
othemess unsetties and recasts, even as it tends also to reaffirm, a familiar and
quintessential Christian virtue like Agape. Jen’s status as something to be achieved in the
future is paradoxical, since the key virtue ofthat unforeseeable future turns out to be the
foundational, supposedly innate human virtue ofa most ancient moral system. Jen’s defenal
to the future and its strange Chinese othemess are consistent with Derrida’ s conception of
the messianic as “thinking ofthe other and ofthe event to corne” (59).
The rnessianic ideal ofthe event to corne, that is, the idea ofthe eventual
achievement of “Jen, the Truly Human,” retums us to the long view of “the general war I
Between the dead and the unborn, the Real and the Pretended.” As much as the Sino
Japanese war itself, this general war is the destination of Journey, but the ambiguities of the
phrase “Between the dead and the unborn, The Real and the Pretended” tend to nuiÏify the
messianic vision with which “Commentaiy” concludes the book. Because the phrase
conveys a sense, not of ideally reconcilable dualities, but of a conflict between etemally
opposed and incompatible terms, it threatens everything that is at stake, theologicalÏy,
politically, socially, and ideoiogically, in the theme ofreconciliation in the poem. As well,
the syntax ofthe phrase confuses key features ofthe poem’s vision, since the unelaborated
parallelism of “the dead and the unbom, the Real and the Pretended” suggests that those
two sets of opposed terms are isomorphic in a comprehensible way. Syntactic parallelisrn
aside, however, any analogy between those pairs is flot easily grasped, since the pairs are
flot really analogous at ail.
Whereas the contest of the dead and the unbom seems to refers to the idea of a
reiationship between past and future, the war between the Real and the Pretended seems to
refer to the poem’s organizing contest of fascism and humanism. Thus, “the Reai” refers to
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the idealistic materialist vision of the creativity, humility, and goodness of “our faithful
swom supporters” and “the Pretended” refers to the slogan-ridden intellectuaiiy deceitful
promises ofthe fascist pretenders and their clerks. The conflict between fascism and
humanism in the poem involves, not a corfflict ofpast and future, but a choice between two
options in the present. Stiil, it can make sense to think of the past, which afier ail has
actuaily happened, as being more real than a future which may neyer corne to pass. It is not
obvious that the humanist and the fascist options should be identified respectiveiy with the
past or the future, yet the speech of the fascists with its insistent use of the future tense is
utteriy centred on the future. In contrast, in the humanists’ speech the past tense dominates,
with the future tense occurring only once and negatively—”Man [ .] neyer will be
perfect”—and with the future the speech envisions being evoked obliquely through
reference to the medievai European past. In spite ofthis apparent confirmation that the
oppositions of “the Real and the Pretended,” the past and the future, and “the dead and the
unbom” are looseÏy associated with one another, it is impossible to reduce these three
oppositions to a strict isomorphism.
Instead, the “between” that govems the two oppositions has several distinct senses.
The sense of “between” in the war between the Real and the Pretended would seem
primarily to involve either the idea of two contrasting options or the idea of the reciprocal
conflictual action oftwo agents. However, the sense of”between” in ‘the war between the
dead and the unhom’ refers flot to the possibiiity of choosing the dead or the unborn or to
their impossible reciprocal action, but to the temporal interval where that war occurs.
“[Between] the Real and the Pretended” refers us to whom “the “general war” involves and
what is being fought over. but “Between the dead and the unbom” refers us primarily to the
fact that this etemal war occurs in the present. This notion ofthe present as occuning
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between the past ofthe dead and the future ofthe unborn is as fundamental to the rhetoric
ofthe poem as is the idea ofa choice between the Realness ofhumanity and the Pretension
of fascism. A similar conception of a present of struggie and choice occuring in-between the
past and the future structures rather more magnificently the rhetoric of “Spain 1937.”
In “Commentary,” however, this commonsensical conception ofthe present and this
rhetoric of struggie are more problematic than they first appear. The problem is neither the
idea of a “general war” in the present, afier the past and before the future, nor the idea of the
present as a time of struggie. The problem is that the dead cannot be confined to the past.
For if the present is an on-going general war, with the Sino-Japanese as one local theatre,
then surely the present has its dead too, and those dead will spiil over into the future, and
the future becomes flot only the time ofthe arrivai ofthe unborn, but also a time ofthe
coming of more dead. The future is even now an abode of the dead; it already participates
in the pastness that the poem identifies with death. What is more, the dead are essential to
the present. The dead speak to “us” to give us strength and to teli us how to live. These
are not the rotting corpses evoked by “the unruentionable odour of death” in “September 1,
1939.” These are a sanitized dead whose dust preffifies the sunset. for Mendelson, the
eloquent dead mask flaws in the poem’s argument: “Auden displays a propagandist’s tact in
putting this noble sentiment [regarding the Unity of the Just and the Free] in the mouths of
the dead. Unlike the embarrassingly warlïke living, the dead have nothing to argue about,
and can recommend unity without being expected to do anything about it themselves. ‘O
happy the free cities ofthe dead,’ Auden wrote in a lyric. There ‘no one need take any
trouble any more” (Early 199). Characteristically, Auden immediately notes, in his
December 193$ sonnet on Housman, the temptation of seeking sentimental solace in “the
uncritical relations ofthe dead.” Already in 1936’s “Autunm Song,” he wams against the
n
3
daims ofthe past on the present: “Close behind us on our track, I Dead in hundreds cry
Alack, / Arms raised stiffly to reprove I In false attitudes of love” (Collected 139). In
“Commentary,” though, the dead offer a version ofwhat Auden later cails “the
companionship of our good dead” (694). More than that, in “Commentary” death becomes
something antiseptic and anodyne so that Auden can write, implausibly, that “our faithful
sworn supporters / [. . .J neyer noticed death or old age coming on” (Prose 1: 685-6)).
Unconvincing as are the representations of the nature of death and the figure of the dead in
“Commentary,” they are moments of a larger theme in the poem and in Joumey.
The theme ofdeath is already present in the une “Season inherits legally from
season” with which “Commentary” opens and afier which the poem regularly evokes the
idea of man’s death, whether as individual or species, whether through biological
catastrophe or the genocidal misanthropy of Genghis Khan. The poem’s final allusion to
death, in which “the moon look{s] down / On battlefields and dead men Iying, heaped like
treasure” (687), is the least abstract and most vivid such allusion, and the most directly
relevant to the war which is the book’s occasion. The idea ofdeath, though, has been there
not only from the beginning of “Commentary,” but from the beginning of Joumey when,
with a gesture to Isherwood’s idea ofthe Test, Auden writes “To-morrow goes to bed /
Planning the test for men from Europe” and “no one guesses I Who will be most ashamed,
who richer, and who dead” (497). Despite the eventual lapse into sentimentality in Auden’s
sanitized vision ofthe humanistic dead in “Commentary,” the terseness ofthis initial
reference is characteristic of Auden’ s treatment of the theme of death in Joumey. Perhaps
because he is aiways dealing with someone else’s death, whether it be the death ofthe
unknown “Guilty” or the Unknown Soldier in the Picture Commentary, or the deaths of
abstract or anonymous figures in IX, XII, XIV, XVIII, the notion of death in Auden’s parts
jof Joumey remains somewhat unreal. In ail those sonnets, death hardly seems like death at
ail, and is presented more like the occasion of a new begiiming, something that opens
hopefui perspectives for the future.
Yet, one cannot finaÏly interpret the thematic and poetic peculiarities of
“Commentary” or Journey without measuring them against the grotesqueness of death, the
unmastered fear of death, the experience of death as tragedy, and the stark idea of death as
an end. In this respect, Isherwood’s “Travel-Diary” is an essential contrast to Auden’s
poems. There the possibility of one’s personal death is the important theme. Thus, Auden
and Isherwood’s ceremonious departure for the Chinese interior “was slightiy sinister—like
watching your own military funeral from the gun-carriage itself’ (510). Thus, “Auden
made me iaugh by saying thoughtfiuly: ‘I suppose if we were over there we’d be dead.’ [..
we iooked down on War as a bird might [.. . .] This is how war must seem to the neutral,
unjudging bird—merely the Bad Earth, the tiny, dead patch in the immense flowering field
of luxuriant China.” (547). Laughter characterizes Isherwood’s ironic treatment of the
theme ofdeath. Death in Auden’s poems is impersonal and unreal, sentimentalized and
sanitized, but in Isherwood it is personai and absurd. At a comic supper, they “were told by
way of introduction [that a certain Major Yang] ‘does flot fear death” (598), and on another
occasion told soiemnly that it was the “Chinese Duty” ofT.C. Liu to accornpany “Auden
and myseif, if necessary, into thejaws ofdeath” (613). Elsewhere, Isherwood muses
satirically about “the ethics of pocketing a pair ofjade animais to save them from the fate
worse than death” (617); and Charleton assures the young authors in early May that “he
would die soon” (590); “[d]rink to the poor old man next Cbristmas Eve. I shail be dead by
then. God Bless.” (592). Perhaps Charleton was already dead, even as Isherwood
composed the “Joumey’s End” episode, just as Charleton’s quaint Shangri-la had
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disappeared forever, while the killing fields around Kiukiang and in the Ku-ling huis fihled
with corpses during the Japanese advance on Wuhan through the autumn of 1938.
Isherwood’s comic treatment of death reaches a crisis as they drive through
mountains:
Auden tried to distract our thoughts from the alarming Present by starting a
conversation about eighteenth-century poetry. It was no good: we could
remember nothing but verses on sudden death [.. . .j At every corner we shut
our eyes, but the chauffeur only laughed darkly as befitted one of the Lords of
Death [. . .] the D.H. Lawrence Todesfahrt continued [....] ‘Oh, my Gard!’
exclaimed Mr. Liu, and was abruptly and violently car-sick. (602)
Once again, the whole is in the part, for Journey us just such a Todesfahrt, and this absurd
mise en abyme encapsulates several ofthe book’s features: incomprehensible laughter,
nausea and the nauseous viscousness of vomit; the question ofreligious faith; the crisis of
the present and the evasiveness ofAuden’s poetry regarding the reality ofdeath; the
aversion to looking directly at death and war.
Eventually, though, Isherwood does have to look, at the old woman whose brains
soak “obscenely through a hile towel” and at the “terribly mutilated and very dirty” corpses
that are the aftermath ofthe last air-raid he describes (587). The brutal plainness ofthe
description of this last air-raid contrasts to his first sketch of the fireworks of an air-raid:
It was a solemn, apprehensive moment, as if before an eclipse ofthe sun [...]
The brilliant moon lit up the Yangtze and the whole darkened city [. .. .] The
concussions made you catch your breath; the watchers around us on the roof
exclaimed softly, breathlessly: ‘Look! look! there!’ It was as tremendous as
Beethoven, but wrong—a cosmic offence, an insuit to the whole of Nature and
the entire earth. Something inside me was flapping about hike a fish.” (526)
$olemn, tremendous, cosmic, the aesthetics ofthis air-raid approach the sublime. As with
any experience ofthe sublime, Isherwood at first feels inadequate to it, and we see that his
later plain unpoetic presentation ofthe victims’ bodily suffering represents the only proper
moral understanding ofthe ‘air-raid sublime.’ Some notion ofthe sublime, ofthe
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experience of things beyond the moral, aesthetic, and intellectual capacities of Auden and
Isherwood which they must struggie to comprehend, is essential to understanding Joumey.
The “Picture Commentary” obliquely approaches the moral and aesthetic problems of the
sublime with its ironic photo of a divinely laughing Buddha in the temple at Journey’ s ever
elusive front une. The several destinations or discoveries ofthis 1938 joumey—the
unknowable otherness of China, vast global geographies, endless irony, fteedom,
excremental formlessness, war, genocide, God, the messianic, death—tend to sublime
infinitude, transcendence, tremendousness, othemess, uncontainability. Unlike Agnes
Smedley who for the first time “feit at one with the universe” when she was with the Red
Army (581), and unlike Alley who seems sublimely at one with the infinite quantifiability
ofthe world, Isherwood cannot find his way into any such cosmic unity or syrnpathy. The
uncertainty oflsherwood’s tone is linked to whatever was desperately flapping like a fish
inside him in the face ofhis first air-raid, and more broadly, his uneasiness and uncertainty
is an effect ofhis incapacity to adequately respond to realities which surpass him.
Similarly, the uncertainty of tone and aesthetic flaws, and the large ideological
ambitions of”Commentary” are signs ofAuden’s own struggles with the sublime
experiences which are the occasion of Journey. 0f the peroratory passage beginning “Night
falis on China” whose immense colonial geography announces the conclusion of
“Commentary” and also finally of Joumey, Wright notes that the “sublime imagery [. .
shows the broadness ofAuden’s perspective” (99). Only the sublime breadth ofthis
passage canjoin the poem’s two positive messianic episodes, the collective social
messianism articulated by the good dead and the inward individual messianism Auden hears
in the Voice of Man. At the end, Auden does present himself experiencing the cosmic
sympathy which eludes Isherwood, so that Auden’s voice and the Voice ofMan together
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articulate a single sublime messianic vision. The dialogue between the poet and the Voice
ofMan, between individual and humanity, is a circular, feedback system, in which errors
and ironies can be recuperated in a never-ending process of communication. With
characteristic reticence, when Auden and mankind tum to the messianic role ofthe
individual, Auden emphasizes neither the individual’s messianic self-identity nor bis or
mankind’s sublime magnificence, but the uncertainty and inadequacy ofthe frail human
individual within this process. Joumey’s closing note is flot the resonant superhuman
heroic ofthe Truly Weak, but the ironic mock-prophetic ofthe Truly Strong.
The “lost and trembling” individual ofthe poem’s concluding messianic moment
seems to require, but has no transcendent God to whom he or she may tum. The poem bas
made clear that there is nothing to tum to but “our faithfiil sworn supporters” among the
dead. This reliance on the dead reveals a dimension ofthe messianic in “Commentary”
fundamental to messianism in so far as the messianic involves an essential relationship to
the dead and to death. Benjamin writes ofthe “secret agreement between past generations
and the present one” in which the “past carnes with it a temporal index by which it is
referred to redemption” (Illuminations 256) and in which the living must feel that “even the
deadwill not be safe from the enemy if he wins” (257). Gottlieb too, in her discussion of
the messianic in Auden and Arendt, raises the issue ofthe dead, when she recalis that in
“primitive Christianity, the eschatological mode of life does not properly consist in living
with some premonition that the end ofthe world is near but, rather, in living one’s life from
the extreme perspective ofits end: only by drawing the sense of life’s end into one’s life can
one live on” (154-5). In “Commentaiy,” only after a sense of death has been drawn into
life and afier the dead have “mingle[d], fluent with our living” (Prose 1: 686) can the poem
tum our attention to the messianic potential of the individual.
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The messianic hope articulated at the end ofJoumey in “Commentary” exists
therefore under the sign of death. This is flot mere morbidity. It is an unavoidable condition
of any living hope articulated between “the inevitable increase of the chances of death”
(English 212) in “Spain 1937” and “the unmentionable odour ofdeath” in September 1939.
The knowledge ofdeath, to a far greater degree than is recognized, marks Auden’s oeuvre
ftom beginning to end. How could it be otherwise for a writer whose childhood world was
that of the Great War, who came to maturity during 1 ‘entre-deux-guerres’ trauma-haunted
“long bout of war neurosis” (Miiler 42), and whose world in 193$ was siipping into the
abyss of another world war that his work had prophecized for years? Auden is the greatest
English-language poet of the mass murdering, humanity-wrecking, civilizational crisis of
the 193 Os and 1 940s. Death, the war dead, and the dead in generai cast a grim pail across
his work. In his 1932 essay “Writing,” which Mendelson calls “a manifesto ofhis private
ideology” (Early 1932), Auden argues that writing involves a desperate effort to unite past,
present, and future, and that the awareness of death provides the original impetus for the act
ofwriting (Prose: 1 16). This awareness of death would continue to pervade Auden’s
writing and thinking. Reflecting on his vocation in “Prologue at $ixty,” he presents the
purposiveness ofhis writing life in direct relation to his eventual death: “Giver-of-Life,
translate for me / tiil I accomplish my corpse at last” (Coilected $32). from the late 1930s
tbrough the mid-1940s, however, Auden’s death-consciousness is especially acute. This is
the period in which Auden became a compulsive writer of epitaphs and elegies—”Epitaph
for a Tyrant,” “The Unknown Citizen,” “At the Grave ofHenry James,” “In Memoiy of
Ernst Toiler,” “In Memory ofW.B.Yeats,” “In Memory of Sigmund Freud,” “Lament for a
Law-Giver.” This is the mortal epoch ofAnxiety’s obsessive thought “Many have perished;
more will” (Collected 456-8). This is the time when Freud, whose death in September 1939
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occasions an elegiac evocation ofthe deaths to corne, joins those whorn “Comrnentary”
presents as “our faithful swom supporters”:
When there are so many we shah have to mourn,
when grief has been rnade so public, and exposed
to the critique of a whole epoch
The frailty of our conscience and anguish,
of whom shah we speak? For every day they die
among us, those who were doing us some good,
Who knew it was neyer enough but
Hoped to improve a littie by living. (273)
“In Memory of Sigmund Freud” reworks the messianic vision ofthe previous fall’s
“Commentary.” The elegy’s modest hopefiilness rejoins the weak, contingent, messianic
human hope which closes Joumey. Weak and uncertain as it is, that hope is the ultimate
discovery ofAuden and Isherwood’s Joumey. Just as XXVII is crucial in Auden’s
development ofthe theme offreedom, SO “Commentary” is crucial in Auden’s articulation
ofthe nature ofhope, in his exploration ofthe messianic theme between 1932 and 1946,
and in his discovery of the messianic vision that sustains his work from 1939 through 1973.
“Cornmentary,” hike Joumey as a whole, stands rnid-way between Auden and Isherwood’s
early evocations ofthe trauma and dead ofthe Great War, and their later responses to the
devastation and death of the Second World War. A gauche, unloved poem it may be, but as
with Joumey as a whole, “Commentaiy” records a revealing moment in Auden’s
confrontation ofthe trauma of war and death in the twentieth century. “Commentary”
records too Auden’s discovery ofa weak hope whose example might stili inspire, but can
certainly stili instmct—if only because the untirnely, precarious, late modemist, late
colonial hope that Auden finds in China and in a world on the threshold of global war and
genocide offers such a timely and grave historical warning regarding the fraihity and
deceptiveness of our own hopes in the face of the dangers of our world.
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In his Scorched Earth (1941), Edgar Snow provides an account of “The Birth of
Indusco” and ofthe anonymous “littie book” which Isherwood plagiarizes at the end of
“Travel-Diary.” Reading Snow’s account, I noticed sirnilarities ofphrasing and argument in
his and Jsherwood’s texts, and conciuded that both authors must have been working from a
common original document. After much searching, I found the document in a Columbia
University archive. In itseiflsherwood’s plagiarism ofAlley and the Snows’ littie book is
straightforward. The 64-page bookiet entitled Chinese Industrial Cooperatives is, however.
quite elaborate. It consists oftwo parts and an appendix. The first part, which Isherwood
prirnarily draws on, consists of statistics, citations from Chinese newspapers, quotations
from prominent Chinese figures, and photographs of the destruction wrought by the
Japanese on Shanghai’s industriai areas. The second part presents a “Plan for a New
Economic Offensive” through the establishment of Chinese industrial cooperatives.
Isherwood plagiarizes this document as follows.
Where Isherwood has “The Japanese have destroyed seventy per cent of China’s
industry” (630), the anonymous bookiet has “Japan immobilized nearly 70% of modem
industiy in China” (2). Where Isherwood has “Already she [Japan] has published schernes
for the building of new canais, railways, cotton and silk mills” (632), anonymous has “from
Tokyo, Peiping and Tientsin corne announcements of plans which...would completely
remake China. Projects range ail the way from building canais, new cotton and siik miils,
iron and coal mines, railways...” (19). Where lsherwood has “0f the 130,000 operatives
now employed in Shanghai ninety per cent are working for the Japanese” (632), anonymous
has “Today only about 130,000 are back at work—90% ofthem in Japanese factories!” (9).
Where Isherwood has “Even if the Chinese in the Settiement retain some measure of
poiitical freedom their operations can only strengthen the Shanghai area as an economic
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base for the Japanese war-machine” (632), anonymous has “Even if Chinese in the
Settiement should retain some measure of political freedom, their operations in Shanghai
can, in effect, only serve to strengthen the Shanghai area as an economic base for Japanese
imperialism” (4). Where Isherwood bas “And yet, during the first four months of 1938,
over 400 new Chinese factories were established in the western district oftbe Settiement,
whule less than fifty industrialists movcd their plants elsewhere” (632-3), anonymous has
“during the firstfour rnonths of 1938 over 400 new Chinesefactories were established in
the western district ofthe International Settiernent atone. During the saine period less than
50 Shanghai industriatists moved their plants to the interior ofChina” (4) [original italicsj.
Wliere Isherwood lias
The Chinese Government, as Alley points out, bas had great success in
developing the agricultural co-operative movement—consumers, marketing,
and credit co-operatives. It lias thereby strengthened the rural purchasing
power. In addition to this the local market lias been automatically protected as
a resuit of the blockade enforced by war conditions on the import of foreign
goods (633),
aiionymous has
the Govemment bas made very marked progress in organizing and supporting
the agricultural cooperative movement—consumers, marketing. and credit
cooperatives. It has thereby strengthened the rural purchasing power, and
improved a market which was anyway given extraordinaiy “protection” as a
result of the automatic blockade enforced by the war. (4)
Where Isherwood lias “The enormously reduced Chinese industrial production is quite
unable to meet this increased demand. Wliat is now urgently needed is the reorganization of
industry on tlie same basis as the successflilly reorganized agriculture. China requires
30,000 industrial co-operatives” (633), anonymous lias “an industrial production
enormously reduced and incapable of meeting the demands”, “agricultural cooperatives
bave succeeded”, and “It is urgently necessary, therefore, to adopt emergency measures”
(5). whule the figure of 30,000 industrial cooperatives comes from page six of the pamphlet.
nWhere Isherwood has
The planners ofthe industrial co-operative movement propose the
establishment oftbree “zones of economic defence”. First, the big static
units—the heavy industries, equipped with elaborate machinery and
employing many workers. These will be engaged chiefly in making
munitions. Because oftheir size they cannot easily be moyeU, so they should
be located far out ofreach ofthe enemy, in the extreme western provinces.
Secondly, the medium-sized units, situated between the front and the rear.
These should be semi-mobile, and equipped with machine-tools. Thirdly, the
‘guerilla’ units. These co-operatives should use only light, easily portable
tools. Their fiinction would be to provide articles of immediate necessity to
the military forces” (633),
anonymous lias
Industrial Cooperatives can be ofthree types:
(1) largest units, utilizing heavier machines, each employing many workers,
located in the west, southwest, and northwest, performing primarily
complementary functions in the Govemment’s big industries program; (2)
smaller units, located between the front and the rear, with machine tools which
when necessary can become (3) the smallest units, operating in the front areas.
The third or ‘guerilla type’ ofcooperative should use only light easily portable
tools, and such units would have two special functions: (a) to provide articles
ofimmediate necessity to the military forces. (8)
Where Isherwood has “providing manufactured articles necessary for the farming
population. They would thus prevent areas adjacent to the Japanese garrisons from
becoming economically colonized by Japanese goods” (633), anonymous bas “providing
manufacmred articles necessary for the farming population, and preventing areas adjacent to
the Japanese garrison zones from becoming economically colonized by Japanese goods”
(8). Where Isherwood has “Industrial co-operatives would also solve the reftigee problem.
They could absorb thousands ofhomeless and workless peasants, and divert the millions of
dollars now being spent on refugee camps in the occupied areas, where destitute Chinese
are merely kept alive until such time as the Japanese wish to exploit their labour power”
(633), anonymous has “Industrial Cooperatives can absorb large numbers ofrefugees and
divert millions of dollars now being spent to maintain refugee camps in the occupied areas
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where destitute Chinese are merely kept alive until such time as the Japanese wish to
exploit their labor power” (8). And finally, where Isherwood lias “The organizers ofthe
movement plan to appeal to the League of Nations, and to the labour parties of friendly
foreign States, for technical and financial aid” (634), anonymous has “The Industrial
Cooperative Moment [sic] especially seeks financial and technical help from the League of
Nations, from Cooperative Societies ofthe League’s member States, from Labour
organizations, relief associations, and various bodies friendly to China” (45-6).
